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Editorial

Although hundreds of articles are published on police administration in the criminal justice informational market every year, it is relatively rare to find a selection that blends theory, research, and best practices that law enforcement executives can use for urgent practical applications. Most police administration books favor a specific approach, which inevitably narrows the perspective and limits the positive impact of new concepts and ideas. This issue of the *Law Enforcement Executive Forum* contains articles that are interdisciplinary in content. The coverage of the effective managerial tools is comprehensive and analytical.

The research field of police administration and management reflects the unique demands and gaps faced by law enforcement organizations, but most of the concerns concentrate on personnel, resources, and dynamic implications of new departmental variables, ranging from politics to technology. As demonstrated in this selection of articles, however, the most consistent police administration issue today is change itself. Law enforcement administrators need to recognize, identify, and manage change effectively and be prepared for many unknowns.

Modern police agencies are less conservative and less focused on keeping traditional policies, models, and protocols. They are more open to innovations, which enables them to be more effective in their mission and improve ties with the community.

The articles that have been selected for this issue should meet the special needs of those interested not only in current research of law enforcement administration, but also in practical policing applications of academic findings. These articles will aid law enforcement executives in enhancing the environment of the agency and responding to various departmental challenges and expectations.

O God, give us serenity to accept what cannot be changed, courage to change what should be changed, and wisdom to distinguish the one from the other.

– Prayer (1934), Reinhold Niebuhr

Vladimir A. Sergevnin, PhD
Editor
Law Enforcement Executive Forum

Police Consolidation Revisited: Implications for American Law Enforcement

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Introduction

A salient feature of the system of justice in the United States is its decentralized organizational structure. To many historians, local autonomy and local control of governmental services is the proud living legacy of the founding fathers who were weary of a strong centralized government. Local governments handle a multitude of tasks, including water and sewer, waste disposal, schools, building regulations, zoning issues, fire protection, and so on. To add police protection to the long list of local government responsibilities is hardly surprising. What may be surprising, however, at least in retrospect from our present-day vantage point, is the call for consolidation of local police departments. The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice (1967) singled out American law enforcement as being in need of fundamental reorganization. The report of the President's Commission called for improved law enforcement through the consolidation of local police departments.

So, where are we today? Forty years after the President's Commission heralded the advantages of police consolidation, has American law enforcement followed the sage advice of the Commission? With few exceptions, police consolidation has not been embraced by police administrators, community leaders, or even residents. To put it mildly, the President's Commission got it wrong, or at least vastly underestimated the organizational inertia impeding the fundamental reorganization of local police departments.

This article revisits the issue of police consolidation with several goals in mind. First, it reviews the issue of police consolidation and places it in a present-day context. The article also identifies and discusses the driving forces behind the consolidation issue 40 years ago and why those forces are much less potent today. Finally, the article highlights alternatives to police consolidation that are of equal or superior advantage. As we will see, because of dramatic changes in the way American law enforcement conducts its business, small departments are no longer organizationally disadvantaged.

The Case for Police Consolidation

The release of the President's Commission report in 1967 was a turning point in American criminal justice. President Lyndon Johnson commissioned a panel of leading experts in 1965 to critically evaluate the justice system and make recommendations. Released at the height of the urban disturbances of the 1960s, the impressive ten-volume report was widely read, discussed, and debated,

particularly the lead volume, *The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society*. Many of the recommendations found their way into various provisions of the Omnibus Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1968. The report called for fundamental improvements in the criminal justice system through better coordination of police, courts, and correctional agencies. The President's Commission resulted in massive expenditures of federal money at the local and state levels through grants, community action programs, and improved officer training and education (Wilson & McLaren, 1977).

Volume Two of the President's Commission, *Task Force Report: The Police*, highlighted the need for significant improvement in law enforcement. The report charged American policing on the whole as lacking consistent standards and goals. It also criticized policing as ineffective, wasteful, and incapable of meeting the complex needs of contemporary society. Of particular concern was the highly fragmented nature of American law enforcement. As the report stated, "A fundamental problem confronting law enforcement today is that of fragmented crime repression efforts resulting from the large number of uncoordinated local governments and law enforcement agencies" (1967, p. 68). The abundance of small, overlapping, and disjointed local agencies did not fit the professional model envisioned by the reformers. The commission flagged Detroit as an example of illogical duplication of services—85 separate law enforcement agencies within the metropolitan area of Detroit with nearly half of the agencies employing 20 or fewer officers. That was 85 separate and distinct everything—headquarters, organizational structures, budgets, policy and procedure manuals, maintenance staff, property rooms, holding cells, and so on. Clearly, there must be a more efficient organizational model to save money and at the same time improve police effectiveness.

The President's Commission recommended that, where practical, small adjacent agencies consolidate into a larger agency, thus increasing organizational resources while minimizing unnecessary duplication of services. In the words of the President's Commission (1967b), "each metropolitan area and each county should take action directed towards the pooling, or consolidation, of services through the particular techniques that will provide the most satisfactory law enforcement service and protection at the lowest cost" (p. 308). Adding urgency to the need for police consolidation was similar criticism from other prestigious groups (Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, 1971; Committee for Economic Development, 1972; National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, 1973). Police consolidation was an idea for which the time had come.

At least three factors helped push the consolidation issue. First, evidence then and now makes a strong case that American law enforcement is highly fragmented and decentralized. The President's Commission cited 40,000 as the number of separate law enforcement agencies in the United States. We know now that this number was inflated. By today's more refined and accurate method of counting, the number is estimated at nearly 18,000—still a very large number. The average department has around 10 sworn officers, and over 1,000 agencies have just one full-time officer (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2002). Clearly, policing American society remains the primary responsibility of small local departments. Indeed, most Americans receive their fundamental law enforcement services from small local departments. This basic fact has not changed over the years.

A second factor pushing the consolidation issue was the dramatic rise in crime in the 1960s, coupled with the urban unease and growing racial divide. These factors converged to prompt a close inspection of the police. Police-community relations were bad and appeared to be growing worse. Advisory boards and study commissions sprung up everywhere to carefully investigate the root causes of our many social ills. With regard to the police, the highly fragmented nature of services seemed to call out for remedy. Moreover, the overall lack of consistent standards that applied uniformly to all departments hindered the development of the professional police model. Police consolidation was viewed as a necessary step toward the creation of uniform standards across enforcement jurisdictions.

A third factor pushing the police consolidation issue was the reform movement, referred to by Nice (1983) as the classic administrative perspective (p. 111). According to this view, excessive fragmentation hinders efficient government operations because of a number of problems: the existence of servicing units too small to achieve economies of scale, inadvertent overlap resulting in unnecessary duplication of services, and lack of professional personnel and minimal accountability to the public. The “good government” reformers were thinking broadly about the merger of entire units of government, with police protection as just one of many essential government services to be consolidated. The consolidation advocates were mostly middle and upper-middle class residents who sought to rationalize and improve government services (Lyons, 1977). Chambers of Commerce, Leagues of Women Voters, civic-minded organizations, and local newspaper editors often favored governmental reorganization. Generally speaking, however, the average citizen was less impressed with the reform agenda and frequently opposed efforts to alter local governmental arrangements.

Police consolidation is often broached as part of a larger governmental merger, such as the formal merger of city and county governments. Local police departments merge in the process. Examples of such governmental mergers can be found in Charlotte/Mecklenburg County (North Carolina), Miami/Dade County (Florida), and Nashville/Davidson County (Tennessee). The legal, political, and economic hurdles to merging entire units of local governments are huge, which in large part accounts for how seldom city-county consolidation has occurred. Residents in the Wilmington/New Hanover County (North Carolina) area have twice rejected city-county consolidation at the polls. Interestingly, the biggest stumbling block to merging the City of Wilmington with the County of New Hanover was reconciling the consolidation of two police agencies—the Wilmington Police Department and the New Hanover County Sheriff’s Department. Ferrell and Foster (1982) document a similar dilemma in the city-county consolidation effort in Lafayette Parish (Louisiana) in 1980. The final consolidation plan stipulated that the only government agencies *not to be merged* were the Lafayette Police Department and the Lafayette Parish Sheriff’s Department; the police department and the sheriff’s department would continue to operate independently. The Lafayette Parish consolidation plan was never implemented—voters defeated the proposal at the polls.

The Waning Interest in Police Consolidation

Existing research evidence does not make a convincing case of the benefits of consolidation (LaGrange, 1987). Claims that larger police departments utilize

resources more efficiently are seldom supported. Indeed, one of the most powerful arguments favoring the consolidation of essential governmental services is the potential cost reduction due to economies of scale. Hirsch (1968) argues that while the consolidation of some services like water and sewer or governmental administration *may* reduce certain costs to taxpayers, the consolidation of police services seldom saves money. On the other hand, Krimmel (1997) found that the Northern York County (Pennsylvania), which was consolidated in 1974, performed police services for less money than a comparison group of eight police departments in nearby rural areas. At best, then, research on the financial benefits of police consolidation has received mixed results.

Another stated benefit of consolidation also has not been supported: that larger police departments provide *better* services than smaller departments. Larger police departments may be able to provide a wider array of police services because they have more resources and available personnel, but the *quality* of police services is not necessarily better than that provided by small departments. The study by Ostrom, Parks, and Whitaker (1978) strongly rebukes the “larger is better” argument. These researchers carefully examined over 1,800 police departments in 80 regions of the United States to determine whether the quality of police services was associated with department size. They found no such link. Instead, the researchers discovered “a much richer network of interrelationships among agencies, and a much higher use of auxiliary services in general than we would have expected” (p. 3). Other studies have found that the quality of police services in small to medium-sized departments is at least equal to, *and sometimes better than*, the quality of services in many large departments (Parks, 1976; Rogers & Lipsey, 1974).

As an indication of the “waning” interest in the topic of police consolidation, a cursory check of the contents of 11 police textbooks published over the past 10 years (from 1997-2007) revealed that little attention was given to police consolidation. To be sure, the “data” used here admittedly was only a convenience sample of police and society and law enforcement texts held in my office or in the offices of colleagues up and down the hallway. Though not exhaustive, the sample was arguably representative of the types of texts available. Special-topics books on community policing, police-community relations, or police deviance were omitted. Also omitted were edited books of readings. The content analysis of relatively recent textbooks in the field only identified three out of the available 11 books that had a discussion (i.e., a clear section devoted to the topic) of police consolidation (LaGrange, 1998; Roberg, Novak, & Cordner, 2005; Walker & Katz, 2005). Although all of the eight remaining texts made mention of the fragmented and decentralized nature of American policing (Bartollas & Hahn, 1999; Conser, Russell, Paynich, & Gingerich, 2005; Gaines & Kappeler, 2005; Grant & Terry, 2005; Langworthy & Travis, 2003; Manning, 1997; McCamey, Scaramella, & Cox, 2003; Peak, 2003), the topic of police consolidation was not explored.

As another check on the waning interest in the topic, a search of the *Criminal Justice Abstracts* using the key terms “law enforcement consolidation” and “police consolidation” revealed few entries. In the past 10-year span (1997-2007), only four published works appeared: one was a doctoral dissertation (Fisk, 2004), and the other three were journal articles (Finney, 1999; Krimmel, 1997; Shernock, 2004). Clearly then, the lingering residual interest in police consolidation is nothing like

the flurry of research activity and debate of the 1970s in the wake of the 1967 President's Commission.

Alternatives to Police Consolidation

The President's Commission was a product of its time. Inspired by the turbulent 1960s—rising crime, elevated fear of crime, campus unrest, the civil rights movement, urban unease, and the growing anti-Vietnam War sentiment—there was a sense of urgency in the air. The task force that focused on the police was looking for deep systemic roots to the problem. One factor that stood out to the Commission was the highly fragmented and decentralized system of American law enforcement. The Commission viewed this method of delivering police services as fundamentally flawed. Criminals don't respect jurisdictional boundaries of police departments. When several dozen law enforcement agencies exist within a single metropolitan area, as is often the case, coordinating effective enforcement efforts in an efficient manner is impeded. When one further considers that crime also frequently cuts across local, state, and federal jurisdictions, the obstacles to optimal crime fighting increase substantially. Thus, it is not surprising that the Commission recommended the consolidation of smaller police departments.

The President's Commission could not have anticipated subsequent findings that questioned the wisdom of police consolidation. As noted previously, studies conducted in the 1970s demonstrate that larger police departments are not necessarily better at delivering quality police services than smaller departments. In addition, cost-benefit analyses of police services fail to lend clear and convincing support for police consolidation.

Independent of consolidation research, there are other reasons that were not apparent to the President's Commission that greatly diminish the need for police consolidation today (e.g., technological advances, multijurisdictional task forces, and community policing).

Technological Advances

The astounding pace of technological developments over the past 40 years has changed the face of American law enforcement. Technological advances affect virtually every aspect of modern-day policing, and emerging technologies have the potential to fundamentally revolutionize the future of police work (Foster, 2005). At the forefront of the technological development, and what makes the consolidation recommendation of the President's Commission much less meaningful today, is enhanced information exchange. Small departments in remote areas have the same access to critical real-time information as the largest departments; therefore, small departments are no longer at such a severe disadvantage. Moreover, the shared cost of big-ticket items among several departments provides the benefits of the latest technology at minimal expense.

This is not to say that American policing is fully "wired." Police departments adopt equipment and technological upgrades at differing rates (Foster, 2005). In addition, many departments use their own information systems and databases, which are not always compatible with other agencies. This clearly impedes information exchange. Nonetheless, information availability and exchange is far

better today than the situation observed by the President's Commission years ago. Further technological advances in the exchange of information are inevitable.

Multijurisdictional Task Forces

Cooperative arrangements among two or more local police agencies offer advantages similar to consolidation. Many areas have established multijurisdictional task forces, such as a City-County Vice and Narcotics Unit or a Gang Task Force, which pool the talent and resources of neighboring police agencies toward a common crime problem. Shernock (2004) describes the proliferation of multijurisdictional task forces in the 1990s as a form of "de facto" police consolidation. Indirectly, cooperative interagency arrangements meet the spirit of the President's Commission recommendation to consolidate agencies in order to improve police efficiency and effectiveness.

Joint operations among local, state, and federal agencies are an innovative extension of the multijurisdictional task force. Project Exile was one such joint venture. Started in Richmond, Virginia, in 1997, Project Exile was a no-nonsense federal crackdown on gun law violators. The program engaged the cooperation and support of local and state law enforcement agencies. Project Exile prosecuted gun law violators in U.S. District Court because stiffer prison sentences were available under existing federal law. The operation included numerous federal agencies (the U.S. Attorney's Office; the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms; U.S. Marshals Service; FBI) plus the local District Attorney, the Richmond Police Department, and the Virginia State Police. Although highly controversial, Project Exile-type operations were initiated in a number of urban centers in the late 1990s.

Community Policing

The President's Commission could not have envisioned the emergence of community policing. It began with the fear reduction studies in Flint (Michigan), Newark (New Jersey), Houston (Texas), Newport News (Virginia), and elsewhere in the 1970s and early 1980s. Researchers discovered a connection between old-fashioned foot patrol and feelings of public safety. Wilson and Kelling (1982) added the necessary conceptual foundation to community policing with their "broken windows" theory. Support for community policing grew exponentially during the 1990s, and so did the financial incentives in the form of grants to local departments through the 1994 Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act.

At its core, community policing fosters a genuine working relationship between the police and the public. The optimal organizational structure under community policing is more flat, decentralized, and democratic than the traditional command structure. Thus, under community policing, large organizations with abundant resources and personnel are not inherently superior to small departments that are less-well endowed. What is most critical is whether a department is serving the community effectively by being closely connected to citizens and their multiple needs. Small departments can—and *are*—every bit as good as large departments in this regard. Police consolidation would not necessarily improve American policing; better police work and more professional police officers improve American policing.

Currently, community policing has lost some of its momentum, not to mention substantial financial support from the federal government in this post-9/11 period. Nonetheless, many of the central tenants of community policing continue to be implemented by police departments nationwide.

Conclusion

Widespread police consolidation as envisioned by the 1967 President's Crime Commission never materialized. Too many obstacles stand in the way of police consolidation. And as it turned out, because of developments in American law enforcement, large-scale consolidation has not been necessary. Research fails to demonstrate that bigger police departments serve citizens any better than medium-sized or small departments. Moreover, developments in American law enforcement since the President's Commission (e.g., technological advances, the abundance of multijurisdictional task forces, and community policing) significantly diminish the problems associated with our highly fragmented system of policing.

Police consolidation is organizationally painful. It creates *political problems* for local governments (e.g., deciding what agency will be the primary law enforcement agency, figuring taxes, making sure all residents benefit equally) and *logistical problems* (e.g., purchasing new uniforms, repainting squad cars, merging personnel, and refiguring rank and seniority). Areas that have tried consolidation have frequently experienced morale problems, cost over-runs, troublesome transition periods, and citizen disillusionment. Short of total consolidation of entire departments, the partial consolidation of key services offers many of the same advantages of consolidation without the immense organizational turmoil.

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Problem-Solving Innovations in a Traditional Police Department with Changes in Police Administration

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“Community policing is the order of the day.”

– David Thacher

Community policing, with its focus on problem-solving, is one of the major innovative reforms in policing. These community policing strategies are designed for, “delivery of police services through a customer-focused approach, using partnerships to maximize community resources in a problem-solving format to prevent crime, reduce the fear of crime, apprehend those involved in criminal activity, and . . . improve a community’s quality of life” (Ford, Weissbein, & Plamondon, 2003, p. 160).

Many large and small police departments have implemented a range of community policing models with varying degrees of success.

While determining the impact on crime and violence and the improvement of police-community relations of a new policing strategy are important, there are other factors and issues critical to understanding this phenomenon. We direct our attention to one municipal police department, which, over the span of multiple police chief administrations, attempted to implement innovative, problem-solving strategies. We examine the impact of incorporating community policing and problem-solving strategies into a traditional police department and report the continuity of the strategy over the span of multiple police chiefs whose administrative styles vary. The obstacles faced by the Wilmington Police Department (WPD), at the time of undergoing significant changes, are outlined as well as how this experience may inform future efforts of police departments in implementing new strategies.

Using a case study model to explore the impact of employing innovative strategies, we review the literature on community policing, provide a detailed recent history of the WPD, and assess its successes at putting into practice innovative administrative enforcement strategies. Finally, based upon our experience as researcher partners working with the WPD on a gun violence reduction grant, we offer recommendations for the implementation of innovative enforcement strategies in a traditional municipal department.

Literature Review

There are several models of community policing, but the central theme is to “build meaningful partnerships for improving public safety” and police departments are called on to “collaborate with practically everyone” (Thacher, 2001, p. 765).

The intellectual genesis for community policing is James Q. Wilson and George Kelling's (1982) work on the "broken windows theory" and Herman Goldstein's (1990) concept of "problem-solving." These conceptual frameworks encourage the police to address crime prevention from the perspective of the community, view minor crimes and incivilities as overt symptoms of community problems, and work collaboratively with the community to address them. In Wilson and Kelling's (1982) study, it was found that if the police and community residents do not fix the area's "broken windows," then more serious and dangerous behavior will increase. Goldstein (1990) argues that the police should work with the community to identify the underlying problems that contribute to the aberrant behavior. In brief, community policing is "proactive" while the traditional policing approach is "reactive." After years in a culture of "reactive" and traditional policing, it may be difficult for a department to signal a change in its style of policing and easily transition to a more "proactive" approach.

The effectiveness of community policing is somewhat uncertain based on extant literature. Reviews of the effects of community policing include Smith's (1986) study of community effects on enforcement levels, Skogan and Hartnett's (1997) study of community policing in Chicago, and Eck and Spelman's (1987) study of problem-orientated policing. Skolnick and Caplovitz (2001) criticized new police tactics found in the renewed focus on "quality-of-life crimes" from Wilson and Kelling's broken windows theory. They claim that several other factors strongly contributed to the decline in crime and that the broken windows approach should not get the credit. Key to the success of community policing is the community's perceptions of these police initiatives and how completely the police department, from the chief to the street officer, accept and incorporate these community policing values and goals in their enforcement efforts (Adams, Roe, & Arcury, 2002; Moore, 1992; PERF, 2004; Thacher, 2001). Reviewing 228 departments that have embraced community policing, a 1996 survey conducted by the Police Executive Research Forum found that many remained professional-bureaucratic and authoritarian with little support for fundamental changes in their organizational structure (Silverman, 1999).

Next, we will summarize the characteristics of crime in Wilmington, North Carolina, and the history of the management of the WPD, including recent efforts to incorporate innovative strategies. In addition, the implementation of the "pulling levers" strategy first incorporated in Boston is reviewed as the innovations introduced in Wilmington share the vision of Boston's crime suppression initiative. Finally, we compare this strategy to the core concepts of community and problem-solving policing.

Crime in Wilmington

We reviewed the crime rate in Wilmington between 1990 and 2005 with a focus on the 1999 to 2003 period when the "pulling levers" strategy hit the streets of Wilmington. In 1992, the first new chief of police, Chief "W" (the seven chiefs of police referred to in this article are assigned identifiers in place of their names) since the early 1970s implemented the concept of community policing. We provide a comparison of the crime rate in Wilmington from 1990, prior to the introduction of community policing with the rates following the appearance of this new strategy. Our focus is on violent crime rates and homicide rates because these

crimes challenged Chief “W” to begin innovative problem-solving policing in the city of Wilmington.

The data shows that while the violent crime rate for North Carolina from 1990 until 2005 tended to decrease at a steady rate from 628.8 per 100,000 to 478 per 100,000, the violent crime rate for Wilmington fluctuated. First, there was an increase from 1990 (1,201 per 100,000) to 1993 (1,353 per 100,000), and then Wilmington crime saw a general decrease from 1993 to a low in 1995 (974) and an increase to 1,317 per 100,000 in 1998 to a steady decrease to 860 per 100,000 in 2005. Throughout this time period, the violent crime rate in Wilmington continued to be significantly higher, almost twice the state rate. Similarly, the murder rate for North Carolina from 1990 to 2005 decreased from a peak of 12 per 100,000 in 1993 to 6.9 per 100,000 in 2005. By comparison, the homicide rate in Wilmington fluctuated erratically over the time period with a peak of 21.9 per 100,000 in 1992 (up from a 9.3 rate per 100,000 in 1990) to a low of 3.5 in 1994 followed by an increase to 19.7 in 1997 and remained in double digits until 2003 when the rates ranged between 5.6 and 8.9 through 2005. As with the violent crime rates, the Wilmington homicide rates were often twice the state rate during the 1990-2005 comparison period; however, from 1990 to 2005, the homicide rate in Wilmington decreased from 15.9 per 100,000 to 10.8 per 100,000—roughly equal to the 1995 rate (11.9 per 100,000). The rate in Wilmington (10.8) still exceeded the 2000 rate for North Carolina (6.9) (North Carolina Department of Justice, 2005). Property crime rates in Wilmington were less erratic yet were far greater than the statewide rate.

Gun violence rates in Wilmington during the late 1990s (when the violent and homicide rates were at their highest) were concentrated in certain areas of the city. For example, the WPD reported that during a 6-month period in 1999, 66% of violent crimes (aggravated assaults, robberies, and homicides) occurred in public housing or within a one-block radius of public housing. They also claimed that there was a strong link between the violence rate and the local illicit drug market (personal communication).¹

Police reports also revealed that the greatest levels and greatest increases in crime were concentrated in or near the public housing communities of Taylor Homes and Creekwood. Taylor Homes has since been demolished. These are also areas that had some of the greatest illicit drug activity. Moreover, some local justice officials attribute the increase in violence to a “destabilized” drug market brought on by enforcement efforts. Periodic “crackdowns” led to an unsettled local drug market, causing increased competition for sales and conflict over control of the territory. Essentially, during the 1990s, the violent crime rate in Wilmington bucked the downward trend experienced both nationally and statewide. This anomaly in violent crime rates led to the implementation of the “pulling levers” strategy in Wilmington. We will address this strategy, crime rates, and its impact on the WPD organizational structure in a later section. In the next section, we review changes in police administration from the 1970s until 2005.

Wilmington Police Department Administration, 1970-2005

The city of Wilmington is located on North Carolina’s Cape Fear River on the west and the Atlantic Ocean on the east. The city was founded in 1739 and was a prosperous port and shipbuilding center for many years. After losing some major

industry in the 1970s, the city has experienced significant economic and population growth in recent years. Between 1990 and 2003, the population increased from 55,530 to 94,000 or a growth rate of 62% (see <http://census.state.nc.us>). Major employers include health and government institutions. The population is diverse with African Americans making up 20% of the population.

A 2005 estimate of poverty in the city indicates that 16.8% of the population lived below the poverty line (see <http://census.state.nc.us>). The per capita income of city residents in 2005 was \$24,895, which was 13th in the state and higher than the statewide rate (\$22,519). Slightly more than one in three residents (37.5%) are college graduates, and almost 9 out of 10 (86.6%) residents are high school graduates—both figures somewhat higher than the statewide numbers. In addition, about one in five (19.5%) of city residents are African American, down slightly from the 1990 numbers. Also, about one in five residents (21%) are under 18 years of age, about equal to the 1990 figures (22%). In short, Wilmington is a mid-size city with a greater than average African American population (U.S. = 12.3%) and a poverty rate (16.8%) that is greater than the national average (12.6%).

WPD and the Civil Rights Era

Currently, the WPD has about 300 employees, 252 of whom are sworn officers. Nonprobationary officers are covered by the civil service commission. The department is supported by a \$19.1 million budget. According to the WPD website (see www.wilmingtonnc.gov/tabid/153/Default.aspx), the department receives 140,000 calls for service each year.

In the 1970s, demands for civil rights centered on a search for identity and propelled Wilmington into the modern era. Former NAACP leader Benjamin Muhammed, then known as Ben Chavis, a divinity student from Duke University and activist, was asked to come to Wilmington and organize protests for inclusion of black history curriculum in a local high school. Ultimately, bombings and other violence occurred, and nine black men and one white woman were arrested and accused of conspiracy in these incidents. The police were involved in these arrests and prosecutions of what became known as the “Wilmington 10.” The primary criticism for the handling of these incidents fell upon the District Attorney’s office and its handling of their prosecution. For example, one of the witnesses, a young man, was apparently given a bicycle by the DA’s office. All suspects were convicted and sent to prison. A few years later, President Jimmy Carter’s campaign for human rights abroad drew criticism because of the domestic imprisonment of the “Wilmington 10” (see www.lib.unc.edu/ncc/ref/nchistory/feb2005/index.html). Under pressure, then Governor Hunt reduced their sentences and ultimately, they were released. Nonetheless, this event overshadowed relations between whites and blacks and may have contributed to a general suspicion of the criminal justice system in the black community. This atmosphere has contributed to difficult relations between police officers and administrators and the black community over the years.

Leadership and Management Styles of Wilmington’s Police Chiefs

The WPD was headed by Chief “B” from the early 1970s until his retirement in 1991. The management strategy most applicable to the department during

his tenure is James Q. Wilson's law enforcement strategy (1978). Chief "B" was a strong supporter of education and the newly developed criminal justice curriculum at the local university. He favored the bureaucratic professional model of law enforcement and emphasized a more legalistic approach. Following the relatively long tenure of Chief "B," the WPD was managed by a succession of police chiefs and acting chiefs. Between 1991 and 2005, WPD was headed by four "permanent" police chiefs and three acting/interim police chiefs. During this time period, attempts were made to incorporate innovative strategies of policing to replace the more traditional or "legalistic" style of policing. These changes were often met with resistance by rank-and-file police officers and some skepticism within the local community.

Chief "W," the new police chief hired in 1992, was an advocate of "community policing." Under his direction, mobile police stations were placed in various sections of the community, and he pushed for a beat approach to policing in an effort to establish rapport between the officers and the community. He reorganized the police department around the community policing concept, formed a Career Criminal Section that targeted criminals who commit the most crimes, and instituted a uniformed anti-drug squad called the Problem Tactical Team. He divided the city into four districts, each with a mobile office and permanently assigned officers to these Neighborhood Area Base Station trailers. A significant portion of the officers opposed these changes, and stickers with "Community Wellness" and a red slash through the middle began to circulate around town (see www.bluelineradio.com/wadmantimeline.html).

His tenure as police chief, which was marked with controversy, lasted 3 years, from August 1991 to August 1994. Some claims surfaced that he was involved in "Satanic" cults. There was no evidence of his involvement in any of these nefarious activities, but the accusations were used to oppose his approach to policing. Considered to be too soft on crime, several officers and organizations in the department opposed him, including the Police Benevolent Association. He took a number of controversial disciplinary actions, which many, if not most, police officers opposed. His greatest support came from the black community who saw his community policing approach—and his personality—as supportive of their concerns and interests. The Reverend Keith Wiley, president of the local chapter of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, commented that Chief "W" ". . . (built) a coalition between the black community and the police and that was very helpful" ("No Reason," 1994). During Chief "W's" term, violent crime increased until 1993 and then began to decrease while homicide rates were high in 1992, his first year, and decreased to a low in 1994.

Following his forced resignation in 1994, the deputy chief was promoted to chief of police. Chief "S" was a long-time veteran of the police department who moved up through the ranks. A 1970s graduate of the local university, he received widespread support among the rank-and-file cops, the community leaders, and the community. His period can best be characterized as a "laissez faire" period—no new programs/strategies introduced—although he vowed to continue supporting the "community policing" concept. Nonetheless, some of the mini-stations were closed down. After 3 years, Chief "S" left in 1997 to head the local Basic Law Enforcement Training (BLET) program at the local community college. Violent

crime rates had reached a low point in 1993 and continued to increase to a high in 1998, and homicide rates increased in 1997.

His replacement, Chief "C," was hired in April 1997. He had been chief of police in Virginia for several years prior to taking over WPD. His approach to policing can best be summarized by the account found on the department's website at the time:

The Department seeks individuals who will commit themselves to community problem-solving. The goal of the Wilmington Police Department is to establish a healthy community by targeting illegal drug activities, violent street crimes, and other quality-of-life problems in neighborhoods. The Department utilizes a mobile police precinct in delivering police services throughout the city in an effort to make the city of Wilmington a better and safer place to live, play, and work. . . .

The "problem-solving" approach under Chief "C" differs from that of the "community policing" model of Chief "W." Chief "C's" was a proactive approach, which attempted to incorporate "hot spot" and crime mapping analysis and a COMSTAT approach. He also signed onto a federal task force approach, based on the "pulling levers" strategy under the coordination of U.S. Attorney's offices in Raleigh. As the summary above suggests, his tenure focused more on the "problem-solving" aspect of policing. Chief "C" was fired by the city manager after refusing to resign in September 2003, following the controversial firing and reassignment of some police officers in response to a complaint filed by a controversial city council member, whose self-published book contained scathing criticism of the Wilmington police (Fennell, 2003). During his tenure, the violent crime rate and homicide rate began a downward trend through 2005.

This action and the ripple effect in the department and the local community led to the city requesting an evaluation by the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF). They completed their report in April 2004 and included several recommendations concerning the implementation of the community policing model and a more proactive approach. The deputy chief, Chief "T," was appointed interim chief of police in September 2003, and he served in this capacity until February 2004 when he left to take a position as chief of police at a department in the western part of the state. Just prior to his departure in February 2004, a confidential memo he had written was released to the media. This memo provided an extremely candid and critical view of the department and its management staff. He wrote that "I would describe the PD current status as coming apart at the seams . . . (with) special interest groups . . . (in which) personal resentment pervades the supervisory ranks. . . ." Among other actions, he recommends sensitivity training for the department commenting that "our community is a powder keg waiting for the right moment" (Fennell, 2004; also see www.bluelineradio.com/page1.html). After Chief "T" left, another interim police chief, Chief "H," was appointed from within the ranks of the department. Chief "H" served, without pushing for any major departmental changes, until August 2004 when the current police chief, Chief "E," was hired. Violent crime rates and homicide rates in Wilmington have continued their downward trend to the lowest rates in years.

From 1991 to 2005, the WPD had been headed by four "permanent" police chiefs and three interim chiefs for a total of seven chiefs over the 14-year period or an

average tenure of 2 years per chief. Some of these chiefs attempted to implement innovative strategies, all of which fell under the rubric of community policing. They ranged from the mobile police stations and career criminal section of Chief "W" to the "pulling levers" and Safe Neighborhoods model of Chief "C" to the Model Block Project and Maximum Uniform Deployment (MUD) strategies introduced by current Chief "E."

All chiefs made some reference to community policing or problem-solving approaches although the strategies differed. For example, Chief "E" has established Problem-Oriented Policy (POP) teams within the Patrol Operations Division. In addition, the Model Block Project and the MUD programs consist of the more intensive and concentrated deployment of police officers to high crime and troublesome areas of the city. These are essentially proactive crackdown approaches, which appear to be quite dissimilar to the problem-oriented policing described by Goldstein. By contrast, the focus of community policing is "to build meaningful partnerships for improving public safety. . . . (it) exhorts city police departments to forswear their autonomy and collaborate with practically everyone . . ." (Thacher, 2001).

In essence, the WPD, as a consequence of changes in administration and in the community, has evolved, sporadically, from a legalistic model of policing to a community policing model, originally resisted by the rank and file, through the "laissez faire" period and to more recent problem-solving yet crime-fighting-focused approaches implemented by the last two permanent police chiefs. Community policing has moved from the department-wide initiative of the Chief "W" era to a subunit within a division. The innovative strategies implemented since this period have been focused on the proactive and strict enforcement approaches. Several questions remain: How complete was this transition? Did bureaucratic inertia and community reaction limit this transformation? How much of the policing in WPD is the more traditional/legalistic model, and how much is the problem-oriented version of community policing?

Traditional Versus Innovative Law Enforcement Strategies

The inherent tensions that exist between the more traditional, reactive law enforcement strategies and the recent innovative strategies that range from classic community policing to the extant versions of proactive policing are explored next. The problem-oriented policing approach focuses on identifying the causes of the problems and formulating responses to correct them. As such, it is an innovative and nontraditional approach to controlling and preventing crime.

The more traditional, professional approaches, found earlier in the WPD, tended to be reactive in their response to crime. Even the more "proactive" responses have proven to have limited effectiveness (Sherman, 1997; Walker, 2001). For example, crackdowns may only temporarily deter crime, which is offset by decay and displacement (Mazerolle, Ready, Terrill, & Waring, 2000; Sherman, 1990). The "announcement effect" of such efforts soon disappear, and the rate of criminal behavior soon returns to "normal" (Walker, 2001). Recent nontraditional and innovative approaches follow the recommendations of Wilson and Kelling's (1982) broken windows theory and Goldstein's (1990) problem-solving approach, addressing crime prevention from the community perspective. We will next

examine the problem-solving strategy that was implemented during the Chief “C” era and discuss the challenges in successfully incorporating an innovative enforcement model in a department marked by internal conflicts and a minority community that is skeptical of police delivery of needed services.

Operation Ceasefire

Innovative policing strategies have often been embraced when found to be successful elsewhere. Such is the case with Boston’s Operation Ceasefire. There were two main components to Operation Ceasefire: (1) direct and intense law-enforcement response directed toward the worst violent offenders and (2) general deterrent effect on chronic offenders to stop their involvement in violent behavior by providing them with alternatives to the violent lifestyle. The latter strategy came to be known as the “pulling levers” strategy that clearly conveyed that every “lever” legally available would be used to prosecute offenders if they continued to engage in violent behavior (Kennedy, 1997). Violent offenders had failed to be deterred by the traditional method of simply increasing the severity of sanctions, when the certainty of the sanctions was, in fact, uncertain. Moreover, the state does have tremendous sanctioning power that it can bring to bear on certain offenders and certain areas, which could be effective if properly marshaled. Consequently, Operation Ceasefire incorporated two major components: (1) “pulling levers” in which they would respond to serious gang violence by “pulling every lever” available on the gangs in question thus clearly communicating the consequences of continued violence to the gangs and (2) “call-ins” in which gang members who wanted to change their violent lifestyle were offered any assistance they might need such as protection, drug treatment, and social services.

Research by David Kennedy (1997) revealed that many of the youth gang members wanted to cease their participation in violent gangs but did not have an “out”—a way to safely “escape” this lifestyle. Studies of the Operation Ceasefire program in Boston show that it apparently had an impact on the rate of youth homicide, gun use (less frequently used in crimes) and gun assaults (Braga et al., 1999).

These research findings led to other locales introducing this problem-solving policing strategy. Similar strategies that are an adaptation or modification of Operation Ceasefire have been implemented in several other communities across the country, including Los Angeles; Indianapolis; Richmond; High Point; and North Carolina, including Wilmington. We will discuss the Richmond and the High Point programs next, as they are the most similar to the Wilmington effort.

Project Exile

Richmond, Virginia, had been experiencing rising crime rates, especially violent crime for years. In the late 1990s, Richmond implemented two major programs: (1) Blitz to Bloom and (2) Project Exile. Blitz to Bloom incorporated broken windows theory with the crackdown strategy in an effort to reduce crime in Richmond. The goal of the “blitz” phase was to reduce drug dealing and related crime in the targeted area through a variety of proactive patrol activities, while “bloom” referred to efforts at social intervention in these “blitzed” neighborhoods. The Project Exile initiative concentrated on reducing gun violence by prosecuting gun offenses in the federal system in which the sanctions are more severe, bond is

less available, and convicted offenders serve their sentences in federal custody. An extensive public outreach and media campaign to educate citizens about lengthy federal prison sentences for gun crimes and maximize deterrence also was a critical component of Project Exile. The effectiveness of Project Exile is reported as mixed with some research finding support (Rosenfeld, Fornango, & Baumer, 2005) and other research finding little or no support (Raphael & Ludwig, 2003).

High Point Violent Crime Task Force

High Point formed the Violent Crime Task Force in 1997 to combat the persistently high level of violent crimes in the area. The strategy included a coalition of 10 law enforcement agencies and community partners that included 15 public assistance agencies and 41 community groups. Preliminary analyses point toward success of this program. For one, this strategy became a national model and was selected by Vice President Gore's Reinventing Government Partnership as an example showcased at the Safe Cities Network conference. Indicative of the success in High Point were significant reductions in homicides, gang-related homicides, gun crimes, and drug-related crimes from 1997 to 1999.

Creation of a Firearm Violence Task Force

Wilmington would emulate the get-tough, crime-fighting Exile approach and hope for the reduction of violence seen in High Point. Wilmington crime patterns prompted the then U.S. Attorney, Janice Cole, to form a task force of local, state, and federal officials to address the problem of gun-related violence. She was acting upon authority developed in the presidential directive of March 20, 1999, when President Clinton directed U.S. attorneys nationwide to develop an integrated national firearms violence reduction strategy. Using the High Point program as a model, Cole contacted representatives from all of these agencies and recruited the criminal justice program at the University of North Carolina–Wilmington to serve as research partners in this endeavor.

The task force, referred to as the Wilmington Task Force to Cease Firearm Violence was formed in spring 2000 and continued in active operation until 2003. In Wilmington, the community call-ins had begun in early 2001. Although viewed as a proactive measure to address the violent crime problem, the calls-ins also had troubles.² A key feature of this approach is the clear communication (as in Operation Ceasefire) that the illegal possession or use of a gun will not be tolerated. A coalition of civic and business leaders worked with the police in posting messages on television, billboards, and elsewhere that warned of the consequences of the illegal use of guns. Results in early 2001 shows 196 persons were sentenced to an average of 55 months of imprisonment.

The task force brought increased cooperation among all of the agencies involved with the local police and ATF compiling a list of 14 violent offenders based upon their rap sheets for the initial call-in. The list of offenders produced by law enforcement brought complaints from their respective probation agents. One offender was identified as one of Wilmington's worst, yet he had a single violent arrest. His probation officer reported that he was driven to the shooting by hallucinations he suffered through a medication/alcohol combination and in a paranoid shooting episode shot (but did not injure) a person and destroyed a

vehicle. The probationer was so distraught after being identified and put through the call-in that he was suicidal, and it took 3 hours to calm him down afterwards. He remained misidentified in both police and court lists as a targeted "violent felon." The mistakes on these listings caused the UNCW research team to question the effectiveness of the Wilmington call-ins. Our observation is that the call-ins were secondary to the focus of identifying, prosecuting, and sentencing the violent gun offenders. As one local law enforcement official noted, "(our goal is to) flip 'em, dip 'em, and ship 'em." From our observation, the innovative problem-solving style in Wilmington fell short when the community resources component was found to be not as strong as the Task Force to Cease Firearm Violence's enforcement efforts.

Lessons Gleaned from the Police Executive Forum Report (PERF)

Thacher (2001) notes how the core values of community policing often conflict with the traditional values of law enforcement (e.g. autonomy, etc.). Moreover, police values may not always be explicitly compatible with a community's values. While some scholars are skeptical of the ability to resolve these conflicts, others, among them community and church leaders, lent support to innovative police strategies that they perceived as reducing conflict. Thacher finds this key to creating an "umbrella of legitimacy" through establishing an atmosphere of mutual trust and respect between the police and the community (p. 769). In addition, these new strategies must be compatible with diverse values and must not require either party to sacrifice their core values (Thacher, 2001). The core values of the police center around public safety, which focuses on serious crime, while community groups tend to be concerned about "soft crime" and "disorder" or quality-of-life issues. Police may tend to see the latter as "nuisance," or "bull-shit" offenses that are not worth their trouble to enforce.

This conflict of values was most salient during the Chief "W" era in which mobile substations and foot patrols were instituted by the department. Thacher's (2001) comments are relevant to WPD when he notes, ". . . these abstract affinities foundered when police lacked enthusiasm for the concrete concerns communities brought to them" (p. 777). To the police, this is not real police work. Until the street cop accepts this notion, community policing and problem-solving strategies will struggle to be successful. Many departments have created separate and special community policing units, which insulate the officers from the pressures to practice traditional policing. These units provide "protected organizational spaces," which allow the department to respond to community demands (Thacher, 2001, p. 781). Selnick (1957), in his book on leadership in organizations, writes such "precarious values" need a degree of autonomy within the organization to allow them to take root. While this approach is not without problems, such as tensions between the neighborhood unit(s) and the patrol units, it does allow a police department to establish positive relationships with the community.

There is some evidence that the core values of community policing and problem-solving strategies did not take hold among the police officers at WPD. For example, the PERF report found that, during meetings with community residents, many commented that the, "officers were 'out of touch' with young people . . . (and) . . . some were playing it loose on the streets," conducting pat-downs and searches without adequate

justification (PERF, 2004, p. 15). In addition, several citizens indicated that problem-solving and follow-up to citizen complaints about quality of life issues did not occur.

The PERF report notes that, while the department's relationship with the community is generally good, it could be better. The report also notes that while the police are "responsive and reactive to calls, (they) do not appear to sustain a high level of positive engagement within all their communities. A recommendation made by PERF is that community policing by the department needs to be less reactive and more proactive and 'results oriented'" (p. 18). In their discussion of WPD's community policing division, PERF comments that this unit is more reactive in nature than proactive. Furthermore, they note, "Though the department has established a number of programs intended to engage the community, there are no defined programs, strategies, or personal expectations, which incorporate the community policing model in day to day operations" (PERF, 2004, p. 81). Among the officers, community policing is considered a less than desirable assignment. They also found that officers often complained that the "zero tolerance" policy limited their discretion and was a waste of time to have to deal with nuisance violations.

A survey of police personnel in spring 2006 as part of the WPD 2010 Strategic Plan is instructive. Survey results point to skepticism among many police officers about community policing and problem-solving approaches. While only 35% agree that problem-oriented/community policing is the "most effective way of policing the City of Wilmington as a whole," it was chosen by a greater percentage than traditional (call-response) and about equal to the "geographical/precinct model" (36%). Also, about 39% chose "media/government TV" as the most effective way to communicate with the public, more popular than "officer contact during neighborhood patrols" (28%) and "community meetings" (15%).

Conclusion

Our contention is that the tension and stress brought by attempts to implement a more "pure" community policing by Chief "W" were resolved by a movement toward innovative yet more enforcement-based and crime fighting approaches of the Operation Ceasefire and the recent MUD models and, in the latter years, the compartmentalization of the COP unit. While COP and POP continued to be part of the police vocabulary, our observation is that it was more talk than walk or a "vocabulary of adjustment" (Cressey, 1958) in which the label, "community policing" is used to identify any change in police strategy. Nonetheless, the internal strife within the department, at least from 1992 until 2004, was not resolved by a change in strategies or a movement from the original COP approach. Instead, internal problems and problems with the community continued through the successive police regimes until 2004. These problems hindered the ability to fully and adequately implement strategies that may have made WPD a more effective department. As a result, we see that the violent crime rates and the homicide rates fluctuated erratically and did not reflect the more stable patterns found statewide and nationally.³ While local and environmental conditions played a part, the instability and internal problems of the organizational structure of the agency proved problematic.

Thacher (2001), in his analysis of community policing, identified three strategies that police departments use to reconcile the conflicting values inherent in community policing. Some departments used metaphors, such as “broken windows” to *synthesize* the values of order maintenance and crime control. Others established *divided organizations* in which they created special community policing units that allowed the department to focus on both “soft crime” and “hard crime.” A third approach was to seek a *balance* between these competing values by muting some of the proactive policing authority. It appears that Chief “E” may be seeking to address the organizational and structural problems inherent in WPD by utilizing the second strategy. That, to date, has succeeded.

One point to keep in mind regarding the objectives of problem-solving policing in traditional departments: unless the community has a great deal of prior trust in the police, these new innovative approaches can exacerbate existing racial and community-related problems. Although scholars do concede that new aggressive police tactics have contributed to the decrease in gun homicide, these tactics may come at a high price (Skolnick & Caplovitz, 2001). These innovative strategies often involve a major restructuring of the police organizations, which can also have an impact on their success (Adams et al., 2002; Moore, 1992; Thacher, 2001).

It will take the commitment of political leaders, police managers, and prosecutors coupled with a strong concern from community leaders to adequately address these long lived antagonisms. The key ways to stop it would be more sophisticated data collection and analysis of arrests. This might involve moving towards goal-orientated management processes that help to better track officers’ performance and ensure management accountability. In addition, prosecutors must put a much stricter standard on the “reasonable suspicion” rule that is often discarded in “problem solving” efforts, such as the task force efforts discussed in this article. Police management should focus on examples of ethical “community policing.” If the community perceives police strategies to be misdirected, ultimately the police are not going to contribute effectively to solving their community’s problems.

One final point: it is obvious from our review that a key obstacle to the successful implementation of problem-solving strategies in WPD was resistance on the part of a significant segment of the rank-and-file officers. Police management was unable or unwilling to adequately address the cultural resistance to these innovative strategies. One of the inherent strengths of the problem-solving approach is the move from the “top-down” management model to a more participatory model. Our observation is that from 1991 to 2005, management attempted to introduce innovative strategies without changing the management structure. Rank-and-file officers resisted because they were asked to change their essential philosophy and approach to policing within the context of a traditional command structure. In short, these innovations lacked an “umbrella of legitimacy” (Thacher, 2001).

Endnotes

- ¹ This pattern is similar to the *Systemic Violence Model*, which focuses on the drug distribution system and how violence is a by-product of this system (White & Gorman, 2000). These crimes include territorial fights and disputes; efforts to protect users and sellers; “transaction-related” crimes; and third-party violence, such as bystander shootings. While the available evidence suggests that the systemic model does not account for all drug-related criminal activity, it does account for most of the current violence related to the illegal drug market, especially drug-related homicide.
- ² There were other problems and issues related to this project. The U.S. Attorney, Janice Cole, made several visits to Wilmington to discuss violence in the community with local leaders; however, a major social faux pas was made when the local leaders hosted the U. S. Attorney. On Monday, December 21, 1999, a “secret meeting” with the U. S. Attorney was held in city council chambers. The stated purpose of the meeting was to address the proposed Wilmington Partnership to Cease Firearm Violence and its impact on the community. The Task Force was comprised of local, state, and federal law enforcement officials, including prosecutors. The WPD chief of police attended this meeting, but the New Hanover County Sheriff was not invited (the sheriff and the U.S. Attorney were both African American). The sheriff’s absence sparked controversy in the local newspapers, which ran headlines stating, “Sheriff’s Absence Troublesome,” “Sheriff Is Excluded from Meeting,” and editorials stating “Maybe Ray Charles Should Be In Charge,” and the “Mystery of the Missing Sheriff.” The uninvited sheriff took to the airwaves and was widely quoted as saying, “I am opposed to closed door meetings.” The *Wilmington Journal*, an African-American-owned newspaper, speculated that this was an effort by the Wilmington police chief to have the sheriff report to him in a consolidated law enforcement agency. After the Wilmington police received funding from the COPS program to hire 15 more police officers, the *Journal* chided the city police department as being “diverted from the areas of the community that sorely need it and using in a way that the city manager, the mayor, the city council, the chief of police, and the U. S. Attorney see fit—at the expense of the African American community in general, and young black males specifically,” (“Maybe Ray Charles,” p. 2).
- ³ While no systematic analysis was conducted concerning the links between these rates and changes in law enforcement strategies and organization, the fluctuations did roughly mirror the changes in police regimes. They were generally down during the Chief “W” years, up during the interim periods, and down during the Chief “C” and “E” years. Clearly more analysis is needed before drawing any firm conclusions.

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Force Continuums: Moving Beyond Speculation and Toward Empiricism

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Force Continuums

Police departments across the country have relied on various forms of force continuums for several decades (Terrill, 2001). A standard force continuum ordinarily ranks varying levels of police force and citizen resistance in terms of severity, with the explicit purpose of offering officers guidance on how to respond when faced with noncompliant or aggressive citizens. Thus, continuum policies attempt to more readily clarify what may be considered “objectively reasonable” force as outlined by the United States Supreme Court in *Graham v. Connor* (1989).

One of the earliest continuums, the linear design, is modeled in the form of a ladder or hierarchical steps. According to McEwen (1997), this type of “continuum approach is to rely first on the officer’s presence to quell a situation, and if that fails, to move to increasingly severe types of force” (p. 49). Another type of a continuum structure is often referred to as a modified linear design in which subject resistance is placed into one of several levels and force options for escalation (and de-escalation) are presented within each level (see Connor, 1991). Other, more nonlinear designs are laid out in matrix form or depicted by a wheel (see Hoffman, Lawrence, & Brown, 2004). In the matrix approach, various forms of suspect resistance are presented vertically along rows while various police responses are offered on a horizontal axis. The wheel design is sometimes presented by a series of concentric circles with the situation as the core (e.g., see the Ontario Model), followed by an intermediate circle of suspect resistance behaviors, followed by an outer circle displaying varying appropriate forms of police force given the type of citizen resistance.

Regardless of what continuum approach a particular agency chooses to use (if any), the placement of different forms of force within the continuum structure can vary. For example, one department may place an Electro-Muscular Disruption (EMD) weapon, such as the Taser, low on the continuum (e.g., right after verbal direction), while another agency may place it high on the continuum scale (e.g., just before deadly force). Of course, the implication is that some agencies view EMD use as more of a “first resort,” while others encourage EMD use as a “last resort” before turning to deadly force. Complicating matters further, some departments rely on less specific types of continuum policies whereby force and resistance are referred to only in vague terms and not categorized into specific levels, while others offer very detailed policies that lay out many levels of both force and resistance.

In sum, force continuums are multidimensional in design and can vary in terms of model type, as well as where various force tactics are placed within the continuum framework. The exact nature of these diverse continuum policies, the merits of

utilizing such an approach, and whether one version is more beneficial over another are presently unknown.

Debating the Utility of Force Continuums

As noted by Rogers (2001), there is clearly support within the law enforcement field for adopting some type of a continuum approach within an agency's policy. In fact, such support is highlighted by Terrill and Paoline's (2006) recent national survey of police agencies, in which they found over 70% of the responding agencies utilized some form of a force continuum within their written use-of-force policy. There is some debate, however, as to whether force continuum policies actually help or hinder officer decisionmaking and subsequent outcomes stemming from forceful encounters with citizens. For example, Petrowski (2002) states, "[t]he force continuum purports to provide a mechanical application when officers should be making a subjective threat assessment" (see also Aveni, 2003). In addition, others have argued that using a force continuum may open an agency up to a greater likelihood of civil liability (Williams, 2002).*

Are Force Continuums Beneficial?

Although force continuum policies are specifically designed to provide officers guidance toward controlling suspects with an appropriate degree of force, previous research has generally neglected this area of inquiry, and no known study has specifically investigated whether certain types of continuum policies are more effective than others. In short, while force continuums are often embedded within force policies, there is no empirical evidence that the approach actually works in some manner. In other words, does a force continuum policy actually guide officers in their force usage? Does a continuum policy enhance the level of control an officer has on a suspect? What impact does a continuum policy have on officer and suspect injuries, shootings, citizen complaints, and lawsuits for police misbehavior? At present, one can only speculate or provide anecdotal accounts as to whether the use of a force continuum leads to good practice with favorable outcomes.

An Empirical Examination

Given the wide variation in force continuum policies, in both form (i.e., design) and placement (i.e., tactics), combined with a lack of knowledge concerning effectiveness, we are currently engaged in a study (*Assessing Police Use of Force Policy and Outcomes*, funded by the National Institute of Justice) to investigate the relationship between varying "types" of policies and a multitude of outcome measures, including the extent to which different policies guide officer decisionmaking; enhance the control of suspects; and/or affect injuries, shootings, citizen complaints, and lawsuits. The goal is to determine, from an empirical perspective, whether certain types of policies offer more beneficial outcomes to police practitioners. It is our belief that studies examining any particular tactic

* Some agencies have removed any reference of a force continuum from their policy completely (Terrill & Paoline, 2006). In some cases, however, departments that have done so still employ a force continuum approach from a training perspective (i.e., the continuum is part of training officers but *not* part of the formal policy itself).

or less-lethal technology (e.g., Taser), apart from the broader application of such tactics within varying policy types, unnecessarily limit potential insight. It is the merging of different policy types with varying tactics, which include less-lethal technologies, that offers the most potential and ultimately useful information for policy makers and practitioners.

The current phase of the study involves eight mid-size police agencies representing each region throughout the country. Over the course of the next year, researchers will spend nearly one month on-site at each agency gathering data, which will consist of two primary components: (1) conducting an officer survey and (2) analyzing official agency records.

The officer survey will offer data on how different policies are understood and viewed by front line personnel. Hence, one of the goals is to assess the extent to which officers believe their policy offers guidance when faced with potential use-of-force encounters. Part of this process involves measuring officer knowledge and awareness (or lack thereof) of their respective force policy. The aim is to tease out the potential disconnection between organizational policy and actual policy awareness, implementation, and usefulness. A second goal of the officer survey is to examine the extent to which officers believe their policy actually permits them to effectively establish or maintain control of suspects. For instance, there is no previous research that has identified whether a linear continuum design offers more control than a nonlinear or wheel-type design or that continuum approaches are more effective at controlling suspects than noncontinuum approaches. In addition, no evidence exists as to how and where various forms of less-lethal technologies fit into varying types of policies, as well as the resulting effect on control. Furthermore, it is possible that an officer may know his or her policy and believe the policy offers guidance with respect to "what to do and when to do it." It is also conceivable, however, that while officers may feel certain policies are clear and offer guidance, the policies are viewed as ineffective in terms of controlling suspects.

In addition to the officer survey, researchers will collect and analyze a series of agency records (e.g., use-of-force report data, citizen complaint data, arrest and calls for service data, training data, civil litigation data) to determine whether certain types of continuum policies, in both form (i.e., design) and placement (i.e., location of tactics within the varying forms), reduce the number and extent of officer and citizen injuries, police shootings, citizen complaints, and lawsuits. The research team will also attempt to compare and contrast departments employing a force continuum approach within their policy to departments that *do not* incorporate a continuum design. In the end, the overarching purpose is to determine not only whether certain types of policies (continuum-based or otherwise) lend themselves more readily to issues of guidance and control, but also to discern the interplay between issues of guidance and control while considering injuries, shootings, complaints, and civil litigation.

Results from the study will permit a unique opportunity to compare the benefits and drawbacks of the varying types of policy approaches being utilized by a large number of police agencies throughout the country. For example, departments employing a linear type of continuum policy may be compared with departments using a matrix design. Similarly, agencies with no continuum policy

(e.g., departments with individual policies on chemical irritants or EMD usage) may be compared with departments that do employ a continuum policy, and even different types of continuum policies. Overall, findings from the study will offer the ability to identify varying policy approaches (continuum or otherwise) according to the identified outcomes measures (i.e., injuries, complaints, shootings, lawsuits).

In conclusion, the *Assessing Police Use of Force Policy and Outcomes* study will offer valuable insight on how varying types of policies actually influence the effects of police use of force. Researchers have investigated how often the police resort to nonlethal force (Adams, 1995), variation in the types of force officers use (Klinger, 1995), views toward force (Muir, 1977), determinants of force (Terrill & Mastrofski, 2002; Worden, 1995), and the number of officers and citizens involved in force incidents (Langan, Greenfield, Smith, Durose, & Levin, 2001). It is now time to examine the effect of continuum policy approaches on resulting outcomes. The study's findings will provide practitioners with a guide for policy making and development. Police administrators will have something to which to refer when making a decision to employ a force continuum approach (or not) within their agency's use-of-force policy. More specifically, they will have empirical policy data associated with lower rates of injuries or citizen complaints. Moreover, they will be able to discern which policy types offer officers greater degrees of control and even those policies that might offer an enhanced level of control but lead to more complaints and lawsuits. In sum, results from the study will permit informed policy decisionmaking based on an independent empirical assessment, rather than speculation and anecdotal accounts.

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Cross-Precinct Analysis of Patrol Supervision: A View from the Inside

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I tell recruits, each precinct is its own little small town. You have certain problems you handle in each precinct daily. They are all operated differently. They are all little police departments inside one big department. The captain is basically chief of this precinct.

– *Officer assigned to Northeast Precinct*


Introduction

Policing scholars have long held that environmental factors affect the prioritization of police activities (Crank, 1990, 2003; Crank & Langworthy, 1992; Davenport, 1999; Maguire, 2003; Wilson, 1968). Policing scholars, consequently, have turned their attention to explaining the varying roles of external factors and the degree to which these factors affect police behavior (Davenport, 1999). According to Crank (2003), many examinations have focused on the effects of environmental factors on organizations as a whole (Davenport, 1999; Katz, 2001; Zhao, Lovrich, & Robinson, 2001) or interorganizational fields (Zhao et al., 2001). Few have examined the role of the precinct as a suborganizational level of analysis (Kane, 2003; Klinger, 1997).

The traditional levels of analyses used in police research include: individual, situational, neighborhood, organizational and legal levels. The individual level of analysis focuses on the characteristics of officers/supervisors that might influence police patrol practices. The situational level of analysis centers on factors specific to a certain situation/encounter and suspect/victim/complainant relationships. The neighborhood level focuses on certain aspects of neighborhoods, such as the degree of heterogeneity and social disorder. The organizational level focuses on differences between subcomponents of organizations or organizations as a whole. Finally, the legal level concerns the role of procedural and substantive law on police behavior (Ricksheim & Chermak, 1993; Sherman, 1980). While factors at all levels of analyses have emerged as important, this study finds that there is an important point of intersection between all five levels of analyses: the precinct (See the “Levels of Analysis in Studying Police Patrol Behaviors” figure).

This study extends current assessments of police behavior by investigating variation in supervisory styles using the precinct as the suborganizational level of analysis. More specifically, this study explores whether patrol officers perceive that supervisory styles vary within a single organization at the precinct level of analysis and, if so, which factors reportedly produce this variation. Triangulated data sources used in this study include 434 hours of participant observation, both structured and unstructured interviews with patrol officers, and review of official agency documents.

Levels of Analysis in Studying Police Patrol Practices



Police Supervision and Patrol Practices

There has been limited research on the relationship between police supervision and police patrol practices in the United States (Engel, 2000, 2001, 2002; Trojanowicz, 1980; Van Maanen, 1983). Some researchers have found that police supervisory styles vary due to the dialectical nature of their job: first-line supervisors must manage affairs with upper command while also managing relationships with subordinates. Managing the inherent conflict in middle-management relationships positions causes patrol supervisors to define their roles differently, resulting in varying adaptations of their supervision (Engel, 2001; Reuss-Ianni & Ianni, 1983; Trojanowicz, 1980; Van Maanen, 1983). Others have developed typologies of police supervisors, arguing that morality and individual values and ideals produce variation in supervisory styles (Engel, 2001; Muir, 1977). In addition, many have tested the influence of supervisory styles on police patrol practices (Allen, 1982; Engel, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003; Reiss, 1971; Smith, 2004), but these studies have produced mixed results (Engel, 2001). Engel (2001) recently concluded that the “police supervision literature is limited in scope and fails to answer many conceptual and empirical questions regarding field supervision. This is especially true of questions regarding differences in supervisory styles” (p. 343). The study presented in this article adds to the literature on police supervision by examining whether patrol officers perceive that supervisory styles vary within a police organization at the precinct level of analysis.

The Role of the Precinct

Klinger (1997) first emphasized the role of the precinct as a viable suborganizational level of analysis within police organizations, explaining that in larger jurisdictions, patrol beats or districts (hereinafter referred to as districts) are grouped to form separate territorial units with separate administrative/managerial structures. These separate administrative structures are usually referred to as precincts. While precincts are separate administrative structures, they are still connected to the agency's superordinate administrative/managerial structure. Larger jurisdictions, therefore, coordinate control through the geographic assignment of responsibility by first organizing into precincts and then, within that organizational framework, into patrol districts (Klinger, 1997). Larger police organizations, therefore,

operate out of one central command; patrol operations are organized into several precincts, each with a separate administrative command. Each precinct within the department, therefore, represents an organizational boundary, which by its very nature, creates distinct and relatively independent cultures within the infrastructure of the police organization (Hawley, 1950, 1986; Klinger, 1997). Klinger's theoretical piece, *Negotiating Order in Patrol Work*, makes such a claim. Other research has documented the viability of the precinct as a significant level of analysis for understanding patrol behavior (Hassell, 2006a; Kane, 2003).

Based on prior research that patrol practices vary at the precinct level of analysis, this study investigates whether supervisory styles vary between precincts as well. As Reuss-Ianni and Ianni (1983) emphasize, "Understanding how the police precinct operates as a working social/administrative/operations unit is critical to understanding the forces affecting the management and practice of police work" (p. 256). This study investigates whether officers perceive that supervisory styles vary within one police organization at the precinct level of analysis. More specifically, this study investigates the following two hypotheses: (1) police patrol officers will perceive that supervisory styles vary between the precincts and (2) the variation in supervisory styles will be attributed to factors unique to each precinct.

Methodology

Research Site

Midwestern Municipality (a pseudonym) is in the heart of the Midwestern United States. According to the 2000 Census, the city population in 2002 was approximately 400,000 persons. The racial breakdown of the city is predominantly white (78.4%), with African Americans (13.3%) and Hispanics (6.1%) comprising the two largest minority groups.¹ The racial composition of sworn officers in the Midwestern Municipality Police Department (MMPD) is 82% white, 11% African American, 5% Hispanic, and 2% "other."

The MMPD is nationally accredited by the Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies and employs approximately 760 sworn police officers. MMPD is organized into four precincts, with separate and distinct precinct stations.² Upper administration is centralized in one main headquarters as is the investigation bureau. All special units are housed in the same headquarters, and location, as well. In addition, booking procedures are handled at the headquarters, and all reports and evidence are forwarded to the main headquarters for processing and archival.

The precincts are organized geographically as Northwest Precinct (NW), Northeast Precinct (NE), Southeast Precinct (SE), and Southwest Precinct (SW). Each precinct is organized into two geographic command areas that are further subdivided into nine individual districts. Three patrol crews are assigned to each shift, for a total of nine crews per precinct. The patrol shifts for each precinct are organized into three standard shifts: (1) A shift – overnight shift; (2) B shift – daytime shift; and (3) C shift – afternoon shift. On each shift, one crew is permanently assigned to one geographic area; the second crew is permanently assigned to the other geographic area; and the third crew is a relief crew and works two days in each geographic area.

Officers are not permanently assigned to individual districts; these assignments are provided during roll call. The patrol workweek is established as a four-day workweek (four days on and two days off). This means that on any given shift, there will be two crews working in each precinct. All roll calls are handled in the respective precincts for all shifts.

Each precinct has a separate precinct captain. In addition to the precinct captain, each shift in each precinct has a lieutenant, for a total of three lieutenants for each precinct. Each crew, additionally, is assigned its own sergeant, resulting in nine sergeants assigned to each precinct. Each sergeant is assigned a crew of patrol officers, which varies by precinct and shift. Official records obtained from MMPD reveal that the largest crews are assigned to the afternoon shifts in the NE Precinct while the smallest crews are assigned to the morning shifts in the SW Precinct.

Research Design

The research design is a multi-method ethnographic case study including observational fieldwork, both structured and unstructured interviews, and official documents obtained from MMPD. During field observation, I accompanied patrol officers, systematically recording the following data: the nature of police-citizen interaction (officer-initiated or citizen-initiated); the reason for the interaction; the start time of interaction; the response time (time elapsed between time of call and actual arrival); the number of officers involved; the disposition of interaction; and the end time of the interaction. All observational notes were recorded with pen and paper. Field observations spanned a 6-month time period, from July 2003 through November 2003. Participation by the patrol officers was voluntary. During roll calls, the sergeant would request volunteers who were willing to participate in the research. Most patrol officers were aware of the study, as the observer met with officers during roll calls at each shift in each precinct prior to the start of data collection. The observation period totaled 434 hours of participant observation.

During field observation, unstructured interviews were conducted. These interviews involved asking patrol officers to explain their decision-making process and to discuss their feelings/thoughts about situations involving discretionary decisions. Unstructured interviews were completed with 76 officers across all four precincts. Since the study is a cross-precinct analysis, there is a need for a standardized assessment to make valid comparisons across precinct assignments. An 11-page questionnaire was designed to uncover police patrol officers' perceptions of precinct-level factors in order to investigate precinct-level variation. Seventy-two structured interviews (based on the questionnaire) were completed by 18 officers in each of the four precincts.³ A coding sheet was developed based on the questionnaire responses, and data was analyzed both qualitatively and quantitatively. Several questions from the questionnaire were used in this analysis, and demographic variables documented officer sex, race, age, years of police experience, and years of service with MMPD. Officers were asked about persistent crime/deviance problems in their precincts as well as the number of calls for service. Officers were also asked whether they believe that supervisory styles vary by precinct. That is, officers were asked whether there were precinct-level differences in supervisory styles produced by precinct-level factors. Officers were then asked to explain their responses (i.e., what are the precinct-level factors that produce precinct-level variation in supervisory styles?

Why do you think there is precinct-level variation in supervisory styles?). In this study, supervision refers to sergeants and lieutenants. Officers have more frequent interaction with their sergeants and lieutenants and, based on past research, it is assumed that supervisory styles influence patrol officer behavior (Engel, 2000, 2001, 2002; Hanniman, 2005; Engel, 2003). These responses were recorded with pen and paper and later transcribed into Microsoft *Access* for query analyses and SPSS for statistical analyses. Field observation notes also documented visible precinct-level variation in supervisory styles, and findings from the analysis are included in this examination.

Official agency documents, which included precinct-level statistical reports, were collected in an effort to cross-reference data collected during the interviews. For example, precinct-level statistical reports documented the type/nature of crimes as well as the magnitude of their occurrence in each precinct. Precinct-level statistical reports also documented population density. Prior evaluation reports provided a basis for contextual/historical analysis, which informed on bidding processes, geographic restructuring, relevant policies, and command structure changes. Additionally, police union newsletters and departmental reports informed the analysis; the newsletters corroborate the cultural tone of the organization, as it was recorded by the observer.

Sample

Field observation was conducted with 76 patrol officers. Seventy-two structured interviews were completed during field observation (18 completed questionnaires in each of the four precincts).⁴ Seventy-three percent of the participating officers were male while 27% were female. The overall composition of sworn officers in MMPD is 80% male and 20% female. Eighty-seven percent of the sample identified themselves as white, while 6% identified themselves as African American, 4% as Hispanic, and 3% as other. These figures compare to the departmental racial/ethnic population of sworn officers: 82% white, 11% African American, 5% Hispanic, and 2% as another racial/ethnic identity. The mean age of the participating officers is 34 (range of 23-53; standard deviation of 7). Officers participating in this study ranged in their tenure at MMPD from one to 22 years, with a mean experience level of 7.5 years (standard deviation of 6). Eighty-three percent of participating officers have worked in other precincts: 61 officers have worked in SW, 47 in NW, 46 in SE, and 56 in NE Precincts. All participating officers were exposed to all precincts during field training.

Precinct Descriptions

Southwest Precinct

The SW Precinct is one of the two largest (geographically) precincts with the fewest number of patrol officers assigned. It is approximately three times the geographic size of the smallest precinct. The precinct is a mix of residential and business, including most of the city's apartment complexes, three hospitals, the local university, and the largest shopping mall in the city. The cluster of apartment complexes within this precinct represents the densest part of the city. According to MMPD statistical reports, the precinct has the lowest crime level with most calls for traffic accidents, traffic hazard issues, and intrusion alarms. The residents of this

precinct are primarily middle- to upper-income non-Hispanic whites; the residents of this precinct are the wealthiest in the city. The housing market ranges from rental properties to the most expensive homes in the city. Data from unstructured interviews with command staff indicate that many of the officers assigned to the precinct are the most experienced officers in the department. The sergeants in this precinct are also the most experienced with the most amount of time on the job. According to the SW Precinct commander, the policing style within the precinct is solely reactive; proactive policing is discouraged. The primary patrol responsibility within the precinct is to answer the calls for service.

Northwest Precinct

The NW Precinct is the second largest precinct (geographically) with the second fewest numbers of officers assigned (second to SW). The precinct is almost three times the geographic size of the smallest precinct. The precinct is a mix of residential and business, including two shopping malls, apartment complexes, and one hospital. In addition, the precinct has an apartment complex that is part of the scattered-site subsidized housing project. According to MMPD statistical reports, the precinct has the second lowest crime level; like SW, most calls are for traffic accidents, intrusion alarms, and civil disturbances. The demographics of the precinct are mixed. The precinct is composed of two areas: (1) the 10-area and (2) the 20-area. The 10-area is mostly middle- to upper-income white individuals while the 20-area is composed of a blend of middle-income white individuals lower-income African Americans, and impoverished Sudanese immigrants. Data from unstructured interviews with command staff indicates that many of the officers assigned to the precinct range from mid-level experienced officers (5 to 7 years of service) to newer officers. The sergeants vary from mid-level experienced to newly appointed sergeants. According to the NW Precinct commander, the policing style within the precinct is primarily reactive with a minor emphasis on proactive policing. Patrol responsibilities within the precinct include answering calls for service.

Northeast Precinct

The NE Precinct is one of the two smallest precincts (geographically) and has the highest number of officers assigned. The precinct is primarily residential. According to MMPD statistical reports, the NE Precinct has the highest crime level within the city. On the first ride-along in the precinct, for example, there were five armed disturbance calls within the first 15 minutes. It is also known among the patrol officers as the most dangerous precinct, with respect to police officer safety; the last four police officers killed in the line of duty were assigned to the NE Precinct. The precinct is predominately composed of African American residents with relatively few white persons residing within the precinct. The NE Precinct is also the most economically deprived in the city. Additionally, according to officers and newspaper accounts, there is a long history of racial conflict between residents of the precinct and the police department. Data from unstructured interviews with command staff indicates that the officers assigned to the precinct are a mix of mid-level experienced officers (5 to 7 years of service) and newer officers. The sergeants vary from mid-level experienced sergeants to newly promoted sergeants. According to the NE Precinct commander, the policing style is both reactive and proactive, with a heavy emphasis on proactive policing. The patrol responsibilities

within the precinct are answering calls for service and proactive law enforcement activities.

Southeast Precinct

The SE Precinct is the second smallest precinct geographically and has the second highest number of officers assigned (second to NE). The precinct is a mix of residential and business, including the downtown area, which is the newly renovated economic hub of the city. According to MMPD statistical reports, the precinct has the second highest crime level with most calls for service for civil and domestic disturbances, as well as gang- and drug-related activities. The demographics of the precinct are mixed. The precinct is comprised of two distinct areas: (1) the 50-area and (2) the 60-area. The 50-area is a mix of middle- to upper-income white residents who live within the downtown area and lower-income white and Hispanic residents. The 60-area is comprised primarily of lower-income Hispanic residents. Data from unstructured interviews with command staff indicates that the officers assigned to the precinct range from mid-level experienced (5 to 7 years of service) officers to newer officers. The SE sergeants vary from mid-level experienced to newly appointed sergeants. According to the precinct commander, the policing style within the precinct is both reactive and proactive, with a heavy emphasis on proactive policing in the 50-area. Patrol responsibilities within the precinct include answering calls for service and proactive law enforcement activities.

Findings

To test the hypothesis that patrol officers perceive that supervisory styles vary by precinct, officers were asked during interviews whether supervisory styles differed between the precincts. If officers answered affirmatively, they were asked to explain their responses. When explaining their responses, officers were asked to rely on their experiences in each precinct. The officers' responses were analyzed and grouped into two categories: (1) factors at the individual level of analysis and (2) factors at the situational and neighborhood levels of analysis. Many officers' responses included references to more than one factor. The analysis demonstrates that 92% of participating officers (66 out of 72) do believe that supervisory styles vary at the precinct level of analysis.

Individual Level of Analysis: Temperament, Personality, and Level of Experience

The interview data reveals that over half of all patrol officers (36 of 66) who believe that supervisory styles vary by precinct reported that the supervisor's temperament and personality produce precinct-level variation in supervisory styles. The officers stated that supervisors who want to be more active bid to higher crime precincts (NE and SE); supervisors who want to be less active bid to lower crime precincts (NW and SW). In essence, explained an officer assigned to SE, "individual personality types are attracted to certain precincts." An officer assigned to SW reiterated this sentiment when he/she reported, "go-getters are attracted to the eastern precincts." An officer assigned to NE emphasized the point by saying, "if a sergeant bids NE, they want to work and see their officers work. They know police will need more supervisory approval, and they take care of officers. In other precincts, sergeants get lazy." Another officer assigned to NE

stated, "In SW, the sergeants are real laid-back and let officers do what they got to do. Out here, sergeants and lieutenants make calls with you. It's the difference between being a leader or a follower."

Other officers reported that the supervisor's level of experience, or time on the job, was an important factor in explaining precinct-level variation in supervisory styles. Most officers reported that newer officers bid to work in the high-crime precincts (NE and SE) and older officers, who have "done their time" in the high crime precincts, bid to work in the low-crime precincts. The end result is that newer and less experienced sergeants and lieutenants are concentrated in the high-crime precincts during afternoon/evening shifts (C-shift) and overnight shifts (A-shift). The more experienced sergeants and lieutenants are found in the lower crime precincts and typically work during the day (B-shift). Official agency documents obtained from MMPD validate these findings.

Several officers assigned to SW (the lowest crime precinct) discussed the differences in supervisory styles based on level of experience. One officer (assigned to SW) stated that such differences could be attributed to "the age and experience of the supervisor. Younger supervisors are more hands on." Another officer stated that "newer sergeants usually work those areas [NE and SE Precinct areas] so they are still in the officer role where they like to be on the street. In NE and SE, you still hear command officers making traffic stops." Another officer reiterated this point when he/she said, "the two sergeants who are in SW are close to retirement and don't want to do anything. Sergeants in NE are out making traffic stops and are more involved." Finally, an officer currently working in SW detailed . . .

The SW sergeants have time on. They have been with [MMPD] for a lot of years. In SE, NE, and NW [20-area NW], the sergeants tend to be less experienced as sergeants out here. Out here, all sergeants have been on for a number of years. SW sergeants don't micromanage as much. They let officers do their jobs. There is less intensive supervision in SW.

Officers assigned to NW (the second lowest crime precinct) also reported that supervision varied according to precinct assignment and that variation was due to level of experience. One NW officer said, "Time on at rank. In SW, the style is less pessimistic, more materialistic. Rank is more important to senior officers than younger officers. In NE, the sergeants are newer, just promoted, just came from the street and understand the necessity of being more decisive and discretionary." Another officer conveyed . . .

SW has higher seniority sergeants and command. They are a lot more laid-back and they [sergeants] didn't want you to call a lot [did not want the officers to call them with questions]. On NW C-shift [afternoon/evening shift], you get younger sergeants and command staff, and they are more hands on and by the book.

An officer, working in NW, also reported that there are differences between the western and eastern precincts: "In eastern precincts, you are allowed a bit more leeway out there. They don't micromanage as much. NW [20-side] gets newer sergeants, and they tend to micromanage more." Finally, an officer said, "In NE,

the sergeant was on calls all the time with us . . . not quite as much in NW. [There are] more experienced officers [in NW] so sergeants trust them [officers].”

Officers in the eastern precincts also remarked that the level of experience of the command staff affects supervision. An officer assigned to SE said that “experience on the job has a lot to do with it. A new, young supervisor is unsure how to handle things. Then they go overboard and are strictly by the book.” An officer assigned to NE reported, that “In NE, you get the sergeants who don’t want to be here to those that still want to work . . . the sergeants are stuck in NE because they are the lowest rung on bidding. The three sergeants with the most seniority work SW C-shift.”

Situational and Neighborhood Levels of Analyses: Nature of Crime/Deviance, Calls for Service, Culture of the Clientele, Citizen Expectations, and Local Political Influence

Patrol officers reported that the differences in supervisory styles are also due to precinct-level differences in the nature of crime and deviance in the precinct and the nature of the calls for service. Although only 23 of 66 (35%) officers explicitly identified the nature of the crime/deviance and calls for service as causing variation in supervisory styles, the field observation notes cross-referenced the strong relationship between the two.

For most officers, the major distinctions in the nature of crime and deviance and calls for service are between the western (low-crime; NW and SW) and eastern (high-crime; NE and SE) precincts. In the eastern precincts, officers explained, the crime is more serious, the pace is quicker, and sergeants are more actively involved in calls for service. In the eastern precincts, there is greater demand and higher expectations of supervisors. In contrast, sergeants working in the western precincts, according to participating officers, are more relaxed and laid-back due to the infrequency of serious crime and calls for service.

One officer assigned to SW explained the impact that the nature of the calls for service has on supervisory styles: “Supervisors are laid-back where there are fewer calls. They are more relaxed in SW. They have a bigger call load and more serious calls in the east.” Another officer from SW reiterated, “Some areas of town have a higher crime rate so responses will be different.” An officer assigned to the SE Precinct also reported on the relevance of the nature of calls for service: “Sergeants are required to respond to certain calls, and more of those calls are in NE.” Finally, an officer in NW commented, “Sergeants will be out more in the eastern sector. More interactive with [his/her] crew. The entire east and at night. More stuff goes on at night. The bad guys are night workers.”

Officers in the NE Precinct were stronger in their opinions about how the nature of crime and deviance and calls for service impact supervisory styles. An officer in NE stated, “A lot of supervisors out west are laid-back; it’s a more laid-back environment out west.” Another officer assigned to NE concluded, “There is more crime in SE and NE and so they [supervisors] are more strict on officer safety here. In SE and NE, officers have to have riot helmets. This is not the case in NW and SW.”

“In NW,” an officer in NE stated, “I never saw a sergeant. I never saw them patrolling. In SE and NE, sergeants are always patrolling and [are] out and about.” Finally, another officer assigned to NE reported, “In NE, you get the sergeants who don’t want to be here or those that still want to work. Some sergeants are sick of the ghetto . . . most sergeants don’t want to work NE because of the racial issues. It is confrontational racism in NE.”

Eleven officers further reported that the culture of the clientele, citizen expectations, and local political influence produce precinct-level variation in supervisory styles. Again, the field observation notes cross-reference these findings from the structured interviews. In MMPD, there is a strong interaction between citizen demand, the nature of the crime and deviance in the precinct, and police patrol practices. In the eastern precincts, for example, the level of crime and deviance is not only more visible and violent, but the crime levels are higher than in the western precincts. Citizens residing in the eastern precincts witness higher levels of more serious crime and, as a result, are generally more permissive of aggressive police patrol practices (e.g., foot pursuits, automobile pursuits, traffic stops, enhanced security measures during traffic stops, etc.) than citizens residing in the western precincts. In contrast, official agency documents uncover that local political interest groups/politicians focus their censure on the aggressive police responses in the eastern precincts, largely arguing that police patrol practices are influenced by racial factors rather than the nature of the crime and calls for service. In the western precincts, as officers and precinct commanders explained, where crime is consistently relatively minor and expectations for police service are high, police patrol officers are obliged to forsake traditional law enforcement practices for more service-oriented assistance.

Officers in the NE Precinct reported on the role of politics and citizen expectations/demands in varying supervisory styles. One officer in NE explained, when asked why supervisory styles differed between precincts, “In NE, it is more of a politically charged atmosphere. NE is subject to more questions. Racial tensions are high. Command styles revolve around that.” Another officer assigned to NE simply responded, “Politics dictate what happens.” An officer in SE also mentioned citizen expectations and local politics as the reason for differences in supervision: “They are more relaxed out west. I think it is because of the demographics of the area and the type of business in the area. In SE, they spend a lot more attention on the downtown area and what those businesses demand. There are no businesses in NE.”

An officer assigned to SW detailed . . .

In NE, command officers show up on calls a little more. The NE and SE community want to see command because those areas have newer officers. Newer sergeants usually work those areas so they are still in the officer role where they like to be on the street. In NE and SE, you still hear command officers making traffic stops.

Officers further reported that policies, and enforcement of policies, vary between the precincts. An officer assigned to SE said that pursuits (foot and automobile) “will fly quicker in NE and SE than in NW and SW.” One officer explained why he/she bid to the NW precinct rather than the NE Precinct. This officer said that

while doing field training in NE, during a traffic stop, a motorist fled and the field training officer (FTO) insisted on a chase. This officer commented that supervisors rarely approve pursuits in NW; in NE, on the other hand, supervisors expect officers to respond more aggressively.

Patrol officers also reported that the manner in which departmental policies are applied is different in each precinct. An officer assigned to SE reported . . .

Each precinct has a certain way of handling things. Also, there are differences in command officers. Such as mayor's complaints [parking complaints that are reported to the mayor's hotline]. In NW, the LT [lieutenant] was very serious about mayor's complaints. You have to check it several times. In SE, if you check it one time, you are good.

Officers in SW noted that mayor's complaints are more frequent in SW than NW: "We get a lot of mayor's complaints, more in SW than NW. Not many in NE." As an officer in SW explains . . .

Sergeants need to be [a] certain way . . . in each precinct. Need to be more flexible in NE. Sergeants allow you to do more stuff in NE than out here. [There are] more controlling command [officers] in SW due to public expectations and politics within the department. Sergeants are on the streets more in NE. Your sergeant will be there and be more involved and active in NE than SW.

An officer assigned to SW said, "The way the rules are applied and interpreted varies. Rules are always the rules, but the way that they are put into practice has to do with the command you belong to . . . Policy varies by precinct."

Officers not only detailed varying applications of departmental policies but explained how informal policies are created in each precinct. For example, an officer assigned to SW described a new "informal" policy that was announced during roll call. According to the officer, an officer working in SW stopped a motorist for driving recklessly. The motorist was angered at receiving a traffic ticket on a Sunday on his way to church. The motorist called the precinct and spoke to the captain regarding the issue. The officer said that a new policy was announced in the SW precinct mandating that officers make no traffic stops on Sundays during church hours.

In NE, the racial tension is high, and the precinct is often the subject of local political scrutiny and distinct policies. In NE, supervisors instructed officers to refrain from wearing their department-issued uniform gloves (black leather gloves) when responding to calls because they look "intimidating" to the African American population. The racial issues between the precinct and the community are a high-priority concern in NE and, in turn, shape supervisory styles and practices.

Discussion/Conclusion

The findings from this study suggest that the precinct is a viable and significant suborganizational level of analysis. It is clear that most participating officers perceived that supervisory styles vary within the police organization at the precinct level of analysis. Furthermore, the officers identified factors at three

different levels of analyses, although many factors are interrelated between levels of analyses, which converge to produce variation at the precinct level of analysis (See “Levels of Analysis in Studying Police Patrol Practices” figure).

The findings of the study indicate that participating officers perceive that individual-level factors are important as partial explanations of variation in supervisory styles. This finding is sensible; there are few who would argue that individual-level characteristics are insignificant. In addition, it would also be reasonable to conclude that persons with aggressive personalities are attracted to increasingly volatile work areas or that sergeants with more time on the job may desire to work in less active precincts. What is particularly enlightening, however, is the unearthing that personality, temperament, and level of experience converge to produce variation at the precinct level of analysis. For example, concentrations of “hard-charging” supervisors in high-crime precincts clearly influence supervision and, consequently, police patrol practices; “hard-charging” supervisors are more apt to be permissive of aggressive police tactics, even those tactics that may cross the line into the extreme (Engel, 2000, 2001, 2002). Intensifying this pattern is the fact that newer, less experienced supervisors are generally assigned to high-crime precincts (due to personnel bidding policies), which has the potential to further restrict proper control of police patrol behavior. Aggressive police behavior in high-crime areas is of much concern among residents and policy makers. The concentration of less experienced, uncompromising supervisors in these areas can only intensify these concerns.

The findings also demonstrate that factors at the situational and neighborhood levels of analyses produce precinct-level variation in officers’ perceptions of supervisory styles. Interview data, field observation notes, and official documents revealed that the precinct-level variation in supervisory styles is attributable to the nature of the crime and calls for service in each precinct. In the NE Precinct area, street-level visible crimes (e.g., gang-related crimes, drugs, shootings, etc.) are more prevalent, and officers perceive that supervisors are more aggressive. Similarly, in the SE Precinct, street-level visible crimes and order maintenance crimes (e.g., prostitution, public drunkenness, etc.) are widespread, and officers perceive supervisors to be actively involved in the daily operations of patrol. In the SW Precinct, on the other hand, most of the calls for service concern service-oriented matters, such as civil disturbance calls (disagreements between neighbors), intrusion alarm calls, and property and/or personal injury traffic accidents. Sergeants, consequently, are perceived by their officers as not being as active or visible because most of the crimes and calls for service are relatively minor (compared to the eastern precincts). Most of the calls for service in the NW Precinct concern service-oriented matters, as well as infrequent bursts of more serious street-level crimes (e.g., drugs, cuttings at local bars/taverns, etc.). Sergeants in the NW Precinct are reportedly perceived as being largely inactive (not patrolling and responding to calls for service) with moments of vigorous activity. Not only do the findings indicate that police priorities (e.g., law enforcement, order maintenance, and service-oriented activities) vary between precincts, but these priorities largely shape supervision.

Patrol officers in MMPD perceive that the culture of the clientele, citizen expectations, and local political influences produce inter-precinct variation in supervisory styles. In the NE Precinct (which has the city’s highest concentration of African American residents) and SE Precinct (which has the city’s highest concentration of Hispanic residents), racial and cultural tensions exacerbate the

inherent conflict in law enforcement. Supervisors must react, and officers perceive them to react, because they are directly responsible for maintaining the legitimacy of the institution of policing within their organizational context (precinct). As Van Maanen (1983) clearly enunciated in his overview of first-line supervisors, . . .

Sergeants are expected by their superior officers to offer (among other things) tangible proof to the public that police are internally accountable . . . Sergeants are to be available to the public at large, thus displaying the organization's capacity to monitor performance of its members. While ritualized occasions of performance appraisal serve this end to a small degree . . . it is the daily rounds made by sergeants that make most salient and visible the organization's promise to control the activities of its employees. (p. 287)

Research demonstrates that when local political interest groups focus public attention on racial tensions between the police and residents, the demand for supervisory presence increases. The louder the public and political cries, as Van Maanen implies, the more visible are the supervisors. Since the level of residential segregation is high in many urban contexts (U.S. Census Bureau, 2002; Wilson, 1987), and if precinct boundaries generally reflect the same patterns (as they do in MMPD), the suborganizational level of the precinct emerges as a crucial level of analysis for explaining police behavior, including supervision.

These situational and neighborhood factors also reportedly affect the creation and enforcement of policies in each precinct. According to officers, precinct supervisors must react to the crime problems in their areas and adapt to the expectations of citizen populations and local political groups. Because officers deal with mass populations, and individual-level tailored responses are impractical, precinct supervisors establish protocols for handling like situations (Lipsky, 1980). Precinct supervisors respond by creating informal work rules that apply to specific situations. As Lipsky (1980) uncovered in his fieldwork . . .

Ideally, and by training, street-level bureaucrats respond to the individual needs or characteristics of the people they service or confront. In practice, they must deal with clients on a mass basis, since work requirements prohibit individualized service . . . Police officers should respond to the implications of the presenting case; in reality, they must develop techniques to recognize and respond to types of confrontations, and to process categories of cases accordingly. (p. 504)

The creation and enforcement of these informal policies is primarily the responsibility of precinct sergeants and lieutenants. This study indicates that it is important to examine the policies, and enforcement of policies, within the organization at suborganizational levels.

Although not explicitly reported by the officers, it is reasonable that factors at the legal and organizational levels of analyses would produce variation in supervisory styles. Laws specific to municipalities generate variation in police practices and supervisory styles at the precinct level of analysis precisely due to situational and neighborhood-level variables (e.g., more violent, street-level crime in eastern precincts). It is also reasonable that organizational factors—bidding processes,

personnel allocation, mapping of precinct boundaries—would produce precinct-level differences in supervision.

This study finds that the precinct is a significant level of analysis in explaining officers' perceptions of police supervision. The current study uncovers that the standard levels of analyses converge at the precinct to produce a discrete unit of analysis. Future research should test the external validity of this study's findings through replication and an explicit focus on supervision. This study involved one police organization and relied on officers' perceptions of variation in supervisory styles. Furthermore, while research has demonstrated a link between supervisory styles and patrol behavior, the findings are inconsistent and tenuous. Additional research is needed to clarify the relationship between supervisory styles and patrol behavior. As this study uncovers, additional research should employ the precinct as a suborganizational level of analysis. Observing and analyzing behavior at the precinct, whether at the line level or up the supervisory chain of command, can offer us a glimpse into the dynamic world of law enforcement. This view from the inside may offer clarity not yet achieved.

Endnotes

- ¹ All references to race/ethnicity will follow the guidelines set forth by the United States Census Bureau.
- ² Law Enforcement Management and Administrative Statistics reports that the national average number of separate and distinct precincts in large, municipal police organizations is four, which strengthens the external validity of the findings in the current study.
- ³ Statistical power analysis (SPA) was used to determine the appropriate sample size. SPA takes advantage of the relationship among four variables involved in statistics inference: (1) sample size, (2) significance criterion, (3) population effect size, and (4) statistical power (Cohen, 1992; Weisburd, Petrosino, & Mason, 1993). In this particular study, because this is the first empirical deductive assessment of precinct-level variation, it is expected that data analyses would produce a large effect between each research group, or each precinct (Cohen, 1992). Additionally, in criminal justice research, the standard alpha, or significance level, is .05. As Cohen (1992) reports, to compare mean responses at a large effect size across four groups using an alpha level of .05, the appropriate sample size is 18 cases (in each group) (p. 158). For a multivariate analysis, using the same effect size and alpha level, with nine independent variables, the sample size would need to be at least 50 cases. Furthermore, in determining the appropriate sample size, it is important to keep the number of cases in each group similar. As Weisburd et al. (1993) explain, ". . . studies in which the sizes of the groups examined are relatively similar are more powerful than those in which the sizes of the groups are markedly different" (p. 350). For these reasons, the total sample for the quantitative analysis in the current study is 72 officer responses, or 18 officer responses in each precinct covering all patrol shifts.
- ⁴ Structured interviews were not completed with four participating officers; therefore, only 72 structured interviews were conducted and included in the analysis.

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In Law Enforcement We Trust: Ethical Attitudes and Behaviors of Law Enforcement Officers and Supervisors

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Police, Division of Forensic Services

Introduction

The ethical values that law enforcement agencies exhibit can affect public perceptions of the agency's ability to protect and serve. The general public's perception is a result of the agency's ability to demonstrate that the ethical values they possess are a reflection of those possessed by the citizens. As public servants, all law enforcement personnel are obligated to fulfill their duties in the best interest of the public they serve. This obligation includes ethical responsibilities to both the agency and the people. To the public, police officers must demonstrate a higher level of ethical behavior due to their position of authority and power (Johnson & Cox, 2005). The organizational values of an agency are instilled in its management, which in turn ingrains it into subordinates. Any discrepancy between the values and beliefs of a manager and those of the agency could have detrimental effects on the subordinate. The focus of this article is to investigate the differences in ethical behaviors among different levels of management and their impact on officers' attitudes. By analyzing the responses to a National Institute of Justice survey of law enforcement agencies, a better understanding of the ethical attitudes and behaviors of law enforcement personnel can be achieved. The results will illustrate the relationships, if any, that exist between the ethical attitudes and behaviors of different levels of management and those exhibited by other law enforcement personnel.

The ethical values of an agency can most readily be observed in those who have the most contact with the general public. While the agency may have a strong ethical responsibility to the public, the actual ethical values and behaviors exercised by its personnel determine the perceptions of those they serve. Conflicting views about right and wrong behavior by superiors can lead to confusion and misinterpretation by subordinates. This, in turn, can lead to substandard performance and lack of public trust.

By studying the relationships between the ethical attitudes of different levels of management and officer attitudes, we will be able to identify whether or not a difference of behaviors exists between these classifications of law enforcement officers. It will also help to determine whether the level of management is related to a person's ethical behavior. A difference of behaviors can be an indicator of possible conflicts and potential abuses by both management and the subordinates who follow their orders. These differences can also have a considerable impact on the organizational culture of an agency. Since the organizational culture of a law enforcement agency is comprised of the interactions between administration,

supervisors, and line officers, any significant difference in the values and behaviors that exists between these members of the same organization can result in internal conflicts, corruption, and loss of public support. The literature review that follows will assist in understanding the consequences and problems that are related to the ethical differences that occur between levels of management and line officers and the impact they can have on the culture of the organization.

Research and Literature Reviews

The perspective of law enforcement personnel can be viewed differently. Pollock (1998) describes two perceptions of law enforcement officers, the first being the "crime fighter," which can be characterized as an enforcer of the law above all, who believes that criminals are the enemy of the public. The public should understand that the decisions made by law enforcement are for the good of the community. The priority of law enforcement is crime control and order. The second perspective Pollock (1998) describes is the "public servant." As public servants, law enforcement officers serve everyone. They are to protect all citizens and carry out their duties without prejudice. Unlike the "crime fighter," there are no enemies unless one considers society as an enemy (Pollock, 1998).

The understanding of these two perspectives is important when assessing ethical issues. The two perspectives may have different ethical values that are employed in the decision-making process while on the job. It is this decision-making process that makes the ethical training of all law enforcement officers so important. The outcome of any situation is dependant upon the ethics, beliefs, attitudes, and training of the officers responding. The ability to make the necessary decisions that produce positive results comes from not only the officer but from the agency he or she represents.

It is the view of the "public servant" that will be taken within the context of this article. As a public servant, law enforcement personnel are committed to the varying behavioral expectations that the general public demands from this profession. These expectations are higher than those of any other profession due to the power and authority a law enforcement officer possesses (Johnson & Cox, 2005). This behavior is affected by different levels of authority as well as the culture of the organization. Administrators, supervisors, and line officers all contribute to the ethical behaviors of each other. The intensity of these contributions varies depending upon the organization and situation. Collectively, the ethical contributions of all personnel comprise the culture and environment in which law enforcement is conducted.

The different ethical considerations that are contributed are a product of the duties that each line officer, supervisor, and administrator must fulfill. Line officers are exposed to confrontations with criminals and the public. Their values and behaviors are most readily seen and tested on a daily basis. They must deal with many problems and situations that require them to use the combination of the ethical values learned in training, those derived from personal values, those influenced by peers, and those that are expected by the public. They use their discretion to handle ethical dilemmas that occur while on duty. Discretion, as defined by Pollock (1998), is "the ability to choose between two or more courses of behavior" (p. 151). This is influenced by an officer's ethical values and plays

a more important role in decisionmaking than rules and regulations (Pollock, 1998). As members of a law enforcement organization, the attitudes and behaviors that affect a line officer's discretion are incorporated into the contributions to the culture within the organization.

The contributions of administrative ethics help to set the tone of the organizational culture of a law enforcement agency. This is where the policies and procedures for the values of the organization must begin. Administrators are responsible for developing the goals and guidelines that subordinate officers are to follow (IACP, 2001). Administrators must consider the reputation of the organization and the public trust it must uphold. Unlike line officers, administrators are not faced with the daily street-level decisionmaking that occurs, but they are still responsible for the influences on those decisions. This is why such an importance is placed on the ethical values of administrators. An administrator's personal ethical values should not interfere with his or her duty to the goals of the organization (Burke, 1989; Thompson, 1992). Although these values can still influence ethical standards, it is the combination of organizational responsibility, public perception, and political influence that administrators often use to shape the organizational culture that exists within a law enforcement agency.

Supervisors are the one classification that is caught in the middle. Their ethical contributions to the organizational culture of the law enforcement agency are derived from their personal beliefs as well as a mixture of line officer and administrative ethics. The supervisor's duties are to ensure that the policies and procedures implemented by administrators are carried out by subordinates and that subordinates adhere to these policies and procedures while fulfilling their duties to the public and the organization. Supervisory responsibility also extends to playing the main role in the development and utilization of ethical values by line officers (IACP, 2001; Peak, Glensor, & Gaines, 1999). Some supervisors, such as sergeants, have more of a connection with line officers, which can affect their attitudes towards ethical values. Paoline (2001) found that street supervisors often have the same attitudes towards organizational environments as line officers. The contributions of supervisors to organizational culture helps to bring together the organizational values of the agency as set forth by administrators and the day-to-day ethical values that are exercised by line officers. This "mediation" role between labor and management is important in order for the organization to run smoothly (Peak et al., 1999).

The classifications of officers used here are formed by levels of authority within an organization. The levels of authority used in this study are line officers, first-line managers, mid-level managers, and senior-level managers. These levels can influence the attitudes and behaviors of other officers. The next sections will discuss what shapes these different levels of authority and what role organizational culture plays in shaping law enforcement agencies.

Level of Authority and Its Influence

As "street-level bureaucrats," line officers must subscribe to a higher level of behaviors just as other public officials (Lipsky, 1980; Raines, 2005). Since line officers are the public representatives of a law enforcement agency, their behaviors and decisions are under the most scrutiny. It is here that the ethical behavior and

reputation of the organization begins. It is important that officer recruits receive the best possible ethical training so they may carry it with them not only throughout their careers but out to the streets where it will be put to the test. Police training often focuses on following rules and regulations and the conduct of officers based upon these tenets. Control by policy, not by human behavior, is usually the approach taken to train recruits. Concentration on policy over behavior can lead to officers doing what is right out of fear of being caught rather than knowing what is right or wrong (Johnson & Cox, 2005). Behavior that is not consistent with that of the citizenry can result in the erosion of public confidence and lack of community support.

It is the responsibility of the supervisors, as well as administrators, to ensure that line officers who confront the public on a daily basis are trained in not only the duties they perform, but also the moral and ethics reasons behind what they do (IACP, 2001; Peak et al., 1999). It is at this level that a distinction of ethical behaviors can exist within an organization. Supervisors who believe that certain actions can be justified or kept from upper management may cross the line of unethical behavior. The position of supervisor, whether it is for a small or large group, is a position that can be described as line work while also being administrative.

First-line managers, such as sergeants and some corporals and lieutenants, are viewed as a rank caught between management and line officer. Officers see them as still tied to the street side of policing. Anyone above this level is viewed as being out of touch with the streets. Higher ranks are considered to be more interested in the political and economical interests than the safety of officers (Barker, 1999). Line supervisors are caught in the middle of being told how things will be done according to administrators and how things really are on the streets. Based on this difference in perspective, a supervisor must use his or her judgment when making decisions involving line officers and the public. Supervisors must win the respect of their subordinates by not forgetting what it is like in the real world yet also adhere to the management duties set forth by administrators.

Mid-level manager positions are considered to be more administrative and less policing. Ranks such as captains and lieutenants can be considered mid-level managers. These managers are responsible for carrying out the policies set forth by senior-level managers. At this level, officers have begun to lose their "street cop" attitudes and adopt the administrative view. Career mobility is a focus, and greater loyalty and commitment to the organization increases (Barker, 1999). They may build their reputations upon the reputation of the organization. Subordinate to senior-level managers, it is the duty of the mid-level manager to make sure that the policies set forth by their superiors are carried out and that the agency runs smoothly. After all, their careers depend on it.

Good ethical training begins at the top. According to Thompson (1985), "administrative ethics involves the application of moral principles to the conduct of officials in organizations" (p. 555). An administrator, or senior-level manager, must carry out the policies of their superiors who are usually people in political positions. Senior-level managers often include ranks such as majors and colonels. To do otherwise would not be ethical because this is the profession that people choose by free will (Thompson, 1985). Administrators, although bound by their duties of carrying out the policies set forth by their superiors, should make

every attempt to establish the highest of ethical guidelines for their personnel to follow. Upper-management must take a leadership role in conveying the agency's overall quality of ethics to its officers. An ethical culture must start with upper-management's commitment to setting the ethical standard for the agency then making sure it is carried out (O'Mally, 1997).

Administrators are responsible for setting the standard for organizational culture in a law enforcement organization, and recruiting the right administrators is the first step to a fulfilling this goal. Needless to say, law enforcement agencies strive to attract highly qualified, ethical administrators. Still, applicants to high level administrative positions can often display traits that can impress interviewers but often do not illustrate the true core values that comprise their integrity. A careful examination into what a candidate believes and the values he or she holds should be conducted. The programs of a leader who has strong beliefs and values gain better support from the public, are more effective, and last longer. Ethics and integrity can help determine how a person will behave and perform. The future leaders of police agencies need to possess the ethical qualities that will help to reshape policing and the public problems it faces (Plummer, 1995). Official obligations and moral duties are dependent upon each other. It can become problematic to place individuals into administrative positions that must choose between personal morals and organizational responsibility. These positions may require the incumbent to choose between their morals and values and the institutional obligations (Burke, 1989). This is why a greater importance should be placed on selecting the right administrator. To retain the trust of the people, the administration should not be in conflict with the mission and goals of a public organization. The administration should then be able to convey these goals and ethical concerns to all personnel.

Promoting good ethical culture requires good ethical officers in those management positions that have the greatest influence. This is done through the promotion process, which can be a barrier to change in an organization. As officers advance through the ranks of an agency, their attitudes and organizational beliefs are molded by their experience and environment. Their commitment to the organization can be affected by the promotional opportunities available (Jaramillo, Nixon, & Sams, 2005). The practice of promoting those who would make the best managers is often wrought with favoritism and partiality. Barker (1999) suggests that many officers believe that the process is not by merit but by political grounds that encourage minority and female promotions. Bolton's (2003) qualitative analysis rejects the idea that minorities are favored over whites. From a minority's perspective, promotion in an organization is made more difficult. Whetstone (2001) also concludes that the promotional system itself eliminates many from upward mobility. His study showed that minorities and women were encouraged more than white males, but even this was minimal. Whetstone also found that unfair testing processes, biased administration, and lack of openings were organizational reasons for individuals not to participate in the promotional process. Conflicting feelings about the promotional process and lack of encouragement from management can create problems and an unhealthy organizational culture. Suspicious of the intentions of managers and loss of confidence by subordinates can result in lower morale and distrust in management. These feelings can then affect an officer's attitudes and behaviors.

The promotion process is used to select those officers who will ultimately establish the goals of the agency. Those who seek promotion should be in it for the work itself, not just the economic gain (Scarborough, Tubergen, Gaine, & Whitlow, 1999). Those who attempt to promote, whether line officers or managers, do it for certain reasons. Studies have shown that personal reasons account for attempting to promote and that increased pay does not play a major role (Scarborough et al., 1999; Whetstone, 2001). Management's role in the selection may be biased in that those who are promoted most likely share the same personal views and opinions of the managers responsible for the promotion. This may result in a command structure with attitudes and behaviors that leave very little room for diversity of thought. When this occurs, having the wrong type of officers in administrative positions can have a detrimental effect on the organization.

Cultural Influence

Organizational culture plays an important role in the development of new officers. Wilson (1989) defines organizational culture as "a persistent, patterned way of thinking about the central tasks of and human relationships within an organization" (p. 91). It is a combination of factors such as environment, attitudes, feelings, beliefs, morals, and values that exist within the people and the organization. This "culture" has been cited as a cause of problems (Bolton, 2003; Johnson & Cox, 2005; Klockars, Ivkovich, Harver, & Haberfeld, 2000; Trautman, 2000). Organizations can often encourage unethical behavior by introducing the behavior that it expects from its new recruits. Even the paramilitary methods used in training can influence a new officer to accept the ethical views of the organization over his or her own (Johnson & Cox, 2005).

Organizational culture works upon a person's behavior by pressuring human emotions such as acceptance, fear, pride, and ambition. Through formal and informal groups, the behaviors of new officers can often be altered to "fit in" in a new environment. If this environment is corrupt or unstable, it could result in unacceptable officer performance and difficulty in decisionmaking. The lines between what is right and wrong can become distorted. Right and wrong may now be defined as what is good or bad for the organization as opposed to what is good or bad for the public.

According to Klockars et al. (2000), "Corruption is the abuse of police authority for gain" (p. 1). Until recently, police agencies handled corruption through the administration/individual approach or "bad apple" approach. This approach views corruption as a moral defect in an individual, not the system or agency. The ethical dilemmas faced by law enforcement officers can be influenced by not only the officer but also the environment in which the officer operates. Minimizing the role of the organization in ethics places the responsibility on the individual. This does little to solve the problems associated with ethical behaviors and agency integrity. The administrative/individual approach views police integrity as a system that expels and prevents "bad apples" from polluting the system (Klockars et al., 2000). Stopping corrupt individuals from entering the system prevents corruption from occurring.

Today, a different approach focuses on the environment and culture of the organization and its relationship to the training and behaviors of law enforcement

officers. An organizational/occupational approach views police integrity as a system in which an organizational culture does not tolerate unethical behaviors. Klockars et al. (2000) concluded that the integrity of police agencies varies within the United States. Officers must know their individual agency's policy for behavior as well as the penalties of breaking such policy. Officers must know the seriousness of misconduct and the level of punishment as well as the agency's intolerance of the code of silence (Klockars et al, 2000).

Organizational culture that can lead to corruption is influenced by the separation from the public, a strong dependence upon each other, and the resistance to change. A lack of training in ethics and a stronger focus on the organization and its beliefs influences one's thinking (Johnson & Cox, 2005). Within law enforcement agencies, a difference in cultures between line officers and management can create an untrusting atmosphere.

Wilson (1989) describes the street cop/management cop cultures that often pit line officers against management. Line officers want the assurance that management will support them at any cost. Management must protect the entire agency at any cost. This may mean disciplining officers and setting examples of those who do misdeeds. Line officers can form distrust towards management when they believe that management has "sold out" to the political side (Wilson, 1989). This division between street work and administrative work can result in an agency that is susceptible to problems or corruption from either side.

Organizational culture that tolerates corruption can lead to an atmosphere in which a "code of silence" thrives and is used to cover up unethical actions by both line officers and the organization. This code of silence is one of the four dimensions that lead to corruption according to Klockars et al. (2000). Trautman (2000) found that 79% of police academy recruits surveyed acknowledged that a code of silence exists and is fairly common. This code, often denied by administrators and officers, is a direct result of unethical organizational culture. Combating the code of silence includes ethics training, consistent accountability, open communication between officers and leaders, an anonymous reporting system, and whistleblower protection. Field training officers and line supervisors have the most ability to prevent a code of silence (Trautman, 2000). The use of such a code casts doubts by the public on the integrity and truthfulness of the organization. Not only does this damage the reputation of the agency, but it damages the reputation of the profession.

The practice of law enforcement suffers as a result of unethical behaviors by individuals and organizations. According to Cooper (1987), organizations can corrupt a practice by pursuing external goods such as power, status, money, or prestige. An organization must possess virtues that support the ethical principles of the organization and the citizens it serves. The virtues of the administrators or officers must be consistent with the internal goods of the practice. No virtues set forth by the practice and supported by the organization should ever be violated to advance the well-being of that organization. Individuals have a duty to their colleagues to abstain from subverting the virtues held by their practice. Each colleague then expects the same from each other. It is this expectation that keeps the practice respectable. Lack of virtues by an individual damages the entire practice (Cooper, 1987).

It is the organizational approach that must be addressed and changed so that the problem of corruption can be fixed. The old transactional style of leadership in which one leader controls the organization needs to be replaced with a transformational style in which changes are made through the cooperation and input of all the members. If positive changes are to be made, therefore, it will take the consensus of the entire organization from the bottom to the top (Johnson & Cox, 2005).

The overall results of law enforcement organizations lacking ethical behaviors are public mistrust and loss of support. As governmental organizations, law enforcement agencies must demonstrate their ability to retain the trust of the citizens they protect. Gaining public trust requires an organization and public administrators to demonstrate trustworthy behaviors. Ethical behaviors that lead to public trust include integrity, openness, loyalty, ethical competence, and consistency. The more ethical a government is, the more public trust it gains. The more a government does to improve its ethical state, the more support and trust it receives. The behaviors of individuals within a government can strongly influence public trust. Management must act as role models to subordinates; this helps to create a more ethical environment, which increases public trust. Openness by employees should be encouraged. Increased openness among employees leads to increased public trust (Feldheim & Wang, 2004).

Analysis and Methodology of the Survey Questions

The National Institute of Justice (NIJ) conducted a study on the integrity of 30 law enforcement agencies. This study consisted of 11 hypothetical scenarios used to measure police misconduct and corruption. The scenarios varied in seriousness and were rated by the participants. Less serious scenarios included running a security business during off hours, accepting unsolicited meals and small value items from merchants on a beat, receiving holiday gifts of food and liquor, and covering up an officer involved in a DUI. Moderately serious scenarios included excessive force after a foot pursuit, a supervisor giving a subordinate time off in return for mechanical work on the supervisor's personal car, exchange of free drinks for ignoring a bar that is open too late, and receipt of a kickback from a towing company. The most serious of scenarios involved stealing a watch from a crime scene, taking money from a found wallet, and accepting a bribe in exchange for not issuing a traffic citation. The responses to the questions about each scenario suggest the ethical attitudes and behaviors exhibited by the participants and, collectively, the agency they represent (Klockars et al., 2000) (See Appendix I).

The responses to the survey were used to measure officers' knowledge of their own policies regarding the actions, their opinions of the seriousness of the offense, how others view the seriousness of the offense, the level of discipline that should be invoked, the level of discipline that would probably be invoked, whether the officer would report another officer engaged in the behavior, and whether other officers would report others engaged in the behavior (Klockars et al., 2000) (See Appendix II).

The behaviors suggested by the NIJ survey give an indication of the organizational culture that exists within each agency. This culture, as mentioned earlier, is a culmination of all the attitudes and beliefs of all personnel as well as the policies and views of the organization. To investigate this further, this article focuses on

just one scenario. Case 7 of the survey—a supervisor allows a subordinate time off during a holiday in return for mechanical work on the supervisor’s personal car—will be examined to determine whether there is a significant difference in the responses of line officers and supervisors. This scenario is the only one of the 11 that was designed to evaluate the ethical behaviors of supervisors. By using this scenario, one can investigate the ethical behaviors of officers and different levels of management. This will be done by analyzing the responses of those who indicated rank. An “unknown” or “other” response to the question of rank resulted in the respondent’s disqualification.

Analyzing Case 7 can illustrate ethical disparities that could exist between different levels of management and their impact on officers. By examining this, one may be able to determine the ethical attitudes and even predict the ethical behaviors that exist within a law enforcement organization. It is hypothesized that . . .

Hypothesis 1 – An officer’s attitude towards supervisor misconduct is positively associated with the officer’s attitude regarding peer attitudes towards supervisor misconduct, the officer’s awareness of policies prohibiting the supervisor misconduct, supervisory position, length of service, and the size of the agency.

Hypothesis 2 – An officer’s attitude towards punishing supervisor misconduct is positively associated with the officer’s attitude regarding peer attitudes towards supervisor misconduct, the officer’s awareness of policies prohibiting the supervisor misconduct, actual punishment, supervisory position, length of service, and the size of the agency.

Hypothesis 3 – An officer’s willingness to report supervisor misconduct is positively associated with the officer’s attitude regarding peer willingness to report misconduct, the officer’s attitude regarding peer attitudes towards supervisor misconduct, the officer’s awareness of policies prohibiting the supervisor misconduct, actual punishment, supervisory position, length of service, and the size of the agency.

This study focuses on the attitudes of officers and managers towards Case 7 of the NIJ survey. The responses to three questions concerning Case 7 will be analyzed to determine any inconsistencies between the three different levels of management and the attitudes and behaviors of officers towards supervisor misconduct. The first question, “How serious do you consider this behavior to be?” is answered using a five-point Likert scale ranging from “Not at all serious” to “Very serious.” The second question, “If an officer in your agency engaged in this behavior and was discovered doing so, what, if any, discipline do you think should follow?” uses the ordinal list of choices “None,” “Verbal reprimand,” “Written reprimand,” “Period of suspension without pay,” “Demotion in rank,” and “Dismissal.” The third question, “Do you think you would report a fellow police officer who engaged in this behavior?” again uses a five-point Likert scale ranging from “Definitely not” to “Definitely yes.” The first and second questions reveal attitudes one would have toward the situation; whereas, the third question is an indication of behavioral action. These particular questions will be used to investigate the different levels of management and officer attitudes.

The different ranks of officers used in this survey are constructed by combining the indicated ranks the officers provided when answering the survey question regarding their rank. For this analysis, five ranks of officers are used. These ranks are officers that include recruits, line officers, deputies, and corporals who are not supervisors; detectives; first-line supervisors comprised of sergeants and corporals who are supervisors; mid-level managers that include lieutenants and captains; and senior-level managers consisting of majors, colonels, and chiefs.

The three levels of management (first-line, mid-level, and senior-level) and officer attitudes will be the focus of this study. By separating these levels of management, we will be able to acquire a better understanding of how management views certain ethical situations and their impact on officer attitudes.

Validity

Thirty police agencies were contacted in which 3,235 officers from all of the contacted agencies responded. This resulted in an overall response rate of 55.5%. Due to confidentiality, the exact types of police agencies contacted were not revealed; however, the types of agencies did not include any state agencies and only one sheriff's agency (Klockars et al., 2000). There is also selection bias of the surveyed agencies as they were not randomly chosen. The sample taken from law enforcement agencies was done as a convenience sample; hence, there is an increased threat to external validity. The conclusions of this article are, therefore, only representative of the agencies who participated in the NIJ study.

Results

Analysis of the data collected by the NIJ survey regarding Case 7 has been compiled in the following tables. The first illustrates basic statistics of the groups that were analyzed; the other three are regression models that could be used to address the attitudes and behaviors of officers and management. The regression models are based upon the independent variables listed in the tables; the dependent variable is the response of officers. Using these different variables in each situation will provide indicators for determining what factors influence an officer's decision-making process.

Table 1 presents the means, standard deviations, and variances of officers and the three levels of management studied in regards to the three questions of the scenario. These responses were based upon the individual's attitudes and behaviors towards the misconduct. One noteworthy item of interest here is that there is a slight increase in the mean scores of the three levels of management as rank increases. While there is a slight increase, the difference in means among management levels is very small in comparison to the difference in means between officers and managers. Also, standard deviations and variances are higher for discipline and willingness to report. These results suggest that managers have similar responses in attitudes towards the seriousness of the misconduct but are not as cohesive in their attitudes about how to punish and whether or not to report supervisory misconduct.

Table 1. Means, Standard Deviations, and Variances of the Three Levels of Management

Level of Management		Seriousness of Supervisor Misconduct 1 = Not at all serious 2 3 4 5 = Very serious	Discipline of Supervisor Misconduct 1 = None 2 = Verbal reprimand 3 = Written reprimand 4 = Suspension w/out pay 5 = Demotion 6 = Dismissal	Willingness to Report Supervisor Misconduct 1 = Definitely no 2 3 4 5 = Definitely yes
		Officers	Mean	4.06
	Standard Deviation	1.100	1.246	1.467
	Variance	1.210	1.553	2.152
	N	2,085	2,082	2,080
First-Line Managers	Mean	4.53	3.90	4.22
	Standard Deviation	.762	1.055	1.072
	Variance	.581	1.113	1.149
	N	376	376	377
Mid-Level Managers	Mean	4.61	3.90	4.33
	Standard Deviation	.619	.949	1.057
	Variance	.384	.900	1.118
	N	167	166	166
Senior-Level Managers	Mean	4.63	4.20	4.46
	Standard Deviation	.771	1.135	1.087
	Variance	.594	1.288	1.181
	N	57	56	57

Table 2. Results of Regression Analysis of Officers' Own Attitudes Towards the Seriousness of Supervisor Misconduct

Independent Variables	Attitudes Towards Seriousness		
	B	Standard Error	Beta
First-Line Managers	.194**	.037	.061
Mid-Level Managers	.306**	.053	.067
Senior-Level Managers	.132**	.084	.017
Length of Service	.018*	.007	.029
Size of Agency	.009	.010	.010
Violation of Policy	.222**	.014	.206
Others' Views of Seriousness	.627**	.012	.661

R² = .648 * p < .05
 F = 791.747 ** p < .001

Table 2 represents the regression analysis observed from the attitudes of the respondents towards the seriousness of a supervisor's misconduct in the scenario. The results show that although all three levels of management are significant, no level of management has much of an impact on an officer's attitude towards the seriousness of supervisor misconduct ($\beta = .061, .067, .017$, respectively). Of all three levels, mid-level managers have the highest beta weights. The same is true for length of service ($\beta = .029$) and the size of the agency ($\beta = .010$). The results partially support Hypothesis 1, which states that officers' attitudes towards supervisor misconduct is positively associated with the officer's attitude regarding peer attitudes towards supervisor misconduct, the officer's awareness of policies prohibiting the supervisor misconduct, supervisor position, length of service, and the size of the agency. The impact of supervisory position, although small, does lend some support to this hypothesis; whereas, the size of the agency, which is not significant, does not.

What does have a much stronger impact is officers' attitude about the way others view the seriousness of the misconduct ($\beta = .661$) and to a lesser extent, the possibility of it being a violation of policy ($\beta = .206$). This supports Hypothesis 1, that the attitudes of others towards the seriousness of supervisor misconduct does affect an officer's attitude and is partially supported by whether the offense is a violation of policy. An officer's attitude can be influenced by peer pressure or doing wrong in the eyes of fellow officers.

If an officer feels that a policy violation is overlooked or does not know if such a policy exists, then the officer may not view this as serious. This model demonstrates that a major influence on officer attitudes towards the seriousness of misconduct is how he or she believes others will feel about the seriousness of the misconduct.

Table 3. Regression Analysis of Officers' Opinions of What Discipline Should Follow Supervisor Misconduct

Independent Variables	Attitudes Towards Discipline		
	B	Standard Error	Beta
First-Line Managers	-.094*	.042	-.026
Mid-Level Managers	-.085	.061	-.016
Senior-Level Managers	.090	.097	.010
Length of Service	.041**	.008	.058
Size of Agency	.018	.012	.017
Violation of Policy	.079**	.017	.064
Others' Views of Seriousness	-.048*	.019	-.044
Discipline That Would Follow	.585**	.012	.598
Own Attitude Toward Seriousness	.389**	.021	.337

R² = .660 * p < .05
 F = 646.290 ** p < .001

The second regression model, Table 3, illustrates an officer's opinion of what discipline should be dealt supervisors who engage in misconduct. Here again, we find that the level of management does not have a crucial impact on attitudes towards discipline ($\beta = -.026, -.016, .010$, respectively). The negative beta weights indicate that first-line and mid-level managers actually have a negative impact on an officer's attitude towards discipline. The strongest negative beta weights are exhibited by first-line managers while senior-level managers demonstrate the strongest positive beta weights among the levels of managers. Length of service ($\beta = .058$) and agency size ($\beta = .017$) do not play a significant role in officer attitudes. Even violation of policy ($\beta = .064$) and others' views of the seriousness of the conduct ($\beta = -.044$) has little to do with influencing an officer's views of punishment. Length of service and an officer's awareness of a violation of policy only partially support Hypothesis 2, which states that officer attitude towards punishing supervisor misconduct is positively associated with officer attitude regarding peer attitudes towards supervisor misconduct, the officer's awareness of policies prohibiting the supervisor misconduct, actual punishment, supervisory position, length of service, and the size of the agency. Supervisory position, agency size, and peer attitudes towards supervisor misconduct are either insignificant or demonstrate a negative impact towards an officer's attitude towards punishment.

What an officer expects the punishment will be ($\beta = .598$) and his or her own attitude towards the seriousness of the offense ($\beta = .337$) does impact an officer's opinion about punishment. These two factors support Hypothesis 2. They both strongly influence the attitudes of officers.

The regression model suggests that the level of punishment an officer feels is justifiable can be regulated by what he or she believes the real punishment to be. This affects an officer's opinion in that the officer knows the possible "range limits" set by the agency. Punishment cannot be too strict or too lenient. The officer's own feelings of how serious the misconduct is will also dictate how much punishment should be bestowed.

Table 4. Regression Analysis of Officers' Own Willingness to Report Supervisor Misconduct

Independent variables	Willingness to Report Misconduct		
	B	Standard Error	Beta
First-Line Managers	.352**	.045	.080
Mid-Level Managers	.475**	.065	.074
Senior-Level Managers	.374**	.103	.035
Length of Service	.028*	.009	.033
Size of Agency	.060**	.013	.045
Discipline That Would Follow	.048**	.014	.041
Own Attitude Toward Seriousness	.484**	.022	.346
Others' Attitude Toward Seriousness	-.269**	.022	-.203
Violation of Policy	.034	.018	.022
Other Officers Reporting	.765**	.014	.705

R² = .734 * p < .05
 F = 827.696 ** p < .001

The last regression model, Table 4, shows the willingness to report supervisor misconduct. Although the three levels of management are significant, they are still not very strong predictors of reporting supervisor misconduct ($\beta = .080, .074, .035$, respectively). First-line managers have the strongest impact with mid-level managers close behind. This third regression model also demonstrates the trend of senior-level managers to have the weakest impact out of all the levels of management. Senior-level managers tend to show the weakest beta weights throughout the three models compared to the other levels of management.

As with the other two models, the length of service ($\beta = .033$) and the size of an agency ($\beta = .045$), even though they are significant, still do not impact an officer's decision to report supervisor misconduct. Violation of policy ($\beta = .022$) and the possible discipline that is expected ($\beta = .041$) showed no indication of being a strong influence on decisionmaking. Hypothesis 3, which states that an officer's willingness to report supervisor misconduct is positively associated with the officer's attitude regarding peer willingness to report misconduct, the officer's attitude regarding peer attitudes towards supervisor misconduct, the officer's attitude regarding punishing supervisor misconduct, the officer's awareness of policies prohibiting the supervisor misconduct, actual punishment, supervisory position, length of service, and the size of the agency, is partially supported by

these results. All variables lend support to Hypothesis 3, except for an officer's awareness of policy violation, due to its insignificance, and an officer's attitude regarding peer attitudes towards supervisor misconduct because it impacts one's willingness to report in a negative way. How serious an officer believes others think the misconduct is ($\beta = -.203$) has a slightly negative impact on an officer reporting the misconduct. This indicates that the more serious officers think their peers view the misconduct, the less likely they are to report it. The perception of peer attitudes towards such behavior can thus result in making decisions based upon peer pressure rather than on ethical awareness. This is where the possibility of corruption and unethical behaviors can begin.

The biggest determining factor of whether an officer is willing to report misconduct is the officer's perception of whether or not other officers would report this misconduct ($\beta = .705$). The officer's attitude towards the seriousness of misconduct also influences the decision to report misconduct ($\beta = .346$). Hypothesis 3 is supported by the influence of others' willingness to report misconduct. It is also partially supported by one's own attitude towards the seriousness of the misconduct. This behavior of whether to report an incident or not relies deeply on the actions of others.

No one wants to be a whistleblower and face the possibility of reprisal from fellow officers or management, but this may also be opposed by a person's own feelings of how serious the misconduct is. It is in these situations when the internal pressure of what to do is eclipsed by the pressures of others. This model illustrates what can be expected when informal organizations and peer pressures have more influence than rules and regulations. This can lead to unreported acts of unethical behaviors. A strong indicator of a person's willingness to report unethical conduct is how he or she might perceive others' willingness to report the same conduct. This could be helpful in identifying and correcting problems with the "code of silence" within an organization.

The results of the correlations of attitudes and behaviors as shown in Table 5 help to support all three hypotheses in that the highest correlation in each of the three categories of own attitude towards seriousness, own attitude towards punishment, and own willingness to report misconduct is an officer's perception of what he or she believes others feel. The presumption of others' attitude toward seriousness by an officer shows a very strong positive relationship to an officer's own attitude toward seriousness of supervisor misconduct. This again indicates that an officers' own feelings and attitudes are influenced by what he or she believes other officers' attitudes are. One's own feelings towards punishment and seriousness of the offense also show a moderate positive relationship, which can influence officers' decisions.

Table 5. Correlations of Attitudes and Behaviors

		Correlations		
		Own Attitude Toward Seriousness	Own Attitude Toward Punishment	Own Willingness to Report
Own Attitude Toward Seriousness	N	1 3083	.586** 3074	.589** 3075
Others' Attitudes Toward Seriousness	N	.778** 3077	.522** 3071	.522** 3072
Punishment That Should Follow	N	.586** 3074	1 3077	.590** 3072
Punishment That Would Follow	N	.408** 3072	.748** 3070	.482** 3070
Own Willingness to Report Misconduct	N	.589** 3075	.590** 3072	1 3078
Others' Willingness to Report Misconduct	N	.492** 3074	.532** 3071	.807** 3074
Length of Service	N	.138** 3062	.139** 3056	.218** 3058
Size of Agency	N	-.021 3083	.021 3077	.012 3078
Violation of Policy	N	.554** 3071	.509** 3066	.424** 3067
First-Line Managers	N	.126** 3054	.098** 3049	.201** 3049
Mid-Level Managers	N	.100** 3054	.063** 3049	.146** 3049
Senior-Level Managers	N	.060** 3054	.069** 3049	.096** 3049

** Significant at the .01 level (2-tailed)

Attitudes towards punishment that should follow and punishment that would follow exhibit a strong positive relationship. An officer's beliefs about how others feel towards punishment of supervisor misconduct play a large role in their own attitudes towards punishment. Not wanting to be too harsh or too lenient on punishment, officers may develop a consensus of the punishment misconduct deserves from other coworkers. There is also a moderate relationship to one's own attitude towards seriousness and willingness to report, which may affect the level of punishment for this misconduct.

Moderate positive relationships exist between an officer's own attitude and others' attitudes towards the seriousness of the offense and an officer's attitude towards punishment and the willingness to report. Others' willingness to report misconduct shows a very high positive correlation to the willingness of one's own reporting of such incidents. This is very important because it illustrates and supports the idea of the "code of silence" and the informal police subculture that can lead to corruption (Klockars et al., 2000; Pollock, 1998; Trautman, 2000).

There seems to be almost no relationship between level of management and the three categories examined. Ranging from .060 to .201, these relationships are significant but show little in regards to strength. The first-line manager, however, does show a stronger relationship than the mid-level or senior-level managers.

Conclusions

This study explored the ethical attitudes and behaviors between law enforcement personnel and the different relationships that exist. This study demonstrated through correlation and regression analysis that strong relationships do exist between an officer's own attitudes and behaviors and those he or she believes that others exhibit. The results show that attitudes and behaviors are influenced by fellow officers.

The findings indicate that level of management has no major effect on the attitudes and behaviors that are exhibited by officers. There are slight differences in responses between first-line, mid-level, and senior-level managers, but these were found to be insignificant. Even though these management levels do not play an important role, the dependence upon the perceived notion of what other officers think does play a significant role.

An officer's attitude towards the seriousness of supervisor misconduct is affected by how he or she feels about other officers' attitudes toward this misconduct. The officer's knowledge of the conduct as being a violation of policy or not also influences his or her decision on seriousness. This demonstrates how an officer's judgment toward ethical behavior is molded. The level of management has very little effect on this ethical decision. The length of service or size of agency also plays a very small part in the officer's views. Dependency upon what an officer thinks others' attitudes are puts more importance on making sure that all officers in an organization conform to high ethical standards.

Punishment that an officer believes should follow the supervisor misconduct is affected by not only his or her attitude towards the seriousness of the offense but, more importantly, what punishment would be received by the department. This indicates that officers will judge the punishments for such violations based upon the organization's view. This can be advantageous if the agency has a record of appropriate and consistent penalties for this type of misconduct.

The most important aspect of this study is the examination of an officer's willingness to report supervisor misconduct. Level of management, length of service, agency size, punishment that would follow, and others' attitudes towards seriousness play no significant role in the decision to report, but the willingness of others to report does. This is illustrated by the major dependence upon the willingness of others to report such misconduct and the smaller influence of one's own attitude towards seriousness. With such a strong influence by others on reporting ethical misconduct, an officer surrenders his or her own beliefs and values to his or her coworkers. This behavior is then controlled by the "group" or to a larger extent, the organization. This can also be advantageous to the organization if it maintains a culture of high expectations of ethical standards. By preserving these standards throughout the organization, officers will adhere to them more if they believe others are doing the same. This is why continued ethics training is so important to the integrity of an organization.

Level of management, in this study, did not seem to have much of an influence on officer attitudes or behaviors. The limits of this study do not allow for an in-depth analysis of the varying levels of management. Using only one scenario in

which supervisor misconduct was evaluated limits the findings to this particular type of misconduct. Other variables that were not considered in this study could contribute to the inconsistent managerial views and influence of different levels of management on the attitudes and behaviors of law enforcement officers. The effects of differences among levels of management on different peer attitudes and behaviors could be the subject of future analyses.

As indicated by the regression models, the influence of others has a great power over those making ethical decisions. This power can often lead to a subverted culture that can exist within an organization. The peer pressure and perceptions of what others may think can lead an officer to “go along with the crowd” or “watch each other’s backs.” This can then develop into lack of integrity or even corruption (Johnson & Cox, 2005; Klockars et al., 2000). Corrupt or dishonest organizations are then at risk of losing public trust. Loss of trust, in turn, results in loss of support (Feldheim & Wang, 2004).

The correlations found between the questions of attitude and behavior also help to sustain the hypotheses that indicate that the influence of others can influence one’s own decision-making process. This demonstrates not only that a relationship exists between the supposed views of others and one’s own views, but it shows that there is a strong relationship. The strength of this relationship is so strong that it has been known to corrupt officers and ruin careers. The work of Weisburd, Hamilton, Williams, Bryant, and Greenspan (2000) supports the idea that going against another officer can result in social isolation. This work also reports that most officers agree that not reporting misconduct is not uncommon (Weisburd et al., 2000). This “code of silence” may often lead officers and management to step over that boundary of breaking ethical rules and into corruption (Klockars et al., 2000; Trautman, 2000).

This provides a starting point to determine what ethical problems can exist within the law enforcement community and what areas need to be addressed during ethics training. Ethics training needs to be a balance of theoretical and practical applications. This training needs to address critical thinking, reasoning skills, and problem-solving abilities. Identifying and defining the virtues that comprise integrity is the first step in developing officers of integrity (Vicchio, 1997). Ethics training should not end after the usual short 4-hour courses taught in most police training academies (IACP, 2001). Instead, it should continue throughout an officer’s career and into management. The use of ethics in a law enforcement agency is something that just cannot be taught; it must be integrated into the organizational culture (Vicchio, 1997).

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Appendix I

Case Scenario Assessment Options

1. How serious do YOU consider this behavior to be?
Not at all serious Very serious
1 2 3 4 5

2. How serious do MOST POLICE OFFICERS IN YOUR AGENCY consider this behavior to be?
Not at all serious Very serious
1 2 3 4 5

3. Would this behavior be regarded as a violation of official policy in your agency?
Definitely Not Definitely Yes
1 2 3 4 5

4. If an officer in your agency engaged in this behavior and was discovered doing so, what, if any, discipline do YOU think SHOULD follow?
 1. None
 2. Verbal Reprimand
 3. Written Reprimand
 4. Period of Suspension Without Pay
 5. Demotion in Rank
 6. Dismissal

5. If an officer in your agency engaged in this behavior and was discovered doing so, what if any discipline do YOU think WOULD follow?
 1. None
 2. Verbal Reprimand
 3. Written Reprimand
 4. Period of Suspension Without Pay
 5. Demotion in Rank
 6. Dismissal

6. Do you think YOU would report a fellow police officer who engaged in this behavior?
Definitely Not Definitely Yes
1 2 3 4 5

7. Do you think MOST POLICE OFFICERS IN YOUR AGENCY would report a fellow police officer who engaged in this behavior?
Definitely Not Definitely Yes
1 2 3 4 5

Source: Klockars et al., 2000, p. 5

Appendix II

Case Scenarios

Case 1. A police officer runs his own private business in which he sells and installs security devices, such as alarms, special locks, etc. He does this work during his off-duty hours.

Case 2. A police officer routinely accepts free meals, cigarettes, and other items of small value from merchants on his beat. He does not solicit these gifts and is careful not to abuse the generosity of those who give gifts to him.

Case 3. A police officer stops a motorist for speeding. The officer agrees to accept a personal gift of half of the amount of the fine in exchange for not issuing a citation.

Case 4. A police officer is widely liked in the community, and on holidays, local merchants and restaurant and bar owners show their appreciation for his attention by giving him gifts of food and liquor.

Case 5. A police officer discovers a burglary of a jewelry shop. The display cases are smashed, and it is obvious that many items have been taken. While searching the shop, he takes a watch, worth about 2 days' pay for that officer. He reports that the watch had been stolen during the burglary.

Case 6. A police officer has a private arrangement with a local auto body shop to refer the owners of cars damaged in accidents to the shop. In exchange for each referral, he receives payment of 5% of the repair bill from the shop owner.

Case 7. A police officer, who happens to be a very good auto mechanic, is scheduled to work during coming holidays. A supervisor offers to give him these days off, if he agrees to tune up his supervisor's personal car. Evaluate the *supervisor's* behavior.

Case 8. At 2:00 AM, a police officer, who is on duty, is driving his patrol car on a deserted road. He sees a vehicle that has been driven off the road and is stuck in a ditch. He approaches the vehicle and observes that the driver is not hurt but is obviously intoxicated. He also finds that the driver is a police officer. Instead of reporting this accident and offense, he transports the driver to his home.

Case 9. A police officer finds a bar on his beat that is still serving drinks a half-hour past its legal closing time. Instead of reporting this violation, the police officer agrees to accept a couple of free drinks from the owner.

Case 10. Two police officers on foot patrol surprise a man who is attempting to break into an automobile. The man flees. They chase him for about two blocks before apprehending him by tackling him and wrestling him to the ground. After he is under control, both officers punch him a couple of times in the stomach as punishment for fleeing and resisting.

Case 11. A police officer finds a wallet in a parking lot. It contains an amount of money equivalent to a full day's pay for that officer. He reports the wallet as lost property but keeps the money for himself.

Source: Klockars et al., 2000, p. 4

Higher Education in the Continuum of Training and Education and Keeping Management/Leadership Training Relevant and Current: From Supervisor to Chief

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Introduction

The prevalence of management, leadership, and executive development programs are evidenced by the literature that reveals a plethora of seminars and courses delivered by public, private, and nonprofit organizations. There are consulting companies, journals, consortia, and business schools in existence to specifically address the development of leaders. Proquest/UMI's dissertation database (2006) contains more than 835 studies on leadership in the past 25 years as well as 65 specific studies on leadership development and executive development, but few studies are aimed at the development of leadership in policing.

According to a meta-analysis of 83 leadership development programs from 1982-2001, Collins (2002) determined that the most effective leadership development programs included the following elements:

- The organization's strategic framework leads to the content of the program.
- Participants in the program are of mixed levels of responsibility.
- Multiple training techniques and knowledge and expertise outcome measures are used.
- The program focuses on the leadership requirements of today and the future.

The importance of executive development programs is immeasurable. Current practice, the overlap in programs, course content coverage, and the vacuum in these training efforts are all topics that need to be frequently examined. This article focuses on the efforts of programs in both New England and California. These programs are delivered in collaboration with institutions of higher education.

With the serious human capital issue (recruiting and retention) facing police organizations related to impending retirements, succession planning, development, and enrichment of future leaders is of paramount importance. Expectations have been heightened for law enforcement and other public safety organizations. As they undertake those efforts, there is the need for external awareness and outreach.

Bennis (1989) provides a passage describing the contrast between management and leadership:

The manager administers; the leader innovates. The manager is a copy; the leader is an original. The manager maintains; the leader develops. The manager focuses on systems and structure; the leader focuses on people. The manager relies on control; the leader inspires trust.

The manager has a short-range view; the leader has a long-range perspective. The manager asks how and when; the leader asks what and why. The manager has his eye always on the bottom line; the leader has his eye on the horizon. The manager imitates; the leader originates.

The manager accepts the status quo; the leader challenges it. The manager is the classic good soldier; the leader is his own person. The manager does things right; the leader does the right thing. Effective performance by supervisors and managers require an understanding and application of both management and leadership skills. (p. 45)

While these contrasts may seem simplistic, upon close examination, the comparisons show distinct differences in management and leader behaviors. Clearly, leaders exercise several of the constructs laid out by Bennis (1989). In the current climate of policing, police supervision and management is better served by those with an ability to exercise both management and leadership skills at the appropriate moments.

Dean (2006) discusses the introduction of an educational mindset instead of a training mindset for police through the encouragement of establishing critical thinking skills. He defends the importance of weaving critical thinking opportunities in both the content and “process” of teaching. Dean references a similar delivery approach of an educational model in international policing for the Singapore Police Force, utilizing a hybrid paradigm model of online delivery and intensive face-to-face seminars.

In the 1990s, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) undertook a fundamental review of all its training, with the objective of introducing problem solving and the continuous learning approach, which is essential to community policing (Himelfarb, 1997). Himelfarb further asserted that the RCMP training evolved into a learner-centered approach rather than an instructor-centered model, leading to a paradigm shift in which the impetus became more learning than training.

Consistent with Knowles’ (1984a, 1984b) principles of adult learning, an adult-centered approach is preferred to help open dialogue as a means of accessing the experience and encouraging reflection of the students. Birzer and Tannehill (2001) suggest that the theory of andragogy is effective in police education. In addition, Birzer and Tannehill assert . . .

Andragogy, with its emphasis on self-directed and continuous learning, past experience of the learner and others, and trainer as facilitator of knowledge, is one effective means to re-engineer police training and align with the changes required for the community policing philosophy. The central features of andragogy have

the potential to meet organizational demands for cost-effectiveness and value, as well as police officers' demands for relevance and autonomy.

Birzer and Tannehill (2001) recognized changes in the approach to training with the RCMP as a means to deal with the challenges of policing.

Another salient feature of the RCMP approach is the client-centered design of training. For example, the police assess and define problems through understanding the needs and expectations of their client base. The RCMP has placed increased emphasis on self-directed learning and continuous learning. All members of the RCMP are now expected to accept increased responsibility for their own development. This is in stark contrast to many police agencies in which commanders or supervisors pick the classes that their personnel will attend and the officer has minimal say in the type of training he or she desires or needs to attend (Birzer & Tannehill, 2001).

There are a number of trainers that stress the importance of including the concept of customer service in contemporary police training. This concept is being reinforced in training sessions for management and executive development in New England and California through the course content delivery model.

Pedagogy v. Andragogy

Facilitated discussions, led by skilled instructors, are aimed to encourage sharing, enhance reflection, and encourage critical thinking skills. Knowles (1970) defined andragogy as the "art and science of helping adults learn." Knowles argued that adults must be taught differently than children because the learning process of adults is drastically distinct when compared to that of children or the traditional pedagogical approach.

Adult learning models have called for a participant-driven, facilitator-led approach. According to Knowles (1984), andragogy was premised on several crucial assumptions about adult learners differing from assumptions about child learners on which traditional pedagogy is premised:

- Self-concept – As a person matures, his or her self-concept moves from one of being a dependent personality toward one of being a self-directed human being.
- Experience – As a person matures, he or she accumulates a growing reservoir of experience that becomes an increasing resource for learning.
- Readiness to learn – As a person matures, his or her readiness to learn becomes oriented increasingly to the developmental tasks of his or her social roles.
- Orientation to learning – As a person matures, his or her time perspective changes from one of postponed application of knowledge to immediacy of application, and accordingly, his or her orientation toward learning shifts from one of subject-centeredness to one of problem centeredness.
- Motivation to learn – As a person matures, the motivation to learn is internal. (Knowles, 1984, p. 12)

Birzer (2004) adapted Knowles' (1970) work and described some of the distinctions between the learning styles of adults:

- Adults need to know why they need to learn something before undertaking to learn it.
- Adults have a self-concept of being responsible for their own lives.
- Adults come into an educational activity with both a greater volume and a different quality of experience from youths.
- Adults become ready to learn those things they need to know or to cope effectively with their real-life situations.
- In contrast to children's and youths' subject-centered orientation, adults are task-centered or problem-centered in their orientation to learning.
- While adults are responsive to some extrinsic motivators (e.g., better jobs, promotions, salary increases), the more potent motivators are intrinsic motivators (desire for increased self-esteem, quality of life, responsibility, job satisfaction). (Adapted from Birzer, 2004)

Birzer (2004) worked to apply the benefits of Knowles' Theory of Andragogy in the discipline of criminal justice education. Birzer believes that there are advantages to the andragogical application including that it draws on students' past experience, treats students as adults, adapts to the diverse needs and expectations of students, and develops critical thinking skills, judgment, and creativity in the learner. Oblinger (2005) likewise focuses on the importance of creating learning spaces designed to encourage an active, collaborative teaching and learning style.

Executive Development Efforts at the Institute

In recent times, executive development programs have shifted from teacher-centered to learner-centered delivery (Myrsiades, 2001). Many programs have used a case study approach with scenarios taken from real organizational situations focusing on the development of critical analysis skills.

An approach taken in New England at the Roger Williams University Justice System Training and Research Institute in Rhode Island is to allow the students to explore issues through experience, reflection, and contemplation while developing or enhancing their critical and strategic thinking and analysis skills. The Command Training Series focus of the First Line Supervisor's Course (FLSC), Mid-Manager Course (MMC), and Executive Development Course (EDC) is on facilitation rather than lecture. A conscious effort has been made to design a conceptual continuum of leadership and management training through a paradigm that facilitates career development of police officials utilizing the adult learning model. This is beneficial because participants in the noncredit-bearing courses are tenured and seasoned practitioners of diverse educational backgrounds.

At the Institute, the conceptual continuum begins with the Command Training Series: FLSC, which is intended to focus on the development of officers who are responsible for the day-to-day immediate supervision of individual police officers. Although most first-line supervisors are typically at the corporal or sergeant rank, the curriculum and its presentation are delivered with role responsibility, rather than rank title in mind. FLSC considers the difficulties of an employee

transitioning from a subordinate role to that of a supervisor, as well as issues related to decisionmaking in a supervisory and leadership relationship.

The Command Training Series: MMC, the second tier of the continuum, recognizes the scope of responsibility of a police official, typically a lieutenant, who oversees the function of a unit comprised of subordinate supervisors and police officers over whom he or she exercises authority. At the mid-manager level, at which sworn officers become responsible for larger groups of people, it is important to recognize the need to develop interpersonal and administrative skills as a means of accomplishing agency goals and objectives.

At the apex of the three-tiered continuum is the Command Training Series: EDC. The focus of this component is the role of administrators within a police agency, normally of the rank of captain, major, deputy chief, or chief, who have policymaking responsibilities in an agency. Conceptual knowledge and practical skill development are fostered as a means of advancing the formulation of goals and objectives in an agency.

There are unique approaches and dynamics for each component of the continuum, dependent upon the role and responsibility of the audience, with each level designed as a stand alone course. Course topics can be found in Appendix A. In the FLSC and MMC, case studies are introduced for problem identification and group process problem-solving exercises. At the EDC level, real-life issues are presented by students. Through collaboration, they identify the problems, potential stakeholders, and possible alternatives along with recommendations for action, implementation, and evaluation.

Enrollment for the EDC is typically limited to 20 students to ensure a low instructor-to-student ratio. The most recent iterations of the course at the Institute were conducted using a hybrid delivery model involving an initial introduction on a web-based distance learning platform preceding three days of classroom work. It is followed by one month of web-based distance learning, culminating with a return to the classroom for a three-day period. Course content is thoughtfully developed within the classroom through the web-based group discussion forums and application in student-selected project advancement. Critical thinking skills for “real-world” problems are reinforced as attendees confer with experienced law enforcement practitioners and academicians delivering the curriculum interactively.

Classroom participation is enhanced using web-based activities. This methodology facilitated students from a wide geographic range to post and share ideas and concepts relating to the course subject matter of Organizational Culture and Change Management, Leadership and Management Principles for the Law Enforcement Executive, Communications, Planning and Data Analysis for Decision-Making, Legal Issues, and Community and Political Environment Issues.

Focus is placed on self-evaluation and self-awareness through the application of Executive Core Qualifications (ECQ). The ECQ include Leading Change, Leading People, Driving Results, Business Acumen, and Building Coalitions/ Communications (U.S. Office of Personnel Management, 1994, 1998; Morreale & Ortmeier, 2004). These elements are used to identify and develop senior executive

service personnel in the federal government. Likewise, they have relevance to those aspiring for executive positions in law enforcement and public safety. (Morreale & Ortmeier, 2004).

The careful selection of course faculty is deemed to be of critical importance in accomplishing those objectives. The backgrounds of the selected faculty reflect focus group and survey research results utilized for program development. Birzer (2004) suggests that instructors should establish the climate, involve learners in mutual planning, involve learners in diagnosing their learning needs, encourage learners to formulate their learning objectives, encourage learners to identify resources and devise strategies for using such resources to accomplish their objectives, and involve learners in evaluating their learning.

During focus group research conducted by the Institute, New England regional police executives and training officials indicated that courses should be taught by instructors with extensive “real-world” experience and strong academic credentials. In that regard, faculty has been drawn primarily from throughout the New England law enforcement community, representing various sized agencies and jurisdictional responsibilities. Faculty typically hold, at a minimum, a master’s degree while a significant number hold doctoral degrees in public administration, law, criminal justice, and education.

Jurkanin and Sergevnin (2003) analyzed current national programs that focus on police executive development. This research expanded on past research by Heck (1990) in which police executive development programs were defined as being “specifically designed to develop the skills of upper-level police administrators.”

Heck (1990) identified 10 topics as principal areas for focus in executive development training. Jurkanin and Sergevnin (2003) found that only six topics appeared in 50% or more of recent programs, including personnel management, executive role in management, strategic planning, legal issues, budget management, and media relations. Additional topics were found in newer programs, including leadership, organizational theory and culture, ethics, communication, and forecasting issues.

The comparison of executive development programs allows researchers and practitioners to identify those topics believed to be most vital in management development and executive development programs.

Course Content Development at the Institute

In order to identify the roles and responsibilities of police executives in New England, focus group and survey research was conducted in the states of Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Vermont. The results from focus group discussions indicated that role responsibilities of police executives are similar throughout the six New England states and included personnel issues, media relations, community relations, recruitment strategies, disciplinary matters, stress management, budgeting, crisis management, and operating in the political landscape. These topics served as the basis for the development of course content at the Institute.

Following the initial focus group questionnaires, a group of 28 chiefs representing each of the six New England states was asked to participate in a survey while attending the fall 2004 meeting of the New England Association of Chiefs of Police. In an effort to identify the needs of active chiefs in New England, survey participants were asked to identify program areas concerning management, self-enrichment, and specialized topics. The questionnaire utilized a five-part Likert scale with ratings from undesirable, somewhat desirable, desirable, or very desirable. The results found that chiefs were interested in developing capacity for executive management (64.3%), mid-level management (71.4%), and first-line supervisor (60.7%). The question pertaining to self-enrichment programs found the topic of leadership rated as very desirable by the majority of chiefs at (53.6%). Clearly, there is a clamor from the law enforcement community for the provision of training that develops conceptual, critical thinking, and leadership skills.

California-Based Initiatives: California POST

For the past three years, the California Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training (POST) has spearheaded a massive revision of the basic police academy curriculum. Among POST's efforts was a major initiative to integrate leadership, ethics, and community policing concepts and skill development exercises throughout all of the 41 learning domains (subjects/courses) of the state's basic police academy. Hundreds of law enforcement personnel and subject matter experts were involved in the project.

Effective January 2006, all police academy recruits in California are now exposed to leadership, ethics, and community problem-solving skill development in the basic academy. The concepts are reinforced throughout the basic academy. Since POST academy graduates are employed by California's 600-plus local, county, and state agencies, all new officers are receiving leadership development training. Furthermore, most of the state's 81 academies are affiliated with community colleges; thus, basic academy recruits earn college credit for the academy experience.

California Public Safety Leadership and Ethics Program (CPSLEP)

In California, a program aimed at developing presupervisory public safety professionals into leaders for tomorrow was conceived. Using a humanities-based leadership development program with proven success in higher education at the undergraduate and graduate levels, a program originally created by Phi Theta Kappa Leadership Development Studies has taken shape. The California Public Safety Leadership and Ethics Program (CPSLEP) is administered by Phi Theta Kappa (PTK), an international honor society of 2-year colleges and the International Public Safety Leadership and Ethics Institute.

The CPSLEP incorporated the unique curriculum and approaches to leadership studies of Phi Theta Kappa Leadership Development Studies to create an innovative and leading edge program for the professional development of industry professionals in the disciplines of law enforcement, fire service, and corrections.

In 2001, a grant served as the impetus for convening a curriculum development committee of 12 representing all three public safety disciplines. The intention of the

CPSLEP is to prepare members early in their careers to contribute at higher levels of leadership roles and responsibilities within their personal, community, and professional lives. To achieve this vision, the California Public Safety Leadership Program attempts to do the following:

- Provide participants with the opportunity to develop and enhance a personal philosophy of leadership that focuses on self, others, the organization, and a larger community.
- Provide participants the opportunity to gain a variety of leadership experiences.
- Utilize a variety of leadership development techniques, theories, and models.
- Help participants develop the ability to initiate and lead organizational change.
- Assist the participants toward greater levels of leadership complexity, integration, and proficiency.
- Provide the participants with opportunities to develop professional networks of public safety personnel from a variety of disciplines including fire, law, and corrections. (Program Materials CPSLEP, 2004)

The curriculum team designed a four-course, 160-hour program and field tested each course three times, revising and refining them based on feedback from professionals participating in the pilot courses.

This curriculum focuses on facilitated adult learning. It was designed to be an interactive participant-based program with a focus on learning activities in which the participant is an active player.

Program and Course Objectives

The basic premise of the curriculum is to ensure that participants receive a guided personal journey of leadership development with an emphasis on ethics. The program objectives, along with the individual course objectives, were developed and reviewed by a large number of industry professionals for relevance and target goals. Subsequent to development, the objectives were given consideration by Academic Review Boards at several community colleges for consistency with current methods for preparation of adult learning objectives. The objectives were then reviewed by PTK for consistency with leadership learning objectives within the PTK program, as well as from their broad based knowledge of leadership development programs around the United States and the international community.

Program Overview

The target audience for the CPSLEP includes a primary audience of presupervisory successor development. Preservice personnel are the secondary audience along with journey level/supervisory members of police, fire, and corrections. The courses include Developing a Personal Philosophy of Leadership, Leading Others, Organization Leadership, as well as Ethics and the Challenge of Leadership. Course descriptions can be found in Appendix B. Each course is intended to build on the other. The facilitator guide for each course is generally set up for 8-hour days but may be modified for shorter segments as necessary to meet local needs.

There are two specific approaches to presenting this program. The first is to conduct the program over a 2-semester period. Most community colleges utilize a 16-week semester. This provides for a total of 32 weeks over 2 semesters in which to present 19, 8-hour sessions. The second approach is to conduct an intensified program in which each course is presented in 4 or 5 straight days. With this approach, it is highly recommended that there be a minimum of 3 to 4 weeks between each course. An additional option for an intensified program is to conduct it in an "in residence" manner at an appropriate offsite location that provides a unique retreat type setting.

The components include Interactive Learning Processes with measurable objectives, courses developed by industry and academic professionals, instructors certified by Phi Theta Kappa, course delivery facilitated for interactive leadership development, and academic credit awarded with community college delivery. The CPSLEP uses survey instruments and assessments, which include the *Leadership Practices Inventory* (2nd ed., Self with Workbook), *Thomas-Kilman Conflict Mode Instrument* (1997), *Leader Behavior Analysis II* (1999), and the *Ethics Awareness Inventory* (4th ed., 1999).

Personal Leadership Development Journal

The Personal Leadership Development Journal was designed to enhance the participants' learning opportunities by providing guidance and consistency across all four courses. The journal is an important part of the participant being actively involved in their own learning. It was designed to provide guidance while allowing freedom of expression, thought, and development. The guiding questions for each activity are simply guides, and not specific mandates.

Individual facilitators or participants may choose to modify, add, or delete questions to fit the individual need. The journal is also intended to be a lifelong document for participants to use as a measure of growth and direction for their continual learning. The activities in the Journal correspond with certain presentation points in the program. While not all program activities and subjects are in the journal, the activities do reflect the major areas of learning. Additionally, certain journal activities support of the Personal Leadership Development Plan (LDP).

Personal Leadership Development Plan

The LDP is designed to serve as the capstone evaluation process for the program. It serves two specific functions. First, it meets academic need for an evaluation process. In addition, it serves to provide the participant with an opportunity to demonstrate developed knowledge and competencies to a third-party review and subsequently receive a certificate of achievement in Applied Leadership Development issued by PTK and the CPSLEP. The LDP is an action plan. It requires that participants do certain activities in conjunction with their participation in the CPSLEP Program. The LDP specifically supports the overall design that the adult be an active participant in his or her learning.

To this point, several hundred students have participated in this program. The program is administered through community colleges and universities, as well as public safety agencies.

Conclusion

Although conceived independently of each other, the two programs described above share similarities in their approach to attempt to enlighten current and future police executives. At the core of these management and executive instructive courses is the engagement of policing professionals and scholars at institutions of higher learning in the development and delivery of the curriculum. When the initiation of courses is preceded by a needs assessment involving police practitioners, the collaboration between academician and practitioner enhances the end product and fulfills the needs of adult students through role responsibility relevant knowledge.

Additionally, the cooperation between practitioner and academician encourages the closing of the philosophical approach gap between concept and application. In both programs, there is recognition of Knowles' principle that adult learner orientation is toward the immediate and practical, complemented by the inherent value of conceptual learning as a means of enhancing critical thinking skills.

The programs in both venues are structured as continuums of learning. Internalized motivation to learn, another of Knowles' principles, can be satisfied through the range of course content designed for adults who recognize the relevancy to their respective employment situation as well as the opportunity to increase their knowledge relationally as their roles change.

Through the utilization of facilitated discussion delivery in the two locations, the adult learners are engaged in self-directed learning. This interactive methodology, which appreciates the reservoir of knowledge intrinsic in the life experiences of the students, serves as an increasing resource for learning consistent with Knowles' beliefs and hopefully creates a desire for lifelong learning.

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Appendix A

Following is a listing of topics/sessions covered in the Command Training Series conceptual continuum at the Roger Williams University Justice Systems Training and Research Institute.

Command Training Series

FLSC Topics

- Exploring Leadership and Communication Styles
- Meyers-Briggs Type Indicator: Leadership, Management and Transitions
- Leadership and Management for the First Line Supervisor
- Situational and Crisis Leadership
- Communication: Interpersonal and Organizational
- Problem Solving and Data Analysis
- Planning
- Ethical Decisionmaking
- Discipline, Labor Relations, and Labor Law
- Performance Evaluation
- Community Policing, Leadership and Management
- Action Planning – Bringing It All Together
- New England Police Chiefs' Roundtable

Mid-Managers' Topics

- Emotional Intelligence
- Leadership, Coaching, and Mentoring
- Communications: Internal and External
- Problem Employees and Conflict Management
- Labor Issues and Legal Research
- Data Analysis, Planning, and Project Management
- Organizational Culture and Change Management
- Budgeting: Understanding the Process
- Management from a Systems Perspective
- Contemporary and Critical Issues
- New England Police Chiefs' Roundtable

Executive Leadership

- Leadership
- Change Management
- Generational Issues
- Budgeting
- The Political Landscape
- Legal Issues for Executives
- Personality Self-assessment Survey
- Executive Core Qualifications
- Action Plan

Appendix B

Course Descriptions for California Public Safety Leadership and Ethics Program

Course One: Developing a Personal Philosophy of Leadership

This course will introduce the California Public Safety Leadership Certificate Program, providing the participant with a deepened understanding of self as it relates to leadership philosophies, knowledge, skills, and abilities. Each participant will explore his or her own core values and begin to develop a personal philosophy of leadership. Through course presentations, dialogue and learning activities, the participant will identify his or her leadership roles in the community to include self, family, professional, and social, as well as define the difference between leaders and managers. The participant will complete self-assessments to gain insights into his or her personal leadership style and characteristics and participate in video and written case studies to further explore his or her understanding of leadership.

Course Two: Leading Others

This course is designed to provide the participant with the knowledge, skills, and abilities to effectively lead others. The participant will explore the various roles of leadership as they relate to being a team builder, delegator, conflict manager, coach, or mentor, as well as interpersonal leader-follower relationships. The participant will gain an understanding of the communication process, empowering others, conflict resolution methods, leading in a diverse environment, and facilitating change. Case studies, video analysis, and other interactive learning processes will be used to explore the dynamic relationship of leaders and followers.

Course Three: Organization Leadership

This course provides the participant with an opportunity to explore the leadership process within organizational settings. The leader-follower relationship is discussed, as well as the influence of organizational culture on leadership effectiveness. The participant will gain an understanding of the components and processes of a learning organization and gain insights into the concept of defensive reasoning within organizations. Case studies, video analysis, selected readings, and group activities will be used to help the participant further understand the theories and principles of organizational leadership.

Course Four: Ethics and the Challenge of Leadership Presentation

In this course, the participant will explore the theories and practices of ethical leadership including the use of ethical decision-making models. The participant will use a variety of learning modalities including case studies, video analysis, and critical thinking scenarios to explore ethical dilemmas. Presentation and class dialogue will define the challenges facing a leader in today's diverse and dynamic organizations. Personal action plans including practical opportunities for leadership will be reviewed.

Validating Higher Order Thinking in a Problem-Based Learning Environment: A Strategy for Law Enforcement Training and Evaluation

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Contemporary recruitment efforts in law enforcement are characterized by a rising concern on the part of departmental administrators regarding the apparent lack of critical thinking and decision-making skills of those entering the policing profession. Law enforcement is not alone in its thinking. Those in disciplines other than criminal justice are increasingly looking for candidates who possess higher thinking skills, particularly generic problem-solving capabilities (LeGault, 2006). Doolittle and Camp (1999) explain, "Preparation of workers for entry into and advancement in the workplace of the next decade requires an educational program that provides not only job skills . . . but also higher order thinking, problem solving, and collaborative work skills" (p. 17). Thomas Friedman (2006), the best selling author, argues that those entering the "flat world" of the 21st century will need to possess higher thinking skills just to remain competitive in a global economy.

In law enforcement, the research suggests that proper decisionmaking on the job can be fostered, in part, through the promulgation of sound policies at the agency command level, which can translate into appropriate patterns of practice on the street by incumbent officers (Becknell, Mays, & Giever, 1999; Brown, 1979; Walker, 1999; Wilson, 1970). The research further suggests that basic recruit training can play a fundamental and significant role in preparing law enforcement trainees to properly and ethically handle the intricacies of contemporary policing prior to working the street (Baker & Carter, 1994; Vander Kooi, 2006).

In a practical sense, law enforcement officers are faced with a number of decisions during a typical tour of duty. They are required to successfully, and quite often independently, handle situations that range from the most serious and complex to the most mundane and routine. The outer limits of discretionary authority may be shaped by departmental policies and court precedent, but individual choices are influenced by a variety of situational factors (Bittner, 1990; Brown, 1979). Recruit training must produce quality decisionmaking skills, and, as Brown (1979) points out, we should probably be less concerned ". . . with worrying about how much discretion patrolmen have and searching for ways to eliminate it, than with trying to enlarge their qualities of judgment and making them responsive to the people they serve" (p. 31). Those in law enforcement training must continually look for learning approaches that will improve their effectiveness in developing the very competencies that may ultimately influence officer behavior in a positive way.

Law enforcement training practitioners are exploring the adult learning methodology known as problem-based learning (PBL) as one approach (Post, 1992). PBL moves away from the conventional, lecture-based training models and toward

active learning approaches characterized by group work, facilitated learning, and problem solving (Post, 1992; Vander Kooi, 2006; Weinblatt, 1999). As a result, the validity of teaching higher thinking skills and the demonstration of those skills as introduced in the classroom must be maintained, as well (Cherryholmes, 1988).

This article offers one approach to validity. Higher thinking skills can be identified through sound job task analyses, which form the basis for content validity. Job tasks can be linked to the learning domain, which in turn, can be linked to basic training objectives, which are delivered during training. Test measures must be reliable as well, or more accurately, the inferences one makes from test performance must be valid and reliable. As discussed in this article, the Rasch statistical methodology of measurement is one option that may be used to ensure the validity of testing and assessment in the academy setting.

Problem-Based Learning

In a theoretical context, decisionmaking is based on Bloom's (1984) taxonomy of higher learning and consists of three major components: (1) identifying a problem, (2) blending newly acquired information with existing information for an appropriate resolution, and (3) evaluating outcomes, both immediate and long term (Bittner, 1990; Boostrom, 1992; Brown, 1979; Ruggiero, 1991). Bloom (1984) and others refer to these higher thinking components as analysis, synthesis, and evaluation (Bloom, Englehart, Furst, Hill, & Krathwohl, 1956). The challenge for law enforcement training, then, is to identify viable learning and educational methodologies that will best develop higher order thinking at the recruit level.

Currently, most basic training academies are tooled for lecture-based delivery platforms (Post, 1992). Students typically listen to lectures, take notes, and then apply their newly acquired knowledge to contrived situations. The idea that student-centered pedagogies, specifically PBL, however, seems to be gaining popularity, and may be potentially productive strategies to improve the quality of learning and develop higher order thinking in the basic training environment (Knowles, 1984; Mager, 1973; Vander Kooi, 2006; Woods, 1994).

PBL is grounded in the constructivist theoretical model (Eggen & Kauchak, 1999). Constructivist thinking is an overarching theory of human learning posited by psychological and philosophical theorists (Fosnot, 1996; Piaget, 1950). Those concerned with law enforcement education and training are now seriously exploring the efficacy of cognitive and social constructivism to serve as the primary training theory for building modern policing competencies and higher order thinking. The several dimensions of constructionist theory typically become operational in the classroom through practical approaches such as problem-based learning and interactive teaching (Brookfield, 1986; Sims, 2006).

PBL is a learning methodology that can be defined as knowledge acquisition through the resolution of real-world problems. In addition to improving the quality of learning, the approach calls for instructors to challenge the students, foster critical thinking and decisionmaking skills, and generate appropriate problem-solving competencies. Problem-based learning requires instructors to be facilitators, rather than lecturers, and requires them to engage the students interactively in the classroom where both knowledge acquisition and the development of higher

order thinking can take place simultaneously. In a more general context, the proponents of problem-based learning maintain that contextual learning and situational awareness can foster discretionary decisionmaking (Eggen & Kauchak, 1999; Hmelo-Silver, 2004)

From this perspective, learning occurs when students resolve real problems that simulate work-related situations, problems that force the students to synthesize information from a variety of sources. The advocates of PBL argue that by working through problem situations, often in peer groups, the students will not only acquire new skills (knowledge) but will do so contextually while building generic problem-solving and critical thinking competencies. The focus is on experiential (contextual) learning (De Lint, 2002).

It is important to emphasize that PBL is not an approach intended to completely replace traditional teaching methodologies. Instead, PBL is designed to make the acquisition of knowledge more meaningful and create a lifelong learning model for continuous professional development. The concept of knowledge acquisition should not be lost in the enthusiasm for problem-based learning. True problem solving is based on the ability to use information to resolve real-life issues, and in fact, mastering complex concepts independent of fundamental knowledge may not be possible. The shift is essentially from knowledge to knowing (Poikela, 2004).

Validity

By most estimates, the PBL approach is gaining momentum in law enforcement training. Its popularity is growing, and an increasing number of states are showing genuine interest in the model for recruit training; however, as intuitively pleasing as the approach seems to be, one must ask about the evidence that supports the validity of teaching critical thinking and problem-solving skills at the recruit level. If state regulatory agencies encourage their training delivery systems to place an increasing emphasis on teaching higher order thinking, as they seem to be doing, it is essential that those same agencies identify ways to establish the supportive validity of those approaches.

In the law enforcement context, validity refers to the concept that standards and evaluation must be based on the essential job tasks performed by patrol officers working in the profession. Data must be collected that supports the job-relatedness of statewide standards. Determining minimum competency for a profession, as state regulatory agencies are required to do, is a high stakes endeavor. Ultimately, it is essential to satisfactorily maintain not only the job-relatedness of the training and educational standards, but also the validity of classroom testing and measurement (Cherryholmes, 1988).

The American Educational Research Association, the American Psychological Association, and the National Council on Measurements Used in Education collaborated on a conventional definition of validity. The *Standards for Educational and Psychological Testing* (1999) accepts three general forms of validity evidence: (1) content-, (2) construct-, and (3) criterion-related evidence. Although the *Standards* refer primarily to the inferences one makes from testing or assessment, the definitions are relevant to the validation structure necessary to ensure minimum competency in law enforcement recruit training.

Content validity refers to training objectives and testing instruments that are “representative of some defined universe or domain of content” (AERA/APA/NCME, 1999; Mehrens & Lehmann, 1984). The learning domain, and the training and testing that emerge from such domains, must be representative of the actual job performed by incumbent law enforcement officers. Curriculum developers and test developers work from the specifications contained in the learning domain. Nationally, the job task analysis (JTA) is the formal tool used to empirically measure the tasks performed by active law enforcement officers and identify the essential job functions of the position of a patrol officer. A formal JTA creates the foundation upon which training and employment standards are set by state regulatory agencies. The process establishes content validity and ensures that what is taught and subsequently tested in the training environment is job-related and essential for functioning as a minimally competent law enforcement officer.

Construct validity can be envisioned in two ways. First, a construct is a theoretical attribute. It is a quality, trait, or characteristic that is intuitively understood and is not directly measurable through observation (AERA/APA/NCME, 1999; Baker, 2001; Mehrens & Lehmann, 1984). In law enforcement, underlying traits such as reading ability, writing ability, physical fitness, intelligence, creativity, and leadership are generally measured indirectly by “constructing” the appropriate variables and indices. Psychometricians refer to construct validity as one’s ability to identify and measure latent traits.

Construct validity also refers to the fidelity of the measuring instruments themselves, whether they consist of questions on a written exam or the criteria used to evaluate student performance in a role-play scenario. Testing instruments designed to measure underlying constructs must contain criteria that adequately represent the construct of interest (AERA/APA/NCME, 1999); however, this distinction is quite often ignored in practice (Baker, 2001; Bond & Fox, 2001). Testing experts typically use conventional statistical techniques to evaluate testing outcomes and make certain inferences based on an analysis of their statistics. What is perhaps overlooked in practice is why less care is taken in operationalizing the scale of measurement in the first place. Bond and Fox (2001) put it this way, “. . . interpretations of analyses can only be as good as the quality of the measures. Why then are students and researchers seemingly unconcerned about how they measure those constructs?” (p. xvi).

Criterion validity refers to measurements structured on a stated set of criteria or to one’s ability to predict some future performance based on the criteria (AERA/APA/NCME, 1999; Mehrens & Lehmann, 1984). The distinction rests on when the observations are made. Ultimately, the purpose of any training delivery methodology is to positively influence behavior on the job. In training and education, for example, criterion validity involves conducting the necessary research to make statistically sound predictions by uncovering meaningful relationships between the underlying theoretical pedagogy and positive job performance.

Unfortunately, high-quality predictive research is limited in the PBL literature and practically nonexistent in the law enforcement research (Albanese & Mitchell, 1993; Colliver, 2000). Much of the research focuses on student reactions to the methodology, the amount of knowledge residue generated through problem-based learning, or its impact on student learning and motivation (Albanese &

Mitchell, 1993; Sims, 2006). Although the problem-based learning approach seems plausible, its translation into improved behavior on the job remains largely unproved. The lack of such research in law enforcement is perhaps due, in part, to the difficulty in capturing accurate data and identifying appropriate work-related criterion measures. In a practical sense, the existence of so many extraneous and intervening variables that influence the working personality of an officer, either positively or negatively, may result in confusing and contradictory interpretations of the research. Identifying any type of statistically significant relationship between the dependent and independent variables is problematic and challenging.

Creating a Validation Strategy

How can a state law enforcement regulatory agency best establish the validity of teaching higher order thinking at the recruit training level? State agencies are empowered to mandate minimum competencies for the position of patrol officer and subsequently license or certify only those who satisfactorily meet the standards. These high stakes determinations require states to ensure the validity of their training and testing. Moreover, if the state determines that certain candidates may not be allowed into a profession, the adequacy of those types of decisions must withstand strict legal scrutiny.

The validation strategies outlined in this article are based on content and construct evidence of validity. It is the process used by the Michigan Commission on Law Enforcement Standards (MCOLES), the law enforcement regulatory agency in the state of Michigan, to establish and maintain the validity of its employment and training standards. To maintain content validity, a strategy can be structured for higher order thinking in the same manner as for any other training objective in the learning domain. It need not deviate from processes already in place. What may be of particular interest, however, is Michigan's approach to construct validity for testing and measurement and how such validity can best be maintained in the PBL environment. The approach suggested in this article is based on a statistical model known in the measurement literature as Rasch measurement, which is a relatively recent innovation in psychometric theory. This article suggests its potential as a viable strategy for establishing the validity of evaluation in the PBL training environment.

MCOLES is the state agency that sets statewide standards for the selection, employment, training, and retention of law enforcement officers. More specifically, MCOLES' statutory responsibilities include the authority to promulgate medical and nonmedical standards (e.g., education, hearing, vision, physical fitness, reading ability, good moral character, and training). The current governing body of MCOLES consists of 15 members who are appointed by the governor. The membership is diverse. It consists of representatives from police agencies, sheriff's departments, labor organizations, prosecution, and defense. MCOLES serves a diverse population and oversees 23 basic recruit academies statewide.

Michigan's formal validation strategy starts with a review of job information (i.e., a review of the tasks and activities performed by patrol officers including the knowledge, skills, abilities, and other underlying characteristics required for minimum competency as a law enforcement officer). Essential job tasks become part of the learning domain for law enforcement training. One of the most

rigorous methods used to define job content is a JTA through which officers' tasks are measured in terms of their frequency and criticality. Michigan's JTA was initiated in 1979, updated in 1996, and then updated again in 2006. These updates ensure that the resulting job description is comprehensive, current, and useful for defining performance standards for entry into the profession, as well as for continuing education initiatives. Detailed information regarding the design and development of the JTAs, and the adherence of these efforts to professionally accepted guidelines, can be found in their respective project reports (MCOLES & Performance Based Selection, Ltd., 1996, 2006; MLEOTC & Personnel Research Consultants, 1979).

The MCOLES basic training objectives are job-related in the sense that they represent the essential job tasks of a patrol officer as identified in the JTA. As is the case nationally, this one-to-one correspondence between the learning domain and what is taught in the classroom forms the foundation upon which the validation strategy is structured. It should be pointed out that the state's training objectives are not written in terms of basic knowledge or comprehension. Instead, the objectives and subobjectives are written as behavioral outcomes, and student performance becomes the demonstration of learned competencies. If a law enforcement training curriculum is to have content validity, job-relatedness, and a logical structure, those responsible for its creation must initially identify and document the requisite competencies and skills that lead to appropriate behavioral outcomes in real-life situations.

Content validity is established and maintained by empirically and conceptually connecting the job task statements; the learning domain; the training curriculum, and ultimately, the test items on the state licensing examination. For example, in the 2006 JTA, the task entitled "inform suspects of their rights" is considered an essential task across all agency sizes and types in the sample. Accordingly, informing suspects of their rights, understanding 5th Amendment implications, and understanding the *Miranda* decision are all part of the basic training learning domain. Such information is then placed in the curriculum as training objectives and then finally as items on the licensing examination.

Similarly, higher order thinking (often manifested as decisionmaking) emerges as an essential underlying construct in the 2006 JTA, either implicitly in the job task statements themselves or explicitly based on the responses to questions about recruit training. For example, MCOLES asked officers what they thought was the single most important concept or characteristic for effective job performance as a line officer. Twenty-seven percent indicated communication skills, 26% indicated decisionmaking, and another 9% indicated problem solving (MCOLES & Performance Based Selection, Ltd., 2006). Moreover, the job tasks themselves imply the need for higher order thinking. Consider "design crime reducing programs for the community," "investigate crimes against persons," and "plan strategies for conducting searches" as examples. Decisionmaking is an underlying construct of policing, and its job-relatedness can be validated in the same manner as other essential job tasks through a scientifically sound job task analysis.

Testing and Measurement

What seems to be lacking in the PBL research, however, are comprehensive discussions about higher order testing and measurement (Ziska, Crabtree, & Roberts, 1998), although some in the academic environment are now making assessment a high priority (Sims, 2006). Thus, a sound validation strategy must include valid and reliable interpretation of student behavior, particularly in the PBL environment. Students will be required to demonstrate not only knowledge acquisition but minimum competency in higher order thinking as well. Here, the discussion shifts from concern about content validity to concern about construct validity. Evaluation takes many forms in an academy setting. For example, multiple-choice tests and quizzes, marksmanship on a firearms range, performance in reality-based scenarios, or successful written performance on a state licensing examination are used to gauge student competency. Pass-fail determinations are not always the goal. Instead, evaluation is often used to measure student progress, which helps the instructors understand the depth of their knowledge.

If instructors use PBL methodology and the training environment gradually shifts from traditional pedagogies to the PBL approach, however, it will be necessary for the measurement of student competency to shift, as well. Paper-and-pencil, multiple-choice tests have their place in the training environment and should never be eliminated. They are useful tools to measure knowledge, comprehension, and application, but if the students are taught higher order thinking, as suggested by the PBL model, conventional evaluation may no longer be adequate. Practitioners must consider alternative assessment methodologies when evaluating higher order thinking. As with other types of assessment, PBL evaluation need not be restricted to pass-fail determinations. Rather, outcome-based assessments should be used as diagnostic instruments, as well as a way for the instructional cadre to monitor and evaluate students as they make their way through the PBL environment.

Practitioners recommend a variety of innovative approaches for the assessment of higher thinking skills. Theoretically, such approaches can yield much deeper understanding of the students' abilities and competencies. For example, instructors can use categorization exercises, pro and con activities, writing assignments (e.g., journaling), or model policy exercises to measure analytic capability (Angelo & Cross, 1993). Synthesis can be measured using concept maps (Kane & Trochim, 2006) or one-sentence summaries. Evaluation can be measured through problem recognition exercises, tabletop scenarios, or articulated summaries (Angelo & Cross, 1993).

Perhaps the most powerful assessment methodology in a training environment is the observation of performances in real-life scenarios, since behavior is the true demonstration of acquired competency (Poikela, 2004). The real-life scenario is an excellent tool that can be used to assess behavioral outcomes of newly learned knowledge and abilities, particularly higher order thinking (Murray, 2004). Scenarios with role players are expensive and time consuming, but they have been used in law enforcement training for decades. In the PBL training environment, there needs to be a process that shifts the nature of the evaluation from a quantitative observation of specific tasks to a more qualitative evaluation based on objectively observed behavior in which student competencies can emerge and be explored. Essentially, an evaluation instrument is needed that can measure higher order

thinking in a real-world context. Evaluating basic knowledge using traditional assessment instruments must continue, but the demonstration of competency through behaviorally based performance is needed to complement conventional evaluation methodologies (Poikela, 2004).

If students are taught higher order thinking, they will ultimately be required to demonstrate knowledge by performing or behaving in a minimally acceptable manner. In other words, students will be required to apply their knowledge and skill within the context of a real-world situation. Measurements must be reliable. Similarly, the inferences made from the observed behaviors in the PBL environment must be valid, and the testing instruments themselves must be well grounded in content and construct validity.

Creating a Working Prototype

With PBL as a backdrop, MCOLES embarked on a project to create an evaluation instrument for behaviorally based student evaluations in situational roleplays. The intent is to create a model that will enable the evaluator to effectively observe and measure not only student knowledge and ability, but also competency in higher order thinking in a training environment. Accordingly, a stated set of performance criteria were identified so higher order thinking could be observed based on acquired skills and knowledge. The distinction between the experimental model and conventional measurements in live scenarios is perhaps a subtle one. The demonstration of true competency is based on all thinking levels, not just the higher ones. Accordingly, what is needed is a model that measures behavioral outcomes in a holistic sense in which student performance is grounded on previously acquired skills and knowledge.

Staff first closely examined the existing job task analysis to ensure content validity. Then, using an interactive group process, staff obtained input from a panel of subject matter experts (SMEs). It was believed that the model should include direction and input from those in the law enforcement profession who possessed the requisite experience, expertise, and insight regarding acceptable recruit performance. Eventually a working prototype was created for measuring behavior in a domestic violence situation. Experimentation at selected academies statewide is ongoing.

As the recruits work through the prototype, they are required to reach reasonable outcomes, maintain officer safety, ensure constitutional protections, behave ethically, perform consistently with policies and procedures, and make reasonable decisions. In addition, the model requires evaluators to use objective, declarative sentences to document recruit behavior. The evaluators are essentially being asked to assess as if they were the student's supervisor on the job, rather than as part of the instructional cadre. In that manner, the model assumes a more qualitative nature as it shifts from the use of observational checklists of tasks to written observations of actual behavior. Since PBL teaches the recruits to think holistically when faced with a situation for which several possible outcomes may be acceptable, the use of qualitative assessment is better suited to measure such behaviors. Bond & Fox (2001) state that when summarizing human attributes, there is "the need for augmentation by some qualifying descriptive data" (p. 197).

The model also calls for the recruits to articulate their thinking to the evaluators during a structured debriefing at the conclusion of the scenario. Initial results from the pilot testing seem to reveal that articulation can yield valuable information about the nature of a recruit's thinking process. Such information may have remained hidden using conventional scenario checklists. Articulation also enhances the process of reflection and self-assessment as students are required to provide their own feedback, at least initially (Poikela, 2004). Interestingly, some evaluators also require the students to produce written accounts of their experiences as part of their debriefing exercises in the form of journaling or report writing. In essence, the model requires the recruits to behave as they would on the job. In the domestic violence scenario, for example, recruits are measured on their ability to produce a reasonable outcome but also on their ability to operate a vehicle, communicate with dispatchers, recognize assailant and victim behaviors, perform safely, maintain legal principles, reach objectively reasonable conclusions, make arrests, transport subjects to lockup, and explore long-term solutions. Such a model provides a mechanism to measure higher thinking skills and immerses the recruit into a real-life experience, as well. Using such a model, evaluators are really being asked to think about assessments in a different way.

MCOLCS will continue experimenting with the prototype and continue to collect data regarding its efficacy and utility. On an intuitive level, such a model seems to be a more meaningful way to assess the higher thinking skills. Bond and Fox (2001) point out, "This at least recognizes the inherent subjectivity involved in collecting information about any human condition" (p. 66).

A Rationale for Rasch Measurement

As with any type of evaluation or measurement, maintaining the validity of the inferences made from observation is essential. Typically, testing practitioners establish validity using conventional statistical procedures that are grounded in classical test theory (Bond & Fox, 2001; Smith, 1991; Wright & Masters, 1982; Wright & Stone, 1979). For example, they analyze multiple-choice tests in order to determine the test's suitability for making pass-fail decisions and whether the items are fair and unbiased (Bond & Fox, 2001; Wright & Stone, 1979). In addition, the reliability of the measurements is often determined by using the Kuder Richardson, split-half, or coefficient alpha formulas (Mehrens & Lehmann, 1984; Smith, 1991). In a similar manner, item difficulties, point biserial coefficients, and average test difficulties are computed using conventional statistical packages. Such analyses are intended to establish the validity of the interpretation of the student test scores (Mehrens & Lehmann, 1984). Using such mechanical, stepwise procedures, as plausible as they may seem, may not be suitable for measuring the complexities of human behavior, particularly if such behaviors are measured on ordinal scales. In fact, some analysts argue that it may be mathematically inappropriate to analyze test data in the traditional way (Bond & Fox, 2001).

Accordingly, some believe that the Rasch measurement represents an improved way to interpret test outcomes and may offer a more rigorous approach for validity and reliability, whether measuring outcomes on a written exam or behaviors in a reality-based scenario. For a complete discussion of the utility of the Rasch model, see *Applying the Rasch Model* by Trevor Bond and Christine Fox (2001).

It may be useful to briefly discuss the Rasch measurement model and its connection to construct validity for both written examinations and performance assessments. This particular model is based on the work of Danish mathematician Georg Rasch in the 1960s. Proponents believe it represents an improved way to establish and maintain construct validity and reliability in testing and measurement (Bond & Fox, 2001; Wright & Masters, 1982; Wright & Stone, 1979).

At its core, the Rasch dichotomous model analyzes nonlinear test scores using log-odds probabilities that are independent of the sample. Furthermore, both person ability and item difficulty are measured using a single interval metric. Using log-odds probabilities transforms nonlinear test data into interval data suitable for linear measurements and interpretation. In the Rasch model, the logarithmic transformation of test results is really a natural log of the ratio of correct responses to incorrect responses, or the natural log of the probability of getting an item correct. Rasch produces output that indicates how well a set of test items fits the model's expectations (probabilities), the reliability of both persons and items in terms of ability and difficulty, and a display of items and persons measured on a single equal-interval scale (Bond & Fox, 2001; Michell, 2003; Wright & Masters, 1982; Wright & Stone, 1979).

According to the Rasch dichotomous model, the probability of a person responding correctly to a particular item is a function of the difference between a person's ability and the item's difficulty. These probabilities are expressed as logit measures. A logit with a value of zero is set at the midpoint of the item difficulty estimates. Higher logit values indicate greater item difficulty and greater person ability (Smith, 1991; Wright & Masters, 1982; Wright & Stone, 1979). Baker (2001) states that when plotted on a graph, a characteristic "S-shaped curve describes the relationship between the probability of a correct response to an item and the ability scale" (p. 7).

Using the Rasch Model

This article suggests that statistical analyses based on the Rasch model can be used to provide evidence of construct validity when evaluating behavior in a reality-based scenario. Although the foregoing discussion describes the Rasch dichotomous model, its principles can be extended to polytomous data, as well (Andrich, 1988; Bond & Fox, 2001; Smith, 2001). An ordinal scale is a common form of polytomous measurement in behavioral research. Extending the Rasch model to include performances measured on an ordinal scale can be accomplished, although the mathematical formulas may be more complex (Wright & Masters, 1982). Interestingly, the Rasch measurement techniques can be extended to partial credit models, which may be more suitable for performance assessments and models that measure inter-rater reliability in qualitative judgments as well (Bond & Fox, 2001). The example described later in this article outlines how the polytomous model was used to establish the validity of a four-event physical fitness test in Michigan.

As discussed by Bond and Fox (2001), the Rasch model addresses several measurement principles that are central to construct validity: unidimensionality, item to model fit, difficulty and ability estimations, and reliability of inferences made from scores. Taken as a whole, the resolution of these issues can help

establish the validity of the testing instrument. Analysts need to be assured that performance criteria are constructed in a valid manner (Bond & Fox, 2001).

Unidimensionality requires the analyst to measure only one characteristic of an individual or a variable of interest at a time. For example, Michigan's licensing examination for law enforcement officers is intended to measure minimum competency as an entry-level patrol officer. As confirmed through Rasch analytical techniques, all items on the test contribute in some way to an understanding of minimum competence as a patrol officer. In a similar manner, performance criteria used for, say, a domestic violence scenario, should contribute to one's understanding of competency to handle a domestic violence call. In both instances, it is important that the testing instruments maintain the concept of unidimensionality.

Item-to-model fit refers to the ability of the examination questions, or performance criteria, to measure what they intend to measure. The Rasch model can provide the analyst with a deeper understanding of how the criteria work. For example, when constructing a list of criteria for a performance evaluation, the evaluator must resolve certain issues. Which items contribute the most to an understanding of the construct under consideration? Do all items contribute equally? If not, what are the conceptual differences between items? Which items are difficult, and which are easy? Are all items working as intended? Is there a correct order? If the selected items or measuring criteria satisfactorily fit the Rasch model, the analyst has confidence that such issues are resolved to a level of statistical significance and that the items contain appropriate psychometric properties.

In the Rasch model, item difficulty and person ability estimations are measured in terms of logits and are placed on a common interval scale for evaluation. The logit scale positions both items and persons. As Bond and Fox (2001) point out, "Each item and person is located along the logit scale according to its estimated value: more positive (higher) persons are more able and more positive (higher) items are more difficult" (p. 34). The evaluator can then determine which items and persons fit the model's expectations.

Ultimately, the evaluator must arrive at certain conclusions regarding the performance of the students and make inferences regarding their scores, either positively or negatively. Bond and Fox (2001) emphasize that . . .

. . . the role of the investigator is to identify an appropriate construct or latent trait, and to use that construct as a guide in deciding which observable aspects of the human condition should be operationalized as part of a data collection device. The investigator's understanding of the construct will allow for the prediction of the measurement outcomes to a considerable extent. Given that the measurement of the construct is the first goal, the investigator will ensure that the test items, prompts, observational checklist, or the like both validly represent the theoretical construct and meet the requirements for fundamental measurement. (p. 192)

MCOLLES has been using the dichotomous Rasch model for its licensing examination since the late 1980s. Similarly, the partial credit model for polytomous data can be used for performance-based assessments.

An Illustrative Profile

To demonstrate the practical utility of the Rasch model for performance assessments, consider the following example. In 2004, MCOLES initiated a project to redesign its existing physical fitness test in order to better measure the underlying construct of "fitness." The JTA reveals that law enforcement officers perform a variety of physical tasks on the job, including running, jumping, climbing, and pushing. As a whole, these individual tasks require a certain level of physical fitness. Although great care was taken to identify specific testing events that would measure fitness and maintain content validity, staff also wanted to discover the extent to which each event contributed to the theoretical construct. The four events are push-ups, sit-ups, a vertical jump and a ½-mile shuttle run. Although it made intuitive sense that such events would, in fact, lead to an accurate understanding of fitness, staff hoped to confirm their thinking through empirical analyses.

During the design phase, staff asked several fundamental questions. First, how confident can one be in making inferences about those taking the test? In other words, how well does the test discriminate among test takers (examinee separation)? Secondly, do the four events create a well-defined construct called "fitness" (item reliability)? In addition, to what extent and in what manner do the four events contribute to an understanding of the underlying construct? Do the events contribute in an equal way, or are there varying degrees in their contributions? Finally, where along a common hierarchical continuum would the events be distributed?

In order to address these questions, MCOLES used the Rasch rating scale model for polytomous data (Bond & Fox, 2001; Wright & Masters, 1982). Staff selected a convenience sample of 81 examinees from Grand Rapids Community College and the Flint Police Academy and subjected their physical performances to Rasch statistical procedures. Staff then examined person and item reliability estimates, standard errors in measurement, difficulty levels, person abilities, and model fit statistics based on the Rasch estimations.

The reliability statistics for both persons and events was 0.75 and 0.82 respectively. The person reliability of 0.75 indicated that the measurement scale discriminated relatively well among the test takers (person separation). Thus, staff was confident in making inferences about the examinees' abilities from their performances. Similarly, the item reliability of 0.82 demonstrated that the events created a well-defined construct. That is, the items were unique and distinct, yet measured one competency (item separation). Table 1 displays the Rasch output. The outfit mean square statistics indicated that the events fit the Rasch estimations well, as do the ZSTD statistics. Outfit measurements are unweighted estimates of the degree of fit to the model estimations and are expressed in terms standardized *z* or *t* scores. Outfit statistics are sensitive to unexpected extremes; whereas, infit statistics are weighted estimates that give more value to on-target observations. For model fit, the analyst looks for outfit and infit mean square statistics near 1 and ZSTD statistics near 0. The logit measures indicate how close the events are to one another in terms of their contribution to the construct. The outfit statistics in Table 1 indicate that all four events fit the Rasch expectations and are therefore suitable as measures of fitness.

Table 1. Fit Statistics

Entry No.	Logit	Error	Outfit MNSQ	Infit MNSQ	Outfit ZSTD	Infit ZSTD	Items
1	-.25	.15	.97	.98	-.2	-.1	Jump
2	.08	.15	.99	.95	-.1	-.3	Sit-Ups
3	.55	.15	.95	1.01	-.3	.1	Push-Ups
4	-.38	.15	.96	1.03	-.2	.2	Run

Table 2 displays the comparison of the examinees and the events on a common hierarchical scale represented in logits. The examinees are plotted to the left of center, and the events are located to the right of center. The better performing examinees appear toward the higher end of the continuum, and the lesser performing examinees appear toward the lower end of the continuum. Each “X” symbol represents two examinees and each “#” represents one examinee (N = 81). Similarly, events that contribute less to an understanding of fitness are located toward the higher end of the continuum. That is, it is more difficult to determine its contribution to the underlying construct and therefore less likely to be endorsed by staff. The Rasch model establishes the midpoint logit values at zero (M+M) along the measurement scale. S and Q are one and two standard deviations from the mean respectively.

Table 2. Map of Persons and Items for Physical Fitness Events

	Persons		Items
3	X #XX		
2	XXX XX	Q	
1	#XX XXX #XXX	S	
0	XXXXXXXXX XXXX	M+M S	Push-ups Sit-Ups Jump Run
-1	XXXXX	Q	
	#XX		
-2	#X		
-3	X		
-4	X		
-5			

In examining Table 2, one can see that all events are located in close proximity in terms of their contributions to an understanding of the construct. Push-ups and sit-ups contribute slightly less, and the shuttle run and jump contribute slightly more. It can also be seen that the push-ups differentiate among those of higher

ability slightly better than the sit-ups, jump, or shuttle run. The run and jump perhaps differentiate among the lesser performing examinees better than the push-ups. The sit-ups work best in the midrange of student ability. The examinee abilities, are spread rather evenly across all levels but resemble the characteristic bell curve. The four events are located near the mid-range of the examinees' abilities so the test is not beyond the ability of the examinees. The four events have slightly different degrees of contribution to the construct but all are quite close together on the scale.

A validation strategy based on the above example can be adapted for a performance assessment in most any topic area in a training academy. The four physical fitness events, of course, would be replaced by criteria that relate to minimally competent performance in a particular subject area, as observed by the evaluators. Student performances could be recorded on an ordinal scale and then subjected to Rasch analyses. The results of the analyses can tell the evaluator whether the items selected to measure minimum competency in the topic area are acceptable measures of performance. Items that fail to fit the model's expectations could be reworked or perhaps discarded entirely and others substituted, although the analyst must still ensure content validity. The analyst should continue this refinement process, if necessary, until the instrument is useful. Then, not only can the inferences made from the performances in the scenario be considered valid to a statistically significant level, the measurement criteria can be considered reliably constructed, as well.

Conclusion

Construct validity can be established by linking the learning domain with the job tasks performed by incumbent officers as identified through a sound job task analysis. Blueprinting what is taught in training to what officers actually do on the street ensures the job-relatedness of the process. When considering the efficacy of testing instruments, however, the discussion essentially shifts from issues concerning content validity to issues concerning construct validity. Evaluation instruments must be constructed in such a manner that individual items on a written test, or the individual components of a behaviorally based performance assessment, are validly constructed and provide reliable inferences based on scores. The Rasch family of measurements can provide the evaluator with viable options for maintaining such validity and can be beneficial when used properly in the testing environment. Equally important, adequately structured performance assessments, together with the conceptualizations of Rasch measurement, can assist state regulatory agencies in maintaining the evidence of validity for higher order thinking. It should be noted that the recommended use of Rasch measurement models is not intended to replace standard statistical analyses. Instead, the models can be used by the analyst to complement the more conventional statistical methodologies.

This article offers a validation strategy for the PBL training environment and examines the feasibility of using a statistical methodology known as Rasch measurement to establish and maintain the validity and reliability of assessment in such an environment. It suggests a methodology and demonstrates an approach that can be used in the development of sound validation practices for both training and testing. Although no measurement is perfectly accurate and all contain some

level of subjectivity, evaluators must continually strive for accuracy in their observations.

Ultimately, the purpose of a state regulatory agency, such as MCOLES, is to ensure the safety of its citizens by licensing only those who possess a certain level of competency. Maintaining the validity and reliability of both training and testing can ensure that the system for producing such candidates functions as intended.

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Criminal Justice Career Fairs: Addressing Recruiting Challenges Through Practitioner and Academic Collaboration

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Introduction

Conducting an annual criminal justice career fair since 2000 has convinced us of the value of a discipline-specific event that brings students majoring in criminal justice into direct conversations with criminal justice agency recruiters over employment and career possibilities. We have been the two chairs of our Department of Criminal Justice and Criminology career fair at Ball State University these past 6 years. The dearth of academic and professional literature offering practical and empirical insights comprises the major catalyst for this article, which provides us an opportunity to . . .

- Share our rationale for a discipline-specific, criminal justice career fair in place of the more typical university-wide event in the best interests of students, program utility, and the high quality of public safety service offered by agencies.
- Encourage practitioners to approach academic criminal justice departments at their local and regional universities about the prospect of holding a discipline-specific career fair.
- Provide key information to academic departments concerning how to successfully hold a career fair, including what we have found through experience to be useful caveats.
- Present some supporting student survey and recruiter evaluation findings emphasizing the value of such an event as an effective collaboration among criminal justice agencies and academic criminal justice departments.

The point of transition from the *study* of criminal justice to the *practice* of criminal justice is critical. Nevertheless, before and after graduation, academicians typically leave students to grapple with launching their careers despite being relatively ignorant about how best to accomplish such an important undertaking. Future success as practitioners is a key component to the lasting impact of a college education, so we view the hands-off approach to student job-seeking as unfortunate.

This article appears to be the first of its kind, though very general information can be found on the subject of career fairs (e.g., tips for jobseekers on how to prepare for and then participate in a job fair) ("Job Fairs," 2000; Rindgard, 1999). Students also can access self-assessments as they ponder possible career paths that suit their personalities and preferences (Arenofsky, 2001). *TypeFocus*TM offers a free

personality assessment aimed at identifying occupational fit, while here at Ball State University, the Career Center features the Quest career exploration tool (Ball State University Career Center, 2005b; TypeFocus, 2005). There are many other helpful academic resources, such as the *Journal of Career Planning & Employment*, which has published brief, complementary articles about student expectations of employers (Roehling & Cavanaugh, 2000), as well as employer expectations of students (Palomares, 2000).

University career centers are well-known for holding job-seeking workshops, résumé writing clinics, and maintaining a library of materials on the broad array of occupational possibilities. In our opinion, however, none of the aforementioned is a suitable substitute for face-to-face conversations between employer representatives and prospective employees. Furthermore, we advocate the discipline-specific career fair. The ability of a student to stand face-to-face with a uniformed officer or other professionally dressed agency representatives instills within the student the seriousness of the career search and affords them extremely valuable personal contact.

Background

The 21st century confronts U.S. employers and employees with some substantial difficulties, ones that hardly bypass the public sector. Lower tax revenues for local and state criminal justice agencies and departments have in many cases led to service reductions, unfilled positions, and delays in capital outlays. The flux in our local, state, and national economies over the past few years, particularly when combined with the unprecedented levels of retirement in the law enforcement field, creates serious hurdles for agencies and departments as they strive to identify, gain access to, and successfully recruit highly qualified candidates for critical public safety professions. Technological advances now enable web-based recruiting efforts, and this can be a useful allied approach. A wholesale shift to web-recruiting is doubtful, however, because this seems unlikely to provide a suitable substitute for face-to-face interactions at employment fairs (e.g., Chung, 2003; Hill, 2004; Ligos, 2004; Tyler, 2000). Career fairs, therefore, offer distinct advantages unlikely to be trumped by the relative convenience of the Internet, and we consider some of these key advantages below.

As criminal justice professors, we naturally are biased in favor of college-educated practitioners. There are many good reasons, but a broad (and seemingly inescapable) one is the sometimes bewildering aspects to the work; the challenge of negotiating one's way within complex organizations over several decades and nurturing professional relationships and the increasing technological demands of routine police, court, and correctional work. Not only must new employees be capable of performing satisfactorily in the short term, they must be able to adapt to pending and future challenges as they pursue professional development across their careers. Criminal justice occupations will not be less demanding in terms of knowledge, skills, and attitudes, but, quite to the contrary, these are becoming more demanding. This makes it difficult to fathom how *less* education might emerge as an eligibility requirement or preference. College graduates, therefore, should have a strong advantage in the criminal justice marketplace as they do in other markets where organizations that sponsor job fairs specifically target college graduates as an important segment of their audience (e.g., consider Clark,

1995; Chang, 2000). Colleges and universities want their graduates to secure quality entry-level positions for which they should be highly competitive (e.g., generally see CareersNow-Online, 2004; "Spring Break," 2002; for criminal justice career fairs, consider Ball State University, 2005b; Michigan State University, 2005; University of Northern Colorado, 2005).

Here at our institution, Ball State University, the Career Center holds a large employment fair in both the fall and spring semesters (Ball State University Career Center, 2005a). Because of the relative size of the smaller public sector versus larger private sector workforces, in combination with needing to satisfy a broad spectrum of student interests that reflect highly varied disciplinary backgrounds, the vast majority of recruiters at university-wide job fairs are from the private sector. In addition, a university-wide event generally maximizes the variety of employers at the cost of focusing on relatively narrow student subpopulations, such as is the case of those who aspire to criminal justice and allied positions (e.g., see Payne & Sumter, 2005). Anecdotally, our university-wide job fair appears to hold limited interest among our criminal justice and criminology majors since so few seem to avail themselves of this on-campus event. The solution to the problem that we perceived in the Department of Criminal Justice and Criminology in the spring of 2000 was to bridge the sizeable chasm between *being* a criminal justice student and *becoming* a criminal justice practitioner, something we accomplished through a discipline-specific career fair (generally, see Payne & Sumter 2005; Zechmeister & Helkowski, 2001). We discuss this in greater detail in the coming pages, beginning with our rationale for devoting so much time, energy, and other resources to this event.

The Importance of Career Fairs for Pre-Professional Planning

The financially meager existence brought by four or more years of college expenses can tempt students to seize their first job offers. Stretched finances, when coupled with uninformed and/or unrealistic notions about career possibilities, can precipitate hasty choices that can have lifelong negative consequences for graduates and their employers. This is particularly troublesome in the public sector. In contrast to labor research findings that suggest private sector employees change jobs approximately seven times during their working years, such mobility is rare in criminal justice. For example, few students realize how common it is for their first employer to be their *only* employer. This heightens the importance of pre-employment information gathering and decisionmaking, particularly since a bit of patience can, in the end, bring improved tangible rewards. Employers want satisfied, productive employees who view their contributions to be important and find pride in their employment.

Students majoring in criminal justice too often wait until late in their university studies to begin meaningful pre-professional career planning. This behavior can seriously hamper students in making smooth and timely transitions from the college classroom to the workplace. In their own interests, students should develop the widest possible array of entry-level career choices early in their academic experiences. This requires considerable initiative on their part, and, frankly, the message of pre-professional planning can be difficult to impress on them. We believe our annual career fair provides an important motivational element.

In general, academic department sponsorship of a career fair provides an excellent means for achieving important goals associated with the education of aspiring criminal justice practitioners. Students gain an opportunity to explore real career possibilities and crucial insights into market considerations about which they otherwise might remain ignorant or misinformed. A career fair facilitates early conversations with employer representatives who can offer students a window into what employers seek in their applicants, while giving employers an opportunity to gauge the current and upcoming crop of interested students. These conversations provide a valuable professional development opportunity for students by fostering early career-oriented networking.

The next section covers some of the more compelling reasons to conduct a discipline-specific career fair. Following this discussion, we share our thoughts on some of the major considerations in conducting a career fair (i.e., department committee composition, first-time planning considerations, scheduling and choosing a site for the event, recruiter mailing list and invitations, registration information, fees and processing applications, and promoting student involvement). This article concludes with our empirical findings from an evaluation by participating recruiters and surveys of CJC majors and minors who did (or did not) attend our recent annual career fair. Both instruments have been informative, and we share some pertinent findings to exemplify the value we see in having an empirical foundation—one absent in the literature to date—for reflecting on past decisionmaking, determining near-term preferences, and considering enhancements for future criminal justice career fairs.

Advantages to a Career Fair

Recruiter and Student Convenience

A discipline-specific career fair provides a rare opportunity for interested students to meet and readily discuss employment opportunities with dozens of recruiters from public (i.e., police, probation, and corrections) and allied private sector employers (e.g., asset protection and loss prevention and private correctional service providers). As mentioned earlier, the Internet admittedly provides a handy means for initially investigating potential employers, but much of the information and impressions that students and employers *should* seek is best pursued through face-to-face conversations. Importantly, most employers are local as well as relatively small and therefore often provide only the barest of details through their websites.

No Commitment Necessary

A discipline-specific career fair brings practitioners and students together in a neutral setting where questions can be posed from both sides of the table, answers provided and considered, and preliminary decisions made about suitable fit. This provides a relatively low-stress setting for both students and recruiters alike where neither needs to make binding commitments.

Realistic Career Expectations

The criminal justice labor market constantly changes, and attending a career fair can lead to a better understanding of the types of positions available at any particular time, along with likely near-term department needs. As student advisors or mentors, faculty discussions of employment scenarios too often do not carry their full weight until reinforced through students' first-hand contacts with recruiters. What most criminal justice practitioners actually do for a living is a crucial component to informed decisionmaking by students and should influence their evolving interests after commencement.

Despite our best efforts in the classroom, hallways, and office hours, student perceptions about careers in criminal justice and the allied private sector are deeply influenced by the bombardment of media images. These perceptions can fuel rather fantastic notions about the range of choices and the nature of certain work, along with their relative importance as novice employees at the bottom of the organizational pyramid. For instance, we have spoken with countless high school seniors and college underclassmen who, upon graduation with a bachelor's degree, anticipate a career in forensic psychology, criminal profiling, or specialized crime scene investigation. In addition to not recognizing the post-graduation education and/or training that these specialties typically require, they often are oblivious to the practical matters such as seniority and relevant professional experience. Furthermore, many students are surprised to learn that a stint as a patrol officer is a typical precursor to more specialized assignments, such as criminal investigations (not to mention carrying a firearm and using force when reasonably necessary). Being guided closer to reality through interactions with knowledgeable recruiters as to the types of positions that *actually* exist and are open to entry-level employees can be invaluable. Recruiters naturally cast their general fields and specific employers in a positive light, but the realities about entry-level opportunities can usefully ground students while simultaneously sparking greater critical thinking about their priorities. In the process, better informed decisionmaking can be developed. Both of these outcomes are central to broad university educational goals associated with lifelong learning. Among other things, students should carefully examine differences that exist between starting salaries, shift-work arrangements, and the timing and size of raises; the range of, and probabilities associated with, particular assignments; promotional and supervisory opportunities; health insurance plan coverage, deductibles, and copays; expectations for continuing education and inservice training; and employer retirement plans and access to supplemental employee-funded options. Learning about these factors reinforces a broad embrace of lifelong learning among students. For employers, students who possess a general familiarity with these matters demonstrate their abilities to probe a problem and gather information, and this often becomes obvious during conversations at the career fair.

It's Not Just a Job, It's a Career

An important function of our career fair event is to socialize students away from thoughts about a job and toward longer-range planning for their careers. Surprisingly, few students understand the difference between a job and a career, and the reason is as simple as it is understandable—if they have been employed in any capacity by this point in their lives, it has involved finding and holding

jobs rather than pursuing a career. In guiding students toward a more thorough and thoughtful examination of potential careers, we hope to advance their career planning. For example, we encourage students who have a long-term goal of performing particular law enforcement functions to first examine “law enforcement” as a career within which they might occupy a variety of positions within a given department, or with several departments, in route to their ultimate goal.

Mock Employment Interview Practice

Finally, a valuable feature to our career fair involves mock employment interviews for interested students on a first-come, first-serve basis. These mock employment interviews are conducted by working professionals involved in their departments’ hiring processes. We currently hold one panel for law enforcement interviews and another one for probation. The former has a much longer history and is in fact a good example of what academic-practitioner collaboration can produce. It was set in motion by an Indiana police department, whose current chief is a graduate of our program, that approached us with the idea of augmenting the career fair by conducting mock interviews.

Over the past 7 years, the mock interview experience has helped many students prepare for the usually stressful experience of a real panel interview punctuated by challenging questions—which is not uncommon for law enforcement positions at the local, state, and federal levels. There is nothing quite like sitting across from several working professionals in uniform or other professional attire and posing questions that cannot be completely anticipated. These realistic interviews last around 20 minutes and conclude with approximately 10 minutes of “debriefing” during which the panelists offer constructive criticism and practical advice. A trial run such as this might provide a crucial experience for students whose first real interview turns out to be with their dream employer.

Planning and Conducting the Career Fair

There are several major considerations to keep in mind when holding a discipline-specific career fair. While our discussion here is aimed primarily at academic departments, it also might be useful to those criminal justice executives or their designees who might consider approaching an academic department about introducing or starting a career fair. Planning and conducting a career fair is a time-consuming and demanding undertaking, especially the first one. We recommend a full year of preparation for the inaugural event. Thereafter, at least in our experience, a 4-month timeline has worked well. The initial startup will consume dozens of hours; involve attention to a wide variety of details; and rely on faculty, staff, student organizations, and other persons. Facility and equipment needs must be identified; reserved; and, importantly, later reconfirmed. In our case, we need a room to spaciouly accommodate 40, 8-foot tables while providing wide aisles for easy passage and space for conversations, along with two small conference or meeting rooms for the two sets of mock employment interviews.

A mailing list of prospective recruiters must be created and then regularly updated, while announcement and registration forms have to be created or updated, printed, and mailed. The mixture of public and private employers needed to attract wide

student participation in a career fair will depend on the faculty's agreed-upon goals, curricular emphases, and student interests. We make it a practice to invite recruiters from among the following groups:

- State and local police, along with specialized federal law enforcement agencies
- Probation, parole, and/or community corrections departments (adult and juvenile)
- Correctional institutions (adult and juvenile)
- District/prosecuting attorneys' offices and defense attorneys (public and private)
- Private sector loss prevention and insurance investigative services
- Private sector contract service providers

Our experience has shown that the majority of the recruiters who represent agencies at our event come from law enforcement, followed by corrections. More recently, private sector employers have been increasing their presence, and we think that this trend will intensify.

Recruiter registration forms and payments must be processed, and confirmations and receipts (or invoices) return-mailed. Their registration information should be recorded in an easy-to-use format and include such items as the number and names of recruiters planning to attend; preferences as to table or floor space for displays; whether they need electrical access for video and/or computer equipment, wall space, or a screen for projected images; and the types of positions that they anticipate having available. We elaborate below on other key considerations.

Committee Composition

We strongly recommend the committee approach to planning, conducting, and evaluating a career fair due to the sheer volume of work necessary for even a modest event. Our department's Criminal Justice Career Day Committee (CJCDC) is comprised of faculty members with complementary backgrounds, interests, and abilities. Ours is nearly a committee of the whole at seven members, which likely is a good idea for smaller departments, particularly the first time. Determining how faculty might best contribute to the event is important. For example, one of our committee members is the faculty advisor to our student chapter of the National Criminal Justice Honor Society, Alpha Phi Sigma. This individual's presence on the committee provides direct access to student assistance for processing registration forms and depositing fees, creating a database of recruiter needs for the event, and mailing receipts/invoices. Another committee member is the faculty advisor to our student chapter of the American Criminal Justice Association, Lambda Alpha Epsilon, as well as our internship coordinator. This individual's presence on the committee also provides direct access to student assistance, which in this case is directed towards updating our contact information on agencies and recruiters and assembling each year's mailing list. This faculty member's internship coordination responsibilities involve constant contact with scores of agencies around Indiana and contiguous states. This provides specialized knowledge about current needs and preferences and is a factor in identifying the most beneficial recipients of each year's career fair announcement. Several of our committee members have had experience as law enforcement or probation officers, and this has made it easier

to identify and secure our mock employment interview panel members based on personal contacts.

Scheduling

Selecting a time and date for a criminal justice career fair is more complicated than it might appear. For one, it is important to avoid direct competition with other major discipline-specific and large-scale university-wide career fairs hosted in the general area. Recruiters brought this to our attention at our first career fair because we unwittingly scheduled ours for the same week (but different day, thankfully) as an already established one here in Indiana. Formal coordination between institutions can be difficult, so we eventually moved ours several weeks away so that minor year-to-year fluctuations would be unlikely to create a “this one or that one” dilemma for recruiters.

Another consideration is strong support from the department chair and one’s colleagues. If a career fair is a valued component of the overall educational and preprofessional development of one’s students, then the necessary cooperative environment likely exists for a highly anticipated, well attended, and successful event. It is important to gain the cooperation of faculty members whose class times overlap with the career fair, and early announcement of the date enables faculty members to accommodate the career fair in their course plans. Although we all bemoan not having enough contact time in courses to cover all of the material desired, canceling one of roughly 30 to 45 class periods during a semester seems a relatively minimal cost for being able to provide students with convenient access to a large and motivated group of prospective employers. A faculty member who cancels a class session once a year during the short span of the career fair—perhaps 3 hours or so—might provide the time necessary for students with tight class and/or work schedules to participate. This form of collegial support can increase student participation not simply because of the time it frees up, but also because the career fair looms larger as a matter of high priority for a criminal justice department and its students. If “covering” classroom contact time remains an issue, consider assigning students a short response paper about their experiences at the career fair. This can have the added benefit of generating useful insights that faculty could pass along to the organizing committee.

A wide range of local, state, and federal departments in Indiana and from contiguous states attend our career fair. Keeping the combination of recruiters’ commuting and the career fair close to an 8-hour day in length will earn you their appreciation, and with it comes greater interest in your future events. Because of travel time, the vast majority of recruiters favor the early afternoon, and we soon settled on 12:00 to 3:00 PM. The morning is available for commuting to campus from any corner of the state, setting up displays, and grabbing a quick lunch before the doors open. The late afternoon and early evening remain for the trip home. (Worth noting here is our recent experience with providing a refreshment table in a draped-off area of the room containing small sandwiches, cheese and crackers, and some fruit and drinks. This was instantly popular with recruiters because finding lunch could be removed from their to-do list upon arriving.)

As for the day of the week, we prefer Wednesdays because practitioners can avoid both the very beginning and end of their workweek. For us, this avoids the longer

75-minute class periods that fall on Tuesdays and Thursdays, which can disincline faculty from supporting their students' participation through class cancellation and/or alternative assignments. The middle of the week also has the advantage of easily accommodating the day and a half of mock employment interviews that precede our career fair.

Location

It is important to use an easily accessible campus building for the career fair. A carpeted room is preferable, and it should allow for wide aisles between the tables. Vinyl or wood floors create a terribly noisy environment and should be avoided. Flow is important, and neither students nor recruiters want to find their access to one another limited by physical inconveniences that the organizers should have foreseen and, thus, prevented. Recruiter location needs thoughtful consideration, too. For example, we distribute the local, state, and federal agencies around the room so as to avoid concentrated pockets of police, probation, and institution-based corrections recruiters. In this way, we spread student traffic around the room to maximize flow, and students see a wider variety of employers as they circulate. This reduces palpable recruiter competition for student attention, too, by providing a modicum of privacy from one's most direct competitors. We think that this also improves comfort and minimizes frustration for all concerned despite the obvious lack of true privacy. This can be important, as recruiters naturally want a setting in which they can contrast their departments with others that are just beyond elbow-rubbing proximity.

Inviting Recruiters

Employer participation in any given year will depend on current hiring needs, agency budgetary considerations, and the recruiter schedule availability. Our most consistent year-to-year participation comes from law enforcement agencies. We work from three general sources: (1) those recruiters who recently participated, (2) those departments and allied private sector entities that accept our students as interns, and (3) those that learn of our career fair through word-of-mouth. All interested entities receive a mailed invitation, but this is preceded by an "early bird" e-mailing with PDF attachments of the announcement letter and reservation form to those that participated the previous year. We receive prompt responses in this fashion from the most interested recruiters.

The Fee

A \$25 fee is payable to one of our student organizations that shares responsibility for conducting the career fair. This nominal fee covers the cost of updating our advertising banner, tablecloth rental, photocopying/printing forms, and miscellaneous supplies (e.g., name badges and felt pens). We estimate that our mean cost per recruiter is around \$15, so the remaining \$10 serves as a fundraiser for the two student organizations. The most expensive cost is refreshments, and the faculty currently covers this expense through a departmental fund. That the financial benefit goes to the student organizations is clearly communicated in the invitation letter. While we do encounter the occasional department that would like us to waive the fee—more importantly, a few are precluded from paying for access to our students such that we waive it on a case-by-base basis—we maintain

that its quite modest level is unlikely to stop a genuinely interested employer from attending. Given recruiters' salaries and benefits for the typically two to three personnel who staff a table, their display boards and handout materials, along with transportation and per diem, we do not think that our \$25 fee is a determining factor in whether an employer participates. In the end, employers are quite open about the benefits of being at our career fair, which attracts between 150 and 200 interested students every spring.

Promoting Student Involvement

Our department is fortunate to have two active student organizations that provide vital service to the committee, recruiters, and attending students. When we initiated our career fair planning in the fall of 1999 in anticipation of our spring 2000 event, it was, in fact, spearheaded and conducted by Alpha Phi Sigma through its faculty sponsor (one of our committee members). Given the many tasks associated with planning and conducting the career fair, the next year, we delegated responsibility to the CJCDC.

Student assistance has been extremely helpful, and we do not hold the opinion that students cannot be depended upon to carry out important responsibilities under faculty supervision. On the day of the event, student helpers handle on-site check-in, hand out name tags to recruiters, and assist them in locating their tables. They also help bring in and set up the displays, though this now is rare given the collapsible, self-contained displays. An added benefit to our student helpers is the ability to develop personal contacts with agency representatives. To promote an overall professional appearance to our career fair, we insist that our student helpers wear appropriate attire and are well-groomed. To clearly identify student workers to the participating recruiters and fellow students, we provide them with nametags that feature a "staff" ribbon identical to those worn by department faculty members.

Evaluating a Career Fair

Methods

The Instruments

We used two instruments to evaluate our criminal justice career fair. First, recruiters were asked to evaluate various facets of their career fair experiences and provide related information. At least one anonymous recruiter evaluation form (n = 57) was collected from each department during a recent career fair. As is typically the case, the vast majority (77%) of the departments operated at the city or county level of government. This is consistent with what many criminal justice professors share with students in that most criminal justice services are found at the local level. The categorical breakdown for the 33 employers represented by these recruiters was as follows:

- 17 law enforcement departments
- 7 corrections departments (probation, community, and institutional)
- 5 other departments/agencies (e.g., U.S. Army, the Indiana Police Corps, and private sector service providers)

- University units (Career Services, Graduate School, Student Voluntary Services, and the Master's in Public Administration w/CJC Emphasis program)

The one-page, 18-item anonymous recruiter evaluation is purposely brief, partly because recruiters are asked to complete it near the end of the fair. It probes recruiters' perceptions of the registration process; assistance at the event; the general atmosphere; the nature and quality of student contacts; as well as the day, date, and time of the event. The first seven items utilized a five-point Likert scale ranging from "poor" to "excellent" in order to collect information on what they viewed as essential elements of a successful event, along with an overall rating of their experience. The remaining ten items queried recruiters about such matters as whether they had adequate space for their booth materials; whether they would prefer a different site or room arrangement in the future; or whether they would like to see the fair held during a different season, month, day, and/or time. In general, and as the findings section further below reveals, there was a uniformly high degree of satisfaction with these matters among the recruiters, and they offered few suggestions.

The second instrument anonymously queried students on their perceptions and experiences regarding the career fair. Knowing that our intent was not only to assess student experience, but also to disseminate our findings with the criminal justice academic and practitioner communities, we submitted our survey instrument and protocols to Ball State University's Institutional Review Board (IRB) for its consideration and approval. The IRB approved our two-page, 19-item student questionnaire, which was then administered to subject volunteers in the Department of Criminal Justice and Criminology's faculty member classes during the 2 weeks immediately following the career fair. This instrument's items reflected two general themes: (1) for those who attended, what was the nature of their interaction with vendors and their overall experiences? and (2) among those who did not attend, what were their reasons?

Our student sample (n = 204) captured approximately 34.6% of our academic year criminal justice majors, with participation levels by male (53%) and female (47%) students being very similar to the overall program distribution of 56% and 44%, respectively. Students from all four class levels were represented; the largest group being comprised of juniors (31.9%) and the smallest group comprised of freshmen (13.7%). Nearly nine-in-ten (88%) respondents were aged 18 to 22 and thus of traditional college age. Students were overwhelmingly declared as either criminal justice majors (73%) or double majors (14%) (e.g., criminal justice and psychology).

Findings

Recruiter Evaluation

The evaluation forms completed by recruiters indicated a uniformly high degree of satisfaction (see Table 1). The median rating for six of the seven Likert-scaled items, as well as the one measuring their overall experience, was "excellent." Around two-thirds of the recruiters provided a score of 5 for each item. Only one mean rating, a 4.25 for "student flow/contact," dropped below a score of 4.5. Nevertheless, approximately one-third of the recruiters rated this item as a 5. We came to the

conclusion that two problems existed as a result of this lower rating when taken in combination with our own observations. First, a choke-point developed in two aisles where unusually popular agencies/recruiters attracted large crowds. In addition, four tables turned out to be situated a bit too far away from the main group and thus were on the fringe of the flow of students. As a result, some of these recruiters felt that many students had bypassed them. In response, we revised the layout for future career fairs to provide wider aisles and prevent isolated pockets of recruiters. Because recruiters often want to retain their floor location, however, we made it a point to speak with those who were located in the two problem areas.

Table 1. Criminal Justice Career Day Recruiter Evaluation Results

	Median	Mean (SD)	Percent "5s"
Initial Contact/Correspondence	5.00	4.55 (.64)	62.3%
Reservation Process	5.00	4.63 (.60)	68.6%
Event Cost	5.00	4.51 (.65)	59.2%
General Atmosphere	5.00	4.70 (.63)	76.8%
Student Flow/Contact	4.00	4.25 (.71)	38.6%
Faculty Member Availability/Contact During the Job Fair	5.00	4.60 (.68)	68.4%
Event Assistance (your needs being met)	5.00	4.73 (.49)	75.0%
Overall Experience	5.00	4.74 (.48)	75.4%

The scale used for these ratings consisted of five levels ranging from 1 = poor to 5 = excellent.

Student Survey

The subsample of students (n = 199; 97.5%) that provided usable surveys was comprised of 87 (43.7%) who attended the career fair and 112 (56.3%) who did not (see Table 2). This distribution among those who did and did not attend was not surprising given that our program consists of over 600 undergraduate majors, while student career fair attendance hovers around 150. Our initial interest was in whether gender, class level, or age influenced attendance generally. Neither gender nor age made a noteworthy difference in attending or not attending, though class level did make a difference. This latter finding should not be surprising. Freshmen were the least likely (20.0%) to attend. Sophomores (49.0%) and seniors (54.2%) attended in very similar numbers, while juniors landed in between (39.1%). The fact that seniors attended in the greatest numbers is not surprising given that they are likely to be the most attuned to the pressures brought by the approaching conclusion to their academic pursuits and their initial forays into the marketplace. We separately examine the attending and nonattending groups of students below.

Table 2. Crosstabulation of Criminal Justice Career Day Attendance by Student Class Level

Did you attend?	Class Level				Total
	Freshman	Sophomore	Junior	Senior	
Yes	5.7%	28.7%	28.7%	36.8%	100.00% (n = 87)
No	17.9	23.2	34.8	24.1	100.00% (n = 112)

Students who attended the career fair were asked to rate its degree of usefulness. The vast majority (87.9%) reported that it was at least “somewhat” useful to them, two-thirds (65.8%) of whom indicated that it was “extremely” useful. We measured overall impressions of their experiences through a five-point Likert scale consisting of “very disappointing,” “below average,” “average,” “above average,” and “outstanding.” Impressions generally were positive, with over half (53.8%) indicating that it was either an outstanding (10.0%) or above average (43.8%) experience. Another large group (40.0%) found it to be average, while only 6.3% reported ratings of either below average or very disappointing. We attribute some of this difference, albeit anecdotally, to the fact that some students have different expectations concerning which agencies will be represented (they can easily be dissatisfied if specific departments of interest to them happen not to participate in a given year), yet this is a valuable lesson for students given that departments’ particular circumstances determine their participation, not student preference.

A series of items sought insights into attendees’ impressions of their interactions with recruiters, specifically, the printed materials that were available, approaching and conversing with them, being informative and articulate about their employers, along with being respectful of students and their interests. Student responses on each of these five items were highly favorable, with over 90% either agreeing or strongly agreeing (see Table 3). This is important because it provides additional evidence that students were satisfied with their interactions. Finally, and interestingly, while many students aspire to state or federal employment, those responding to our survey generally were more impressed with recruiters from local agencies (see Table 4). This finding bodes well for the high proportion of local law enforcement agencies present at our events.

Table 3. Attitudes of Students Attending Criminal Justice Career Day

Item	Response				Total
	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	
Printed materials were excellent.	32.9%	61.2%	5.9%	0.0%	100.0% (n = 85)
Recruiters were easy to approach/talk to.	33.7	51.2	14.0	1.2	100.0 (n = 86)
Recruiters were informative.	37.6	54.1	8.2	0.0	100.0 (n = 85)
Recruiters were articulate.	36.5	55.3	8.2	0.0	100.0 (n = 85)
Vendors respected you and your interests.	40.0	52.9	7.1	0.0	100.0 (n = 85)

Table 4. Agency Impressions on Students by Level of Government

Item	Response		
	Yes	No	Total
Federal agency made the best impression on me.	39.1%	60.9%	100.0% (n = 87)
State agency made the best impression on me.	36.8	63.2	100.0 (n = 87)
Local agency made the best impression on me.	52.9	47.1	100.0 (n = 87)

Also of interest to us was the substance of student-recruiter conversations. To examine this, we created a list of items that students could select simply by way of a check mark. This list included an “other” category to capture topics that we otherwise would have missed (see Table 5). Of the eight forced choices, only three were selected by more than half of the student attendees as having been included in their conversations with recruiters. These were types of positions/assignments available (74.1%), the testing and/or selection process for applicants (65.9%), and starting salaries (62.4%). There was a relationship between academic class standing and these three items, with seniors more likely than juniors to report them as having been part of their conversations.

Table 5. Topics Discussed by Students and Recruiters in Descending Order (n = 85)

Item	Response		Total
	Yes	No	
We talked about the types of positions and assignments available.	74.1%	25.9%	100.00%
We talked about the testing and/or selection process for becoming an employee.	65.9	34.1	100.00
We talked about starting salary.	62.4	37.6	100.00
We talked about how to submit an employment application.	47.1	52.9	100.00
We talked about work schedules and shift work.	35.3	64.7	100.00
We talked about the salary schedule after the first two years of employment.	34.1	65.9	100.00
We talked about promotion opportunities.	34.1	65.9	100.00
We talked about retirement/pension programs.	20.0	80.0	100.00
We talked about other issues.	8.2	91.8	100.00

As for other likely topics, not quite half (47.1%) of those students who attended the career fair reported discussing how to submit an application for employment, something that understandably was most common among seniors (75%). There was far less discussion about longer-term employment issues. For example, only around one-third of attending students reported having discussed issues such as salary schedules after the first two years of employment (34.1%). For some unknown reason, this was most common among sophomores, not juniors and seniors. Overall, discussion of promotion opportunities was a topic among a bit more than one-third (34.1%) of students, while retirement/pension programs trailed much further behind (20%). Only slightly more than one-third (35.3%) of attendees discussed the specifics of work schedules and shift work that might have serious consequences for their health, family commitments, recreation, and safety.

Few students among the group that did not attend the career fair (n = 112) reported missing it for other than class conflicts due to the time of day (35.7%) and/or work and/or child care responsibilities (39.3%) (see Table 6). Most students appear to have missed the career fair due to circumstances not easily mitigated and had little, if any, connection to the quality of the event itself. The next most common reason was simply not yet feeling ready to talk with recruiters (16.1%), while the remaining six reasons individually attracted no more than 12.5% of student responses. Percentages for four of these six items fell well under 10%.

Table 6. Reasons that Student's Did Not Attend in Descending Order (n = 112)

Item	Response		
	Yes	No	Total
I had to work/had a child to care for/or other important responsibility.	39.3%	60.7%	100.00%
I had class at the same time as the event.	35.7	64.3	100.00
I wasn't ready to talk with recruiters.	16.1	83.9	100.00
I don't want to work in the criminal justice system.	11.6	88.4	100.00
I wasn't interested in talking with recruiters about their departments.	8.0	92.0	100.00
I didn't know about the criminal justice career day.	7.1	92.9	100.00
I was intimidated about talking with department representatives.	6.3	93.8	100.00
The agency list for the event didn't appeal to me.	6.3	93.8	100.00
I did not attend because of some other reason.	12.5	87.5	100.00

Discussion and Conclusions

Our goals for this article have been two-fold: (1) to provide a starting point for criminal justice departments considering a discipline-specific career fair and (2) to encourage practitioners to approach academic departments about hosting one. In support of our position that sponsoring a criminal justice career fair is a highly valuable endeavor, we have outlined some key benefits, made some suggestions borne of direct experience, and presented some relevant empirical evidence. Our assessment efforts suggest that our events have been positive ones from the perspectives of both students and employer recruiters. The survey of the students who attended the career fair yielded numerous indications about their positive experiences, as did the recruiter evaluation with regard to their experiences. Those students who did not attend indicated that this was due primarily to factors beyond our control.

On the one hand, holding a career fair demands much effort for faculty already faced with ever-increasing expectations about scholarly productivity, excellence in teaching, and service to the university and professional communities. On the other hand, we find the benefits to a career fair to be compelling. A well-run criminal justice career fair fills a crucial void within the student-focused criminal justice department's range of extracurricular opportunities. We firmly believe that events along the general lines of ours can be equally successful elsewhere, so we hope that criminal justice departments that currently do not sponsor a discipline-specific career fair might take encouragement from our experience and decide to tackle one. We also hope that criminal justice agencies and private sector employers might be encouraged to approach academic departments about a career fair. While our career fair was campus generated, the idea for the law enforcement mock interviews came from a police department that was interested in our students as well as willing to provide valuable career-building skills.

Altogether, we think that a discipline-specific career fair holds many benefits for students, employers, and the faculty. For criminal justice employers, there is not a suitable substitute for a career fair that offers convenient face-to-face conversations with a targeted, interested, and motivated pool of potential candidates. For students, this is an opportunity to gain important career and "market" information,

learn first-hand lessons about career preparation, and refine their communication skills through interactions with working professionals. For academic departments, a career fair helps emphasize to students in a tangible way the importance of career-planning while simultaneously building important networks among public and private sector employers who are likely to employ the graduates of their programs. Thus, career fairs have major benefits for students, employers and academic departments.

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Law Enforcement Officers: Their Perception of Personal Safety and Job Performance

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Introduction

The purpose of this article is fourfold: (1) to emphasize the role of community policing as an important faction of society, (2) to examine officers' perceptions of their personal safety while performing their daily job/tasks, (3) to explore how the perceptions of the officers perceivably affect their ability to be effective and efficient while performing their jobs, and (4) to examine the extent of officer tragedy taking place in American society. We propose a model that will assist agencies in providing optimal training that could serve to make officers feel safer while performing commendable work. Community policing is defined by Meese (1994) and Moore & Trojanowicz (1988) as the use of sophisticated investigative problem-solving techniques while interacting cooperatively with community institutions such as families, schools, neighborhood associations, merchant groups, and social service agencies to create safe secure communities. Although the primary responsibility of officers is to serve, protect, and create a safe community, Clarke and Zak (1999) suggested that in every community in the United States, law enforcement personnel and firefighters regularly put their lives in harm's way to protect the public. The authors went on to suggest that the risk of a fatal incident for law enforcement personnel and firefighters is three times greater than for all other workers. Although we are intrigued with officer/community interaction(s), this work focuses primarily on police safety.

The issue of "police safety" is synonymous with the term *officer survival*. Law enforcement agencies, officers, and trainers have been looking for ways to enhance the skill levels with limited budget and time constraints. This complex problem is dependent on more than just training. This literature review examines the issues associated with police safety.

Literature Review

During basic police recruit training, every officer develops an understanding and foundation of "police/suspect violence." It is also the place where recruits develop the necessary skills, which are considered minimal, to control a threat. The foundation of that training can be found in what is classified under the umbrella of "high liability training." These areas are classified as such because this is where officers and agencies are mostly to be involved in litigation. High liability is an area in which mistakes can be made and cause serious injury and/or death to unintended bystanders.

High-liability training is not unique to one state. In fact, an examination of Florida, New York, California, and Michigan reveals that each has a similar mandate and training standards for basic recruit training. The courses cover firearms, defensive tactics, vehicle operations, physical fitness, and traffic stops. The hours of this training vary from state to state with the following averages: firearms is 75 hours; defensive tactics 64 hours; physical fitness 47 hours; vehicle operations 26 hours; and traffic stops 13 hours. The remainder of time is spent in areas such as constitutional law, patrol, drug identification, community policing, etc. The recruits want more, but the budgets are limited, and any other training in the area of officer safety must be done through inservice training; advanced classes offered at the local training academy; or most often, accomplished on their own.

To understand a need for advanced and continued training above and beyond that of the police academy, one need only look at *The FBI Uniform Crime Report: Officers Killed and Assaulted 2005*. This document is an annual document that details who, what, when, where, and how officers are killed and/or assaulted. An examination of the 2005 statistics offers the following data: 55 officers killed with a profile of the victim officers as white males, average age 37, and 10 years of service. The most common situations in which these officers were killed include traffic stops or pursuits, making an arrest, ambush, disturbance calls, and investigating suspicious persons. The most dangerous assignment was uniform patrol, and the most common weapon used to murder an officer was a handgun. The deadliest months were August and November; the deadliest day of the week was Thursday; and the deadliest hours were between 10:01 PM and 12:00 AM. Finally, the profile of the suspects was as follows: white male, average age 30, height 5'10", 175 pounds. From 1996 through 2005, the numbers are fairly consistent. The number of officers killed varies, but the circumstances surrounding their deaths, as well as the victim officers' average age, race, and years of service have remained consistent over time.

Petrocelli (2006) identifies what are known as the 10 deadly errors of policing. These errors are nothing new, as they were identified some 30 years ago by Detective Pierce Brooks of the Los Angeles Police Department and have remained a constant today:

1. Failure to maintain proficiency and equipment – Officers fail to maintain equipment such as handcuffs being rusted and inoperable or firearms not being cleaned. Also, officers may be unable to qualify with firearms and outdated defensive tactics skills.
2. Improper search and use of handcuffs – Officers searching before they handcuff a suspect and poor/no handcuffing technique.
3. Sleepy or asleep – Officers often do not get enough sleep before a shift due to family, shift work, overtime, and court.
4. Relaxing too soon – Officers make the assumption that a situation or suspect is under control.
5. Missing the danger signs – Officers may miss hidden weapons during a search or pat-down. This may occur because of improper preparation and a lack of proactive supervision. From an administrative perspective, they miss the warning signs and issues associated with officer suicide and oftentimes fail to hold officers accountable.

6. Taking bad positions – Officers fail to take a position of safety during traffic stops and field interviews.
7. Failure to watch the suspect's hands – Observing the suspect's hands means more than just being visible and out of the pocket. Many suspects are adept at cupping weapons in their hands such as knives or razor blades; seeing the palms of the hands are essential.
8. Tombstone courage – Many officers believe that because they wear the uniform that it demands respect. In doing so, they take unnecessary chances.
9. Preoccupation – The number one stressor for police officers is the administration in relationship to their job. Will the administration support me if I make a mistake? Other issues associated with this category are a lack of proper training, failure to be recognized, marital problems, and shift work.
10. Apathy – This contributes to each of the errors in varying degrees. It is hard to measure because it is a crime of omission, rather than commission.

If you examine the Ten Deadly Errors closely, it is clear that most are associated with mental errors. Remsburg (1986) supports this with the following statement: "Your mind is the most dangerous weapon you carry on patrol" (p. 16). When it comes to officer safety, officers are their own worst enemy and feel a sense of false security and entitlement. Thomas (2006) examined the development of fitness standards for inservice law enforcement personnel and noted the following:

In establishing mandatory training standards for inservice law enforcement personnel, such initiatives will be met with resistance and trepidation. The anxiety among inservice personnel is that standards would be used as a punitive measure to discipline or terminate those who cannot meet the department standard. Inservice personnel are skeptical of anything that is new or mandated. More importantly, they feel that they have a sense of entitlement, in as much, as they have been with the agency for a number of years and should not be forced to participate in such a program. (p. 13)

In fact, officers have made the following statements regarding training and the implementation of new initiatives (Thomas, 2006):

"I know how to make an arrest so why do we have to do this?"

"The administration has no idea what we do or need."

"If I can't qualify then they will fire me."

"This provides the administration with a tool to deny me a promotion."

"We never had standards before, so why now?"

"Just leave me alone; I do my job."

"I've been doing this job for 20 years, and I can tell you that training isn't important."

"I am a detective and work inside, and no one is going to attack me." (p. 14)

These statements are examples of fear and embody what is known as “destructive entitlement.” They also coincide with the 10 deadly errors and the concept that experience breeds confidence. What makes this confidence so alarming is that it is predicated upon the unknown variable of human behavior, not of the officers, but the suspect in every encounter.

The one aspect of this complex puzzle that has not been discussed is the loss of learning without repetition. In essence, certain skills are lost because they are not utilized. The recruit who graduates from the academy is indoctrinated with patrol tactics and is eager to apply all of the skills that he or she has learned in the academy. As an officer gets older, however, his or her duties become routine much like the assembly line worker, and therein lies the danger—apathy. The Florida Department of Law Enforcement (1997) explains skill deterioration or loss of learning without repetition in the following manner: we lose 42% of what we have learned in 30 minutes; 56% in an hour; 64% in 8 hours; and 75% in a week (p. 7.8).

Methodology

A qualitative research method was used to analyze the nature and contextual experiences of law enforcement officers who had received training at their agency or at least at an academy that certified them in the area of law enforcement. A qualitative method was used in order to provide a rich description of law enforcement officers’ experiences and their training. Bogdan and Biklen (1992) defined qualitative research as being “rich in description of people, places, and conversation, which are not easily handled by statistical procedures,” stating that “qualitative researchers are concerned with understanding behavior/experiences from the subject’s own frame of reference” (p. 2). Consequently, analyzing the training and experiences of the law enforcement officers is more easily understood utilizing qualitative research because this approach permits the in-depth exploration of the experiences of a group of people in their own voices.

Participant Selection

The population studied consisted of 90 law enforcement officers who had received training in the area of law enforcement and 4 training supervisors who led the training department at each participating agency. The officers represented four different law enforcement agencies in Florida. Surveys were distributed to officers through the training office. Once the surveys were completed, they were retrieved from the respective training officers.

An attempt was made to include a range of experiences and orientations in order to examine the full spectrum of the nature and contextual factors that condition the officer’s training experience(s) and the interface of officers and the citizenry in working through the problems and issues that occur in community policing. This group included officers representing various ranks within the law enforcement agencies. The officers participated on a voluntary basis and were not coerced/forced to complete the survey instrument.

Research Design

Prior to the beginning of the study, the training supervisor in each law enforcement agency was contacted, given a brief description of the study, and asked to participate. The supervisors were asked to provide an approximate number of officers who were currently active and had served on the force for at least 6 months. Once the numbers were given, the researchers attempted to survey at least one-fifth of the officers at each agency. The one-fifth number was chosen, as it appeared to be a manageable number, which was agreed upon by the researchers and the training officers.

Each of the potential participants was briefed by the training officers and told the purpose of the survey. After explaining the survey, the officers were given time to complete the survey. The participants were encouraged by both the researchers and the training officers to be as candid as possible and told that the information gathered from the surveys would be used to analyze and critique the existing training program at the respective agencies. The primary method of gathering data for this study was through open-ended questions on a survey instrument and a program analysis based on interviews with the training officers/supervisors. The program analysis consisted of reviewing initiatives/programs geared at law enforcement safety and having conversation with training officers about their respective training departments.

The general participants were asked to respond to the 11 open-ended questions on the survey instrument. The participants were generally asked to describe their training experiences and share their experiences of working with the community. The participants were asked to share their views on the level of quality in the training program(s) in which they had received training prior to and after becoming a certified officer. As for the training supervisors, they were asked to describe their view on the importance of training, provide an assessment of the extent and quality of the training that they had received, and assess the training provided at their respective agency.

As interviews progressed with the training officers, probes were used to encourage the officers to illustrate their reflections with specific examples and experiences. Tangential topics and questions evolved, however, and the investigators pursued what Spindler and Spindler (1992) refer to as a flexible format, encouraging the interviewee to speak freely about concerns and, in the process, answering questions that had not been asked.

The interviews usually lasted about 30 minutes, although some of them were longer. Notes were taken during the interviews and later served as a means for data analysis.

Data Analysis

There is a unique relationship between the data and its analysis in a qualitative study. As the data is collected, "units" emerge that suggest further data needs to be collected. Categories of information may also emerge. Typically, the data is coded according to these categories and analyzed to explore meaning and interrelationships (Bogdan & Biklen, 1992).

Coding

Coding is the process by which data is ordered. Coding occurred simultaneously with the data collection to permit the researchers to identify relationships among the variables. There are three forms of coding: (1) open coding, (2) axial coding, and (3) selective coding.

The line-by-line examination of each transcript to identify emerging concepts expressed by the study's participants initially did open coding. Axial coding was used to review experience areas and hypothesize relationships. Selective coding for core arenas was conducted systematically to identify codes with a significant relationship that could be used for additional data collection (Strauss, 1987).

As we analyzed the surveys and reviewed the notes from the interviews, similar terms, phrases, and experiences emerged. The terms, phrases, and experiences were carefully examined, resulting in the development of two key experience areas: (1) social and (2) intellectual. The experience allowed us to gain a sense of the participants' situational perspective. Within the social arena, there are the experiences of the officers interacting with the community, especially the combative. The intellectual arena includes such experiences as knowledge (the training process), perception, and reflection.

Results: Community Interaction

In regards to community interaction, 73 of the 90 officers (81%) reported very negative experiences within the community. The negative experiences ranged from verbal abuse to physical aggression. The physical aggression was usually in the form of resisting arrest and the shoving of officers; however, 27 (30%) of the officers reported situations in which individuals attempted to use nonlethal weapons against them. Another aspect of community interaction addressed by the law enforcement officers was community trust. A vast majority of the participants voiced a concern about the lack of trust exhibited by members of the community towards them. Officers suggested that the citizens see them as the enemy rather than as a protection and service agency. The officers voiced the concern that citizens continue to call them as a last resort, usually after the situation had escalated to a dangerous/life-threatening level.

Significant Concern

One theme that emerged from the study that stood out more than any other was the concern that the officers expressed in regards to their interaction with the seriously mentally ill population. The majority of the officers agreed that responses for assistance with seriously mentally ill (SMI) persons could change quickly from a routine call to one that could become either dangerous or life-threatening. The officers attributed this fact to their lack of training as well as their lack of understanding about the SMI persons. Eighty-four of the 90 officers (93%) voiced concerns about the relationship that their department had with social service, especially mental health agencies. Officers reported a great divide in the agencies knowing the full range of duties by law enforcement agencies and law enforcement knowing the full responsibilities of the social service agencies. The officers suggested that there is still a great deal of stereotypes present in regards to what these different entities

do. The officers basically see too much separatism between law enforcement and social service agencies, which hinders the joint success that could be enjoyed. The officers suggested that an improved relationship could improve their services, as they would be more aware of what's available to the citizens that they encounter, especially the SMI persons. As a remedy to this area of concern, the officers had to first assess their level of training in the area of dealing with SMI persons. The majority of the officers reported that they believed they had received inadequate training for intervening with SMI individuals. Their perception of inadequate training is based upon the fact that their mental health training was less than one hour. The officers also reported that mental health training is not required at their agencies and that inservice training provided by their respective agency deals mostly with sociological issues not mental illness. All of the officers who expressed concern with working with the mentally ill stated that dealing with SMI individuals had become so routine that mental health training should become mandatory and ongoing. They also proposed that mental health training be considered just as important to their training as cultural diversity.

Furthermore, the officers also suggested that more emphasis should be given to improving human relations skills because the ability to listen to people and respond in a sensitive manner is essential to good police work. Lastly, the officers suggested that mental health professionals become part of the training process of law enforcement. The officers advocated a seamless system that would provide opportunities for social service professionals and law enforcement officers to become knowledgeable about the services provided by each agency as members of the same team, not competitors.

General Themes

- On a scale of 1 to 10 with 10 being the safest, the officers were asked how safe they felt while performing their job. The mode score was 7; the average score (mean) was 6.5; and the median was 8. This basically tells the reader that for the most part, officers are feeling somewhat unsafe while performing their daily duties/tasks. As gleaned from the literature review, this unsafe feeling can have devastating consequences.
- When asked to what degree officers thought that their agency valued safety, 52 of the officers said "very much," 30 said "somewhat," and 8 said "very little." This helps the reader appreciate the fact that most of the officers at least acknowledge that their agency values safety. Perhaps this perception allows the officer to feel valued by the agency.
- When asked whether or not their respective academies spent adequate time on officer safety, the majority of the officers answered "no." These officers suggested that more time should have been devoted to more realistic scenarios. These officers also suggested that there should have been less time in the classroom and more time spent analyzing and responding to realistic scenarios. Another point that was highlighted by these respondents was the perceived need for more refresher sessions and mandatory inservice training involving officer safety. The overall theme for this question was, "too little, too fast."

- When asked about the part of their job that presented the greatest risk, all of the concerns were in the area of traffic, domestic violence, domestic disturbances, and personnel: 33% cited traffic stops, 18% cited domestic violence, 16% driving, 16% lack of back-up, 4% working in traffic, and 10% general encounters with the public including SMI persons.
- The officers were also asked to relate which aspect of their job made them feel the safest: 33% suggested that adequate back-up them feel the safest while another 33% suggested that sufficient training made them feel the safest, 20% identified proper equipment, and the other 14% were divided into areas such as time off, vacation, and experience.
- When asked how many officers they knew who were injured over the last year in the line of duty, and how they were personally affected, the officers, on average, knew of six other officers who were injured over the past year. These were accounts within the officers' own agencies and not knowledge gained from the mass media. As for how the officers were affected, the majority suggested that the incidents caused them to be more cautious as well as more aware of the need for more training in different areas. Again, most of the dialogue was about policing the SMI population.
- When asked how concerned they were about personal safety when they applied for the position, interestingly enough, there was a split between two answers. Approximately half of the officers shared that they were "somewhat concerned," and the other half suggested that they were "very concerned." The other two possible answers were "not concerned" and "concerned." None of the officers chose those responses.

After considering the findings of the study, we offer the following model as a workable, systems approach to law enforcement personal safety training.

BARTH Model: Five Vital Steps

All law enforcement recruits should receive extensive training based on the BARTH model while in the academy and once at their respective agency. Based on the input from the participants of the study, one area of concern would definitely be in the area of mental illness. The block of training for this subject/topic would be no less than 8 clock hours. The training would be conducted by qualified mental health professionals (e.g., psychiatrists, psychologists, counselors, etc.).

In addition to the academy training, all officers will be required to attend refresher courses on an annual basis. This training will be offered as inservice training conducted by a trained mental health professional.

Officers, who excel in their training and/or show an extraordinary commitment to this area, would be allowed to attend additional training and become part of a crisis team for that agency.

The crisis team would consist of trained law enforcement officers as well as social service personnel who would be housed at the agency. The crisis team would be on call 24 hours a day in order to assist officers who need crisis intervention.

The law enforcement and mental health agency would become involved in cooperative education, which would allow each agency to become more fully aware of services available to the public. This initiative would enable law enforcement personnel to make appropriate decisions in regards to diversion, etc. The mental health agency would benefit by being able to service individuals who truly need mental health services.

Both agencies would get the public involved by offering workshops and seminars (free of charge) to the community and prepare pamphlets and brochures that would be given to citizens who have mentally ill family members and/or friends. The literature would explain the process of dealing with the mentally ill and list numbers for assistance. It is believed that the above effort would help gain the trust of the citizenry.

Consequently, we suggest that the above model could improve the training of law enforcement officers who are spending a significant amount of time engaged in community policing with SMI persons.

As for the BARTH model in general, it can be implemented in the following manner:

- B. Beware of officer apathy:** This step addresses the issue of being lax and careless. As was shown in the literature review, apathy decreases the officers' personal safety by allowing the officer to perform risky behaviors and/or become less safety conscious.
- A. Allow the officers to be a part of the training curriculum.** One point that was noted from this study was that the officers wanted to have a say on the subject matter that would be offered by the agency. This gave way to having a special section on the area of mental illness.
- R. Realism in training:** The offers suggested that the training department should duplicate real-life incidents in which the officers had been exposed, thus allowing for each officer to learn from the experience(s). The majority of the officers expressed that they lacked realistic training.
- T. Tactics:** The goal should be to maintain a high proficiency in tactical skills by providing the most up-to-date skill sets in the profession. This can be accomplished by the training officer(s) being aware of the most current trends in the law enforcement field.
- H. Hone and refine the skills,** thus allowing for the skills to become second nature. This can be accomplished by offering refresher courses on an ongoing/regular basis.

The researchers feel that if the BARTH model is implemented, more agencies will be able to meet the training needs of its officers. It is the belief that most of the tools and/or resources that are needed in order to implement the model are currently in place at most agencies. It becomes a matter of grouping and streamlining resources. The researchers cannot stress enough the importance of allowing the officers to be a part of designing and implementing the BARTH model. The agency supervisor will find the officers' insight to be invaluable.

Conclusion

This study assessed the status of law enforcement officers' personal safety in southwest Florida. The study reviewed related issues and examined the experiences of 94 law enforcement officers. The findings of the study revealed a number of gaps that included the following: poor community relations, poor training in mental health, community distrust, and a lack of commitment by the different agencies to provide adequate personal safety training. The study also highlighted the perceived dangers that SMI persons present to law enforcement officers, as well as how important training is in assuring quality service to not only the SMI individual but to society at large.

Based on the findings that have been shared in this article, it is clear that what is necessary for officers is meaningful training to address the issues associated with apathy and routine to keep the officers sharp. This issue needs to be addressed more fervently as the officers get older and look at the job as routine, understanding that safety is essential to their survival. Another important aspect of the study was the call by the officers to be more involved in the development of their training. The researchers have provided a model that would accommodate such a request.

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911 and the Failure of Police Rapid Response

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*Now I dialed 911 a long time ago.
Don't you see how late they're reactin'?
They don't care 'cause they stay paid anyway.
Thinkin' you are first when you really are tenth.
You better wake up and smell the real flavor
Cause 911 is a fake life-saver.
911 is a joke in yo' town
911 is a joke.*

—Public Enemy, 1988

The primary job of the patrol officer is to answer 911 and 311 calls for service. The problem of misuse and abuse of 911 has been broken down into unintentional calls, misdials, hang-up calls, and prank calls (Sampson, 2004). This article examines all dispatched police calls for a period of one year in Baltimore's Eastern District. While the Eastern District is by no means a typical police district—98% African American with high levels of poverty, drugs, crime, and blight—it provides a snapshot into the world of 911 and rapid response. This study combines a quantitative analysis of 911 and 311 calls for police service with a qualitative analysis of the worthiness of these calls and the effectiveness, if any, of police response. I served as a uniformed police officer in the district for the period of the research.

Police departments are committed to responding to every citizen's call for police service. More than any tactical strategy or mandate from the police administration, citizens' telephone calls control the majority of police services. The emphasis on radio calls means that in busy districts, officers can do little other than answer dispatched calls for service. A system allowing all citizens unlimited and equal access to police services, is, at its core, very democratic. The reality, however, is anything but. Police service is not unlimited. Access must inevitably be controlled. Police respond to the most overt manifestation of a problem or to the location at which one citizen, justified or not, demands repeated police presence (Force, 1972).

The advent of patrol cars, telephones, two-way radios, "scientific" police management, social migration, and social-science theories on the "causes" of crime converged in the late 1950s. Before then, police had generally followed a "watchman" approach: each patrol officer was given the responsibility to police a geographic area (Wilson, 1968). In the decades after WWII, motorized car patrol replaced foot patrol as the standard method of urban policing. Improved technology allowed citizens to call police and have their complaints dispatched to police through two-way radios in squad cars. Car patrol was promoted over foot patrol as a cost-saving move justified by increased "efficiency" (Wilson & McLaren, 1972).

Those who viewed police as provocative and hostile to the public applauded reduced police presence and discretion. Controlled by the central dispatch, police

could respond to the desires of the community rather than enforce their own arbitrary concepts of “acceptable” behavior. Police officers, for their part, enjoyed the comforts of the automobile and the prestige associated with new technology. Citizens, rather than being encouraged to maintain community standards, were urged to stay behind locked doors and call 911.

Car patrol eliminated the neighborhood police officer. Police were pulled off neighborhood beats to fill cars. Levels of motorized patrol—the cornerstone of urban policing—have no effect on crime rates, victimization, or public satisfaction (Kelling, Pate, Diekman, & Brown, 1974). Lawrence Sherman (1983) was an early critic of telephone dispatch and motorized patrol: “The rise of telephone dispatch transformed both the method and purpose of patrol. Instead of *watching to prevent* crime, motorized police patrol became a process of merely *waiting to respond* to crime” (p. 149).

A quick response time became an end in itself rather than a means to crime prevention. In order to respond quickly, police must be available to receive dispatched calls. Police are pressured to be “in service” as much as possible. Parked alone in the middle of an empty parking lot—the ominous police car and the long walk discourage pesky citizens from approaching—a police officer is considered “in service.” When dealing with people—the essence of the job, some might argue—police are considered “out of service.” David Bayley (1994) explains this police prime directive:

Despite what police say, the prime directive of patrolling is to be available rather than to respond adequately to the myriad calls for service. For police managers, therefore, patrol officers are “working” when they are simply cruising around. . . . Police forces must store capacity, and they do so in patrol. For patrol officers as well as for commanders, claims of being busy are a way of disguising the invisible burden of always being ready. (p. 46)

Because patrol officers spend most of their workday sitting in a police car or driving around, officers develop a car-centered method of policing their post. Officers learn most of their knowledge of an area through the window of a patrol car. Even in an area where most crime occurs on the sidewalk and most residents do not own a car (much less drive to work), officers are more attuned to pot holes and stoplight timing than to street crime and quality-of-life issues. The high volume and low content of 911 calls further discourage any routine nonconfrontational interactions between the police and the public.

The theory behind car patrol, still taught in today’s police academies and criminal justice textbooks, is known as the “three Rs.” The first R is “random patrol”: police driving in nonfixed patterns to create the illusion of police “omnipresence.” This stands in direct contrast to the older idea of police walking in a fixed and regular beat. As Professor Carl Klockars (1983) memorably wrote, “It makes about as much sense to have police patrol routinely in cars to fight crime as it does to have firemen patrol routinely in firetrucks to fight fire” (p. 130). Gary Cordner and Robert Trojanowicz (1992) summarized the widely cited Kansas City Preventive Patrol Experiment (Kelling et al., 1974):

During 1972 and 1973, a year-long experiment was conducted in Kansas City, Missouri, to test the effects of preventive patrol. . . . Fifteen patrol beats were included in the study: five were control beats with normal levels of preventive

patrol; five were proactive beats with 2–3 times the normal levels of patrol; and five were reactive beats, with no preventative patrol. It is important to realize that patrol units would enter the reactive beats to answer calls whenever requested. After handling calls, however, these patrol units would vacate the reactive beats and do their patrolling in other areas. . . . When the data were analyzed, no significant differences were found on any of the indicators between the control, proactive, and reactive beats.

In debunking random patrol and omnipresence, the Kansas City study cast doubt on the previously unquestioned faith in motorized random patrol as an effective and essential means of policing. The impact of the Kansas City Report, however, despite being one of the most heralded scientific police studies, was negligible.

The second of the three *Rs* is “rapid response,” the theory that a quick police response to the scene of a crime will result in the greater apprehension of criminals. For fire trucks and ambulances, the benefit of rapid response is obvious: quick response saves lives. Rapid police response is not designed to prevent crime, however, and its failure to do so should come as no surprise. Though it may seem counterintuitive, rapid police response does not prevent crime and has almost no effect on the odds that a criminal will be caught. Even instantaneous police response would be ineffective, as the vast majority of the time, most 911 callers—whether by necessity, choice, or confusion—wait until a suspect is gone before reporting a crime (Kelling & Coles, 1996; Spelman & Brown, 1981).

But it is pointless to blame the victim. Even if victims were to respond “correctly” or a third party calls police while a crime is in progress, dispatch takes time. If police do not arrive within one minute of a crime, rapid police response has virtually no effect (Bieck & Kessler, 1977; Spelman & Brown, 1981; Tien, Simon, & Larson, 1978). The 911 operator must answer the call, gather the relevant information, and enter it into a computer. This information is then sent to the relevant police dispatcher. The dispatcher then finds time to dispatch the call to a police officer. More often than not, even if police just happen to be in the right place at the right time, callers have been waiting for 5, 10, even 20 minutes.

The illusion of omnipresence and rapid response is usually shattered the moment one calls with a need for police service, yet despite its basic failure, reactive car-based policing is popular on many levels. Radio cars provide a means to account for and control officers; police officers like being sheltered from the street in the comparative comfort of a car; and police administrators generally find it easier to focus on response time than crime prevention.

The third of the three *Rs* is “reactive investigation,” the effective working of the criminal justice system to “solve” crimes and provide deterrence against future crimes. While investigation is rightfully a key part of police work in solving crimes, the public’s beliefs in these techniques is hugely inflated. The O.J. Simpson trial raised the bar too high for the preservation of chaotic crime scenes, and TV shows, most notably *CSI: Crime Scene Investigation*, portray a faith in technology that, when not absolute fiction, is science-fiction for most police departments. Crimes get solved because people talk. Call them rats, finks, stoolies, confidential informants, cooperating witnesses, or good citizens; it’s the good old-fashioned snitch that

solves crime. Science and technology have a long way to go, and solving a murder isn't as important as preventing the crime in the first place.

Legitimacy of Police Calls for Service

This study is based on a breakdown of all dispatched calls in one police district. This data provides a somewhat crude breakdown that reveals that police are most often occupied with calls with which they should not be involved or can do very little about. While most people don't call 911 once in a year, others call 911 daily. Police in Baltimore's Eastern District handled 113,205 calls for service in 2000, or about 2.5 calls per resident per year. This is roughly four times the national average (Sampson, 2004). Officers respond formally and informally as back-up for many more calls. The total number of primary calls is approximately one call per hour per patrol officer. The frequency of calls per officer increases when other officers are "detailed," "out of service," or otherwise unable to take calls. Call volume is not evenly dispersed throughout the day: 12:00 PM to 2:00 AM is generally busy while 3:00 AM to 7:00 AM is generally slow.

Calls for service have been categorized into three basic categories: (1) requiring a written report and relate to a crime (26% of dispatched calls), (2) resulting in some police service, even if very limited in scope (35% of calls), and (3) unnecessary or illegitimate calls, receiving but not needing any police response (40% of all calls). As coded by responding officers, 39% of calls have no need for police response. An additional one-third of calls are minor matters, not needing rapid response. Just over a quarter of calls involve a crime or require a written report. Drug calls account for one-fourth of all dispatched calls. Citywide, excluding the Eastern District, drug calls account for approximately 7.5% of all calls.

A written police report serves as a proxy measure for a "legitimate" call. Any call involving a crime, victim, injured person, or property damage results in a written report. Legitimate calls can be major or minor. Examples include a stolen car, a fire in a vacant building, a person shot, an arrest for drug possession, a window broken by a thrown rock, or a man who hits his girlfriend. As an indicator for a legitimate call, written reports tend to overestimate the percentage of legitimate calls because of the inclusion of all "domestic-related" calls.

In Baltimore, "domestic" calls are defined as all situations involving present or former sexual partners, indicated by key words such as *husband*, *wife*, *girlfriend*, *ex-boyfriend*, or *baby's mother*. As there is no specific category for domestic-related calls, all police calls are classified as either domestic- or nondomestic-related. Similar to other categories, a large percentage of "domestic" calls are not legitimate. All "domestic-related" calls, legitimate and illegitimate, require a written report.

Calls for Service in Baltimore's Eastern District

Category of Dispatched Call for Service	Category as Percentage (n) of All Calls	Percentage (n) of Dispatched Calls with . . .		
		No Need for Police Response ¹	Some Police Service ²	Crime Committed or Requiring a Written Report ³
All Calls for Service	100% (113,205)	38.9% (44,003)	35.4% (40,093)	25.7% (29,109)
Drugs	25.6% (28,959)	13.9% (4,027)	67.2% (19,462)	18.9% (5,470)
Disorderly	10.5% (11,874)	28.6% (3,398)	64.9% (7,707)	6.5% (769)
"Other"	8.8% (9,953)	39.3% (3,910)	26.0% (2,584)	34.8% (3,459)
Alarms	8.3% (9,353)	94.4% (8,833)	3.7% (346)	1.9% (174)
Common Assault	6.9% (7,865)	41.3% (3,252)	23.7% (1,867)	34.9% (2,746)
911 No Voice	5.6% (6,341)	90.1% (5,764)	7.3% (462)	1.8% (115)
Larceny	3.8% (4,346)	28.0% (1,219)	12.8% (556)	59.2% (2,571)
Family Disturbance	2.9% (3,277)	25.6% (839)	37.1% (1,216)	37.3% (1,222)
Auto Accident	2.6% (2,990)	23.8% (712)	30.5% (912)	45.7% (1,366)
Burglary	2.3% (2,639)	49.1% (1,297)	12.0% (341)	37.9% (1,001)
Armed Person	1.9% (2,168)	57.9% (1,255)	29.7% (641)	12.5% (272)
Destruction of Property	1.8% (2,059)	27.9% (575)	14.6% (300)	57.5% (1,184)
Aggravated Assault	1.4% (1,580)	48.0% (759)	20.4% (322)	31.6% (499)
Selected Other Categories				
Gunshots	0.9% (980)	59.4% (582)	32.8% (321)	7.9% (77)
Stolen Auto	0.9% (969)	37.9% (367)	7.4% (72)	54.7% (530)
Assault, Shooting	0.3% (324)	51.9% (168)	1.9% (6)	46.3% (150)
Assault, Cutting	0.3% (312)	29.2% (91)	5.4% (17)	65.4% (204)
Rape	0.1% (120)	39.2% (47)	4.2% (5)	56.7% (68)
Carjacking	0.04% (48)	20.8% (10)	4.2% (2)	75.0% (36)
Not Listed Above	15.1% (17,048)	40.5% (6,898)	17.3% (2,954)	42.2% (7,196)

¹ These calls are not legitimate. If no written report is required, police may give a call "oral code." There are six oral codes: (A) call unfounded, (B) unable to locate complainant, (C) no such address, (D) no police services needed, (E) [suspect] gone on arrival, and (F) call abated. For most categories, codes A through E are included in this column. For the categories "narcotics," "armed person," and "disorderly," codes A through D are included in this column, and code E is included in the following column. Gunshot calls coded D are also included in the following column as, by custom, the oral code for gunshots refers to the presence of a victim rather than the existence of gunshots.

² These calls are coded "abated," a catch-all oral code. Some of these calls are legitimate. Calls coded "abated" may (narcotics) but usually do not (auto accident) involve a crime. While no police report is written, calls coded "abated" imply some need for or effect from police services, even if minor.

³ A written police report is required for any property damage, injury, victim, arrest, and all "domestic" calls. A call in any category can be "domestic." In this column, categories with a large number of "domestic" calls—"family disturbance," "larceny," "destruction of property," "common assault," and "other"—are inflated due to the inclusion of unfounded "domestic" calls.

Source: Baltimore City Police Department, 2001. Data recoded by author.

Four dispatched calls illustrate the concept of an "illegitimate" domestic call. All of these calls require a written report but lack a crime, victim, injury, or damage.

- A worried man calls police to report that his girlfriend has not yet returned home from work. Police receive a call for a domestic-related missing person.

By the time police arrive at the couple's house, the woman has returned home safely. She was delayed by public transportation.

- A woman calls police because she believes her baby's father stole her house keys. Police receive a call for domestic-related theft. When police arrive, the woman apologizes because she has found the misplaced keys.
- Police receive a call for domestic-related assault in progress: a woman being assaulted by her boyfriend. Upon arrival, police find no sign of struggle. A happily inebriated woman is sprawled on the couch. Her boyfriend is seated nearby. Both are dressed for bed. She laughs and says she called the police because her boyfriend put his feet in her hair. The boyfriend apologizes for her, saying he thought she was joking when she said she was calling the police to report an assault.
- A resident calls police and reports that a man and his girlfriend are yelling in the street. Police respond to find two people, casual friends, loudly planning when they will see each other next.

Illegitimate domestic calls are responsible for increasing the number of written reports and thus overestimate the number of "legitimate" calls as defined by a written report. Given the limitations of available data, I could not analyze domestic calls separately. Approximately one-third to one-half of all written reports are domestic-related, and a majority of domestic calls—in a ratio similar to nondomestic calls—are unfounded.

The bias of using written reports as a proxy measure for legitimate calls is not entirely one way. There is not a written report for every required call. Police officers do not like writing reports and will avoid doing so if at all possible. The number of required reports that are not filed, however, is not a large percentage of all reports. An officer cannot get in trouble for writing an unnecessary report, and officers who do not write a required report risk severe trouble. Reports are written for some unfounded calls in order to protect the officer from accusations of mishandling a call. Outside of the time required to write most reports—five minutes to half an hour depending on the report—there is little downside to writing a report.

Before the 911 system was introduced, citizens in need of police service found a police officer or called the local police station. *All* calls for service required a written report. After 911 was introduced, requests for police service skyrocketed, and police were overwhelmed by report writing. The system was changed so that today only arrests, crimes with victims, and domestic-related incidents require written reports. If no report is required, officers may "close" a call with one of six "oral codes": (1) call unfounded, (2) unable to locate complainant, (3) no such address, (4) no police services needed, (5) suspect gone on arrival, and (6) call abated.

Thirty-five percent of calls are coded "abated," a catch-all oral code that implies some need for or effect from police services, however minor. While there is not a great deal of significance as to which oral code a call receives, calls coded "abated" may, as in the case of drug dealing, involve a victimless crime but usually, as in an auto accident, do not involve a crime. Some minor crimes without personal

injury or property damage may be coded “abated.” The following are examples of “abated” calls, thus requiring no written report:

- A strong wind opens a store’s poorly secured rear door, setting off a burglar alarm. There is no sign of forced entry, and a search of the building shows no person present nor any sign of stolen or damaged property. The responding officer closes the door securely.
- Two cars collide with damage but no injuries. In Baltimore, only accidents with injury or involving city vehicles require written reports. The majority of “abated” car accidents are legitimate in that cars did crash, but there is little police can do other than direct traffic and facilitate the exchange of drivers’ information. To the frustration of insurance companies, no police report is written.
- An assault call reveals two friends engaged in a loud public discussion. The men apologize for their noise and go home.
- A man claims he was robbed. Investigation reveals the man to be a drug addict who freely gave ten dollars for drugs but received nothing in return. This call could be handled in many ways (including the arrest of the addict), but most likely the complainant would be dismissed and the call coded “abated.”
- A caller states that boys on a neighboring stoop are selling drugs. When a police officer approaches, three young men on the stoop disperse.
- A call for a family disturbance reveals a 17-year-old man sitting on the stoop. He says he called the police because his mom locked him out and he wants to go back inside. His mother, inside the home, says she kicked him out because he’s out of control and disrespectful and called her a “bitch.” The son is given a stern lecture, but the mother is told in private that she can’t kick her son out of the house until he turns 18.

Based on the broad range in the “abated” category, it is not possible to dichotomize these calls as either legitimate or undeserving of police response. A majority of “abated” calls are minor but legitimate in that police perform some function or service, even if this service could come from agencies other than the police. “Abated” calls are grouped in their own middle-ground category of “some police service” required, however minor. One-third of dispatched calls fall in this category.

Along with all calls coded “abated,” the oral code “suspect gone on arrival” indicates “some police service” for drug calls, armed person calls, and disorderly calls (see the “Calls for Service” table). While including all these calls as legitimate overestimates the legitimacy of these categories, it acknowledges that many calls are irrelevant by the time police arrive but were legitimate when they were first made. Gunshot calls coded “no police services needed” are also included in this category. By custom, the oral code for gun discharge refers to the presence of a victim rather than the existence of gunshots. If a gunshot victim is found, the call is reclassified as an “assault by shooting,” and a report is written. Most calls for gunshots do, in fact, reflect actual gunshots. The remainder are prank calls or loud firecrackers.

Many people falsely assume that police dislike responding to “minor” calls. Police are often more concerned about the legitimacy of a call than its severity. Police officers tend to enjoy any call in which they can make a difference or help an appreciative person. Most officers take particular pride in some category of minor call for which they believe they give particularly thorough service. Police tend to take minor calls seriously as long as the situation can be resolved by some police action that is not available to the calling citizen. While officers frequently complain that some people call the police too much, police also believe that many people are too hesitant to call police about “minor” but very real issues. As one officer said, “If they don’t let us know about a problem, we can’t do anything to fix it.”

Thirty-nine percent of calls to which police respond require no police response (see the “Calls for Service” table). Calls coded “unfounded,” “unable to locate complainant,” “no such address,” “no police services needed” (except for gun discharges) and “suspect gone on arrival” (except for the aforementioned categories), are all indicative of a call with little or no legitimacy. Police call these unfounded calls “bogus” or “bullshit.” While the definition of a “bullshit” call is somewhat flexible, one officer defined a “bullshit call” as follows:

Something we shouldn’t be there for. “Bullshit” is people call police, but then get mad that you show up. Or when you show up, and they make shit up. Bullshit is any junkie who wastes my time because they got burnt [*ripped-off on a drug deal*] and say, “I was robbed.” Or some bitch who don’t get paid and says, “I was raped!” Everything out here is bullshit. Half the CDS [*drug*] calls are bullshit . . . What can we do about it? People want their rights. People here just want their drugs, their “hair-ron” [*heroin*], some malt liquor, and a “little some’m’ some’m” [*something something, i.e., sex*]. We just get in the way.

While all unfounded calls are considered “bullshit,” not all “bullshit” calls are unfounded. Legitimate but minor calls most often achieve their bovine descriptive because of an uncooperative victim or the inability of the officer to “do anything.” Many victims of even violent crime are uncooperative with police due to fear of or friendship with the suspect. Other victims simply—and sometimes wisely, if they are wanted—choose to avoid interaction with an ineffective criminal justice system. It is not unusual for crime victims to be uncooperative and, for example, not even reveal their name.

Illegitimate calls stem from a variety of sources. A large percentage of calls are simply fictitious: people use 911 to harass enemies, draw police away from an area, and make prank phone calls. Calls that require no police response include a complainant who cannot be located; a location that does not exist; a call reporting that an unarmed stranger at a bus stop is armed; a burglary at a location at which there is no building; a false report of a man shot; and a person, usually a child, who dials 911 and hangs up. As a category, 90% of these “911 hangups”—6% of all dispatched calls—are unfounded.

In general, officers can determine the validity of a call from the sparse information given by the dispatcher. One officer said, . . .

There's lots of clues, even when they [*dispatchers*] barely tell us anything. First, there's the location. Small-time robberies or rapes at drug corners are bullshit. People getting burnt [*ripped-off by drug dealers*] and what not. A real shooting will get lots of calls. If you're harassing drug dealers and one call comes in for a shooting a few blocks away, you know it's bullshit. Other calls you know are legit. There aren't too many fake cuttings. If you get a call for a cutting, good chance you're going to see some blood. Assaults are usually bullshit. [*Calls for*] burglaries, destruction of properties, stolen autos—well, not always stolen cars—but in general, they're legit. You just have to remember that nobody out here tells the complete truth. Everybody is out to get theirs . . . Other times you get information from the dispatcher and know there's nothing you can do. Or should do. Somebody can't raise their kid? What the hell am I supposed to do? I ain't baby's father.

The same officer expressed frustration with the 911 system:

I don't know why they have us responding to calls we can't do anything about. "He said, she said" [*type of calls*]. All we do is tell them to go to a court commissioner. We can't do shit if we didn't see it, but they still send an officer. That way it's on us [*the patrol officer*] and not on them [*the department*].

Drug Calls

Drug calls, usually anonymous, don't help police officers. Police already know the hot drug corners:

What's the point of telling us there's CDS [*drugs*] on 700 Port, or Madeira and Chase, or Wolfe and Eager? No shit. Either you let us jack everybody up [*stop and search people on the street*], lock everybody up just for being there, or you live with it.

We're not going to stop drug dealing. Look at all the junkies around. They're gonna buy! But people call 911 and we drive by. Ninety percent of this job is clearing corners, harassing junkies, and paperwork. What's left? I got to eat lunch and take a dump, too. How much worse would the city be if I just turned off the radio and did my job? I guarantee you I could do a better job if it weren't for [*the dispatcher*] always shouting in my ear.

We can't get shit done because call are always coming in. How many are really "in progress"? Five percent? How many are innocent victims? None.

As police must appear at each call request, the quality of these responses plummets as the quantity increases. Temporary dispersal of drug suspects is usually the best that can be achieved.

In part because of police officers' inability to solve the drug problem, however, officers generally welcome drug calls as "easy calls." Drug calls are less likely to require a written report than other calls, and as most drug calls are anonymous, there is no victim or complainant to placate. There is a modus operandi to police response to an active drug corner. When a police car approaches, drug activity stops and people—dealers, friends, addicts, lookouts, and any "innocents" who

happen to be walking by—will slowly walk away. Most often, the suspects will go for a brief walk around the block and then, after police leave, reconvene on the same or a nearby stoop. Dispersing without being asked is considered a sign of criminal activity, or perhaps an outstanding warrant, but police also view quick and unprompted departure—walking, not running—as a sign of respect and a satisfactory resolution to most problems. This interaction is so ritualized that it resembles a dance.

When a police officer approaches a group of suspected or known dealers, the officer will slow his or her car down in front of the individuals. This tells the suspects that the officer is there for them and not just passing through on the way to other business. If a group of suspects does not disperse when an officer “rolls up,” the officer will stop the car and look at the group. The mutual stare, known to police as “eye fucking,” serves a dual purpose: the police officer scans for contraband and weapons but also declares his or her dominance over the turf. Police officers assert their right to control public space. Every drug call to which police respond—indeed all police dealings with criminal or social misbehavior—will result in a suspect’s arrest, departure, or deference, but usually there is little long-term impact.

A drug call can be resolved in a few seconds or, with surveillance and investigation, can take upwards of an hour. Such a range gives patrol officers the ability to “sit on the call,” remain “out of service,” and not receive other dispatched calls. With this block of time, officers may finish paperwork, go to the bathroom, eat an uninterrupted lunch, or avoiding answering “bad” calls for another officer who is also trying to avoid taking calls. “Bad” calls, such as suspected child abuse or DOA (dead body), involve more time commitment, paperwork, or unforgettably horrible smells. When “sitting on a call,” conscientious officers will come back “in service” for any call on their post, an ideal, believed to be disappearing, known as “post integrity.” If no officer is “in service” (available to answer calls), the dispatcher may assign the call to their sergeant. This is a sure way to get officers back “in service” because sergeants are not supposed to answer calls for service.

Discussion

This study quantifies the level and misuse of police resources in the majority of dispatched calls for service. More than half of all dispatched calls for police service are fictitious, involve no crime, or peacefully resolve themselves before police arrive. In Baltimore’s Eastern District, the majority of 911 calls are for drug dealing, prank calls, and noncrime-related calls. The fact that drug dealing persists is perhaps the best example of the failure of police patrol based on rapid response. The high call volume of dispatched calls virtually precludes any form of patrol focused on crime prevention.

The impact of rapid response goes beyond the single quantifiable misuse of police resources. During slow periods, the possibility of receiving a dispatched call prevents officers from doing foot patrol, in-depth investigations, or any activity that may cause an officer to stray too far from the patrol car and the false promise of rapid response. Formally, police officers have no discretion over the calls to which they must respond. Informally, officers go through great effort to control their time and labor. In a throwback to old days when the dispatcher placed index cards in a police officer’s box, officers ask for backed-up calls on their post to be

put in their “box.” In the precomputer days, the calls could wait until the officer was free to deal with them. Computers and “improved 911,” however, have taken discretion away from the dispatcher and police officer. The perverse internal logic of rapid response demands that even nonemergency calls be quickly assigned to any available officer, even if that officer lacks knowledge and experience with the address or people involved.

Police isolated in squad cars will not know the community. An officer with over 30 years of experience talked about the greater knowledge he had before patrol was car-based and dispatch-controlled:

Back in the old days [*the late 1960s and 1970s*], there was such a thing as post integrity. You were out there walking around and people knew you. Things were different. You [*police*] could get away with anything . . . But that’s just the way things were. We had a lot of fun. But we also knew what was going on. People talked to us and trusted us. Well, some of them.

There is an inherent conflict between rapid response and knowing the community. There are not enough patrol resources to emphasize both rapid response and an alternative to a reactive, car-based patrol. The public that most needs police protection is already aware of the failure of 911 and police response; the rest of the public—the more influential and prominent citizens that generally defend the status quo and do not call for the police—need to be “unsold” on the necessity and inevitability of the reactive patrol.

Even with fewer cars and a de-emphasis of rapid response, police officers would better respond to all citizens’ needs. Free from the tyranny of dispatch, officers could focus on quality rather than quantity of response. A better system would require police dispatchers or police officers to exercise professional judgment and separate legitimate from illegitimate calls for police service. Such a system would need to affirm current legal protection for good-faith police errors. Freeing these police resources would make rapid response more consistent and reliable for the very rare serious crime in progress. By not promising (and usually failing to deliver) rapid response to all calls, patrol officers could be free to focus on crime-enabling problems and community concerns on their post.

Such a system would not be perfect, but it could be demonstrably better than the status quo. It could be tested in an area as small as one sector covered by the dozen or so police officers under the command of one sergeant. Experienced patrol officers would respond to all calls on their post. These officers would be free to walk their beat and use their discretion to solve local criminal problems. Nonemergency calls could be kept on an appointment basis. These officers, perhaps ironically, would still need access to rapid police response for backup. Inexperienced and lazy officers could be placed in patrol cars to learn the ropes, respond to legitimate emergency calls in progress, and provide officer back-up.

No police officer is ever promoted to beat cop. Foot patrol is most often a form of punishment. While the public generally favors increased foot patrol, the opposition to foot patrol in the police organization is strong. A car is comfortable; your feet don’t get tired; you can listen to the radio; you can talk to your partner in private; you stay warm and dry; and it’s easier to avoid problem people until after they

commit a serious crime. Then, you simply arrest them. Yet dealing with problem people *before* they commit a crime, though perhaps undesirable, is a police officer's job. Recognizing the failures and limitations of the status quo is the first step to better patrol: 911 calls dominate police far more than rapid response impacts crime.

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Re-Examining the Perceived Relations Between Police Officers and Security Personnel

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Introduction

Private security is one of the largest industries in the United States and shares many of the same missions as public law enforcement, including protection of property and crime prevention. The private security industry is almost triple the size of public law enforcement in terms of the number of officers employed (Joh, 2004). While employment in private security was on the rise prior to September 11, 2001, since the terrorist attacks on the Pentagon and the World Trade Center (WTC), increased focus has been given to private security as part of the first line of defense against future terrorist attacks.

Much of the capability for prevention, crisis response, and crisis management lies in private hands. . . . And many of the targets of terrorist attacks may be privately owned—banks, businesses, suppliers of transportation and communications infrastructure, shopping malls, and major building . . . like the World Trade Center in NYC. The first person to discover an actual attack against the homeland is likely to be a private security guard. (McIntyre, 2006, paragraph 23)

Indeed, the first responders to the attacks on the WTC were private security staff of the WTC and surrounding buildings, who helped to save thousands of people before the towers collapsed (Hall, 2003; Morabito & Greenberg, 2005). In its final report, the 9/11 Commission (2004) recommended private preparedness as a means of protecting against and preparing for another terrorist attack: “. . . unless a terrorist’s target is a military or other secure government facility, the ‘first’ responders will almost certainly be civilians. Homeland security and national preparedness, therefore, often begins with the private sector” (9/11 Commission, 2004, p. 398).

Research conducted prior to September 11, 2001, indicated that the relationship between private security professionals and law enforcement personnel could most aptly be described as a lack of mutual respect between the two groups, with neither group reporting high levels of trust or cooperation with the other (Calder, 1980; Nalla & Hummer, 1999). Putatively, there have been many changes to law enforcement and private security since the 9/11 terrorist attacks. It is possible that the perceptions of each group towards the other might have changed due to appeals for increased cooperation between the groups since the start of the war on

terror. It is the goal of this article to begin to assess the attitudes of law enforcement and security personnel towards each other in the post-9/11 era.

Police-Security Cooperation and Partnerships

Research regarding the police-security relationship takes two forms. One is to identify the partnerships that do exist between the public police and private security. This branch of research also attempts to identify reasons why there are not more partnerships, as well as suggest factors that can make cooperation either more or less likely. The other form of research in this area directly examines the attitudes of public police and private security personnel towards one another. Most of the academic research regarding the relationship has been of the first sort, with relatively little attention given to the attitudes of police and security personnel.

To speak of private security as a monolithic enterprise is somewhat misleading (Morabito & Greenberg, 2005). Instead, private security encompasses many different occupations and enterprises. Although different in their form, many private security enterprises are somewhat similar in their focus on proactively preventing criminal losses to a company's assets. These assets include, but are not limited to, personnel, intellectual property, confidential information, physical property, and profits. The efforts of public law enforcement agencies are, by their very nature, often the exact opposite in scope. Law enforcement agencies are often reactive in their nature, arriving after a criminal act has been committed. Despite the general differences between public police and private security, there is at least one area of overlap between the two groups—they both seek to protect the people and the property of the United States (IACP, 2004). Bradford and Simonsen (1998) argue that “while the interests of the public and private sector are not identical, they can easily be viewed as complementary . . . there is a public and private interest ‘overlap,’ especially in cases where there is an overwhelming public interest” (p. 165). Arguably, the attacks of September 11 created a situation of overwhelming public interest in the prevention of future terrorist attacks in the United States.

While there has been increased attention to cooperation between private security and public police since 9/11, this attention is nothing new. During the 1970s, the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) chartered the Private Security Advisory Council “to improve the crime prevention capabilities of private security and reduce crime in public and private places by reviewing the relationship between private security systems and public law enforcement agencies, and by developing programs and policies regarding private protection services that are appropriate and consistent with the public interest” (Private Security Advisory Council to the LEAA, 1977, p. ii). The Advisory Council to the LEAA published reports on the regulation of security services, crime prevention, ethics for security managers, prevention of terrorism, legal authority of security employees, and training curriculum. One of these reports outlined guidelines for the establishment of advisory councils at the state level. The report concluded, “Law enforcement must learn to respect and utilize the role of private security in crime prevention and reduction, and private security must be willing to earn that respect by substantially upgrading the quality of its personnel and services . . . councils can meet this challenge by providing a mechanism to combine the resources of private security and law enforcement” (Private Security Advisory

Council to the LEAA, 1977, p. 17). In addition, the Private Security Advisory Council to the LEAA outlined issues between law enforcement and private security that could harm efforts in cooperation, including lack of mutual respect, lack of communication, lack of cooperation, lack of law enforcement knowledge of private security, perceived competition, lack of standards and training in security, and perceived corruption from law enforcement and private security groups (Private Security Advisory Council to the LEAA, 1977).

The Private Security Council to the LEAA is not the only group to highlight these conflicts. A 1971 study by the Rand Corporation had previously outlined the same issues as the Private Security Council did a few years later. Kakalik and Wildhorn (1972) stated that "there should be a predetermined, clear-cut policy for public/private police interaction" (p. 22). In 1977, the National Advisory Committee of Criminal Justice Standards and Goals formed a task force to examine private security. Their report called for improvement in the relationship between law enforcement and private security. "Effective interaction between the private security industry and law enforcement agencies is imperative for successful crime prevention and depends to a large extent on published clear and understandable policies developed by their administrators" (National Advisory Committee on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals: Task Force on Private Security, 1977, p. 205).

The first Hallcrest report in 1985 showed that there was a mutual lack of respect between law enforcement and private security, with law enforcement officers and administrators rating private security as only somewhat effective. In addition, both administrators and officers viewed private security as a "junior or silent partner" rather than an equal in crime control and prevention (Cunningham & Taylor, 1985, p. 189). To be fair, it is not only law enforcement personnel that tend to view private security in this manner, with terms like "rent-a-cops" being common descriptors of private security personnel (Greene & Seamon, 1995, p. 5). Private security is viewed by both the general public and law enforcement to be less trained, less confident, and less professional than their respective law enforcement counterparts. This perceived lack of training on the part of private security leads to a general conception that private security personnel are less adequate in handling a situation as compared to law enforcement. Certainly, there are still concerns over the training, or lack thereof, of private security personnel. According to the Service Employees International Union (SEIU) (2006), there are no federal regulations of the industry, and 31 states require no training for private security personnel. In addition, 21 states do not require private security officers to be licensed, and in 16 states, criminal background checks are not required for employment in private security. Mangan and Shanahan (1990) point out that the perception of private security as lacking in training has served to make cooperation between law enforcement and private security less likely.

This is not to say that there is a complete lack of cooperation between these two entities. The Hallcrest Report II emphasizes that cooperation between private security and law enforcement has improved, including state and federal sponsored partnerships as well as more local partnerships between law enforcement and private security. Mangan and Shanahan (1990) note that on two occasions there were summits held by the boards of the American Society for Industrial Security, the State Association of Chiefs of Police, and the National Institute of Justice. In addition, due to the increasingly national and international nature of security, the

FBI has taken a leadership role in coordinating cooperative efforts of government agencies and corporations (Mangan & Shanahan, 1990). Some specific state and national partnerships include the California High Tech Crime Advisory Committee, the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC) Operation Partnership, the Overseas Security Advisory Council (OSAC), the Virginia Police and Private Security Alliance, and the Washington Law Enforcement Executive Forum (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 1999). These partnership programs foster mutual communication, training, and publicity through the use of forums, monthly meetings, and better role understanding between the two groups.

Cooperative efforts also include partnerships at the local level. The Bureau of Justice Statistics (1999) published a document called *Operation Cooperation*, which lists partnerships between private security and local law enforcement. These partnerships include the Austin Metro High Tech Foundation, Dallas Law Enforcement and Private Security (LEAPS), Miami Association for Security Administration Professionals, New York Area Police/Private Security Liaison, the Law Enforcement and Private Security Council of Northeast Florida, the Philadelphia City Center District, and the Southfield Michigan Pooling Resources in Defense of our Environment (PRIDE) (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 1999).

Given that there are cooperative efforts between law enforcement and private security, it is surprising to find very little in the academic literature systematically evaluating these partnerships. The need to evaluate the level of cooperation, its effectiveness, and avenues for enhancement are necessary if law enforcement and private security wish to improve cooperative efforts. Although academia has shown little interest in evaluation of these cooperative efforts, there are some instances of empirical and exploratory research on the police-security relationship.

Police-Security Attitudes

Morley and Fong (1995) surveyed top administrators of police agencies and owners of security organizations in California regarding their opinions of what causes strained relationships between public police and private security. They found that a majority of respondent law enforcement officers reported that the largest cause of their mistrust of private security was the lack of training in the security industry. In addition, law enforcement respondents reported that a respective lack of understanding of the roles of each organization as well as security's understanding of the legal consequences of their actions also contributed to the poor relationship between the two entities (Morley & Fong, 1995). Security respondents, on the other hand, reported that the main reason for strain was the lack of communication between police and security. They did, however, also feel that a lack of training of security personnel, as did the law enforcement respondents, contributed to strain between the two entities (Morley & Fong, 1995). Certainly, examining the attitudes of administrators in both public police and private security is important and useful as this is where partnerships and cooperation are likely forged; however, it is generally in the lower ranks that cooperation and partnerships must play out. Administrators can create partnerships and call for cooperation, but this does not guarantee success. Successful cooperation must also rely on the attitudes and actions of the people expected to collaborate. In these public police-private security partnerships, this is often the rank-and-file personnel. For this reason, it

is important to understand their attitudes towards cooperation and towards one another in general.

Nalla and Hummer (1999) observed the perceptions between law enforcement and private security professionals in a Midwestern state. They found that security professionals and police professionals generally believe that there is cooperation between the two groups. The police officers in their sample, however, rated their relationship with security more positively than did the private security personnel, who tended to view the relationship as not positive and even adversarial. In addition, police were less likely than security personnel to report that the two groups were equal partners in crime prevention. Both groups reported that they could do more to improve the relationship between the two. Two factors differentiated the opinions of police and security personnel from one another. For police officers, time on the job influenced their view of the relationship, with officers working less than 10 years having a more positive view of the relationship than those working over 10 years. For security personnel, previous experience in law enforcement was a key factor in the overall opinion of the relationship. More specifically, security personnel with no prior police experience view the relationship more positively than do those with prior police experience.

Police-Security Relations Post-9/11

Cooperative efforts between law enforcement and public security have been viewed as increasingly critical since 9/11. The majority (85%) of the nation's infrastructure is owned and protected by the private sector, yet it is public law enforcement that generally has threat information regarding potential attacks against this infrastructure (9/11 Commission, 2004). Cooperation and partnerships, then, are vital to effectively protect our infrastructure from attack (Morabito & Greenberg, 2005). Morabito and Greenberg (2005) argue that "neither law enforcement nor private security can protect the nation's infrastructure alone; law enforcement-private security partnerships are essential" in effectively protecting our nation's infrastructure from future terrorist attacks (p. 1).

In his historical analysis of private security, Albanese (1986) notes that the private security industry has, at various points in time, prospered due to major social or technological change, which brought about forms of crime to which public law enforcement was slow to respond. While terrorist attacks are not a new form of crime for many parts of the world, the terrorist attacks of 9/11 were new to the United States. Certainly, there has been a response by public law enforcement, including the passage of legislation such as the Patriot Act and the creation of the Department of Homeland Security. Due to the ownership of the infrastructure and the vast numbers of people employed, private security has also, however, stepped up to take its place in the prevention of terrorism much as it did in the early 1900s with labor unrest, in the 1960s with urban riots and anti-war demonstrations, and in the 1970s with the advent of the screening of airline passengers (Albanese, 1986).

Sarre and Prenzler (2000) argue that there are at least two factors that have led to the growth of private security. Public disillusionment with public policing, they argue, may create an atmosphere in which private security can flourish. As the police are criticized as being insensitive to victims, overzealous with criminals,

and corrupt, private security can step in with a legitimacy that may be lost by some police agencies. Secondly, Sarre and Prenzler (2000) argue that perceptions of an increased threat of crime, real or imagined, can lead to increases in private security. Certainly, 9/11 created an increase in the perception of the threat of crime in the form of terrorism. Not only did the attacks themselves serve to create this perception of threat, but it could also be argued that continued media attention to the attacks as well as the following anthrax attacks and subsequent legislative and policy changes (e.g., the creation of the Department of Homeland Security and the advent of the color-coded threat level system) also served to amplify feelings of insecurity. In this type of charged environment, private security is more in demand by a worried public, as well as by private enterprise.

In addition, it is possible that another factor is also partially responsible for the growth of private security after 9/11. The attacks added to the responsibilities of public law enforcement at all levels. Not only are local, county, and state agencies responsible for the crime-fighting duties entrusted to them prior to 9/11, they are now expected to be active participants in the protection of the homeland. This additional obligation has the potential to overburden the existing resources of public police. This, then, may create more opportunity for private police to step in and perform some of the duties historically reserved for public police. A related example can be seen in the protection of army facilities in the United States. After the terrorist attacks, the Department of Defense (DOD) increased security requirements at domestic military installations. At the same time, both active duty and reserve military personnel were deployed overseas to fight in the war on terror, leaving a shortage of military personnel to protect domestic installations. As a result, Congress has allowed the DOD to temporarily use private security guards to provide security, which it has done. As of April 2006, private security guards were being used at 57 Army installations in the United States (GAO, 2006).

The Present Study

The focus of this article is to further the academic body of knowledge concerning the relationship between law enforcement and private security by incorporating the impact of the terrorist attacks of 9/11. Members of the North Texas Chapter of the American Society for Industrial Security (ASIS) served as the population of security personnel. Police officers involved in the study came from three police agencies, all located in North Texas. These three departments were chosen based on both availability and willingness to participate and were not selected to be representative of agencies in the United States or even in the state of Texas. In each police department, the chiefs encouraged participation but left the individual decision to participate completely voluntary.

The survey was made available to both samples via a web portal. In order to maintain anonymity, the heads of ASIS and each of the police departments were sent an e-mail message with the appropriate website through which their staff or members could participate in the survey. The primary e-mails were sent out on November 22, 2004. The survey expired on November 29, 2004. Each of the police departments chosen provides Internet access to all officers for each shift, making the instrument readily available to possible respondents at the police departments.

Of the three police departments, the total number of subjects receiving information regarding availability of the instrument was 219, while the total number of ASIS members receiving information regarding the survey was 850. The total number of respondents was 182. Of these, 59 were police respondents, and 123 were security respondents. Although there were a smaller number of police respondents, the response rate for police was higher (27%) than was the response rate for security (14.5%).

The instrument we used relied heavily on the survey device implemented by Nalla and Hummer (1999). Several items were drawn directly from this survey instrument, in hopes that some comparisons could be drawn between that study and this one. In addition, three items were added to the survey instrument that specifically address issues relevant to the 9/11 attacks. Consistent with Nalla and Hummer (1999), one survey was generated for private security personnel, and another similar survey was generated for police officers. The questionnaire consisted of 10 items regarding the respondent's opinion of various aspects of the police-security relationship, measured on a five-point scale, with 1 being strongly disagree and 5 being strongly agree. The first seven items were drawn from the questionnaire used by Nalla and Hummer (1999), and the last three were added to assess what impact, if any, the respondents perceived 9/11 to have had on the police-security relationship.

Findings

Description of the Sample

Table 1 presents the demographic characteristics of the sample divided into the police and security groups. There were 59 police respondents and 123 security respondents. For both groups, the sample was predominantly male and overwhelmingly white. There were differences across the two groups in terms of age, with 50% of the police sample falling within the 31-40 age range and over 50% of the security sample falling between the ages of 41-60. In addition, none of the police group was over the age of 61; whereas, almost 9% of the security group was between the ages of 61-70. In terms of education, police officers were more likely to have an associate's or bachelor's degree (52%), but security personnel were more likely to have both post-graduate education (20.8%) and a master's degree (15.1%) than were police officers. In terms of years in their present field, 59% of the police sample had 11 or more years in policing; whereas, 71.1% of security personnel reported 11 or more years in the security profession. Security personnel were more likely to report previous military experience (46.7%) than were police officers (32.2%). The majority of the security sample (59.8%) reported previous experience in law enforcement, but only 31% of police officers reported prior experience in the security profession.

Table 1. Description of Sample

Variable	Police (%) (n = 59)	Security (%) (n = 123)
Gender		
Male	93	93.1
Female	7	6.9
Race/Ethnicity		
White	84.7	91.6
African American	0	1.9
Hispanic	1.9	6.5
Other	3.8	0
Age		
20-30	12	5
31-40	50	17.8
41-50	26	39.6
51-60	12	28.7
61-70	0	8.9
Education		
High School Diploma	9.6	4.7
Some College	25	21.7
Associate's Degree	13.5	8.5
Bachelor's Degree	38.5	29.2
Post Graduate	9.6	20.8
Master's Degree	3.8	15.1
Years in Field		
0-10	41.1	28.8
11-20	39.3	28.8
21-30	16.1	33.9
31-40	3.6	5.9
41-50	0	2.5
Prior Military Experience		
Yes	32.2	46.7
No	67.8	53.3
Prior Experience in Security/Law Enforcement		
Yes	31	59.8
No	69	40.2

Opinions Regarding the Police-Security Relationship

The findings regarding the respondents' opinions of the police-security relationship are presented in Table 2. A response of 1 indicates that the respondent strongly disagreed with the statement; whereas, a response of 5 indicates that the respondent strongly agreed with the statement. The F test for mean difference was used to discover any statistically significant results between the two groups. This test was chosen to be consistent with Nalla and Hummer's (1999) analysis. The first statistically significant difference is the questions regarding the overall view of the other group. Consistent with Nalla and Hummer (1999), security personnel had a more positive view (4.12) of police than police (2.98) did of them. When asked whether they believed the police-security relationship to be strong, both groups tended to disagree; however, the difference between the means was statistically significant, with security (2.65) in slightly less disagreement with this statement than police officers (2.14). Similarly, both groups tended to disagree that police

and security carry equal weight in crime prevention activities, with the security group (2.57) disagreeing slightly less than the police group (2.14). The difference was statistically significant at the .05 level, however.

Table 2. Respondent Perceptions of Police/Security Relationship

Item	Security (n = 59)	Police (n = 123)	F
1. Security personnel generally have a positive opinion of police officers.	---	3.51 (1.09)	.611
Police officers generally have a positive opinion of security personnel.	2.55 (1.03)	---	
2. My view of security personnel is positive.	---	2.98 (1.11)	16.29**
My view of police officers is positive.	4.12 (1.02)	---	
3. I characterize the relationship between police and private security as strong.	2.65 (1.23)	2.14 (0.94)	28.21**
4. In my view, security personnel generally cooperate with police officers in most crime prevention activities.	---	3.41 (1.23)	.215
In my view, police officers generally cooperate with security personnel in most crime prevention activities.	3.20 (1.29)	---	
5. In my view, police officers share information with security personnel on matters related to professional interest.	2.34 (1.21)	2.24 (1.09)	1.60
6. In my view, police officers excel in promoting working relationships with security agencies.	---	1.90 (1.19)	3.12
In my view, security personnel excel in promoting working relationships with police agencies.	2.04 (1.00)	---	
7. Police and security personnel carry equal weight in crime prevention activities.	2.57 (1.28)	2.14 (1.21)	3.90*
8. Terrorism has affected the relationship between police officers and private security.	3.60 (1.22)	2.08 (1.39)	.03
9. Homeland security funding has affected the relationship between police officers and private security.	2.69 (1.61)	1.53 (1.21)	18.91**
10. I believe the relationship between police officers and private security is stronger now than before the World Trade Center attacks of September 11, 2001.	3.44 (1.22)	1.97 (1.23)	4.09*

Mean scores are reported (1 = strongly disagree and 5 = strongly agree)

Standard deviations are reported in parentheses.

**p<.01; *p<.05

Opinions Regarding the Impact of 9/11

One goal of this study was to assess whether the events of 9/11 impacted the views of either police or security personnel towards each other. We asked both groups whether they felt that terrorism had affected the relationship between police officers and security. Security personnel did tend to agree more with this statement (3.60) than police did (2.08); however, the difference was not statistically significant. Both police (1.53) and security personnel (2.69) generally disagreed with the notion that Homeland Security funding had affected the relationship between police and private security. The attitudes of the police were significantly more negative regarding this matter. When asked whether the relationship between police and private security is stronger after the attacks of 9/11, police generally responded negatively (1.97); whereas, security personnel tended to respond positively (3.44).

Discussion and Conclusion

The findings of this study are generally consistent with the existing literature regarding the police-security relationship. Police officers typically did not have an overly positive opinion of security professionals but did believe that security professionals typically had very positive opinions of them. Security professionals did hold positive opinions of police officers and were generally aware of the negative perceptions held by law enforcement towards them. Police did, however, generally have a more positive opinion of security than they perceived them to have.

In regards to the calls for more cooperation and the sharing of information since 9/11, it is interesting to note that there were no significant differences between the two groups regarding the promotion of working relationships or the sharing of information, with both groups tending to disagree with these statements. Both police (1.90) and security (2.04) personnel generally disagreed that the other excels in promoting working relationships between the two. Also, both police (2.24) and security (2.34) tended to disagree that police officers share information with security personnel on matters related to professional interest. Both groups did, however, generally agree that the other cooperates in crime prevention activities. This is consistent with Nalla and Hummer's (1999) findings, the only difference being that their mean differences were statistically significant for this item while ours were not. Given that both groups tended to agree with this statement prior to 9/11, the terrorist attacks and the subsequent calls for increased cooperation do not seem to have impacted the opinions of either group in regards to cooperation.

Security personnel were more likely than police to agree that terrorism, Homeland Security funding, and the attack on the WTC had impacted the police-security relationship. Given such differences of opinions, it is perhaps the case that the primary first defenders of a unified America against terrorism are, in fact, not entirely unified. Given that private security personnel putatively secure the majority of the nation's infrastructure and it is public law enforcement that is most likely to advance knowledge of impending attacks, the lack of perceived cooperation is somewhat troubling. Perhaps now more than ever, education of both the public law enforcement and the private security communities about the duties and importance of the other as well as the necessity for cooperation and partnerships is warranted and, in fact, essential to the future security of our nation's infrastructure.

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In the Wake of Political Turmoil: The Cherokee Nation Marshal Service

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The Cherokee Nation Marshal Service: A Brief History

The Cherokee Nation Marshal Service was created in 1991 in response to *Ross v. Neff*, a Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals decision, which ruled that Oklahoma peace officers lacked jurisdiction to arrest an Indian on tribal land. In *Ross*, the Court held that state jurisdiction was limited to only those crimes committed by non-Indians against non-Indians and victimless crimes committed by non-Indians. The only exceptions would be when the tribe consented to jurisdiction or when Congress had expressly granted jurisdiction to the state.

Ross stemmed from an incident in which an Adair County deputy sheriff responded to a disorderly conduct report occurring on a ballpark and playground located on Cherokee tribal lands. During an ensuing struggle, the deputy shot Ronnie Ross, a Cherokee tribal member, in the leg. As a result, Ronnie's leg had to be amputated below the knee. With neither tribal consent nor a congressional grant of jurisdiction,¹ the Adair County deputy lacked jurisdiction to arrest Ronnie Ross on tribal land. The Tenth Circuit decision had an immediate effect on law enforcement in all 14 Oklahoma counties that comprise the Cherokee Nation. It ended the traditional practice of emergent law enforcement by county and state agencies and left a significant portion of northeast Oklahoma with almost no police protection (Heck, Keen, & Wilds, 2001).

Recognizing the severity of this situation, Principal Chief Wilma Mankiller enlisted two tribal administrators, Pat Ragsdale and Chadwick Smith, with the task of rapidly establishing a law enforcement presence in the Cherokee Nation. Their goal was to build a police force in consultation with the FBI, the BIA, and law enforcement agencies throughout the Oklahoma counties where jurisdiction might be shared. They vigorously solicited applicants who had law enforcement experience and were accredited through a law enforcement academy. Once initial hiring was completed, cross-deputization agreements² were signed with other jurisdictions, and the Cherokee Nation Marshal Service, so named in honor of deputy U.S. marshals who worked alongside the "Light-Horsemen" in Indian Territory during the 1800s, was officially established. Pat Ragsdale served as its first director (Heck et al., 2001).

The cross-deputization agreements mutually empowered county law enforcement officers with law enforcement jurisdiction on Cherokee lands and Cherokee marshals with law enforcement jurisdiction on county lands. Two years after the *Neff* decision, the Cherokee Nation had successfully established cross-deputization agreements with 12 Oklahoma counties and had established a full complement of law enforcement presence on Cherokee tribal lands.

Since the Cherokees modeled their code after the Oklahoma Criminal Code, Director Pat Ragsdale required all Cherokee Nation marshals to complete an accredited law enforcement academy as well as the Indian Police Academy in Artesia, New Mexico. This enabled the Cherokee marshals cross-deputization with the U.S. Marshal Service as well as county law enforcement agencies, thereby affording them enormous dual law enforcement jurisdiction within the state. It also gave the Cherokee Nation the strongest law enforcement presence in its history (Heck et al., 2001).

In spite of this strong start, serious problems loomed over the horizon; the marshal service would almost be destroyed within a few years of its creation due to political fallout caused by internal fighting among the governing branches of the Cherokee Nation. This article will focus on the rebuilding of the Cherokee Nation Marshal Service in the aftermath of that political turmoil. It will address the Nation's struggle to once again obtain cross-deputization agreements with local and state agencies, examine data revealing the nature of calls and arrests made by the Cherokee Nation, and address jurisdictional issues currently confronting Cherokee Marshals.

The Embattled Byrd Administration

On August 14, 1995, Joe Byrd became principal chief of the Cherokee Nation by default when it was discovered several days before the runoff election that his only opponent, George Bearpaw, had once pleaded guilty to a felony. Although Bearpaw had received a deferred sentence and the felony conviction was later expunged, tribal law (i.e., Cherokee Nation Constitution) provided that persons convicted of or having plead guilty to a felony were ineligible to hold any elected office within the Nation. Consequently, amid intense protest and calls for a new election, the court ordered the tribal election commission not to tally any votes cast for Bearpaw. Byrd's administration would thus be haunted by unprecedented political factionalism from the start (Gamallo, 1995).

Then, in February 1997, accusations arose against Byrd's administration for misappropriation of tribal funds. When Byrd refused to release tribal records pertinent to the ensuing investigation, a search warrant was issued directing the Cherokee Nation Marshal Service to retrieve the records from his office. Executing the search warrant, Director Pat Ragsdale and Lieutenant Sharon Wright, along with a dozen marshals, began searching the W. W. Keeler Complex south of Tahlequah on February 25.

Principal Chief Byrd arrived and ordered them to stand down. When Ragsdale refused to comply, Chief Byrd placed him and Wright on administrative leave. Ragsdale immediately made emergency application to the Judicial Appeals Tribunal, and both he and Lieutenant Wright were reinstated the following day by ex parte order. In issuing the order, Chief Justice Dwight Birdwell cautioned that any further interference with the investigation would constitute contempt of court. In response, Chief Byrd fired the entire marshal service and announced that any further orders of the Judicial Appeals Tribunal pertaining to the marshals would be ignored (Mouser, 1998/1999).

Byrd was subsequently charged with obstruction of justice; however, eight members of the tribal council along with Byrd's attorneys initiated a movement to impeach all three justices of the Judicial Appeals Tribunal. In response, the six remaining council members began boycotting council meetings to prevent a quorum, which required ten members. Since the executive branch was deadlocked and the legislative branch was unable to obtain a quorum, the Cherokee Nation government effectively ceased to function (Mouser, 1998/1999).

In the mix of political confusion, Byrd created a new marshal service on March 21; however, many of the original marshals refused to stand down and remained on duty without pay. The original marshals were now acting under the authority of the judicial branch and stationed themselves in the Cherokee Nation Courthouse. The Byrd marshals were acting under the authority of the executive branch and remained at the W. W. Keeler Complex. Realizing his inability to maintain control over a split judicial and law enforcement agency, Chief Byrd solicited the BIA to assume law enforcement responsibilities in the Cherokee Nation (Mouser, 1998/1999).

In the early morning hours of June 20, Byrd's marshal service with the assistance of the BIA stormed the Cherokee Nation Courthouse in downtown Tahlequah. The BIA, with the assistance of the FBI, seized all court records and locked down the building. Chief Byrd then sent a certified letter of termination to the only remaining tribal prosecutor (Romano, 1997, p. B1).

The Judicial Appeals Tribunal had continued to operate from the basement of the chief justice's home. They retaliated by immediately issuing a writ ordering Byrd to reopen the courthouse. When Ragsdale and several remaining original marshals attempted to serve the papers on Byrd's marshals, violence erupted. In the aftermath, six people were injured, and three, including Pat Ragsdale, were arrested (Gibbons & Glen, 1997).

In response to the melee, the U.S. federal government and the Tribal Council set up an independent commission, the Massad Commission, to mediate and attempt to resolve the conflict. After conducting several public hearings and interviewing numerous tribal officials over several weeks, the three-member Massad Commission submitted its findings and recommendations to the Tribal Council. All three branches received some degree of criticism, but ultimately the Massad Commission held that Byrd's attempt to impeach the justices of the tribunal was clearly in violation of the Cherokee Constitution and therefore void *ab initio* (Massad, Layden, & Gibbons, 1997, p. 381). Under considerable pressure from the BIA and the Justice Department, Byrd finally agreed to abide by the commission's recommendations and relinquished control of the courthouse to the judicial branch.

Rebuilding the Marshal Service³

Prior to the Massad Commission's decision, Principal Chief Byrd solicited assistance of the BIA and thus relinquished control of its law enforcement authority to the BIA for the first time in history in September 1998. Although Byrd's 10 marshals remained active until the end of his administration, they operated without any

formal law enforcement authority. As such, jurisdiction and legal authority of the Marshal's Service remained in a very precarious state of affairs.

Subsequently, Chief Joe Byrd was defeated at the polls by Chad Smith in the summer of 1999. Because they had no formal authority and had to function for so long without pay, most of the original marshals were forced to abandon their jobs. Only a few dedicated souls remained throughout the conflict. Consequently, when Principal Chief Chad Smith assumed power, rebuilding the Cherokee Nation Marshal Service to its original strength became a priority.

By November of 1999, Chief Smith was able to re-assume law enforcement jurisdiction from the BIA, and eight of the original marshals returned to service. He assigned Pat Ragsdale to work with the Tribal Council in an effort to rebuild the marshal service to its original strength of 14 officers. The council approved the requested marshal's budget in July 2000, and Chief Smith appointed David Roberts, a former Tulsa County Deputy and ATF agent, as the new director. Director Roberts hired Sharon Wright to assist with administrative duties and promoted her to captain in December of 2000. He also hired four former Cherokee Nation Housing Authority officers who had exercised limited law enforcement authority during the Byrd administration. By the end of December 2000, the Cherokee Marshal's Service numbered 16 officers, two more than when it collapsed in 1998.

In an effort to demonstrate unity to the Cherokee people, Chief Chad Smith worked closely with the Tribal Council and was able to double the budget by 2002. Hiring resumed, and the department increased to its current force of 30 regular marshals and two contract officers who serve as special investigators for the Cherokee Nation casinos.

Reestablishing Jurisdiction

In 1992, Cherokee Nation Marshals were cross-deputized with both county officers and the U. S. Marshal Service. Cross-deputized officers enjoyed full interjurisdictional law enforcement authority; however, when the BIA assumed law enforcement responsibilities in 1997, the Marshal Service was abolished and cross-deputization agreements ceased in practice. Interestingly, Delaware was the only county that formally withdrew its agreement. Other counties merely assumed that the agreements were no longer in force and stopped providing law enforcement on Indian lands.

The absence of these agreements presented a special problem because of the checkerboard jurisdiction that resulted from the allotment of Oklahoma Indian land and forced assimilation that peaked during the early 1900s. For example, in counties and towns that had no cross-deputization agreements, law enforcement officers had no authority over Indians on housing lots or acreage classified as Indian land. Consequently, if a serious problem emerged, local officers would stand by to contain the situation, but a Cherokee Nation Marshal had to be dispatched to work the call. Because of the vast area covered by the Cherokee Nation, a marshal sometimes had to travel halfway across the state to work a call. Thus, when the Cherokee Nation finally resumed responsibility for law enforcement, regaining cross-deputization agreements became a primary goal for the Nation's General Council, Julian Fite. Nowata became the first county to resume cross-deputization

with the nation; Cherokee, Adair, Delaware, and Macintoch Counties were the last. By December 2006, agreements with all but one of the 14 effected counties were reached. The final county is pending agreement as of this writing.

Another casualty suffered by the marshal service was the loss of cross-deputization with the U. S. Marshal Service. Although it has not been renewed, 13 of 31 marshals still have federal jurisdiction through Special Law Enforcement Commissions (SLEC) with the BIA. In order to acquire SLEC certification, marshals must have either completed the Indian Police Academy or completed the BIA's Indian Country Jurisdiction Course within the past 2 years. Certification can be renewed for two terms, or a total of 6 years. After that time, the course must be retaken to retain certification. Of particular interest, Oklahoma counties can now approach the tribe and request the same certification. Upon completing the required training, county law enforcement officers would be granted the same SLEC jurisdiction on tribal lands.

The Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 limits tribal punishment for *any* crime to one year in prison and/or a fine of \$5,000; therefore, the Cherokee Nation notifies the FBI and the U.S. Attorneys office of major crimes. The FBI either investigates the case jointly with the Cherokee Marshals Service or merely delegates the case to the Cherokee Marshals to investigate. Then, the U.S. Attorney's Office determines whether the case should be prosecuted in federal court, tribal court, or both.

The Cherokee Marshal Service Today

Today, the Cherokee Marshal Service remains at full capacity and is expected to grow considerably in the near future. Minimum qualifications to become a marshal include being at least 21 years of age with at least a high school diploma and no criminal record. Applicants undergo a background check and must be sufficiently physically fit to complete both the 16-week CLEET academy and the 18-week Indian Police Academy. By policy, all new hires must carry both commissions. Preference is given to those with prior law enforcement experience or some college education. Currently, 13 marshals (almost half of the department) have a college degree, while five others have some college. Two of the marshals are female, and three of the male officers are non-Indian.

Sharon Wright became acting director in January 2004 and was permanently appointed to the position in May 2005. A captain works directly under her and helps oversee the agency's four major divisions: (1) investigation, (2) patrol, (3) operations, and (4) security. The investigative division includes one chief investigator and eight investigators. Patrol includes 20 marshals under the supervision of one lieutenant. The Operations Department is run by an operations manager who supervises dispatch and records personnel. Security is directed by a lieutenant who oversees 13 security personnel and promotes community policing.

In addition to the four major divisions, the department has several specialized units. Fourteen marshals serve on a special operations team that primarily assists county officers serving high-risk warrants. The Cherokee Marshal's Service also maintains a four-member narcotics division, a two-member DARE unit, and a six-person underwater dive recovery team.

As is the case with any police agency, the marshal service performs a wide range of tasks associated with law enforcement, order maintenance, and service (see Appendix). During 2004, Cherokee marshals responded to 2,114 calls. Of these, 1,830 (86.5%) were order maintenance calls, 120 (5.6%) were minor crimes (domestic, trespassing, and vandalism), and 154 (7.2%) were property crimes (burglary, robbery, larceny, and auto theft). Of the property crimes, 100 (4.7%) were for larceny (see Appendix, Figure 4). During the same year, Cherokee marshals made 455 arrests and issued 89 citations. Of these arrests, 82 (18%) were for drug-related charges, and of the 82 drug arrests, 64 (78%) were successfully prosecuted (see Appendix, Figure 6).

Because the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1964 limits tribal punishment to a maximum incarceration of one year, most major crimes are prosecuted by the federal district court in the Eastern District of Oklahoma. During 2004, this court prosecuted seven major crimes cases while the Nation prosecuted only two such major crimes.

The Future of the Cherokee Marshal's Service

The advent of Las Vegas-style gambling and entertainment in Cherokee Nation casinos may create an enormous shift in jurisdictional issues. Since 2004, massive numbers of non-Indians and non-Cherokee Indians have invaded Cherokee casinos. With this invasion of money-laden visitors naturally flows an exponential increase in theft, robbery, drug trafficking, gang activity, and domestic violence. Previously, infrequent crimes such as corruption, money laundering, loan sharking, fraud, federal conspiracy, and violations of RICO and the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act are expected to increase.⁴

This explosion in both the number and nature of crimes presents the Cherokee marshals with a complex maze of jurisdictional issues. The Cherokee marshals must consider the following:

- Is the offender Indian or non-Indian?⁵
- Is the victim an Indian or a non-Indian, or is the crime victimless?
- Has a federal crime been committed?

The split-second nature of law enforcement encounters makes absolute resolution of this jurisdictional maze virtually impossible, but, without attempting to resolve jurisdictional issues, the Cherokee marshals are without an adequate foundation to determine authority to resolve the issues raised by *Ross* and determine who has authority to arrest and where the offender should be transported for jurisdictional prosecution.⁶ As exemplified by the following table, resolution of such jurisdictional authority is extremely complex.

Jurisdictional Chart for Indian Territory

Perpetrator	Victim	Crime	Jurisdiction	Jurisdictional Authority
Non-Indian	Non-Indian	All	Exclusive State No federal or tribal	State Authorities <i>United States v. McBratney</i> , 104 U.S. 621 (1881)
Non-Indian	Victimless ⁷		Exclusive State	State Authorities
Non-Indian	Indian	All	Federal (exclusive) No state or tribal ⁸	FBI for all crimes General Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1152 ⁹
Indian	Non-Indian	Major Crimes ¹⁰	Concurrent federal or tribal No state jurisdiction	FBI or Tribal Police for major crimes Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1153
Indian	Non-Indian	Minor Crimes	Exclusive Tribal No state jurisdiction	Tribal for minor crimes* General Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1152
Indian	Victimless		Tribal jurisdiction	Tribal for minor crimes*
Indian	Indian ¹¹	Major Crimes	Concurrent federal or tribal No state jurisdiction ¹²	FBI or Tribal for major crimes Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1153
Indian	Indian	Minor Crimes	Exclusive Tribal No state jurisdiction	Tribal for minor crimes* Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 ¹³

* Although the tribes may investigate major crimes (the 14 named crimes made subject to federal jurisdiction by the Major Crimes Act), their judicial authority to punish for any crime is a sentence not exceeding one year and a fine not exceeding \$5,000 under the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968.

Similarly, the U.S. Attorney's Office determines whether a major crime will be prosecuted in federal court. If the matter is declined for federal prosecution, tribal law enforcement, the tribal prosecutor, and the District Attorney's Office (if applicable) must be notified in writing.

The federal government also has jurisdiction to arrest for violations of federal statutes. These general federal crimes include RICO violations, drug crimes, conspiracy, and a felon in possession of a firearm.

Understandably, differentiating the tribal status of either the perpetrator or the victim with merely visual observation is virtually impossible. Similarly, differentiating the nature of the crime and determining whether it is tribal, state, or federal is often equally impossible.

Such complexity almost mandates the equivalent of a law degree for every Cherokee marshal. Otherwise, the officer might overstep jurisdictional authority and expose both him- or herself and the Marshal's Service to civil and criminal liability. Understandably, the obvious solution is cross-deputization among all city, county, and state law enforcement officials, but even this seemingly simple solution has complex ramifications. Once the Cherokee marshal is involved in the arrest of a non-Indian, the officer acquires an additional duty of testifying in a non-Indian court. With limited resources and manpower, appearing at depositions and preliminary hearings and being called as a witness in court could prove to be an incredible drain of time and money.

The apparent solution might be to simply exclude non-Indian offenders from tribal lands and casinos, thereby turning a blind eye to non-Indian offenses such as petit larceny, minor drug offenses, and simple domestic disorders. Such nonfeasance, however, might expose the Cherokee marshal or the tribe to both civil and criminal

liability. For example, consider a situation in which a mother slaps her child for crying while she left that child unattended in the tribal casino parking lot while grabbing coffee and taking a few quick pulls on the slot machine. Failure of the Cherokee marshal to make a timely report of this or *any* child abuse, whether the child is Indian or non-Indian, constitutes the commission of a federal felony under 18 U.S.C. § 2258.

Similarly, tribal officers may act as state, county, or federal officers when cross-deputized. By consenting to cross-deputization agreements, the Cherokee Nation may well be consenting to all state and federal laws associated with carrying a state or federal badge. As such, any Cherokee marshal who commits nonfeasance, malfeasance, or misfeasance while acting in the capacity and under color of law of a county or federal officer may well be subjecting both him- or herself and the Marshal's Service to civil tort liability.

As such, Cherokee marshals must become elite, well educated law enforcement officials, highly trained not only in tribal law, but also in state and federal law. The Cherokee marshal must be trained on how to diffuse conflict arising among diverse and varying cultures, arrests of Indians as well as non-Indians, and a quagmire of jurisdictional issues. In essence, the Cherokee Nation marshal faces some of the most extensive and complex multijurisdictional training requirements in the nation.

To address that need, the FBI's Indian Country Unit has integrated training with the FBI and the Bureau of Indian Affairs – Office of Law Enforcement Services (BIA – OLES) as well as tribal, local, state, and county law enforcement agencies. The FBI provides training on Indian Country Basics, Law Enforcement Training for Safety and Survival, Crime Scene Management, Crime Scene Processing, Child Sexual Abuse, Physical Abuse Training, Child Homicide, Stress Management, Indian Gaming Investigation, Interviewing and Interrogation, First Responder Course, Forensic Interviewing, Critical Incident Training, and local training as requested.¹⁴

In addition, Northeastern State University, strategically located a few miles from the Cherokee Nation's headquarters, has incorporated in their collegiate studies courses dealing with tribal studies, Indian law, criminal justice, American courts, homeland security, paralegal studies, and the Cherokee language. Through this partnership, the Cherokee marshal is adequately armed with legal resources sufficient to navigate this unfamiliar jurisdictional territory.

Conclusion

The aftermath of *Ross v. Neff* has forced the Cherokee Nation's Marshal Service to evolve from the frontier day Light-Horseman into a modern-day law enforcement expert. The Cherokee marshal must be well versed in tribal, state, and federal law in order to properly handle the vast array of jurisdictional issues that might be encountered on tribal lands. Otherwise, the marshal may find him- or herself in a high-tension situation making untrained, unwise, and potentially incorrect arrest decisions. To overcome this particularly complex jurisdictional mine field, Director Sharon Wright is taking a proactive stance by providing Cherokee marshals with education and training geared to diffuse those land mines before they explode.

Endnotes

- ¹ The Act of August 15, 1953, Pub. L. No. 88-280, 67 Stat. 588 (1953) provided the state's permission to assume criminal and civil jurisdiction over any "Indian Country" within the borders of the state. Under this public law, Oklahoma could have, without the consent of the effected Indians, assumed jurisdiction over any Indian country in the state by constitutional amendment; however, Oklahoma did not take such action. Today, Title IV of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, 25 U.S.C. § 1321-1326 (1970), requires the consent of the effected Indians before the State is permitted to assume criminal and civil jurisdiction over "Indian Country. . . ."
- ² Cross-deputization agreements are also known as mutual aid agreements.
- ³ Much of the information contained in the remainder of the article was gathered from on-site visits to the Cherokee Nation Marshal Service and personal interviews with Director Sharon Wright.
- ⁴ The FBI has federal criminal jurisdiction over acts directly related to casino gaming in Indian Country by virtue of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 25 U.S.C.A. § 2710 *et. seq.*
- ⁵ To complicate matters, Congress has not provided a statutory definition of the term "Indian." The federal court did, however, create a two-prong test to resolve the issue: (1) Is the individual of Indian descent or have a quantum of Indian blood? and (2) Is the tribe federally recognized by the U.S. Government? 25 U.S.C. § 479.
- ⁶ The Cherokee Nation is self-governing with their own marshal's service, not under the direct control of BIA Law Enforcement Officers (who have the authority to enforce both tribal and federal laws).
- ⁷ Even the term "victimless" has yet to be defined, especially when considering drunk driving or speeding offenses; however, adultery, vagrancy, drug possession, prostitution, disorderly conduct, and public drunkenness are generally considered victimless crimes.
- ⁸ See *Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe*, 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
- ⁹ The general crime extends, through the Assimilative Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 13, most state criminal law and makes it a federal crime if committed by a non-Indian on Indian lands (a.k.a. the Federal Enclaves Act and the Indian Country Crimes Act).
- ¹⁰ The Indian Major Crimes Act provides that exclusive federal jurisdiction applies when any Indian commits specific crimes against the person or property of another Indian or other person within Indian country (18 U.S.C.A. § 1151, 1153). The enumerated crimes in § 1153 (b) include murder, manslaughter, kidnapping, maiming, a felony under chapter 190A 18 U.S.C. § 2241 *et seq.* (e.g., certain sexual offenses including rape and sexual abuse, incest, assault with intent to commit murder, assault with a dangerous weapon, assault resulting in serious

bodily injury, an assault against an individual who has not attained the age of 16 years, arson, burglary, robbery, and theft).

¹¹ Congress specifically declared that tribes have jurisdiction over nonmember Indians (nontribal members who are Indian) under 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2), thus overturning *Duro v. Reina*, 495 U.S. 686 (1990).

¹² *United States v. McBratney*, 104 U.S. 621 (1882).

¹³ The state of Oklahoma does not have jurisdiction over criminal offense committed by one Creek Indian against another in Indian country [Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, § 401, 404, 25 U.S.C.A. § 1321, 1324, *Rice v. Rehmer*, 463 U.S. 713, 103 S. Ct. 3291 U.S. (1983).

¹⁴ See *Indian Country Crime*. Retrieved July 26, 2006, from www.fbi.gov/hq/cid/indian/about.htm

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18 U.S.C.A. § 2258.

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Appendix: Crime, Arrest, and Court Records for 2004

Figure 1: Minor Crimes in 2004

	Disturbance	Domestic	Trespass	Vandalism	Environmental
January	6	2	0	4	2
February	1	1	3	1	0
March	3	7	1	4	0
April	9	9	1	2	0
May	2	3	5	0	0
June	3	1	3	2	0
July	0	3	2	1	0
August	3	1	3	2	0
September	0	4	2	4	0
October	1	2	3	3	0
November	1	2	4	2	0
December	0	0	1	1	0
Total	29	35	28	26	2

Source: Marshal Service Program Summary

Figure 2: Serious Property Crimes in 2004

	Burglary	Robbery	Larceny	Auto Theft
January	5	0	11	1
February	2	1	9	0
March	3	1	9	1
April	4	0	5	1
May	4	0	9	0
June	0	0	7	1
July	5	0	4	2
August	3	0	8	0
September	4	0	10	0
October	1	3	8	2
November	3	1	11	4
December	0	0	9	2
Total	34	6	100	14

Source: Marshal Service Program Summary

Figure 3: Order Maintenance Activities in 2004

	SOT Call Out	Alarm	Missing/ Runaway	Natural Death	Auto Accidents	ICW Assist Juveniles	Assist Other Agencies
January	0	10	2	2	1	2	95
February	0	4	2	1	3	5	75
March	0	6	0	0	3	5	94
April	0	7	0	1	3	2	117
May	0	2	2	1	3	0	249
June	0	7	1	0	0	7	209
July	0	0	0	0	3	20	177
August	0	7	1	0	0	2	165
September	0	0	0	0	0	5	170
October	0	0	0	0	1	4	156
November	0	0	1	2	4	3	85
December	1	2	0	2	1	0	106
Total	1	45	9	9	22	56	1,698

Source: Marshal Service Program Summary

Figure 4: Service Activities in 2004

	Civil/Court Process	Citizen Assist	Community Function	Other/ Information
January	1	15	0	17
February	6	12	1	7
March	2	13	1	10
April	4	14	3	8
May	0	13	2	3
June	0	23	0	3
July	0	23	1	2
August	0	20	0	3
September	0	22	1	9
October	2	17	4	22
November	2	13	1	15
December	2	15	0	26
Total	19	200	14	125

Source: Marshal Service Program Summary

Figure 5: Arrests/Citations in 2004

	Arrests	Traffic Citations
January	35	4
February	20	0
March	43	10
April	50	2
May	44	5
June	35	10
July	42	5
August	35	10
September	43	12
October	38	10
November	35	10
December	35	11
Total	455	89

Source: Marshal Service Program Summary

Figure 6: Disposition of Cases Filed by Narcotics Unit in 2004

	Total Arrests	Successful Prosecutions	Not Referred for Prosecution
January	9	7	2
February	8	6	2
March	5	2	3
April	9	7	2
May	8	6	2
June	13	9	4
July	7	6	1
August	6	5	1
September	0	0	0
October	8	8	0
November	9	8	1
December	0	0	0
Total	82	64	18

Source: Marshal Service Narcotics Unit

Figure 7: Disposition of Felony Cases in 2004

Crime	Date Filed	Court Filed	Disposition
Domestic Violence	6-15-04	U.S. Eastern District	7 Years Federal
Assault & Battery with Dangerous Weapon	6-18-04	U.S. Eastern District	6 Years Federal
Assault & Battery	6-18-04	U.S. Eastern District	4 Years Federal
Homicide	7-20-03	U.S. Eastern District	5 Years Federal
Child Sexual Abuse	8-06-04	Cherokee Nation District Court	Prosecuted in Cherokee Nation District Court
Destruction of Private Property	8-07-04	Cherokee Nation District Court	Prosecuted in Cherokee Nation District Court
Assault & Battery with Dangerous Weapon	9-14-04	U.S. District Court	Prosecuted in Federal District Court
First Degree Rape	11-12-04	U.S. Eastern District	14 Years Federal
Assault & Battery with Dangerous Weapon	12-07-04	U.S. Eastern District	6 Months Federal Plea Bargain

Source: Marshal Service Investigative Division

Translational Research: Bridging the Gap Between Theory and Practice

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Introduction

In a perfect world, the observations and conclusions derived from research would move practice toward the development of insightful ideas used to create more effective strategies for addressing social issues. Logically, it seems as though research and practice would easily complement one another; however, while this is an appealing notion, each currently plays a minimal role in the formation or improvement of the other.

In many social science disciplines, there remains a divide separating policy makers, practitioners, and researchers. The field of criminal justice has been no exception to this reality, as both policy and practice remain relatively uninformed by existing empirical research, resulting in a current gap between research and practices. Furthermore, practice activities are likewise not apt to inform the agenda of researchers, so those to whom research findings might be most useful (i.e., practitioners) often unintentionally overlook their value. This may occur for any number of reasons including public demands, differing paradigms, or political pressures.

Both sides of this partnership, researchers and practitioners, have often recognized this apparent gap, but solutions to the dilemma have yet to be thoroughly addressed. Incentives for change are, however, beginning to shift previous paradigms relating to the relationship between research and policy/practice. For example, in recent years, federally sponsored programs have begun to require a significant percentage of funds to be allocated toward the assessment of respective program goals and objectives (typically 10%) (Lane, Turner, & Flores, 2004; Murphy & Dienemann, 1999; Tilley & Laycock, 2000; Welsh & Farrington, 2005). Consequently, "as funders require programs and interventions to be evidence-based and expect outcome evaluations to be conducted, clinicians, administrators/policy makers, and researchers/educators will more likely participate in the integration of research to practice" (Campbell, Daood, Catlin, & Abelson, 2005, p. 12).

Presently, evaluations conducted under these new requirements generally employ *applied research* strategies. More specifically, applied research might be understood as a strategy in which academics draw from the current scientific literature to identify "best practices" for informing or addressing practitioner inquiries and/or issues emerging from the field. While applied research provides a means for researchers to promptly respond to practitioner questions relating to pressing problems, it rarely produces the comprehensive solution that practitioners are

ultimately seeking. Instead, it may offer a short-term solution, or one that is less than effective, as lessons from the literature are rarely on-point or directly applicable to the issue(s) at hand (i.e., not site specific). When this occurs, the practitioner has little recourse. In other words, the reason that the solution fails is not readily apparent, leaving many questions unanswered, and the practitioner back where he or she started. While this approach has produced a limited number of effective results, it has also quite often exacerbated the gap currently separating research and practice.

In an effort to assist vested parties in bridging this gap, we suggest that greater benefit could be derived if those attempting to address common issues developed more dynamic and reciprocal relationships utilizing the concepts of *translational research*. Originating in the medical field, translational research offers vested parties (i.e., researchers, practitioners, policy makers, and community leaders) the opportunity to work together in an effort to develop a more thorough understanding of the intricacies of a particular problem, as opposed to simply looking to the literature for solutions others have used to address similar problems.

As previously implied, differentiation between applied and translational research is an important one. Applied research is limited to drawing “generic” solutions from the literature to address some immediate problem; whereas, translational research involves dynamic interactions across multiple agency/organizational actors in addressing the issues at hand. In addition, such interactions are best characterized by an openness to considering others’ perspectives, dedication, and leadership among those vested, in an effort to reach mutual goals for addressing such issues. Through this process, parties are able to share a variety of perspectives and ideas, which will likely lead to more efficacious outcomes.

To date, there have been few initiatives throughout the criminal system that have actively employed the concepts of a translational paradigm. For this reason, we have reviewed studies from a number of other disciplines with some history of effectively utilizing such concepts in an effort to promote a “model” of best practices that might be used in appropriate future criminal justice-oriented endeavors. The underlying issues that lead to the gap between research and practice inform these practices. It is important to acknowledge and adjust for these existing limitations if those vested are to begin shifting their current paradigms toward more evidence-based policies and intelligence-led criminal justice strategies.

The Gap

In exploring issues that have typically fostered the gap between research and practice, it became evident that several variables have traditionally contributed to the manner in which the relevant parties related to one another. The factor that has perhaps demonstrated the greatest impact was that these parties often worked in organizations with very divergent paradigms. This can spur a resistance to change among parties, fueled by negative attitudes and stereotypes, making it difficult for them to consider the perspectives and ideas of those outside their familiar venue. Because working successfully in partnership essentially requires some adjustment on the part of each group member, it was fitting to explore this element of the gap by considering the differing demands placed on researchers and practitioners.

While researchers tend to feel they have the luxury to ponder, advancing research at a slow pace, the public demands swift action on the part of practitioners when problems arise. Police, judges, and corrections officials often experience constant pressure to solve crime problems *today*, rather than in the near future. This likely happens for a number of reasons including round-the-clock media coverage of violent crime and its devastating effect on victims and communities, demands by citizen groups to keep their neighborhoods safer, and visual images of improper use of force by police officers.

Due to this variation in pace, practitioners looking to researchers for an immediate answer likely feel that the researchers have dropped the ball; however, this is rarely the case. The real problem stems back to the fact that the parties influencing our system of justice have differing priorities and agendas, which impacts the gap, as it causes them to perceive problems and solutions very differently.

Another factor that has impacted the gap is that, “much research by social scientists can be rather unhelpful to policy-makers and practitioners” (Tilley & Laycock, 2000, p. 215). While research findings are meant to provide knowledge and support for the activities utilized in practice, they are typically not disseminated in a manner conducive to a general audience (i.e., scholarly publications, academic conferences, etc.). Moreover, the language common to this mode of dissemination is not readily accessible to non-science-based audiences. This has tended to be particularly problematic for practitioners as they have attempted to interpret and apply research findings.

Taken together, these factors result in the lack of a common agenda as well as precise, rigorously tested interventions (i.e., a gap between research and practice). Often, when an intervention appears effective, the “why” necessary for reproduction of the positive outcome is likely based more on speculation rather than concrete, empirically grounded evidence.

As the criminal justice discipline advances, a means for bridging the gap between research and practice is necessary for vested parties to best meet the needs of those served. Hence, improving strategies requires understanding of two primary considerations: (1) research questions and endeavors must be grounded in, and continuously informed by, the practices and/or issues realized from the field (i.e., the “practitioner reality”) and (2) field policies and related strategies are implemented based on empirically driven information.

Origins of Translational Research

To advance criminal justice solutions/interventions over an extended period of time requires the development of a strategy or paradigm facilitating the encouragement of vested parties looking to one another for knowledge and insight. As briefly discussed in the introduction, a proposed strategy in addressing this seemingly difficult task is the practice of *translational research*, a term first initiated in the medical field.

In the 1998 article entitled, *Bridging the Gap Between Practice and Research*, the Institute of Medicine (IOM) called on scholars and clinicians to begin addressing the needs of the public through “research to practice” (Lamb et al. as cited in Campbell et al., 2005). In

answering this call, the conceptual framework for translational research was established. The concept, translational research, refers to the practice of scientists sharing innovation and data produced in a laboratory setting with clinicians in order to refine it into a legitimate remedy as dictated by their practice. Moreover, the remedy then becomes immediately applicable in the treatment of disease.

Within this framework, the initial research itself was, and continues to be, informed by the dynamics of the field as it creates a cooperative venue for applying what is learned in the empirical world to the treatments and interventions needed by practitioners. The fact that the field is determining the applicable and necessary solutions creates a reciprocal relationship among the various stakeholders, offering the necessary venue for developing a “shared dialogue.” Here, a mutual understanding of the problem facilitates the formation of common goals and a sense of partnership among participants. This is an important concept, as the goal of translational research is to promote circumstances in which all parties at the table feel they have a voice and are benefiting in some capacity. Moreover, a combined effort offers a higher likelihood that the resulting solution will be more efficacious than if one group or the other attempted to perform the task alone.

Since its inception in the medical field, the utilization of translational concepts has been effectively illustrated in areas such as cancer research, cardiovascular disease, and gene therapy (Hudgins & Allen-Meares, 2000). Attempts at combining research and practice have also proven valuable in other contexts including social work (Allen-Meares, Hudgins, Engberg, & Lessnau, 2005; Berg-Weger et al., 2004), public health education (Roe & Lancaster, 2005) and occupational health (Kramer & Wells, 2005), where collaborative endeavors of this nature have joined researchers, practitioners, and policy makers in efforts to develop a shared dialogue about widespread problems. Moreover, applying these concepts within a criminal justice context will also likely provide successful results. While this seems like common sense, the reality can be both time-consuming and difficult (Tilley & Laycock, 2000).

For this reason, few cooperative projects of this nature have been initiated to date; however, some projects in criminal justice contexts have been conducted using a collaborative model conceptually similar to that of translational research. These efforts have been published in the area of substance abuse treatment (Campbell et al., 2005), juvenile probation (Lane et al., 2004), evaluation research (Tilley & Laycock, 2000), and abuser intervention programs (Murphy & Dienemann, 1999; see Table 1). In addition, two authors in the area of corrections have offered insight and guidelines as to how mutual partnerships between agencies and academics might be created and fostered (Smith, Tewksbury, & Potter, 2005; Gentry-Sperber, Henderson-Hurley, & Hanley, 2005; see Table 2).

Reviewing the discussions related to these studies has indicated that a number of the authors agree that the incorporation of a “research to practice” philosophy is both necessary and inevitable in the area of criminal justice but that it has yet to be fully realized. While the project documentation shows that the collaborative process has not been completely refined within a criminal justice context, it does offer insight as to how future efforts can best employ the translational model. Additionally, these studies have allowed the authors to address some of the practical needs and obstacles inherent to projects of this nature (e.g., necessary

levels of commitment, goal setting, regular assessments informed by the field providing real-time feedback, etc.), which will also be helpful to those planning future endeavors.

Table 1

Examples of Translational Research Efforts in Selected Areas of Criminal Justice		
Authors and Year	Area	Translational Concepts Applied
Campbell, Daood, Catlin, & Abelson (2005)	Substance Abuse Treatment	Two statewide conferences were held in 2000 from which focus groups were organized in an effort to explore the issues faced when combining research and practice in this area. In identifying these issues, the authors were able to build on the body of knowledge related to the undertaking of this type of collaboration. In addition, they identified how those issues might be addressed in future initiatives.
Lane, Turner, & Flores (2004)	Juvenile Probation	The authors discussed their own experiences with a juvenile probation project that required collaboration between researchers and practitioners. They outlined the importance of combining research and practice, as well as offered insight as to building and maintaining those relationships beyond the initial project.
Tilley & Laycock (2000)	Program Evaluation	The authors discussed various strategies that can be employed in order to develop more comprehensive solutions to crime problems, including a discussion of limitations as to what makes some interventions more successful than others, as well as issues to consider when combining research and practice in future assessments.
Murphy & Dienemann (1999)	Abuser Intervention Programs	A collaborative research task force held organized discussions in an effort to develop common research agendas, which would benefit the wide range of stakeholders. These discussions resulted in a number of promising research initiatives in which the translational principles would be applied.
Crawley, Hughes, & Dopke (2006)	Juvenile Intervention Strategies	The city of Grand Rapids formed a partnership with Michigan State University and Grand Valley State University to pioneer a progressive approach in responding to juvenile crime; a paradigm shift that involved studying a problem first before launching a responsive program. After the analytical research based work was completed, a comprehensive new approach to juvenile crime was developed and implemented by the police department and juvenile courts.

Table 2

Best Practice for Using Translational Research in Criminal Justice	
Guideline	Brief Explanation
Designated Leaders	Designating leaders at the outset of the project increases the chance of a successful collaboration in that leaders provide other members with motivation, direction, and assistance with communication between organizations.
Bring the “Right” Parties to the Table	Each agency will bring separate but significant qualities to the table that include a unique perspective of the issues, willingness to compromise, and the ability to assess and/or allocate resources. Things to consider with respect to choosing who to include are the compatibility of personalities, openness to considering others’ perspectives, and the capacity to overcome biases. Each of these respective strengths builds on the cohesiveness of the group by ensuring that every member agency has a “voice” in the process.
Mutual Goals & Agenda	Shared “vision” achieves buy-in, levels expectations, and provides incentive that each party will benefit in some capacity. Moreover, this will provide parties with a sense of ownership of the project.
Open Communication	This creates a true sense of partnership by building a sense of trust between members. It also affords them the opportunity to hold open dialogue sessions during which critical insights can be shared and a sense of shared responsibility can be maintained.
Timeliness	The nature of the project will determine the timeliness with which the group is able to address the issues—all group members must be willing to adjust priorities and expectations within reason in order to accomplish the group’s goals.
Presentation of Findings	The group must be mindful to communicate as to the specificity of the findings so that expectations can be adjusted accordingly. It is also pertinent that findings are reported to each agency at various points throughout the process so that each is able to witness progress. In accordance with this, it may serve stakeholders to develop “talking points,” in an effort to share the findings beyond the group.
Dedication	Collaborations of this nature require concentrated effort for a continuous period of time, which includes persevering when inevitable disagreements arise.

Based on a review of these initial studies, translational research within the context of criminal justice is grounded in a spirit of collaboration and ongoing reciprocity. It involves building an alliance among individuals linked by a common problem in order to develop a viable solution for addressing that problem. With this in mind, issues to consider at the outset of a project might include the type(s) of problem(s) that need to be addressed, the resources an agency can offer, the expertise and experience of the researchers, the time frame in which the group must operate, the degree of control over the process each party wants, and expectations for the final outcome of the project (Smith et al., 2005).

It is important to consider these issues in deciding who is “brought to the table,” as an underlying philosophy of translational research demands some degree of adaptation in how each represented organization/agency views the role of the other. Moreover, all of these issues will likely impact the ability of the group to move forward in developing a satisfactory solution to the problem.

Relevant Parties

The benefit and importance of involving all relevant parties in the process of enhancing and/or generating more effective policies, programs, and interventions cannot be overemphasized. As indicated by Weisbord & Janoff (1995) in their Integral Organizational Change Process Model, this is a critical element. The model emphasizes that organizational change in criminal justice agencies requires a complex, systematic transformation, as no agency operates in isolation. The inclusion of various system stakeholders is, therefore, critical to the success of any change effort. Here, such paradigm “shifts” are certainly facilitated through the utilization of translational research practices.

Moreover, a significant number of stakeholders beyond the researchers and practitioners likely exist within this context. For example, this might include program administrators, educators, policy makers, citizens, and community leaders (Campbell et al., 2005). Having these parties present allows each group to take ownership of their past, present, and future; confirm their mutual values; and commit to action plans grounded in reality. Regardless of who is at the table, however, all parties must be vested in the success of the project, as numerous stakeholders, each with differing perspectives and strategies, have the potential to result in competing rather than common agendas (Campbell et al., 2005).

Logically, the first, and perhaps most important step in this process, is assembling the right combination of representative individuals. These individuals must possess strong leadership and communication skills, as successful collaboration requires active leadership on many levels. Moreover, it may be prudent to appoint leaders from each representative organization/agency who possess a solid understanding of the problem and what outcomes are feasible in order to better facilitate communication among the group.

Here, leaders can encourage participants to accommodate the needs of the group as a whole by promoting a sense of understanding for all perspectives and ensuring that the concerns of every participant are adequately addressed. Designating leaders who are able to assist the group with communication may increase the likelihood of the group’s ability to effectively address the issues.

Once the initial interactions have established a cohesive group, individual members can begin discussing their unique knowledge and experiences relating to the problem, thus building a collective understanding of how best to proceed. As the work progresses, the group will begin to develop “talking points” to share their successes. Talking points are a way of communicating the action and progress in understandable bits to the public and other interested parties via media coverage. “Bringing the information into the public arena through the media in ways that maintain the integrity of the findings and conveys the information in an accessible fashion is the key” (Petronio, 1999, p. 90).

In addition, this helps facilitate the ongoing conversations necessary for successful advancement of the issues (Lane et al., 2004) in that positive exposure can be used in this way to encourage collaboration by emphasizing the benefits of translational research. It may also guide those who have not previously embraced these principles, toward considering it a viable possibility. What’s more, talking

points encourage the growth of these practices beyond the initial collaboration, as participants from the various venues network and move toward a collective purpose.

The Benefits and Advantages

Employing a conceptual framework such as that utilized in translational research presents several benefits. Briefly, these advantages might include more viable and effective interventions; however, the advantages likely extend beyond these obvious benefits, as an established relationship between university researchers, community leaders, and criminal justice practitioners potentially serves each in a separate but significant way. Most notably, public concerns can be more readily addressed with combined efforts through improved communication and information sharing.

From a practitioner's perspective, translational research provides a law enforcement agency with a unique opportunity to work with academics also actively involved in the community. This partnership should then lead to a cooperative identification of best practices and approaches to solving problems chronically plaguing their shared community. To clarify, working collaboratively, community and law enforcement leaders can partner to nominate a unique problem in need of attention. Academics are then poised to help the group identify, explore, and/or describe underlying correlates/causes of a unique problem, and subsequently help implement and assess proactive problem-solving strategies.

Serving the community in this capacity offers university researchers an opportunity to meaningfully fulfill their role of civic duty through research agendas driven by community need. Translational research has the capacity to assist practitioners in addressing problems more expediently from an empirical perspective. To this end, a university gains rapport with the community and agencies, while community/agency relations also improve. In addition, criminal justice agencies will often gain access to a wider range of funding options, which is an important benefit as agencies often lack funding for special emphasis projects. Partnering with university researchers toward a specific end can bring in funding from new sources such as grants.

Additionally, but perhaps less formally, projects of this nature might inform changes to curriculum, incorporating innovative ideas through service learning. These opportunities can enrich the course of study by offering students aspiring to work as practitioners the chance to gain relevant work experience and network with the agencies. Agencies benefit from this practice as well by gaining access to "up and coming" practitioners. This likely guarantees that translational research practices will perpetuate beyond the scope of immediate projects as the concepts are instilled as part of the educational process.

Successful use of the concepts and practices of translational research potentially constructs a set of circumstances in which all vested parties benefit from the end result. For this reason, serious consideration should be given to what might be accomplished in bridging the gap between research and practice by employing such methods.

Limitations

While the advantages are numerous, the pitfalls that exist with respect to the use of research in guiding policy and practice must also be considered. It is helpful to consider these potential limitations prior to project initiation, as these difficulties can reduce the feasibility of this type of collaboration from the outset (Allen-Meares et al., 2005).

The first issue that might be considered a limitation is that the translational process can be arduous and challenging in nature. Specifically, the process may be particularly time-consuming for those involved (Allen-Meares et al., 2005). For instance, requiring practitioners to read through research that may or may not offer meaningful suggestions or relevant ideas is not practical—other job requirements likely take precedence over reading literature written in “technical” terms (Campbell et al., 2005).

Another illustration of this point may come in how the group communicates regarding the findings of the research. In particular, practitioners may find that “researchers often have, at best, rather vague answers . . . to pressing questions, with many caveats, qualifications, and admonitions for more research to be done” (Murphy & Dienemann, 1999, p. 1322). Without adequately addressing this limitation, solutions to problems can result in knee-jerk reactions by criminal justice leaders, rather than well thought out strategies based on sound research, input from relevant parties, and program evaluation.

A second limitation that would present a concern for the researchers is that organizations might unintentionally abuse the findings of the research. This occurs when an organization generalizes the findings beyond the original scope of the project. While inference can be fine when the facts are placed within context, the results must be used with caution, lest the entire process be delegitimized. “Most policy decisions are taken in a political context” (Tilley & Laycock, 2000, p. 221), and maintaining a position may be difficult given political pressures. With this in mind, it becomes important to closely guard the integrity of the project from anyone who might use the findings to fulfill a personal or political agenda.

A final limitation that must be guarded against is a lack of rigorous assessments failing to answer the “real” questions—lacking scientific validity. The limitation here lies not in applying translational research practices, but rather that it is easier to fall back to using old applied research models. In doing so, assessments may follow the rules but not the true spirit of what the vested parties strive to do (i.e., serving those in need).

When the group identifies and discusses these potential limitations at the outset of a project, they can effectively address the limitations in a number of different ways. Recognizing the limitations also requires vested parties to be aware of the idea that “translation is more dynamic than simply applying our research to problems” (Petronio, 1999, p. 88) and that it requires a group effort in developing ways of negotiating a strategy toward a practice that satisfies all parties to some degree (Lane et al., 2004).

Future Agenda

In furthering the development of evidence-based policies and the advancement of intelligence-led policing strategies, the field of criminal justice is shifting in the way leaders think about existing problems. This shift will likely result in the development of new and perhaps more effective approaches, which can be further promoted through the utilization of translational research concepts and practices.

With respect to the relationship between researchers and practitioners, the discovery of a common dialogue is necessary in order to push the field beyond what currently exists. As success stories resulting from the use of translational research come to be recognized, it is likely that this practice will be utilized more frequently in developing stronger, more effective interventions. If research is to impact policies and practices in a meaningful way, stakeholders will likely need to rely upon communication in promoting a new culture of cooperation among the various participants.

In an effort to address the current research/practitioner gap, we propose that researchers and practitioners alike consider the potential benefits that collaboration and advancement of a deeper understanding could have for the criminal justice field. A collaboration of this magnitude no doubt takes a great deal of effort and organization on the front half but is something that could be truly beneficial well beyond those involved in the initial process.

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