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Materials/publications are available through the Illinois Law Enforcement
Training and Standards Board Executive Institute.
Today’s law enforcement administrators face a plethora of issues related to the day-to-day management of their organizations. As such, professional administrators must keep well informed regarding current issues and emerging research in the field. The work day of the law enforcement administrator is never predictable, as brush fires may erupt at any moment and require their quick assessment and response. There is little doubt that substantial preparation is critical to effectively operating as a leader within the law enforcement profession.

The Law Enforcement Executive Forum is dedicated to keeping law enforcement administrators prepared to meet emerging challenges. It strives to bridge the gap between theory and practice. As such, Forum articles are written by both academics and practitioners, with the overall focus on improved service delivery. Additionally, the Forum strives to provide articles that are timely and diverse in terms of addressing emerging issues and concerns confronting law enforcement administrators.

This issue of the Forum is representative of the diversity and complexity of problems faced by today’s law enforcement executives, beginning with a series of articles on leadership, and ending with a series of articles on use of force and other legal issues. It is our hope that through research and the sharing of ideas, we can assist law enforcement leaders with meeting the important challenges of today and tomorrow.

Thomas J. Jurkanin, PhD
Senior Editor
Executive Director, Illinois Law Enforcement Training and Standards Board
Avoid the Trap of Finger Pointing—Servant Leadership: The New Paradigm for Law Enforcement Organizations

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Leadership is a serious business. When discussing leadership, we are not simply speaking about the personal development of one person, but rather the forming of a future organization.

Today, more than in the past, criminal justice leaders are being tasked with enormous responsibilities that demand both competent and effective leadership skills. Intellectual curiosity and critical thinking skill sets are the tools that can help make the difference in law enforcement leaders being effective today and well into the 21st century.

Making an effective leader is a task that involves careful thought and skill development. The collective evidence strongly suggests that environments that are created through the Servant Leadership Model will produce employees who challenge themselves to be productive, creative, loyal, and dedicated to the needs of the criminal justice sector.

In order for people to effectively learn in any environment, they must feel at ease and comfortable. Lucas describes a training room set up for the luxury of the students to learn. This room consists of enough personal space where students will not feel cramped or intimidated, including just the right amount of chairs for the number of students, ample hearing conditions with no interruptions from outside disturbances, average temperature settings, neutral colored walls, and well-lighted rooms. The training room is arranged to facilitate the comfort of the students, promoting an optimal learning atmosphere (Chari, 1998).

Being concerned about the people under you and acting on those concerns is a trait of Servant Leadership. Baron (1996) found that interpersonal relationships are critical determinants within any organization and provide a foundation for how effectively it functions, performs central tasks, and reacts to all those external environmental variables that are exacted upon it. The theory and concepts behind Servant Leadership are in sharp contrast to the notion that managers and leaders serve as power brokers and standardize discipline.

Servant Leadership


Today, the visionary leader recognizes that a lack of business and political acumen along with a misunderstanding of the organizational culture and demands can result in poor productivity, which damages the employees and the organization.
Servant Leadership focuses on leaders serving the people under them (“What Is Servant Leadership,” 2002). Servant leaders are entirely different people than traditional leaders but only because they have observed the value of authentic leadership style versus the more popular style of reacting to a perceived crisis or a knee-jerk reaction. Servant leaders do not hide behind their subordinates, but, rather, they rally among coworkers on the front lines in a similar fashion to one of the original pioneers of Servant Leadership, General Stonewall Jackson, who served during the Civil War.

Drawing upon work of Morrison (1994) and the lessons learned from Jackson’s eccentric intellectual mastery of war, who was considered peculiar by many and revered by others as an empowering military leader at a difficult time of war with little in the way of resources. His service to duty, while working alongside his troops and executing his leadership skills in war, never wavered, much like we find today in the challenges noted by Garfield (1992). Getting his troops to engage in bloody battles under his visionary style of leadership speaks volumes to his ability to effectively inspire others to challenge themselves. In the face of adversity, he stood there like a stone wall, thus leading to his nickname.

Today, visionary leaders, such as Sallie Krawcheck of Citigroup, Sir Richard Branson of Virgin Atlantic Corporation, Herb Kelleher of Southwest Airlines, and long-time Chairman of the Federal Reserve Dr. Alan Greenspan, who seek out innovation from others are at times viewed as peculiar leaders. Whether Stonewall Jackson or one of these other leaders, each knows that true leadership is such that it can bring lots of criticism from those who do not fully understand its focus. They do not waver in spite of criticism, and they recognize that valuing employees is paramount to organizational success (Klubnik, 1995).

Acknowledging the body of evidence on leadership issues, both the private and public sectors have significantly improved their organizational cultures and services by developing and supporting the Servant Leadership Model, which emphasizes focusing groups of people toward common goals. The failure to do so is many times the stumbling block for promoting effective change.

For the purpose of this article, we will discuss the importance of organizational relationships as one of the principle foundations for developing a Servant Leadership Model. With that said, we will also briefly explore the relationship between employee attrition and leadership.

Leadership

One of the best definitions of leadership is one that nurtures people in an environment full of encouragement and support to accomplish tasks without being directed. The visionary leaders are those who pursue creative approaches to leadership. These have been aptly demonstrated by the Marion County Florida Sheriff’s Office, which is just one example of a flagship organization. The Marion County Sheriff’s Office exhibits its Servant Leadership style by using a quality control process much like an Ombudsman to provide checks and balances to leaders on its organizational goals. The balanced scorecard system is a quality control process used to track progress and make any necessary changes within an organization.

The public sector leadership examples of the Dallas Texas Police Department and Marion County Sheriff’s Office are on track with well-led private sector organizations
that embrace the value of Servant Leadership-led police organizations. Both private and public sector leaders find they will succeed in positive and measurable outcomes if they find creative ways to lead their organizations.

Today, more than ever, public sector leaders must encourage critical thinkers and dissenters to focus upon new and creative ideas in a culture full of competing interests with scarce resources to perform at an optimum level and beyond. No organization will be effective without real and valued input from both of these groups.

Leadership decisions are often not popular, and change is ever so perplexing. Peter Drucker (1998), who is known for his research on positive humanistic leadership and organizational management, is one of the many pioneers responsible for the paradigm shift away from the outdated autocratic style of leadership. According to Drucker, “one does not manage people as previously assumed. One leads them.” Visionary leaders who subscribe to the Servant Leadership Model find the organizational culture less oppressive and that values become more important to the service mission of the organization. In the process, personal conflict, differing opinions, or insecurities come together in a new collaborative relationship paradigm. We then find less of a power-control image of a leader because the servant leader actually reframes the partnership with coworkers and promotes others to rise above their current status, valuing them by selecting the right people for jobs. This combined with positive reinforcement facilitates personal growth. When employees are motivated, they are more consistent in their performances and eager for constant improvement.

The cost of public sector services is measurable, and output is found to increase significantly due to the subtle power of coaching and the persuasion process used by the servant leader. The servant leader also benefits from this process by understanding ethics and power along with an awareness of the value of organizational trust and its integrity and the coming together style of Servant Leadership. To become a servant leader, an individual must provide positive reinforcement and influence and meet the demands of the employees under them in order for the servants to optimally perform their work (McCrimmon, 2006).

**Attrition**

Attrition is a good indicator of the quality of leadership. When one considers the scarce resources that are available for recruiting and retaining good criminal justice employees, attrition issues become a major and costly problem (Wood, 2005).

In considering the attrition factor, agency leaders should address the known and potential costs associated with new employee recruitment and define the qualification prerequisites. Next, an organization should address the time that management would spend attending trips to job fairs and colleges, screening applications time, interviewing, and conducting meetings regarding the decision process. If your law enforcement organization would like to advertise in newspapers, journals, the Internet, and via other ads, these costs must be calculated as well. The dedication of information technology personnel in formulating recruitment and job information on the firm’s homepage is important to quantify.

Another form of advertising that an organization may employ to create interest for new employees is brand value. The visionary law enforcement leader recognizes
that a good solid organizational reputation in the field of law enforcement is a tangible benefit in recruiting. Its presence would attract excellence in potential applicants. This metric is by far the best recruitment tool and the least costly.

In the research, Bonifacio (1991) outlines some of the major findings that impact law enforcement attrition. Police officers find themselves negatively impacted by the culture of the organization and are considered miserable from being exposed to the degradation that runs rampant within their occupation. Considering the high demand for control and expectations from the organization the officers are bound to fail. These findings seem to underscore what Iannone and Iannone (2001) found in law enforcement agencies, which indicated that poor supervisory practices account for a significant number of employees who feel dissatisfaction and hold negative feelings. They identified four areas as problematic and noteworthy:

1. The working environment
2. Harsh, abusive, tyrannical, or inept supervision
3. Misunderstood agency policies and procedures
4. Management failures

High attrition rates can become fiscally monumental. Large attrition is not unique to local law enforcement agencies. A considerable amount of turnover occurs in state and federal agencies where costs can easily exceed $100,000 to recruit and train one officer for employment (excluding relocation and other costs) (J. Ragan, personal communication, August 2008).

Thus, law enforcement leaders who focus upon accountability and have measurable events produce better overall results. In contrast to the safety of the community, law enforcement leaders with myopic vision run the career risk of experiencing enormous challenges to their leadership and job tenure if they end up with an insufficient number of qualified personnel.

It takes several years to adequately train an officer to function independently. The argument for utilizing the Servant Leadership Model takes into consideration the drain of qualified officers and the loss of productivity, lower morale, and safety issues surrounding high turnover rates. The number of citizen complaints and the potential for civil liability also support the argument for a review of the Servant Leadership Model (Orrick, 2002).

According to Orrick (2002), replacing officers with a new recruit within a three-year period can result in costs to the agency upwards of $60,000 per replacement. In essence, turnover is expensive. Redirecting costs for recruitment and training diverts opportunities from other programs within the community.

In 2007, the average cost of recruiting and training one law enforcement officer for the Marion County Florida Sheriff’s Office exceeded $86,000 dollars (L. Sullivan, personal communication, August 2007). Other agencies structure the costs for training in a similar fashion. The Cincinnati Police Department sponsors two basic recruit classes annually, and the cost for these two police academy classes is $600,000 to cover the attrition of approximately 50 officers per year (excluding recruit salaries). By comparison, the Dallas Texas Police Department’s costs for training one new police recruit (excluding salary and other incentives) runs at least $62,000 (Eiserer, 2006).
Thus, depending on the effectiveness of the modeling approach of police leadership within any sized police organization, the particular style of leadership represents either a positive or negative organizational culture where attrition is impacted.

During a recruitment symposium held by the 205th Session of the FBI National Academy, the group found that a healthy work environment becomes an important overriding factor for employees. Adequate staffing levels, fairness, two-way communication up and down the organization, respect, supportive managers and supervisors, career development programs, core values, continual training, and educational incentives all constitute a healthy work environment. Those who participated in the symposium were in agreement that an organization wherein work fosters a sense of camaraderie and encourages growth for everyone to pursue a common set of goals results in and leads to a strong sense of belonging and personal motivation to remain employed within that organization. Moreover, the personal empowerment of these employees is further supported by working in a learning environment where the culture supports ownership in the organization through active participation of managers and leaders who are open to new ideas and change (Vest, 2001).

In the study conducted by Yearwood and Freeman (2004), the data indicated that research on criminal justice attrition rates in North Carolina were suggesting multiple reasons that may exist for law enforcement turnover. Aside from ownership within the organization, most employees desire the opportunity to be treated in a fair and balanced manner by their agencies’ leadership. A few of those examples include fair promotions, mutual respect, educational opportunities, and consistent increases in annual pay and benefits.

Collins (2001) viewed employee attitudes as ranging from disempowered to empowered. Disempowered employees feel devoid of enthusiasm and place themselves in the hands of the organization; whereas empowered employees are responsible for their own sphere of influence. No matter what an individual’s position is in any organization, the recognition process affects an individual’s ability to reward and recognize others.

One of the key values of a system that recognizes the accomplishment of employees is its ability to act as a motivator and reinforce desirable behavior. This type of system encourages employees to develop self-esteem and job satisfaction. This, in turn, increases the organization’s productivity and the perceived value of the organization to its employees. It is leadership that turns people into members of model organizations that lead to empowerment and the growth of new ideas.

Servant Leadership indeed offers the organization an opportunity to develop itself into one of those model organizations that rises to the level of becoming a healthier, freer, and empowering place to work and could potentially become one of the best places a person could find to be employed.

The Foundation of Servant Leadership

There are eleven known characteristics of being a servant leader:

1. Healing
2. Stewardship
3. Serving others
4. Listening
5. Foreseeing the future
6. Compassion
7. Conceptualization
8. Ability to persuade
9. Knowledge of what is going on around them
10. Sense of group closeness
11. Desire to help people grow

All of these characteristics make a servant leader focus on the people that the leader is serving (Barbuto & Wheeler, 2002).

To become a servant leader, an individual has to have the desire and passion to put him- or herself second to the needs of the organization and people under him or her. In order for servants to be loyal to an organization and their leader, they must feel concern for them to succeed and grow as individuals (Barbuto & Wheeler, 2002). When people are happy, they are healthier, work harder, are more willing to serve others, are perceived as friendlier, and have the desire for the organization to succeed (“What Is Servant Leadership,” 2002).

A significant issue for effective leadership in the future is to place the internal customer (the employee) first. This effort builds a confidence level within an organization in several ways. Employees who feel part of a group, who develop a sense of team within the group, and who learn that they possess many talents are found to be the most balanced and productive members in any organization (Senge, 1995).

In the culture of the organization, Senge (1995) found that above all the value of creating an inclusive workplace full of exciting learning opportunities develops an organizational core without high levels of anxiety and encourages employees to find creative solutions to issues and problems. Such organizations find out what they are facing and have to overcome in the future. The servant leaders’ philosophy of giving empowerment to their employees will help build trust and respect between the leader and their followers. By involving everybody and focusing on the employee, the employee takes pride in his or her work, feels part of a team, and develops a strong commitment to the organization.

The Place of Employees in Organizational Relationships

It seems safe to assume that numerous scientific studies undertaken by researchers and supporters of Servant Leadership, including Stephen Covey (2004), Margaret Wheatley (Wheatley & Rogers, 1996), Kenneth Blanchard (Blanchard & Hersey, 1977), James Collins (2001), and Peter Senge (1995), among others, corroborated the measuring of organizational performance outcomes through well-designed skills and are more interested in building positive relationships. These types of organizations are full of valued team members much like the employees of the Herman Miller Furniture Company. These employees who work in a manufacturing trade have enjoyed the feeling of empowerment through being members of an organization that follows the Servant Leadership Model. The success of the firm has been evolving for over 42 years, and the company demonstrates empowered
employees, low attrition, high production of quality goods, and outstanding customer service, which have, in turn, propelled the company into a premier status as leading the industry standard. This example reaffirms that leading people is the opposite of trying to control them (Deming, 1986).

Relationships between people can be easily improved by using a Servant Leadership approach because it stresses the needs of the person by focusing on the entire group and organization. No one feels threatened, and retaliation becomes an embarrassingly outdated concept. Individual leaders and managers do not become the focus. The use of compassion provides an opportunity to build a relationship. Compassion is the ability to understand someone’s personal life situations and take those circumstances into consideration when tasking or asking him or her to perform job functions. The trait of healing draws people to a leader when they need advice and guidance. Healing and compassion help to build personal and organizational relationships because workers have an attachment to their boss and know they can confront him or her with questions or concerns that may exist outside of the work environment (J. York, personal communication, July 2005).

If the leader of the criminal justice organization can conceptualize and predict future trends for their work environment, staff members will believe the person has goals and wants the organization to succeed. If servants think the leader is moving in a positive direction, the corporate to personal relationship will emerge as being stable and cohesive. As a servant leader, one puts their desires second and the needs of the people they lead first (“What Is Servant Leadership,” 2002). This is viewed as serving others prior to the needs of oneself (Barbuto & Wheeler, 2002).

Mutual cooperation and goodwill can be created when the group knows its needs come prior to their leader. When the leader reframes the previously held notion of power and authority being the dominant theme of the organization, their organizational relationship will significantly improve. This is because the individual’s needs come first. Persuasion is a key component in building relationships. If servant leaders have the ability to persuade, they can convince people to lead and perform under their own direction and desire. If a servant follows the criminal justice agency values and rules because they want to, not because they have to, the servant characteristic of persuasion will create a cultural shift to a personal relationship of loyalty and fellowship (Barbuto & Wheeler, 2002).

Conclusion

The autocratic method of controlling people that dates back to the Industrial Revolution is simply outdated. Today, a leader who chooses to bark out orders and lead by a tightly held control leadership style generally learns that the notion of a divide and concur bully mentality may leave employees quaking in their boots but destroys the organization. The opportunity to balance out previously held leadership by implementing a style of Servant Leadership should move forward. Following that style of leadership will lead to optimum performance in criminal justice organizations.

To further dispel any confusion on the benefits of reframing efforts found in Servant Leadership, the consensus appears to be evident in the February 27, 2004, television magazine news story broadcast to over 10 million viewers that chronicled
the organizational benefits for Servant Leadership by way of an introduction of its merits to American workers. As a result of the news story, the network received an unprecedented hundreds of thousands of telephone calls from excited viewers wanting to learn more about this leadership style. The comments of viewers seemed to suggest they believed Servant Leadership could lead to improvement on the job (Spears & Greenleaf Center for Servant Leadership, 2004).

To create a learning environment where people want to learn and have the desire to achieve greatness, it is recommended that a Servant Leadership approach be utilized (Senge, 1995). This approach focuses on the needs of the servants first, and the criminal justice organization and leaders second. Servant Leadership as applied in criminal justice organizations is intended to build positive relationships so that both leaders and employees respond well to the intended organizational goals through individual participation.

By putting the needs of a servant first, employees become empowered to perform to their highest ability level. If a person wants to perform, the information and conceptualization drawn from any learning environment is retained and used. According to Collins (2001), setting up an environment that focuses on the servant learning will directly impact how the servant performs and will be further demonstrated by improved production.

True leaders work as part of a team and foster individual as well as group success. With this in mind, a manager must be willing to be a pupil, admit to their own mistakes, be willing to listen, learn from employees’ mistakes, and accept constructive criticism. Regardless of how much education or experience a leader has, he or she should understand the importance of incorporating listening skills into their personal leadership style.

Twenty-first century law enforcement leadership is undergoing major transformations, and it will most likely require a new approach to its business model (Blanchard and Hersey, 1977). Maintaining the status quo in law enforcement leadership is recognized as problematic by all leadership research. Law enforcement leaders often find themselves in a complex juxtaposition of being so concerned with doing things right that they fail at doing the right thing.

Servant Leadership is inspirational and promotes a culture of integrity, trust, and a real concern for others grounded in mutual respect that sets the organizational foundation toward serving the public and community through effective and competent leadership. This, in turn, entices public servants to want to learn and to become empowered to serve. The demand for great leadership is within every one of us.

References


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Leadership Perception in Police Organizations

Dan D. Terry, Sergeant, Elmhurst Police Department

Introduction

What are the characteristics of a good leader? This question has no doubt been asked repeatedly over the years and has been the subject of much research and literature. Why do some leaders seem to have the capability of bringing their work group together as well as the ability to motivate and to achieve high performance, while others seem unable to do this? In most organizations, both supervisors who are considered good leaders and those who are lacking in their ability to effectively lead others can probably be found.

Good leaders seem to instill a sense of pride in the work group, a sense that what is being done is of value and appreciated. They are able to motivate people to give more of their best. Working for a good leader is more enjoyable, less of a hardship, more satisfying, and the desire to strive for optimal performance to please this leader may be the norm.

On the other hand, there are those leaders who seem to have the opposite effect. Instead of motivating employees, they seem to de-motivate them. They are not well-liked or respected, tend to frustrate employees, and when this leader isn’t standing over employees directing them in their efforts, performance or production may suffer. Working for this person might be outright miserable. Employees do not feel valued or appreciated.

What are the characteristics that separate these two types of leaders? Some prior research on leadership styles consists of the Autocratic, Democratic, and Free-Rein Leader (Iannone & Iannone, 2001, pp. 33-35; Swanson, Territo, & Taylor, 2008, pp. 278-279); McGregor’s Theory X and Theory Y (Hilgert & Leonard, 2006; Swanson et al., 2008, pp. 189-190); Blake and Mouton’s (1964) “Managerial Grid”; Fiedler’s (1967) Situational Theory; Hershey, Blanchard, and Johnson’s (2001) Situational Model; the University of Michigan’s study on production-centered and employee-centered leaders (Northwestern University, 2006, p. 113); and the Ohio State University study focusing on “initiating structure,” a task-oriented characteristic of leadership, and “consideration,” a people-oriented characteristic of leadership (More & Miller, 2007, pp. 138-140; Northwestern University, 2006, pp. 112-113).

After examining these various leadership theories, some common themes can be identified. Many of the characteristics of the various leadership styles can be categorized based on their primary emphasis. There are task-oriented characteristics of leadership and employee-oriented characteristics. Task-oriented leaders’ primary focus is on production or the task at hand. They supervise “by the book,” practicing close supervision, making most of the decisions, and allowing very little subordinate participation in decisionmaking. The autocratic leader, McGregor’s Theory X leader, Blake and Mouton’s concern for production, the University of
Michigan’s production-centered leader, and the Ohio State University’s “initiating structure” reflect the characteristics of the task-oriented leader.

Employee-oriented leaders’ primary focus is on human relations within the work group. They seek ideas from others and encourage participation from subordinates. The democratic leader, McGregor’s Theory Y leader, Blake and Mouton’s concern for people, the University of Michigan’s employee-centered leaders, and the Ohio State University’s “consideration” reflect the characteristics of the employee-oriented leader.

After examining the literature, it is evident that today’s police leaders can benefit from an employee-oriented emphasis. However, in the field of policing, there will be times when the situation warrants a task-oriented response. When an emergency situation arises and lives are at stake, the task at hand must take priority. A supervisor or leader must be task-oriented to ensure that the task is completed. There is no time to consider the feelings and opinions of each individual member. Even so, in modern policing, with the emphasis on community policing and the customer service environment, police organizations may be better suited if they adapt an employee-oriented leadership style: “Community policing advocates empowering the individual officers with more discretion and more responsibility than traditional policing; hence, the direction from the organization must emphasize shared values, participatory decisionmaking, and a collegial atmosphere” (Swanson et al., 2008, p. 250).

According to Iannone and Iannone (2001), “The supervisor who leads democratically, seeking ideas and suggestions from his subordinates and allowing them to participate in decision making that affects them, by and large secures the best results as a leader” (p. 34). Likert (1961) adds, “Studies indicate that leaders who are perceived by subordinates to be supportive are likely to have high-producing units. . . . Supervisors with the best records of performance focus their primary attention on the human aspects of their subordinates’ problems and on endeavoring to build effective work groups with high performance goals” (p. 7).

Probably the most successful supervisor would be the one who can adapt to different situations as needed. If a situation requires a task-oriented response, the supervisor acts accordingly. If the circumstances warrant an employee-oriented response, again the supervisor acts accordingly. This is the basis of Fiedler’s (1967) contingency or situational theory. A leader’s behavior is flexible and can be changed; however, most people are predisposed to one style (Blake & Mouton, 1964, pp. 12-13). Many supervisors may not find it easy to change their style of leadership from one moment to the next. In the absence of this ability to change their personality and leadership style to fit each unique situation, the supervisor who practices the employee-oriented style may have an advantage over the task-oriented supervisor.

In the examination of the research on leadership styles, nearly all of the sources pointed toward the employee-oriented style as a better or more productive style. Except for those few circumstances, such as the immediate, emergency type situation, the employee-oriented style was preferred.

It is evident in the literature that a focus on human relations in the work group and an employee-oriented leadership style can enhance performance and production
over the long haul. There is also emphasis in these areas in today’s leadership training (see Northwestern University, Center for Public Safety, 2004, 2007; Public Agency Training Council [PATC], 2003).

Is the leadership style most prevalent in policing today consistent with the literature? The average police leader can probably recite much of what the research on leadership has to say, and many if not most police leaders have probably attended some form of leadership training where these topics have been emphasized. Police leaders may be able to talk about the characteristics of a good leader, but the question is, “Do they demonstrate the characteristics of a good leader?,” “Do they ‘walk the talk’?,” and “Are their actions as a leader consistent with their words, or do they say one thing and do another?”

**Purpose and Methodology**

A study conducted in 2005 attempted to answer some of these questions. The purpose of the study was to compare the attitudes and perceptions of line-level police officers from DuPage County, Illinois, regarding leadership styles with the attitudes and perceptions of their supervisors (Terry, 2005). According to Hersey et al. (2001), a *leadership style* is defined as the behavior pattern of the leader as perceived by the follower. They further contend that a leader’s own perception of his or her leadership style does not necessarily define the actual style being used and could be vastly different from the perception of the follower (p. 117. 173). This leads to the questions, “In the eyes of the followers, are the leaders ‘walking the talk’?” “Do their behaviors match what they say?”

In a 1983 study of 64 police departments in Illinois, 81% of the officers believed their departments used an autocratic (task-oriented) style of management, while the administrators thought an employee-oriented style was mostly used (Auten, 1985). During Auten’s research, it was clear among all levels of the police organizations that a participatory philosophy of management (employee-oriented) was the preferred style. The research, however, demonstrated an obvious difference in the perceptions of the management styles being used. The top managers of the organization believed an employee-oriented style was present in their organizations. The mid-level supervisors and line personnel believed a more task-oriented style was present. Some of the biggest differences in perceptions were concerning communication and decisionmaking in the organizations. The subordinates did not feel that their input was being sought nor were they being considered during the decisionmaking process.

Any significant differences in the perception of leadership style between the line-level police personnel and their supervisors may point to areas where attention may be given to improve the police organizational environment as well as the service to the public. If the leadership style practiced by supervisory personnel in police organizations is not consistent with styles that promote high-performing work groups or that contradict that which is necessary for the success of today’s policing strategies, such as community policing, police efforts will not meet their full potential, and effective police services may be hindered.

A simple random sample was used for Terry’s 2005 study. A questionnaire (survey) was prepared, and members of municipal police departments within DuPage County, Illinois, were surveyed. DuPage County is located directly west
of Cook County and the City of Chicago. There are approximately 38 individual municipalities, each with their own police agency, and approximately one-third of these municipalities were chosen at random and surveyed for the study.

It was acknowledged that an individual often does not strictly lead in one particular style 100% of the time, but he or she may practice a certain degree of both styles, found on a continuum, somewhere between purely task-oriented and purely employee-oriented. Respondents in the study were asked to choose the response that reflects the more prominent leadership style.

Data Analysis

Although numerous implications may be drawn from the findings of this study, three areas stood out and are emphasized here. First, in examining the data of this study, it becomes obvious that there is a connection between a person’s position within the police organization and his or her view of the leadership styles being used.

Numerous comparisons were made in order to see if a person’s gender, age, education level, years of police service, organization size, or whether they had obtained some form of leadership training would affect their perceptions on leadership styles within their organizations. There was very little significant difference when these variables were compared. In less than 7% of the comparisons made was there found any statistically significant difference in their views on leadership styles.

On the other hand, when the leadership style perceptions were based on the person’s position within the police department, whether they held a supervisory or a nonsupervisory position, there was a statistically significant difference in 75% of the comparisons. Such a vast difference demonstrates that the position held within the ranks of the police department, be it a supervisor’s position or not, may help determine how one views leadership within that department.

What creates this difference in perceptions between the officers who are responsible for carrying out the day-to-day tasks of the police department and those higher in the rank structure who are responsible for making policy and overseeing that tasks are carried out? If the perceptions of these two groups can be more congruent with each other, might the organizational climate improve? Can the police organization be functioning with full effectiveness with such disparity between groups?

Secondly, the data reflects that a person’s direct supervisor is perceived to be more employee-oriented than the organization as a whole. Approximately 35% of respondents believed their direct supervisor to be task-oriented, while about 30% of respondents thought they were employee-oriented. When asked about the organization as a whole, about 59% of respondents thought the leadership style of their organization was task-oriented and only 9% of respondents perceived the organization’s leadership style as employee-oriented. This is a significant difference between the view of a person’s direct supervisor and that of the overall organization.
A possible explanation for this may be due to the closer and more intimate relationship between an employee and their direct supervisor compared to the management of the organization as a whole. An employee normally spends more time in contact and communication with their direct supervisor than they would with the administration or supervisors from other groups within the organization. Due to more frequent contact, they can more easily see and identify their direct supervisor’s attitudes and motivations and come to know more clearly what is expected of them. Due to the closer connection between an employee and his or her direct supervisor, this relationship will often be less formal and more collegial.

If the proper channels of communication are not in place within the organization, there may be more skepticism as to the motivation or agenda of others within the department where a close relationship does not exist. In Auten’s (1985) study, he concluded that the farther down on the organizational hierarchy, the more likely one would perceive top management as arbitrary. Even though the administration may perceive themselves as leading with an employee-oriented style, it is not communicated appropriately to the lower level of the organization. Traditionally, communication in the police organization was directed downward through the chain of command from the administrative or top management level (Miller & Hess, 2005). In today’s policing environment, it may prove more beneficial for communications to be opened, accepted, and respected from all directions—from top-down, bottom-up, or horizontally from one work group to another within the organization. The coordination of communication between all groups within the police organization can enhance the “big picture” view for members of the organization. A clearer understanding of each group’s roles within the larger organizational context may increase an employee’s sense of value and importance to the effective operations of the organization.

According to Trojanowicz, Kappeler, and Gaines (2002), “In the traditional police organization, authority for policies and decision-making is vested primarily with those in top management and then with middle management” (p. 96). In fact, “Command officers and supervisors had complete authority over subordinates, and they had little tolerance for ideas originating at the bottom of the management structure. Communication flowed downward through the bureaucratic chain of command” (Miller & Hess, 2005, p. 110). A change from the traditional model of policing to the community policing philosophy requires a change in management styles. A more participatory management style is recommended for community policing. Some of the characteristics of a participatory management style include a focus on teamwork, a trust of employees, asking for input and listening to employees, and for supervisors to act as coaches and teachers and not merely as order givers (Miller & Hess, 2005, p. 107).

Lastly, the data from Terry’s 2005 study reflects that supervisors perceive themselves as leading with a more employee-oriented style, while their subordinates see them as more task-oriented. More than 50% of the supervisor group believed they utilized an employee-oriented leadership style, and only 10% perceived their style as task-oriented. In contrast, about 30% of subordinates believed their supervisors to be employee-oriented and about 35% believed them to be task-oriented.
Discussion

What creates such a difference in opinions? The focus of this study was on the respondents’ perceptions and not necessarily on reality. How people see the world may largely be based on their experiences in life. A person’s values, upbringing, and position in life influence the way he or she sees the world. With police supervisors and nonsupervisors in different positions, they have different roles and responsibilities which can influence their perceptions as to what is appropriate and acceptable behavior. The nonsupervisor may not experience the same stresses as the supervisor and vice versa. Therefore, what is important or appropriate for one may not be so for the other. Different views on how things should be have the potential to create conflict. The question should be, “What can be done to make the perceptions of supervisors and nonsupervisors more congruent with each other?”

So, how do we start to work on removing or decreasing some of these differences in perception between the police supervisors and their subordinates? Who is responsible for leading the efforts toward this change? Is it feasible to expect the line-level police personnel to adapt, adjust, and change their views on leadership within the organization to be consistent with that of the command and/or police administration? Of course not. To force subordinates to change their perception of their leaders would only serve to further strengthen that perception as being arbitrary and not employee-oriented. Referring back to Hersey et al. (2001), they explain that the leader’s leadership style is defined by the perception of the follower. It is not the leader’s own perception of their leadership style that necessarily defines the actual style being used (p. 117, 173).

It is the responsibility of those in supervisory positions to grow, develop, and motivate those beneath them in the organizational hierarchy. It is their duty to set the right climate to motivate subordinates and enhance productivity. This is one of the roles of organizational leadership. To effectively accomplish this, it may require supervisors examining themselves to ensure their behaviors are consistent with this calling: “Leadership begins with the leader managing their own inner life so that the right emotional and behavioral chain reactions occur” (Goleman, Boyatzis, & McKee, 2002). Jim Collins (2001), in his book Good to Great, explains that a company that wishes to move from being a good company to a great company must be able to “confront the brutal facts.” They must be able to critically examine the present condition of the company so they know where they are, where they need to be, and what hard decisions must be made to get there. In order to consistently make good decisions, a clear picture of the company is necessary. Hiding or ignoring mistakes, problems, or bad news is not going to help a company achieve greatness (pp. 65-89).

Although, Collins (2001) is referring to taking a critical look at the present status of a company, the same dynamic may hold true for an individual, specifically one in a leadership role. Being an effective leader requires being able to “confront the brutal facts” about oneself, having an understanding of personal motivations, values, biases, etc., whether good or bad: “A person’s past experiences, positive or negative, can distort perception” (Kohlrieser, 2006, p. 35).

In his book titled Emotional Intelligence, Daniel Goleman (2005) suggests that a person’s emotional intelligence may be more important than a person’s IQ. Some
of the characteristics of emotional intelligence include self-awareness, being able to understand one’s true feelings, being able to handle one’s emotions, having self-control, being empathetic toward others, and being able to effectively handle relationships (p. 43). Another way to think of emotional intelligence is to equate it with strong character traits. A person with character will be more apt to self-evaluate themselves, identify areas of weakness, and take measure to improve in those areas. Their interaction and relationships with others may be more positive as well as they possess a genuine concern for others. A person with poor character or who is low in emotional intelligence often has difficulty with relationships: “It is precisely the lack of these skills that can cause even the intellectually brightest to flounder in their relationships, coming off as arrogant, obnoxious, or insensitive” (pp. 112-113). Therefore, lacking in character or emotional skills might impact a subordinate’s perception of their supervisor negatively.

In Robert Levering’s (2000) book titled A Great Place to Work, he suggests that one of the reasons participatory management techniques were not successful in the late 1970s and early 1980s was that they threatened the status quo of the management class. Some managers opposed participatory management techniques because it would call for a change of behavior on their part, giving more decisionmaking authority to subordinates (pp. 87-88). Might similar motivations unconsciously affect the perception of supervisors today? They are the boss, they are responsible for the outcome of their subordinates, so they unconsciously hold to task-oriented behavior, even though they believe they are more employee-oriented? According to Goleman (2005), “Emotions that simmer beneath the threshold of awareness can have a powerful impact on how we perceive and react, even though we have no idea they are at work” (p. 55).

For leaders, being honest regarding their true feelings and motivations, and accurately communicating this outward, may be a good first step toward reducing some of the differences in the perceptions between police supervisors and their subordinates. According to Goleman (2005), emotional intelligence can be learned. Of course, no learning will occur if the individual is not willing to “confront the brutal facts” in the first place.

If the supervisor perceives that they operate in a primarily employee-oriented style and agrees this to be the preferred style of leadership, but through self-evaluation finds unconscious values and motivations that reflect more task-oriented traits, this may be one area that can be worked on and monitored as a means of improving the effectiveness of the organization’s leadership. Subordinates observe the behaviors of their supervisors. They are influenced by the values, habits, and working methods of their supervisors and emulate those values that get rewarded by the supervisor. If subordinates are not performing as the supervisor desires, before assessing blame on the subordinate, it may be wise to first examine the behaviors of the supervisor (Maxwell, 2005).

As important as self-awareness may be in making sure a supervisor’s perception of their leadership style is consistent with their true innermost beliefs, it must now be appropriately demonstrated and communicated to others. The supervisor must “walk the talk.” Having identified their true feelings, values, and motivations, their behavior should mirror those accordingly.
Communication and interaction among supervisors and subordinates may be another key to eliminating differences between the groups and motivating subordinates to higher levels of performance: “Of all the skills a manager/leader/supervisor needs to be effective, skill in communicating is the most vital” (Bennett & Hess, 2007, p. 101). Through communication and interaction, subordinates may come to better see and understand the true motivations, values, and vision of their supervisors. It is the supervisor’s job to engage subordinates by sharing the organization’s vision and showing them how they add value and fit into the “big picture”: “The better informed each employee is about his job and how it relates to other jobs, the greater will be the opportunities for making the organization more effective” (Levering, 2000, p. 152).

Terry’s 2005 study demonstrated a difference in perception regarding the leadership style of the respondent’s immediate supervisor and that of the organization as a whole. The latter was perceived to be more task-oriented. Although the difference in perception may not have been as significant as that shown in Auten’s 1983 study, the findings are consistent. Auten (1985) pointed out that some of the greatest differences between the perceptions of management and their subordinates were in the area of communication and decision-making and that the higher up in the organizational hierarchy the manager was, the greater the difference in perception. Police administrators thought themselves to be employee-oriented, but they were not viewed that way by those at the line level.

According to More and Miller (2007), “In studying supervisor/subordinate relationships, officers have an entirely different view of how they are treated by supervisors as compared to how supervisors view the needs of subordinates. Supervisors think that they clearly understand the problems that subordinates face, but subordinates think exactly the opposite” (p. 12). Police administrators at the top of the organization may benefit by increased interaction with those at the lower levels, communicating their vision and making sure it is clearly understood: “People don’t buy into a vision they don’t understand” (Maxwell, 2005, p. 64). Police administrators should also ensure that their mid-level managers are carrying out their responsibility for sharing the organization’s vision with their subordinates. This cannot be a one-time event at the beginning of the year or during an annual evaluation; it should be a continuous process. The vision must be continuously communicated throughout the organization (pp. 65-66). Without the appropriate level of communication, how will the subordinate know what is expected, how they are doing, and where they fit into the organization?

In addition to providing continuous feedback downward, the supervisor in today’s policing organization needs to respect and appreciate upward communication from their subordinates: “Effective managers give all subordinates a chance to contribute ideas, opinions, and values as decisions are made” (Bennett & Hess, 2007, p. 114). A true employee-oriented leader will have a genuine interest in their subordinates. This will be demonstrated by the willingness to let employees have their say and provide input into how the job is performed. When supervisors see subordinates as important to the organization, trust, participation, productivity, and job satisfaction may increase (More & Miller, 2007, pp. 148-149).
Conclusion

Community policing advocates that officers become problem-solvers, increasing their use of discretion, their responsibility, and their participation in decisionmaking. Supervisors need to empower subordinates to fulfill these roles. The employee-oriented leader is more likely to foster the appropriate organizational climate that leads to higher, more effective performance over the long haul. Many supervisors would agree with this statement, but does their leadership style support it? Many supervisors stay busy managing processes, material resources, and things, often neglecting the most important resource to the organization—the human resource, the employee: “Leaders who tend only to business often end up losing the people and the business. But leaders who tend to the people usually build up the people and the business” (Maxwell, 2005, p. 218).

Studies have shown that the view of the leadership style being used within an organization or by the organization’s supervisors might be different depending on a person’s position within the police organization. The perception of those in supervisory and nonsupervisory positions might not be consistent, potentially hindering the effectiveness and harmony of the organization. Increased interaction with subordinates and an honest evaluation of oneself may help close the gap between these differences and improve the relationship between subordinate, supervisor, and organization, leading to a more effective and gratifying police organization.

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Law Enforcement Leadership Metrics, Negative Stress, and Coronary Heart Disease: The Dangerous Elixir for the 21st Century

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Introduction

In most democratic countries, we find the police to be the idealistic frontline defenders who respond to protect society. The leadership style within law enforcement plays a major role in the legitimacy of the police agency. These authors assert that there is a correlation between leadership, negative stress, and coronary heart disease in local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies and that this is based on one commonality—the human component. Leaders are incapable of being born; leadership can, however, be learned and taught well for most anyone who chooses to embrace the value in lifelong learning opportunities. Those who don’t wish to learn risk a workplace culture of negative stress, leading to physical and mental health concerns.

For a variety of reasons, historically, we rarely get a glimpse of the internal schema and culture found in the secretive profession of law enforcement (Archer, 1999). Often, the men and women working in law enforcement are somewhat restricted in their conduct by policy-driven analytics and do not feel comfortable discussing life inside. Another potential reason is that we find a gap in authentic leadership skill sets among law enforcement personnel. The implications of decisions made by people serving in leadership roles within law enforcement encompass many varied outcomes. A perceived imbalance of power is one such concern. At that axis, we find abuse, bullying, and retaliation as patterns of repeated aggression intended to harm personnel as defined by Einarsen and Skogsad (1996).

As found in the work of Babbie (1998), research in the social sciences is necessary for improvement and future success and to change previous behaviors. The purpose of this article is to balance out the literature that suggests that being exposed to an unhealthy work environment is dangerous to the health of personnel.

The Medical Discussion

Law enforcement is believed to be one of the most stressful occupations in the world. Literature on police officer stress indicates that stress can lead to a greater likelihood of absenteeism, burnout, job dissatisfaction, early retirement or attrition,
a weakened immune system with increased short- and long-term illness, long-
term disability, poor work performance, and potential premature death (Anshell,
2000).

Today, a healthy diet, exercise, and smoking cessation programs all reduce the
risk of disease and promote overall well-being; however, more prevalent and
concealed is the style of leadership found in law enforcement organizations that
is more harmful than previously considered. That exposure to dysfunctional
leadership can result in poor health, attrition, and low-performance levels. The
negative consequences of being exposed to abusive environments have recently
become a topic for discussion among leaders.

Other studies have shown that police officers have an increased rate of
cardiovascular and gastrointestinal disorders, divorce rates twice the national
average, and suicide rates two to six times the national average (Axelbend & Valle,
1979).

Police officers have an increased risk of heart disease, which is related to years of
service, and increased mortality for officers over 40 years of age (Vena, Volanti,
Marshall, & Fiedler, 1986). Job pressures include the responsibility of protecting
the public, the inactivity/crisis see-saw, internal departmental conflicts, the
maintenance of macho defenses, bipolar thinking, emotional distancing from
others, poor diet, lack of regular exercise and sleep, and the generally negative
image of serving in the profession of a law enforcement officer. These pressures can
accumulate and be more physically, emotionally, and psychologically debilitating
than the risk that an officer may be injured, or perhaps even killed, while in the
line of duty (Dishkin, 1989).

Sapolsky (2005), a Stanford School of Medicine neurological researcher, found that
more medical evidence exists to support the argument that, at any age, exposure
to negative stress and abusive relationships results in damage to physical and
mental health. In summary, these examples of ranking dominance within a social
setting has a profound and negative impact in the realm of health, disease, and
socioeconomic status.

In a series of ethnographic primate and human studies, the data suggest ranking
or occupational hierarchy drives negative stress as the metric that promotes a
culture of dysfunction. Sapolsky (2005) found that social dysfunction grounded
in abusive, bullying, and retaliation behavior within groups triggers several
negative biological responses from adrenocortical, cardiovascular, reproductive,
immunological, and neurobiological hormones. These outcomes result in long-
term and measurable damage to a person’s physical and psychological health.
The prolonged exposure to that type of negative stress has serious lifelong health
consequences.

In addition to Sapolsky’s (2005) research, Blackburn’s (2004) investigational data,
which spanned two decades of research, revealed that human telomeres are
crucial indicators for maintaining the stability and integrity of chromosomes. The
telemeres become damaged as a result of being exposed to prolonged amounts
of negative stress. The discovery of the important chemical enzyme that creates
teleomeres is a key indicator that scientists can use to determine lifespan and health of human cells.

Law enforcement leaders can benefit from the Sapolsky (2005) research data and findings by developing a correlation of the data resulting in evidence that indicates that the stress level was less the higher the level of dominance held by people, or the higher hierarchical position; the stress level was greater in lower or inferior positions.

In applying this concept, if the person with a dominant or superior position is removed from the organization and replaced with a more humanistic style leader, the level of negative stress of the lower-position individuals improved.

The American Medical Association (AMA) (2002) found occupational abuse and bullying behavior to be directly related to poor employee health, decreased performance, and higher costs to insure workers. Moreover, the AMA recommends expanded funding of comprehensive research programs to further assess the problem of people being exposed to abuse and bullying environments as defined by the AMA in the DSM IV.

**Epidemiology of Negative Stress Explored**

Stress could be defined as a combination of a stressor and stress reactivity, encompassing a stimulus and response. The stressor has the potential to elicit stress reaction, depending upon the perception of threat and the person’s ability to cope. Fear or the perceived threat of fear is the imbalance axis in this discussion.

Many variables, including personal attributes, cognitive appraisal, coping strategy, and social support may modify stress reactivity in any given situation and can account for the different response of two individuals exposed to the same stressor (Anshel, 2000).

Sudden-onset stress is characterized by a rapid increase in catecholamines (epinephrine, norepinephrine, and dopamine), thus increasing physiological arousal, alertness, and enhanced memory consolidation (Arnsten, 1998). After a brief period of time, this initial reaction is followed by an increase in glucocorticoids (cortisol, primarily) which shuts down the digestive system; redistributes blood flow, moving it away from the internal organs to the muscles; and mobilizes energy reserves. These events are typical of the fight-or-flight response described by Cannon (1932) and are equivalent to the “alarm reaction” in Selye’s (1956) Stress Reactivity Model.

Stress reactivity, although very complex, involves two basic components: (1) an endocrine (hormonal) response and (2) a nervous system response mediated through the autonomic nervous system.

If the stress is repeated or continued for some time, becoming chronic, the person uses coping mechanisms to try to adapt to the situation during what Selye (1956) termed the “stage of resistance.” There is an overproduction of glucocorticoids, which, in turn, suppresses the production of insulin, calling upon stored metabolites to fuel the energy demands, leaving the individual prone to fatigue.
and illness, entering Selye’s “stage of exhaustion” (pp. 36-38). This will have detrimental effects on memory, learning, cognitive function, and sleep, as well as damaging the immune system due to the exposure of a bath of corrosive hormones that represent a stress response more damaging than the original stress.

Police officers encounter many sources of physical and psychosocial stress. Physical stress (Anderson, Plecas, & Segger, 2001) is encountered during bodily exercise of a physical nature. Psychosocial stress (Anshel, 2000) is the response of an individual to the self-perceived imbalance between demands presented and the resources the individual has at his or her disposal to respond successfully (Eden, 1990). Psychosocial stress may be acute or chronic and is manmade.

Acute stress is derived from events that have a sudden onset of a critical nature, with the situations of limited duration. Chronic stress builds over time and does not resolve itself quickly. It may not lead to immediate distress but depends on the person’s ability to cope and the coping strategy employed. The two cited sources of chronic stress are (1) organizational or structural and (2) those internal or inherent to the job (Storch & Panzarella, 1996).

Another negative footprint related to stress is found in the scientific data relating to persistent epigenetic differences associated with prenatal exposure to famine in humans taken from the Dutch Hunger Winter Experiment as reported by Heijmans (2008). In this body of evidence, researchers linked exposure to negative stress back to prenatal consequences. As a result of living in social and psychological negative stress, pregnant women were found to have released a series of biological corrosive hormones in their bloodstream that resulted in neuro-developmental cellular damage to their offspring resulting in long-term health effects.

**Project Shield**

The U.S. Department of Justice’s National Institute of Justice conducted a research study called Project Shield that evaluated the negative effects of stress. The effects were divided into psychological, physical, behavioral, and organizational public health categories. There is little argument that law enforcement officers internalize their feelings and are at risk from many different perspectives. No studies focus on individual thought or psychological functions as episodes related to exposure to negative stress in law enforcement as it is related to agency leadership. However, Project Shield found that officers experienced an increased risk of mortality and morbidity from cancer, heart disease, hypertension, acute migraine headaches, reproductive problems, chronic back problems, foot problems, insomnia, alcohol abuse, and anxiety (Harpold & Feamster, 2002).

The public health medicine concept of prevention can be applied to help against stress. Primary prevention focuses on education that encourages healthy lifestyles. Secondary prevention targets individuals with the condition, trying to stop the dangerous behavior. Tertiary prevention involves treating and rehabilitating individuals so the behavior is not repeated in the future. Prevention could be costly, but it may be more effective than the treatment protocol once serious illnesses have developed.
The Law Enforcement Officer Perspective

In rare instances, law enforcement officers speak out publicly by providing a series of critical analyses they have developed from their career experiences. One such example is retired career FBI Special Agent-Attorney Coleen Rowley (2002) who accused her own agency of filling the leadership ranks with inexperienced careerists. She contends this choice is proven to be an ineffective one in part because these individuals lacked the requisite life and leadership experience. Rowley asserts that, in part, the failures among FBI leaders to address field concerns led to missteps during the September 11, 2001, terrorist attack and helped create a negative and mistrusting organizational culture within the FBI.

Taboo Talking Point

We pose the question, “What role if any does law enforcement leadership play with regard to leadership, negative stress, and coronary heart disease?” In previous work on negative stress, researchers suggest that adopting healthy lifestyles can help avoid personal health issues for people. It takes more than a notion of civility to transform organizations into healthy workplaces considering at least half of all workers who call in sick do so because of an occupational stress-related illness (“By the Numbers,” 2008). According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, in 2008, employees suffering from severe levels of negative stress are absent from work on average 23 days per year. These economic costs are staggering.

In this article, the focus upon leadership and its relationship to negative stress and coronary heart disease is meant to balance out the literature by discussing modern-day perceptions that take the previous research farther. These authors suggest this phenomenon requires more recognition than simply developing good coping skills.

Imbalance of Effort-Reward Systems

Most working employees at one time or another in their careers develop feelings that they are undervalued and, as a result, become depressed and feel overworked and underpaid. Often, these negative feelings lead to negative stress, and employees either retire, leave, or become cynics within the organization. As such, if disgruntled, it is common to find former employees who discourage potential new employees from working for the same organization or those who are engaging in occupational sabotage.

Today, employee retention is problematic for all law enforcement leaders. It signals cultural leadership issues that exist within the organization. Few of these leaders will openly admit that the underlying issues could be related to dysfunctional leadership skills.

It is unlikely that employees or law enforcement leaders realize the damage that negative stress causes to physical or mental health, and the fiscal impact exacted upon taxpayers as a result of poor leadership. To the contrary, if law enforcement leaders actively engage in behavior intended to inflict an intentional act upon an individual or group of employees, it is probable that civil liability attaches.
At a certain point, the level of career commitment intersects with discouragement based upon the employee’s perception. We classify this organizational gradient as one that is under the explicit control of law enforcement leadership. Commonly stated, poorly managed organizational change and operations harm the health of employees. The recommended approach for law enforcement managers is to avoid at all costs the notion that employees would question the existence of an organizational axis of commitment versus stupidity. Those feelings of job insecurity and complexity lead to a culture of organizational imbalance and increase the risk of coronary heart disease and poor health among employees (Sapolsky, 2005).

At this axis, we find that physical health, mental health, and performance issues collide. This is a crucial intersection where commitment and stupidity can lead to a downward path that benefits no one.

When employees perceive they are experiencing negative stress in the workplace, there is an economic cost. For example, when employees use their healthcare benefits for various forms of treatment, those costs can spiral out of control, exceeding projected budget allocations for healthcare expenditures. Most times, leaders do not recognize this juxtaposition.

**Law Enforcement Leadership**

This problem is not localized. Local, state, and federal law enforcement leaders’ decisions impact public perception because each creates a cultural image and perception among employees and the public. The same behaviors are found in any law enforcement organization unless its leadership reframes the foundation by quality control, affirming its metrics to authentic and ethical standards; otherwise, the organization and its personnel can become dangerous without oversight (Freeh, 1997).

Law enforcement leaders drive workplace growth through analytics. Each knows their decisions impact not only public policy and social justice issues; they also know that their choices lead and shape the organizational culture. Those same decisions have a profound impact upon the law enforcement agency, each individual worker, and their respective families. These cultural icons are often the drivers for performance within the organization as well as taking the lead to earn the public’s trust and respect. In law enforcement, image counts. Blanchard and Hersey (1977) offer examples of successful models that can be adopted by law enforcement leaders in a reframing process to improve the organizational culture of policing. The organizational brand value and a respected workforce are critical components to the successful delivery of social justice. These same law enforcement leaders are constantly battling the Achilles heal in the need to attract the next-generation candidate for employment. For example, the Metropolitan District of Columbia Police are reported to have numerous examples of leadership issues that relate to allegations of police misconduct (Adversity.net, 2008).

No member of a law enforcement organization can expect to engage in authentic transformation of its organizational culture without knowledge. In part, this paradigm shift can become successful by creating a learning culture within law enforcement. These critical thinking skills derived through developing learning enterprises will lead to knowledge through creativity and innovation. We expect
our police leaders to effectively guide the organization through the continuous turbulence and uncertainty found throughout the world. We also expect our leaders to be great visionaries through adapting the workplace to change initiatives.

The viewpoint expressed by psychologist and retired San Francisco Police Captain Dr. Alan Benner (personal communication, January 15, 2002), who created the San Francisco Police Department’s Behavioral Science Division, suggests the issue of negative stress and workplace conflict is directly related to the leadership style found within law enforcement.

Benner reflects on the behavioral similarities between all law enforcement agencies and its leaders and managers. He points out that unless the agency leadership dedicates itself to taking a healthy, proactive approach to its management, the operations will become influenced by individual biases and destructive behavior, which will become apparent in the organizational culture. The casualties of internal behavior are the employees and their families.

To improve excellence in law enforcement agencies, authentic leaders can remodel their organizations as adaptable workplaces if they so choose. The organizational culture theme we so badly desire today in law enforcement is dependent upon its own brand of authentic leadership.

Developing the model workplace culture requires much more than discussion. In part, we rely upon those people with many different skill sets—not just cops. Visionary and futuristic leaders can see the future by exploring the current events they find within their own organizations; however, they require peer-reviewed data and cooperation in order to lead effectively. One way is to complete multi-approach style assessments of these law enforcement leaders’ skills and the climate of their workplaces to begin to gain insight as to how to approach efficient and productive reengineering strategies.

In the complex workplace today, few law enforcement leaders take the time to consider what happens if the police are part of the problem by harboring cultural or organizational biases or pushing their own ego-driven agendas supported by conspiratorial actors seeking recognition from superiors. Each action and reaction can create both positive and negative perceptual outcomes from a variety of people, each with their own set of values.

Since this process of self-examination is never easy, many law enforcement leaders choose to avoid becoming a part of the process, thus failing to grasp one of the most important assessment phases of a leader—that is, being open minded to effective change, which includes authentic self-examination supported by critical analysis and collaboration across the landscape, with a focus that creates legitimate change and signals to others that you are sincere.

For law enforcement leaders, these strategies are well within the realm of possibility. These opportunities are considered as stark contrast to the frequent dysfunctional outdated leadership styles found in some law enforcement organizations.

Leaders are not genetically predisposed to be great. The choice of leading is both a real and a conscience action. Baron (1996) found that interpersonal relationships
are critical determinants within any organization and provide a foundation for how effectively it functions, performs central tasks, and reacts to all those external environmental variables that are exacted upon it. These types of professional relationships are found in all law enforcement organizations.

Those interpersonal relationships are at least as important as other factors that have received far more consideration and attention from researchers in organizational behavior and industrial organizational psychology, including areas of job-related attitudes, cynicism, performance, and reward (appraisal) systems and other aspects related to employee behaviors (Baron, 1996). Each of these areas is influenced by leadership.

If individuals were to consider the importance of positive and negative employee perceptions of their workplace culture and compare those differences to the organizational performance, such an understanding of social relationships and interactions would provide more insight into designing healthy and productive employees and workplace cultures (Duffy, Ganster, & Pagon, 2002). Underscoring this theory, law enforcement leaders can realign the organizational culture through real reconstruction initiatives.

**Humanistic Relationships**

There appears to be no argument among scholars that social relationships are clearly complex matters that are capable of producing intense feelings. A person's perception of happiness as well as disappointment is crucial according to Rook (1992). Threats of disruption within an individual's social network are a considerable source of stress according to Duffy et al. (2002). We find no evidence to suggest law enforcement employees are different.

In early history, it was the victim’s expressed prerogative to exact a degree and amount of punishment from the offender without influences (McCormack, 1987). In those times, victims themselves determined the kind of services necessary in order to restore themselves to the condition they enjoyed prior to the inflicted injury (Sayles, 1991). Retaliation by the victim was the earliest form of social control, although it often proved to be disruptive, ineffective, and disorganized (Ziegenhagen, 1977). That retaliation often led to blood feuds or vendettas, whereby the group would intercede when a loss had been handled in a disproportionate manner. At times, it may be difficult to separate how law enforcement uses its authority and power to function because it is clearly arguable that it is a form of retaliation. Often, police are criticized for retaliation if they arrest suspects alleged to have committed particular crimes. Today, retaliation-type behavior is found in most all law enforcement organizations. Most literature today does not distinguish the differences between positive and negative forms of retaliation among police.

In the contemporary workplace, such forms of retaliation are unacceptable but not unknown, and the problem creates more problems. Careers and families are easily derailed by harboring these fears from events such as loss of employment and unrealistic work demands as a couple of examples.

Leadership is not always legitimate. Nonlegitimate leadership decisions can create a toxic elixir and a plethora of abusive behavior that leads to a hostile workplace
environment marked by many forms of negative and retaliatory behavior that undermine the victim’s self-worth. Such behavior is an unproductive phenomenon that can destroy the organization and its mission. The loss of personnel combined with reduced recruitment efforts negatively impacts human capital, and this behavior can be economically devastating to any organization, costing billions of dollars annually (Neuman, 2001).

Considering the potential importance of interpersonal workplace relationships, it appears that more attention should be devoted to these issues—in particular, those perceived to be negative interactions in the law enforcement community. Vinokur and van Ryn (1993) undertook studies to research the effects of negative workplace issues on workers’ well-being and attitudes to compare and contrast the differences and understanding of how to improve workers’ perceptions of their environment. Behaviors they considered to be undermining to workplace social interactions included “targeting an employee by criticism in terms of their own attributes and/or actions intended to hinder the attainment of instrumental goals” (Vinokur, Price, & Caplan, 1996, p. 167).

In recent high profile incidents of violence, U.S. Postal Service employees have implicated negative workplace stress caused by actions ranging from poor leadership to bullying. Investigation of these incidents uncovered employee claims that they were abused and bullied (victimized) by management and coworkers. Bullying behavior was found to be the primary precursor for employees using violence. Employees described how they were victimized by management through discrimination, harassment, racism, and sexual abuse until they could no longer cope with the level of abuse and turned to excessive rates of attrition and then violence as a means to cope and punish those who they felt were responsible or had a role in their bullying (Namie & Namie, 2003).

It is often difficult to understand the behavioral dynamics within the workplace that negatively affect employees. For example, bullying behavior requires a form of concealment to carry its message of destruction. Due to the psychological design of abuse and bullying, victims are generally unaware that they are being targeted until some time later when they find themselves in some form of conflict (Wyatt & Hare, 1997).

Expanding on this viewpoint, Finch, Okun, Barrera, Zautra, and Reich (1989) and Rook and Pietromonaco (1987) found in early social undermining research that clear linkages existed that support the notion that undermining events result in emotional reactions such as distress, negative stress, and decreased subjective well-being. Rook (1992) agreed with those same conclusions and noted that negative actions and related comments directed toward bullying targets may result in feelings of guilt, self-blame, or isolation.

**Monitoring the Economic Maxims**

None of the local, state, or federal law enforcement organizations are mandated to report incidents of personnel issues attributed to leadership and the correlation to negative occupational stress. Therefore, we explore a series of data from other public agencies. The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) (2002), in conjunction with the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, has
outlined a combined effort between industry and government to establish an initiative to protect U.S. workers from job-related injuries, illnesses, and deaths within the workplace environment. NIOSH has recognized the existence of bullying and negative stress in the workplace and reported that sensational acts of coworker violence are only a small part of the problems associated with leadership. The agency found that, on average, 20 U.S. workers are murdered and 8,000 employees are victims of assault each week at work, which is much higher than the statistics reported annually in any school. None of these statistics even include the more subtle bullying, such as threats or other forms of verbal, physical, and sexual harassment that is commonly found in law enforcement agencies.

Much like the evidence presented by Brodsky (1976) on harassment in the workplace, in an article published in the Federal Employees News Digest ("Harassment and Retaliation," 2002), federal leaders were cautioned that harassment and disciplinary action against employees is more broadly construed than a complaint such as sexual harassment. Harassment was outlined as inclusive of the following examples: intimidation and ridicule or insult directed at any employee who is a member of a protected class based on race, color, nationality, or ethnicity. If federal employees feel that they live in a culture of negative stress and are being harassed by management and cannot perform their job, they can bring a civil suit against the local government entity, the agency, and/or individuals and leaders because the work environment is hostile.

When an employee brings a civil action against the agency, the number and persistence of allegedly hostile comments and/or actions come into consideration along with their severity and the context in which they occurred. The acts themselves present opportunities for disclosure of all the overt and covert behavior to be presented in order to provide a foundation for the question of whether an employee has been subjected to harassment by leadership and management.

In looking at recently published U.S. government statistics for complaints (charges) filed by federal employees for allegations related to workplace issues published by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) (2002) for fiscal year (FY) 2001, it can be found that in the federal employment sector, approximately 22,257 of the charges (representing the highest percentage of all complaint areas) filed with the EEOC alleged that employees had been victims of retaliation by their agency’s management. The report stated that discrimination alleged on the basis of reprisal represented the highest percentage of complaints; biases and nonsexual harassment were the issues most alleged by federal employees.

In FY 1999, the Federal Employee Hearing Program received 12,637 requests for hearings, a 3.4% increase from FY 1998. In the appellate review program at EEOC, 8,690 cases for review were reported in FY 1999, representing an increase of 8.2% (EEOC, 2002). Federal agencies reported spending $27,442,112 for EEOC contract investigations in FY 1999 as compared to $11,188,309 in FY 1998, a 145.0% increase. At the same time, the amount spent on investigations conducted using in-house personnel also increased by 12.1% from $19,656,263 in FY 1998 to $22,031,202 in FY 1999. Overall, the cost for investigating these federal employee complaints was determined to include payments to fact-finding investigators at a cost to taxpayers of $49,000,000 in FY 1999 (EEOC, 2002).
The amount of money paid out in awards to federal employees for compensatory damages were $8,521,713 in FY 1999, an 18.9% increase from FY 1998 figures. Attorney’s fees awarded for representation of federal employees totaled $7,862,373 for FY 1999, a 4.8% increase from FY 1998 costs (EEOC, 2002). No explanations were provided regarding the increase in complaints. The data reported that billions of dollars are paid out annually by the U.S. Government for claims made for the negative and retaliatory behavior of government leaders in tort actions.

No data is available for healthcare costs attributed to these examples and to negative stress. No oversight takes place on funds used from the U.S. Treasury Judgment Fund to pay claims for these incidents. Additionally, no person or agency is accountable to reduce the payment for claims made by federal employees (U.S. Treasury Department, 2002).

Lastly, the costs related to employee attrition can be quantified. First, the law enforcement leader should develop an understanding as to why employees leave. Money is not the main reason; instead, people leave for reasons directly related to abuse, bullying, and flawed leadership and management within the organization. In the last five years, the cost of employee attrition has risen 25%, and replacement costs can be greater than 18 months of the person’s salary level (People First Solutions Ltd., 2004).

If we accept the data as a justification for a more focused perspective toward leadership in law enforcement, we can be served well by paying attention to Yandrick (2002) who found that although there are no real statistics on the extent of workplace abuse and bullying by agency managers, the problem is reported to be endemic in some organizations and can be difficult to ferret out because of the potential fear of retaliation. He noted that the unhealthy workplace attributed to ineffective leadership practices, which is one of the most insidious and destructive problems yet also one of the least documented and most tolerated. The problem often surfaces in such behavioral forms as verbal abuse, sexual harassment, and discrimination. As mentioned, bullying and retaliation represent forms of intimidation that flourish within organizations and discourage employees from reporting the problem, which, in turn, has been shown to lead to negative workplace stress, psychological issues, and destructive behaviors for employees and their families.

Leadership within organizations is cited as being responsible for helping to create unhealthy employees through lack of leadership skill sets. Law enforcement is not immune from this. Leymann’s (1997) research affirmed that these unhealthy employees would not engage in violence if the organization functioned as a healthy platform.

Employee perceptions of fairness have been identified as extremely important markers to determine how employees view their fit in workplace culture. Issues where perceived fairness is important include employment security, opportunities for movement and promotions, trust, respect, dignity, and a sense of control over their jobs (Leymann, 1989, 1997).

Focusing upon the true meaning of self-esteem, Reasoner (2002) defines the premise around developing self-esteem as a building or people-making enterprise.
He asserts that there is no doubt that leaders, educators, parents, and business and government officials play significant roles and

... must develop individuals with healthy or high self-esteem, characterized by tolerance and respect for others, individuals who accept responsibility for their actions, have integrity, take pride in their accomplishments, who are self-motivated, willing to take risks, capable of handling criticism, loving and lovable, seek challenge and stimulation of worthwhile and demanding goals, and take command and control of their lives. (p. 1)

Healthy and authentic self-esteem is noted to lead to individuals who develop trust in their own being; to be life-affirming; and to be constructive, responsible, and trustworthy. Reasoner (2002) notes that self-esteem is more than an individual perception of feeling good or having positive feelings about oneself:

Individuals with defensive or low self-esteem typically focus on trying to prove themselves or impress others. They tend to use others for their own gain. Some act with arrogance and contempt toward others. They generally lack confidence in themselves, often have doubts about their worth and acceptability, and hence are reluctant to take risks or expose themselves to failure. (p. 2)

They frequently blame others for their shortcomings rather than take responsibility for their actions.

Reasoner (2002) points out that a close relationship has been documented between low self-esteem and such problems as violence, alcoholism, drug abuse, depression, eating disorders, negative stress, suicide, and low achievement. He explains that the concept of self-esteem is strongly grounded in practice by being “connected to a sense of competence and worthiness and the relationship between the two as one lives life” (p. 3). A strong sense of worthiness prevents competence from becoming arrogance by keeping the individual focused on basic values, and competence prevents worthiness from becoming narcissism by requiring that good feelings be earned, not given. Thus, behaviors that might be described as egotistic, egocentric, conceited, boasting or bragging, bullying, taking advantage of, or harming others are defensive behaviors indicative of a lack of self-esteem and “should not be confused with authentic, healthy self-esteem” (p. 3). Reasoner writes that “most feel that a sense of competence is strengthened through realistic and accurate self-appraisal, meaningful accomplishments, overcoming adversities, bouncing back from failures, and adopting practices such as assuming self-responsibility and maintaining integrity, which engender one’s sense of competence and self-worth” (p. 3).

The Mental Health Perspective

The U.S. Center for Mental Health Services confirms that people get so much of their identity from the workplace that they feel disrespected if they perceive they are being mistreated at their jobs. Researchers have found that employees physical and psychological functions become negatively affected by an unhealthy workplace environment, reducing self-esteem and self-confidence and creating
stress that results in disabling injuries to employees and their families (NIOSH, 2002).

Those negative feelings of unhealthy conflict certainly are regarded as precursors to angry and disruptive behavior. The Massachusetts Department of Mental Health found that disgruntled employees get much of the blame for negative workplace stress, outcomes attributed to ineffective leadership. Changing this potentially destructive problem requires education, a paradigm shift, and change for the entire leadership workplace culture within law enforcement (Workplace Violence, 2001).

Lifton (1986) also discussed the oppressive and the abusive-bullying-rich environment under dysfunctional leadership. Lifton promotes education as the means for teaching people to critically think about the intentions of a leader. On the same theme, Dunham (1947) said that in order for the Nazis to seize power, they had to curtail freedom for everyone else. That process led to the persecution and death of millions of people. The abuses negated other rights as well, including the right of free speech. Dunham noted, “whenever there exists a group of people bent upon oppression, it will, unless checked, consume and annihilate all other groups” (p. 141).

Studies

In one pioneer study, The National Health System of Britain (as cited in Hoel & Cooper, 2002) used a survey to ask questions regarding employees’ perceptions of negative stress in the workplace. This study focused upon associations between leadership and the health outcomes of blue collar and professional workers, including mental health workers. The study included a 20-item inventory of bullying behaviors that was designed for the study, the Job Induced Stress Scale, the Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale, the Overall Job Satisfaction Scale, the Support at Work Scale, and the Propensity to Leave Scale.

The results from the survey indicated that 38% of employees reported experiencing one or more types of abusive and negative behavior in the previous year. Of those, 42% stated that they personally had witnessed abusive and negative behavior directed toward others, and when it occurred, it was most likely from a manager or the leader. Two-thirds of employees tried to take action, but most reported dissatisfying results. The staff that was bullied reported lower levels of job satisfaction and higher levels of job-induced stress, depression, and intention to leave the job. These participants were more likely to be clinically anxious and depressed, and they were more likely to leave their jobs. Researchers identified three explanations for these considerations: (1) bullying leads to psychological ill health and reduced job satisfaction; (2) certain employees are more likely to report being bullied than others; and (3) depression, stress, and anxiety may have some effect upon the individual’s status as a victim if others perceive they are weak (Hoel & Cooper, 2000).

Potter-Efron (1998) noted that anger and negative behavior is an outcome of poor leadership in the workplace, and unless the source of the problem is identified and controlled by individuals in their environment, they will find an unhealthy outlet, such as destructive behavior, as a means for making an adjustment to their perceived conflict. Neuman and Baron (1998) found that employees’ perceptions of
having been subjected to negative stress made them feel like they had few choices except to accept or return the same behavior to others. Keashly, Trott, and MacLean (1994) made the argument that negative workplace behavior is an unhealthy form of learned behavior, and the cycle will continue unless some positive intervention takes place.

Wyatt and Hare (1997) noted that organizations often recruit, hire, and train the best and the brightest for their jobs, and yet they find that bullying and abuse occurs among these high-level employees, who are competent and dedicated workers, respected by their community and peers. Their research on the U.S. Postal Service is notable in this regard. Wyatt and Hare pointed out that top leadership in the U.S. Postal Service has denied the existence of behavior identified as a systematic scheme of humiliation and contempt against mail carriers by first-line supervisors and their managers. They cited the example of a U.S. Postal Inspector (federal postal police investigator), assigned to investigate complaints relating to bullying and abusive workplace environments at postal facilities, who was found to have committed suicide. In a note, the Postal Inspector stated that he could no longer endure the pain from this type of abusive workplace behavior.

Leymann (1989) conducted a major review of literature related to victimology and concluded that a consequential process of traumatizing events resulted from being exposed to negative behavior. He concluded that many of the victims of this behavior experienced Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) symptoms and stress levels that were threatening to the individual’s socioeconomic existence. When the situation continued, the victims were removed from their social networks or forced into early retirement, often resulting in some permanent psychological damage.

These frustrated employees find themselves alone and unsure of what has led to their feelings of isolation. Jackal (1988) and Kramer and Neal (1998) described the process by which employees can begin to feel the pain of isolation and begin to develop schemes to get back at those they perceive responsible for their pain and frustration. Namie and Namie (2001) found a similar process. Frustrated employees engage in destructive behavior that is seen as an attack against the employer or boss within the workplace, and the workplace becomes the arena for a sparring match. Leadership fights back with more rules, policies, and exercise of power designed to eliminate any perceived threats against their authority base in an attempt to thwart change and maintain the status quo. The problem just escalates.

Evidence suggests that negative workplace behavior can be profoundly negative for the victims, but also very damaging and costly to the organization in which it occurs. Neuman (2001) suggests that organizations that experience workplace behavioral problems incur a number of losses.

Catalin (2001) describes how poor leadership in federal law enforcement fits into the same descriptive models as noted by other researchers. These same organizational issues create internal problems due to employees using more sick leave, intentionally being less productive, challenging the status quo through union activities, resigning their jobs, and sabotage. This behavior results in a large economic and human capital loss to the organization.
Performance and Productivity

In a similar vein, Analoui (1995) noted in a study regarding workplace sabotage that 65% of all acts of sabotage, including attrition and corporate espionage, stemmed from discontent with management and a perception that it engages in unfair behavior toward workers.

Bolman and Deal (1997) argued that a dysfunctional organization, regardless of its mission and competent employee talent, will not survive and will eventually become ineffective. We apply the issues outlined by Bolman and Deal and employee attrition to the example of the U.S. Secret Service as noted by Ragavan et al. (2002). Those internal organizational pressures were alleged to plague the agency and its personnel to an embarrassing level.

Most of the public has a perception that most law enforcement agencies are elite, premier investigative organizations that represent the best and brightest unbiased officers. By legislative intent, design, and statutory authority, these law enforcement agencies are permitted and encouraged to be the U.S.’s domestic front-line defense to challenge the status quo of any group(s) of individuals involved in sensitive matters involving wrong doing, criminal activities, or threats to the national security of the country and its citizens.

Expanding somewhat on what Benner (personal communication, January 15, 2002) discusses, White (2001) expresses a similar point of view as it relates to an organizational context of workplace issues. White describes a workplace that becomes poisoned by leaders using bullying tactics and how that process continuously evolves into more destructive behavior imitated by others within the organization.

Recognizing the emotional investment and commitment issues of law enforcement personnel is important. Police consultants Gilmartin and Harris (1996), former law enforcement officers, have undertaken this area of research. They focus much of their research and training information on the effects of dysfunctional cultures on the many actors within the law enforcement organization. They outline the damage caused to a law enforcement organization afflicted with what they describe as malcontent cops. Considering the previously noted research cited in this study, this oversight into the cause of certain behavioral issues and outcomes could significantly impact the organization. Other studies cited in this project have reported placing the majority of the blame for dysfunctional police organizations on the individual employee(s), blaming or singling them out as causing problems in organizations.

Consider the value of the research presented by Duffy et al. (2002) in comparison to the research of Gilmartin and Harris (2002). Gilmartin and Harris report that “it seems clear that an individual would not feel committed to an organization in the presence of intentional personal and professional hindrances, since these actions are perceived as direct reflections of an organization’s values” (p. 14). Moreover, employees are more likely to have a positive evaluation of an organization when they perceive that their needs are being met rather than threatened (Cropanzano, Howes, Grandey, & Toth, 1997).
Professional Entitlements and Stress

Much like Deming (1982), researchers Gilmartin and Harris (2002) recognized that effective team-building and coping skills are collaborative matters that require law enforcement leaders and employee commitment in order to produce an effective and healthy workplace. In their research, both present challenges to law enforcement leadership by considering the “creation and maintenance of a values-based agency consisting of an ethical cadre of officers and supervisors that represent the values of society” (p. 1). This concept has not been approached by law enforcement until recently, and proactive values maintenance is identified as the focus. Gilmartin and Harris point to their theory that values deterioration is linked with a culture of occupational entitlements:

Being exposed on a regular basis to “special authority” and at the same time being exposed on a daily basis to that element of society that operates without values combines to severely challenge an officer’s core values system. Unchecked authority operating in an ethical vacuum is a central theme of all police corruption. (p. 3)

In other words, this belief allows law enforcement officers to rationalize their behavior and justify to themselves that they can engage in otherwise unacceptable behavior that would result in some enforcement action if undertaken by the community at large. These types of employee considerations undermine the integrity of the profession as noted by Culbert and McDonough (1980). The entitlement mentality permits unrealistic privileges which generally begin as benign issues and move into much deeper entitlements as a culture and career progresses. Moreover, certain ranks and titles present more considerations and entitlements—the adage that rank has its privileges would present an argument for entitlement. Whether an entitlement offers law enforcement personnel a personal courtesy or a culture of unacceptable behavior, like with any authority-based system, the potential for abuse exists.

Expanding a bit on what Gilmartin and Harris (2002) reported, Turvey (1995) completed research on the organizational culture in law enforcement and found in particular that police are most often trained to solve problems and control behaviors, and when they lose the ability to function or to fix problems, they have difficulty overcoming that obstacle. Turvey made the following observation:

The job, in all its parts, makes cynics of idealists, and that in itself is incredibly stressful. So, over time, police culture can create an individual trained in the use of deadly force to maintain control, carrying a gun, who is stressed and cynical. (p. 4)

This explains the argument that the reason law enforcement personnel at times engage in self-destructive behaviors is that they do not know how to tackle particularly difficult personal challenges. Turvey’s (1995) research presents for consideration symptoms such as depression, personal problems, and substance abuse that should signal concerns. One such concern is that of police suicide. Turvey notes that hopelessness is one of the most prevalent contributors to the suicidal mindset. Losing self-esteem and the sense of control over personal behavior, feelings, or circumstances leads to an insurmountable mindset: “The
idealistic Academy graduate turns into a depressed cop” (p. 4). Turvey presents the results of his study relating to suicide among law enforcement officers, stating that more than twice as many police officers committed suicide than were killed in the line of duty, and this suicide rate is double that of the general population.

The U.S. Public Health Service established criteria for the physical and mental health of federal employees through the Department of Health and Human Services. The Office of the Surgeon General’s (2000) report on mental health declared that the mind and body are inseparable, placing both mental and physical health considerations on a continuum. Mental health issues include the ability of any person, regardless of their ethnicity, race, gender, sexual preference, and other nonmerit factors to function effectively free from harassment within their workplace environment. Any extended exposure to abusive environments produces real and disabling health conditions. The U.S. Surgeon General promotes a foundation for successful contributions to the workplace, family, community, and society. This strategy is accomplished by promoting overall proactive mental health programs.

**Workplace Protections**

The Occupational Safety and Health Administration Act (The Act) became Public Law 91-596, 91st Congress, S. 2193, on December 29, 1970. The Act encourages employers and employees in their efforts to reduce occupational safety and health hazards in the workplace and to institute new programs and legislation for providing safe and healthful working conditions. The Act requires OSHA to explore ways to discover new latent diseases, to establish causal connections between diseases and workplace environment conditions, and to conduct research, including psychological factors relating to health problems, in recognition of the fact that occupational health standards present problems and emerging themes often different from those involved in occupational safety and health concerns (OSHA, 2002).

Under The Act, workers have the right to complain to OSHA and seek an inspection of their workplace for violations of The Act. The Act prohibits employers from discriminating against any employee who exercises his or her rights and complains about their workplace environment. Discrimination includes firing, demotion, transfer, layoff, losing opportunity for compensation or promotion, exclusion from normal overtime work, assignment to an undesirable shift, denial of benefits such as sick leave or vacation time, blacklisting with other employers, taking away company housing, damaging credit at banks or credit unions, and reducing pay or hours (OSHA, 2002).

**The Fear Factor**

Few law enforcement officers are in the position to fully realize the macro and micro conditions that outline the cultural landscape found in their jobs. Fewer are willing to speak out publicly in opposition of their agency leadership for fear of career suicide and retaliation. Take for example the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s strict standards for employment; it too has a considerable amount of internal conflict and allegations of unethical conduct as it relates to leadership (see Kessler, 2002).
The Office of Special Counsel (OSC) (2002) is an independent federal investigative and prosecuting agency that obtains its authority in regard to employment issues from the Civil Service Reform Act and the Whistleblower Protection Act. Under the provisions of Title 5 USC 2302(c), the law mandates federal agency officials with personnel authority as the responsible unit for informing federal employees of their rights and remedies under Prohibited Personnel Practices, Chapters 12 and 23 of Title 5. Title 5 USC 2302(b) prohibits 12 personnel practices, including reprisal against whistle-blowers. Those 12 illegal and prohibited personnel practices include behaviors such as racial and sexual discrimination, some forms of coercion, and various behaviors that would constitute harassment or bullying. Again, the law does not specifically refer to the phenomenon of workplace bullying, but many of the prohibited behaviors would fit within the scope of the bullying definition.

The 12 illegal and prohibited personnel practices are as follow:

1. Discrimination against an employee or applicant based upon race, color, religion, gender, national origin, age, handicapping condition, marital status, or political affiliation
2. Soliciting or considering employment recommendations based upon factors other than personal knowledge or records of job-related abilities or characteristics
3. Coercing the political activity of any person
4. Deceiving or willfully obstructing anyone from competing for employment
5. Influencing anyone to withdraw from competition for any position so as to improve or injure the employment prospects of any other person
6. Giving an unauthorized preference or advantage to anyone so as to improve or injure the employment prospects of any particular employee or applicant
7. Engaging in nepotism
8. Engaging in reprisal for whistle-blowing
9. Taking, failing to take, or threatening to take a personnel action against an employee or applicant for exercising an appeal, complaint, or grievance right
10. Discriminating based on personal conduct that is not adverse to the on-the-job performance of an employee, applicant, or others
11. Taking or failing to take, recommend, or approve a personnel action if taking or failing to take such action would violate a veteran’s preference
12. Taking or failing to take a personnel action, if taking or failing to take action would violate any law, rule, or regulation implementing or directly concerning merit system principles noted in Title 5 USC 2301

Testifying at the request of Chairwoman Maxine Waters at a Congressional Black Caucus meeting hearing on “Employment Discrimination in Federal Law Enforcement,” Deputy U.S. Marshal Fogg related that abuse, harassment, discrimination, and bullying occur within the U.S. Marshals Service workplace. This hearing caused interest in Congress and resulted in the introduction of federal legislation by Congressman James Sensenbrenner as the Notification and Federal Employee Anti-Discrimination and Retaliation Act of 2001 (No FEAR Act, H.R. 169) in the House of Representatives to encourage federal employees to speak out on issues and problems within all federal agencies (Warren, 2001). The No FEAR Act of 2002 is being amended in the No FEAR Act of 2009, H.R. 67, to strengthen those features of the 2002 passage of the act due to continued abuse by government agencies.
On January 29, 2001, Senator John Warner introduced the Federal Employee Protection Act of 2001 (S. 201) in the Senate. Both bills require federal agencies and their leadership to be held accountable for violating antidiscrimination and whistle-blower protection laws. The legislation mandates that federal agencies be accountable for harassing employees who challenge their policies and for failing to recruit, reward, and retain the “most qualified person” for federal positions. The bill prohibits bad managers from being rewarded with promotions and accountability for agency decisions; that requirement does not exist today (H.R. 169) (Warren, 2001) (see also the Federal Employee Protection of Disclosures Act of 2007).

The Feds Are Not Model Organizations

Federal Law Enforcement Officers Association (FLEOA) Attorney Lawrence Berger (personal communication, September 3, 2002) cited the many complaints received by the EEOC and stated that many of the issues outlined in those complaints are not under the jurisdiction of the EEOC. An interesting point made by Berger was that it is not the original complaint that becomes the problem but, rather, the retaliation and reprisals that occur after employees file complaints against their agency leadership. These reprisals are often subtle and hard to prove and include exclusion from agency opportunities, transfers, job assignments, lower performance ratings, assignment of cars, and training opportunities as examples. The agency managers can promote retaliation by finding ways of using agency policies and rules to make life miserable for employees.

According to Berger (personal communication, September 3, 2002), federal law enforcement officials are functioning in a biased environment and assign blame to their employees without understanding the value of human capital: “You can’t simply send an employee to a weeklong school and expect them to become an effective leader within the organization.” It must be a commitment and an investment in the long-term outcome of becoming a true leader.

Berger (personal communication, September 3, 2002) presented the overview that, in his experience and observations, federal agents identify with their occupations. In other words, the men and women who are employed in federal law enforcement jobs are educated and professional with a deep sense of commitment to their jobs. They often find themselves identifying with their occupations, and it could be described as a unique membership law enforcement culture.

The problem of bullying within federal law enforcement is a management and agency leadership problem that Berger (personal communication, September 3, 2002) described as a crisis situation. He stated that bullying federal law enforcement employees in particular is part of an ethos described as a “divide and concur mentality in management of human capital.” He said he does not understand why management treats and exposes their human capital to such negative, abusive, and counterproductive behavior. Since agency managers use an approach that attacks the individual instead of the problem, “these agents are subjected to this type of management and they lose their dignity.” That results in extraordinary demands placed on employees who tend to view themselves as victims in the workplace. The victimized employee finds him- or herself targeted by managers and feels separated, isolated, and excluded from opportunities within the agency. This type
of behavior leaves the employee feeling fearful and intimidated. He thinks this style may be attributed to applying law enforcement (police) techniques to human resource and personnel issues.

Through Berger’s (personal communication, September 3, 2002) observations and experiences representing the agents in various administrative and legal issues regarding their employment status, he has found that federal agencies promote people into their leadership positions who have no experience in how to effectively manage people or organizations. These promoted leaders seldom have behavioral science or any academic or practical background or experience in the use of positive role modeling and mentoring skills: “These managers utilize their police training and investigative techniques [in] dealing with criminals and apply those same bullying interpersonal skills to the agents within their own agencies.” They simply treat agents like criminals by using threats, intimidation, and bullying and manage human capital by fear to achieve their goals. Employees become their agency’s targets, and within the agency, the bullies are located in top positions and range all the way down to the first-line supervisory agent level: “You can’t treat people [employees] as if you are a cop; you need real people skills” asserts Berger.

Berger (personal communication, September 3, 2002) noted that agency leadership and its managers have a built-in advantage, which leaves the culture one of unresolved conflicts. Due to of these challenges, employees are not embraced in an organizational culture of communality but, rather, one based upon legality. The process of challenging punitive actions against employees is designed to be ineffective, and resolutions are not in favor of the injured party. Berger asserts that grievances, objective oversight, and EEOC reviews are a waste of time. None of the Merit Service Protection Board (MSPB) reviews and actions are effective, and over 85% of actions against employees are affirmed by review of various government agencies. Berger has found that leadership within many federal agencies is not really accountable to anybody within the government. These advantages place the employer in the position of power within the organizational context of the workplace.

Berger (personal communication, September 3, 2002) stated that any reference to workplace conflict arising from management’s point of view is an overly legalistic and formal culture with no real remedies. Instead, it is an illusionary impression provided to the public and employees. He noted that employees could become less productive or leave the agency, and the process outcomes of this are very expensive. He perceived much of the problem as related to a situational values system problem that is reinforced by the organizational culture within the agency. This type of learned behavior tends to breed others to act out and promotes the bullying behavior already layered within the organization. He noted that many examples of negative physical and mental health have been attributed to federal officers being exposed to intentional acts of abuse undertaken by agency managers.

According to Berger (personal communication, September 3, 2002), “officers are being deceived by believing the agency is a community but . . . that perception is nothing other than fiction.” He cited the controversy surrounding the new Transportation Security Agency (TSA), which oversees the security at airports and
the federal air marshals. Berger stated that TSA is falling apart due to the treatment of employees by its agency leadership. He noted that managers are being taught to use intimidation and fear to manage their workforce, and those employees are rejecting that management style.

Berger (personal communication, September 3, 2002) offered suggestions for a paradigm shift in federal law enforcement leadership by educating employees to become authentic and effective leaders by focusing on education in the psychological and behavioral sciences to promote a positive and empowering culture respectful of human capital. Utilizing ombudsman programs; liaison; and upward, downward, and lateral communications among all members in a supportive workplace would be an initial strategy toward replacing the old style of management with a modern, productive, and effective organization.

**Leadership, Coronary Heart Disease, and Liability**

Numerous civil class action lawsuits have been filed in recent years by hundreds of federal agents against agency leadership and individual managers for harassment, discrimination, and exclusionary and bullying type tactics designed to keep employees from career enhancement opportunities (Berger, personal communications, September 3, 2002).

The visionary law enforcement leader is assumed to be constantly vigilant and seeks out creative solutions to redesign negative behavior and stress, which is perceived to be a growing problem. One such consideration is the potential for litigation associated with poor leadership skills and negative health outcomes. Education offers a pathway for law enforcement leaders to avoid many of these pitfalls associated with leadership and negative stress.

One modern example is Florida’s attempt to recognize the impact of the debilitating effects of negative stress. Florida’s focus is on a quasi-prevention framework and on legislation enacted to provide compensation for first-line responders who are suffering from stress-related illnesses partially or completely induced by job-related stress.

Florida is joined by several states that each have enacted the so-called “Heart-Lung” laws that address these employment issues related to negative stress. Florida’s statute specifically provides this protection for “any Florida state, municipal, county, port authority, special tax district, or fire control district firefighter or any law enforcement officer or correctional officer” (Florida Statute [Florida Heart-Lung Act] §112.18). Federal law does not provide a similar protection.

It is clear the stress endured by persons in these occupations may constitute stress in the extreme. This inherent stress, coupled by any additional stress caused by negative leadership practices or workplace situations can easily add up to serious, life-threatening physical and emotional disease processes.

Tacitly recognizing the insidious and cumulative effect of negative stress, the Florida legislature created a statute that took the burden of proof off the state officer and placed it squarely on any entity wishing to challenge the origin of the
disease. Most generally this is the public agency that was unable or refused to recognize the potential danger.

Any of the officers who suffered under the “Heart-Lung” statute were protected by this legislative presumption that the harm suffered, whether in the form of a chronic and debilitating cardiovascular disease or other like-kind chronic disease or condition, occurred as a direct or indirect result of employment status rendered to the state government in a highly stressful, highly dangerous environment.

It is noteworthy to point out that the language ultimately chosen for the statute indicated that the illness was to be presumed to have been directly or indirectly “accidently” caused by the stress of the job unless “the contrary be shown by competent evidence” (Florida Statute §112.18[1]). The rationale behind this statutory language is that it is beyond dispute that the negative stresses inherent in these jobs can create cardiovascular and pulmonary disease, but it is clearly difficult to define the particular disease path in any particular officer. Although not stated explicitly, much of the committee’s commentary made case that the negative stress of these jobs, from within and without, played a critical primary role in the resulting medical problem. In any extrinsically highly stressful job, stress plays a strong role, but coupled with soul-crushing negative stress induced because of poor or negative leadership practices, the effect is overwhelming. It is not a shock that one in a highly negatively stressful environment ultimately succumbs, physically or psychologically, to the devastating effects of the stress therein as found in many law enforcement cultures.

Entitlement under the statute requires that the qualifying plaintiff “shall have successfully passed a physical examination upon entering into any such service as a firefighter or law enforcement officer, which failed to reveal any such condition” (F.S. 112.18[1]). This requirement’s purpose is to establish a baseline level of competent, unhindered health and general fitness for duty prior to employment and helps define the arc of the resulting negative stress on the other end of the process.

The history of the physical examination requirement prior to employment in these fields is not as straightforward as one may believe. Physical examination of potential law enforcement officers and firefighters began at the federal level and filtered down through the state and local levels with less than due haste. Today, it is virtually universal (although not completely universal) in all city, county, state, and federal branches.

In the Florida Statute, the health issues addressed specifically and only “tuberculosis, heart disease, or hypertension” as the causal agents for covered medical disabilities. With the issue of stress, heart disease and hypertension immediately stand out. The correlation between negative stress and heart disease and hypertension in particular is extremely high. Once debated mildly by the medical community, by the early 1960s and late 1970s the link was demonstrated as irrefutably present, though not always obvious. The complicating variable in these considerations was the conceded point that heart disease and hypertension could be caused by numerous other conditions unrelated to stress. Here is where the legal challenges began.
The *Florida Statute* was signed into law by Governor Crist on June 8, 2007. Interestingly, in the same legislative year, there were numerous other legislative proposals and/or changes addressed by lawmakers with profound impacts directly related to the new law. Florida’s Worker’s Compensation Laws have been in a state of flux ever since, with Courts openly debating the issue of the proper place for jurisdiction of these cases and, specifically, requirements of proof and statutory presumptions.

Included in this, and perhaps most germane to our topic, was the change lowering the required standard of proof in occupational diseases or conditions from “clear and convincing evidence” to “a preponderance of the evidence.” The “clear and convincing evidence” standard is a relatively high hurdle, especially in any administrative law scenario. The burden is placed firmly on the plaintiff and, in practice, this often becomes a very difficult standard to reach. Whenever a state legislature, or court of competent jurisdiction for that matter, wishes to slow the onslaught of potential cases, the “clear and convincing” standard becomes the norm.

Following the preponderance of the evidence test, the most usual standard in civil litigation amounts to essentially a “more likely than not” standard, which is much more accessible to plaintiffs, especially in scenarios in which the sympathies of the jury or the bench are critical.

One of these additional legislative changes that was a great concern to city, county, and state officials was the legislative decision to have a continuation of permanent complete supplemental disability benefits past the age of 62 if the plaintiff’s employer did not participate in the social security program. This was, of course, entirely foreseeable and inherently logical, but the scope of the liability becomes very much larger indeed.

The Florida Heart-Lung Act (2008) was essentially a continuation of a trend to provide protections to any “first-responders” suffering an anticipated potential harm as a result of services rendered. The history of the first statute along these lines provided protections for first responders who had inadvertently contracted Hepatitis C. Due to the long incubation period and difficulty in establishing the precise place and time of the infection, the legislature saw fit to begin having in place a working presumption. Naturally, this presumption made the logical concession that there was a high degree of probability that the disease/infection (initial contact) occurred in the line of duty. Though not conclusive, it was a reasonable deduction to even the mildly informed layman.

The Florida Legislature was able to do the same in forwardly thinking that significant amounts of negative stress have an equally high probability of resulting in a debilitating health (heart-lung) condition. The analogies are that unremitting high levels of negative stress will invariably lead to a compromised or diseased state in even the healthiest of persons. To the legislature’s credit, it had the foresight to see also that this compromised health condition was not limited to those instances in which a clearly physical element existed. Negative internal and extrinsic stress levels join forces to profoundly negatively impact these officers.
The Florida Legislature redacted the ancient legal argument that insisted that mental injuries can only be recognized by the law in those instances in which there is a foundational physical injury. Today, we take for granted that it is quite possible to suffer a tremendous emotional-mental or nervous injury without an accompanying physical injury, but for centuries prior, Courts in the United States and Europe rejected this theory.

More controversial was the notion that mental injury led in a predictable arc to a physical, indeed potentially deadly, injury or compromised health. According to Mantell (1994), leaders should be aware of the potential for a negative workplace environment, leading to negative feelings and the possibility of stressed-out employees walking around like ticking time bombs. Along the same lines, and substantiated by Vartia’s (1996) research, the legislature early on realized that, just as in the case where a physical injury may be immediate, permanent, and totally debilitating, in the most extreme circumstances a mental or nervous injury can be capable of the same devastation.

At issue here was whether to consider eliminating a six-month waiting period before allowing a determination of permanent (mental) injury in conjunction with providing the same waiting period with the physical injury. The Florida Legislature, in a forward-thinking move, approved a mental injury or defined psychological condition as well.

**Daniel H. Raess v. Joseph E. Doescher**

The essential facts of this case consist of a plaintiff sought compensatory and punitive damages for assault, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and tortuous interference with employment. Both parties to this litigation are physicians.

The plaintiff’s argument was couched in the term of “workplace bullying” by the plaintiff’s expert witness, an organizational psychologist. Evidence before the court concerned an alleged verbal altercation between the parties in the workplace.

The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff on his assault claim and awarded compensatory damages in the amount of $325,000. The basis of the compensatory damages was the plaintiff’s inability to continue to work in that environment.

As stated, although expert witness testimony described the behavior of the defendant as “workplace bullying,” the court correlated this directly to the ancient right of all to be “free of an assault of another.”

In Indiana, to establish a valid action for assault, a plaintiff must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence (as evidenced by a majority vote of the jury), that a defendant clearly acted in such a manner that would cause a reasonable fear of imminent harm at the time with the ability to inflict such harm. The trial court found testimony credible, along with other evidence, and concluded an assault had taken place. No actual physical contact need occur so long as one was reasonably afraid that such contact would occur. This manner of assault is, indeed, perfectly analogous to what may be referred to in the vernacular as “Workplace Bullying.”
As the court states in its opinion, “Appellant’s brief at 515 sets forth that ‘Assault is created and inflicted when one acts intending to cause an imminent apprehension of a harmful or offensive contact with another person’” (Cullison v. Medley, 570 N.E.2d 27, 30 [Ind. 1991]). As we have explained, “Any act of such a nature as to excite an apprehension of a battery may constitute an assault. It is an assault to shake a fist under another’s nose” (Id., quoting W. Prosser & J. Keaton, Prosser and Keaton on Torts § 10 [5th edition]).

**Conclusion**

The exposure to chronic negative stress does change the physical and psychological functions of the human body and is linked to suicide. Many scholars attribute authentic leadership skills as crucial to developing a healthy and productive workplace. We find no evidence to suggest that the law enforcement workplace is different. The scientific community has provided ample medical data that conclusively links together the human disease process attributed to being exposed to abusive, bullying, and stressful environments.

As a result of our scientific research, we found that these cultural and organizational environments were manmade enterprises. Therefore, reframing people and cultures away from abusive, bullying, and stressful relationships does result in considerable improvement in the psychological and physical health of employees and increases productivity at lower costs.

It is suggested that law enforcement leaders have the responsibility for leading an organization and its employees in a positive and authentic vein. Police administrators who choose to not lead effectively can face a series of problematic employee health issues and a dysfunctional infrastructure, resulting from poor choices that can potentially ruin the organization and its membership.

Much like Senge’s (1995) the suggestions to create an engaged culture of learning within organizations, the visionary law enforcement leader who is constantly vigilant and seeks out creative solutions to redesign leadership skill sets among personnel can prevent behavior that contributes to negative stress and, thus, can avoid many of the outcomes of stress-induced workplace cultures.

**References**


Federal Employee Protection Act of 2001 (S.201).


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Officer Needs Assistance: Police Officers’ Attitudes and Mental Health After Critical Incident Involvement

Andrew M. Peters, Sergeant, LaGrange Police Department

Introduction

The public sector employs many critical personnel to provide citizens with an expected quality of life. One such critical group of personnel is made up of the thousands of law enforcement professionals who work for the municipal, county, state, and federal police forces across the nation. This class of public employee is expected to provide service, oftentimes under the most extreme and dangerous conditions, and to complete the jobs that others have difficulty even thinking about. A bus full of college athletes falling off a highway ramp, a disgruntled employee returning to his place of employment and fatally shooting his boss and coworkers, a suspect being shot after shooting at police, a hurricane destroying a city, and terrorists crashing commercial planes into the World Trade Center are all examples of events reported locally and nationally that required a police response.

Police officers can encounter an overabundance of stressful events during their tour of duty. They have sworn an oath to protect and serve the citizens of the community, county, state, or country that has hired them. They are asked to perform these duties under extreme conditions and to handle critical incidents that many could not fathom. Through training, experience, and teamwork, police can often handle critical incidents, control the events, and complete their sworn duties. It is coping with the event during the weeks, months, and sometimes years after the critical incident that can be the most troublesome. Police officers, firefighters, soldiers, emergency service personnel, nurses, and doctors are all professionals who regularly encounter traumatic events, stressors, or critical incidents that may lead to the inability to cope with the mental and physical demands of their careers and daily lives. It is important as administrators, leaders, supervisors, coworkers, and friends that we recognize when fellow police officers are having a difficult time dealing with their involvement in a critical incident and when they may be exhibiting clear signs of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD).

Equally important is the development of a thoughtful and effective policy that mandates screening and treatment for police officers involved in critical incidents. PTSD is a debilitating disorder that negatively influences the overall health, effectiveness of work, and sociability of those diagnosed. The impact of such a policy would affect more than the life and wellness of the employee. Others who would benefit include family members, coworkers, supervisors, village administrators, and the community in which the officer serves. Many cities, villages, or towns offer psychiatric services to police officers through their Employee Assistance Programs (EAPs) after critical incident involvement. Participation is often determined by the officer involved or mandated only after dysfunctional behaviors are too obvious to ignore. This allows for the refusal of needed treatment due to peer pressure or due to negatively pervasive attitudes within the law enforcement community and the
community at large in regards to psychiatric treatment. By making the mandate for treatment a matter of policy, the issues related to negative stigma or relative weakness of those receiving treatment can be reduced or removed.

The political, ethical, and economic aspects of creating a policy that mandates psychiatric evaluation and treatment after police officers are involved in a critical incident are also of great importance. In each arena, the positives for such a policy are obvious. They include, but are not limited to, support for employee health, assurance of quality service and service providers, concern for employee and community well-being, and retention of highly trained employees. There are also negative effects, which include limitation of discretion, compliance without true participation, and an increase in expenditure for psychiatric care. As previously mentioned, other public employee work groups are also part of this high-risk category and could benefit from similar policy implementation; however, this research will involve police officers only, examining issues involved within this work group.

Literature Review

The mental disorder known today as Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) has been an identifiable human mental condition for centuries. It is most closely associated with combat veterans and has been referred to as railway spine, soldier’s heart, shell shock, combat fatigue, effort syndrome, and operational exhaustion over the years. The American Psychiatric Association (APA) (1994) in its Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV) established the current diagnosis of PTSD in response to returning veterans of the Vietnam War and the overwhelming symptoms they exhibited (National Center of PTSD, 2007). Studies show that there is a lifetime prevalence of PTSD in the United States of 8 to 9%, and approximately 25 to 30% of victims of significant trauma develop PTSD (Grinage, 2003).

PTSD is the only disorder listed in the DSM-IV in which the incidence of a traumatic event or stressor is part of its diagnosis (Schiraldi, 2000). Traumatic events in the DSM-IV are broken down into three categories: (1) Intentional Human (e.g., combat, abuse, torture, criminal assault, terrorism, witnessing violent crime), (2) Unintentional Human (e.g., accidents with mass casualties or involving children, fires, explosions, mass transit accidents), and (3) Acts of Nature (e.g., hurricane, tornado, earthquake, animal attacks, other severe weather) (APA, 1994). The other criteria for diagnosis of PTSD include persistent re-experience of the event, persistent avoidance of stimuli related to the trauma, persistent increased arousal not present before the event, previously listed symptoms lasting longer than one month, and disturbances causing distress or impairment in social or occupational settings (APA, 1994). A diagnosis of acute PTSD refers to observable symptoms that persist for no more than three months and implies that the assimilation of the disturbing memories is possible. Schiraldi (2000) describes PTSD as an intense fear of the unpleasant recollections of the traumatic event through thoughts, images, or perceptions that repetitively invade one’s awareness. The repeated exposure to new traumatic incidents by police officers places them at a high risk of developing PTSD, other disorders, and dysfunctional behaviors.

There are many theories of how to best approach the diagnosis and treatment of PTSD and the related symptoms of exposure to traumatic stress. Current research suggests that Critical Incident Stress Debriefing (CISD) should be abandoned and replaced with a screening and treatment approach to PTSD prevention. CISD is a
technique used for management of psychological distress and prevention of PTSD that generally occurs one time after the critical incident and involves some emotional processing, recollection, or reworking of the event (Rose, Bisson, Churchill, & Wessely, 2005). Through the examination of various studies, it is apparent that CISD does not reduce the associated symptoms or the development of PTSD (van Emmerik, Kamphuis, Hulsbosch, & Emmelkamp, 2002; Rose et al., 2005). One report even suggested an increase in PTSD symptoms related to CISD (Rose et al., 2005). The use of CISD after exposure to traumatic incidents is best described as inefficient and ill-suited, despite some participants reporting satisfaction with the debriefings (Creamer, 2006). The emerging alternative to CISD is a self-administered screening approach, taken within a few days of the event and resulting in treatment for those exhibiting criteria for diagnosis or symptoms of PTSD (Brewin et al., 2002; Brunet et al., 2001; Rose et al., 2005; van Emmerik et al., 2002).

The effectiveness of using brief screening instruments in identifying PTSD is supported by empirical data gained through several recent studies. The studies used screening instruments (questionnaires based on DSM-IV criteria) to predict the development of PTSD in several different groups, including police officers and matched non-police comparison, and rail crash survivors and crime victims. In both studies, the instrument showed internal consistency, good test-retest reliability, good convergent and divergent validity, and excellent prediction of PTSD in all of the groups (Brewin et al., 2002; Brunet et al., 2001). Recommended treatments of PTSD from the National Center of PTSD (2007) include both psychotherapy (talk therapy) and pharmacotherapy (medication). The most important aspect of treatment discussed by several authors is that a “one size fits all” approach is too limiting, and alternatives such as cognitive behavioral therapy, psychological first aid, brief eclectic psychotherapy, and the development of pre-incident support need to be established (Creamer, 2006; Gerson, Carlier, Lamberts, & van der Kolk, 2000; National Center of PTSD, 2007; Person, 2006).

Untreated, PTSD and symptoms related to critical incident exposure can have a devastating impact on a police officer’s health, both mentally and physically. Co-morbid disorders of PTSD occur in 80.0% of PTSD patients and include depression, alcohol and drug abuse, and other anxiety disorders (Grinage, 2003). There are obvious signs of these disorders, including increased rates of cardiovascular and gastrointestinal disease, a divorce rate twice the national average, and a suicide rate three times higher than the national average, which indicates that occupational stress affects the life of police officers (Neylan et al., 2002; Ritter, 2007). Two studies investigated the theory that police officers suffer lower sleep quality due to critical incident exposure and normal work stressors, and the relationship between traumatic exposures, sleep quality, and health. The first compared the sleep quality of police officers (n = 747) to a non-police group (n = 338) while controlling for variable and stable shift work. By using the Pittsburg Sleep Quality Index (PSQI) with an optimal cutoff PSQI score of > or = 5 and the Mississippi Scale for Civilian Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (MS-CV), the study showed 64.1% of police officers working variable shifts and 63.7% of police officers on stable shifts suffered from clinical insomnia (poor sleep). Only 44.9% and 50.4% of subjects in the non-police variable shift and stable shift groups, respectively, suffered from poor sleep (Neylan et al., 2002). The statistically significant differences in the groups support the authors’ hypothesis that police officers are more frequently affected by poor sleep, which can lead to increased health risks. The study also creates a weak but statistically significant connection between critical incident exposure and general
work stressors to poor sleep quality, and it dismisses the theory that the increased stress is related to variable shift work (Neylan et al., 2002). The second of the studies looks more closely at sleep problems as a mediating factor between traumatic events and perceived health of police officers (Mohr, Vedantham, Neylan, Metzler, Best, & Marmar, 2003). This evaluation’s sample consisted of police officers ($n = 741$) who were also administered the PSQI and MS-CV, as well as the Critical Incident History Questionnaire (CIHQ), the Michigan Alcohol Screening Test (MAST) Symptom Checklist-90 (SCL-90), and the Short-Form-12 Physical Composite Score (SF-12 PCS) to assess sleep quality, exposure to critical incidents, and perceived physical health. The findings similarly suggest a significant relationship between traumatic events and poor sleep and that poor sleep leads to increased health problems as perceived by the participants (Mohr et al., 2003).

Knowing that police officers are at risk of exposure to critical incidents and that they may suffer from poor health, both mentally and physically, after these exposures, why are they not seeking help? One theory suggests that police officers, and even some portions of the general population, have built up resilience to loss and trauma (Honig & Sultan, 2004). Resilience is an adaptive condition to help persons cope with the traumatic events and organize thoughts about it naturally; those incapable of assimilating those thoughts into daily existence are more likely to develop PTSD (Schiraldi, 2000). Compounding the problem is the likelihood that resilient individuals will exhibit similar symptoms but with less severity than those needing assistance with recovery, and police officers generally tend to underreport symptoms associated with the event (Honig & Sultan, 2004). Honig and Sultan studied 982 officers after involvement in an officer-involved shooting or other life-threatening event over a nine-year period by administering a survey with seven content areas: (1) perceptual disturbances, (2) control and security, (3) cognitive and behavioral, (4) emotional, (5) legal concerns, (6) impact on the job, and (7) impact on home life. The study supports findings that police officers have high resilience after exposure to life-threatening events, but they do express a high degree of reactivity through symptoms that include increased startle response, nightmares, sleep disturbances, flashbacks, intrusive recollections, and feelings of anger and rage. Most importantly, even with observable symptoms reported, 60.0% of the officers related they would not seek psychological care if it were not for the mandated intervention.

A study on Iraq and Afghanistan combat veterans can help shed some light on why there are barriers to receiving mental health services in both military and police service. This study interviewed combat infantry units either before their deployment to Iraq ($n = 2,530$) or three to four months after their return from Iraq or Afghanistan ($n = 3,671$) with results showing major depression, generalized anxiety, and PTSD (Hoge, Castro, Messer, McGurk, Cotting, & Koffman, 2004). The results were gathered on a self-administered screening test using the pre-deployment group as the control. The responses showed combat service in Iraq resulted in meeting the criteria for PTSD in 15.6 to 17.1% of those surveyed, while combat service in Afghanistan or pre-combat service resulted in meeting the criteria 11.2 or 9.3%, respectfully. Similarly, it revealed 23 to 40% of those who met the criteria for mental disorder did not seek mental health treatment and were twice as likely as those who did not present symptoms of mental disorder to cite concerns over stigmatization in seeking mental health care. The reasons cited most often for not seeking treatment in both groups were being seen as weak, being treated differently by leadership, members of unit having less confidence in them, difficulty in getting
time off work for treatment, leaders would blame them for the problem, and harmful to career (Hoge et al., 2004). The study sheds light on the need for treatment among returning combat veterans and the need for policymakers, leaders, and clinicians to research and develop methods that effectively reduce the barriers, perceived or real, for those most in need of that treatment.

Program Description

It is well-known that police officers are often exposed to traumatic events/critical incidents, that they can suffer from debilitating mental and physical illness if symptoms are persistent and untreated, that untreated symptoms negatively influence officers personally and professionally, and that they are less likely to seek professional help despite observable symptoms warranting intervention. The intervention is a policy change that would mandate the screening of all officers involved in officer-involved shootings, other life-threatening events, and critical incidents. This new program could use existing mental health services through contracted EAP providers, given that they are using clinically accepted and proven techniques of diagnosis and treatment. Honig and Sultan (2004) also address the need for treatment as it pertains to police officers: “Mandatory interventions after a shooting or other life-threatening event, combined with realistic training to build an officer’s decision-making skills under stress and positively exploit the adaptive stress reaction, remain the most effective and efficient approach to reducing the negative impact of the event on the officer and agency.” The mandate is important not just because it will provide help to those who need it, but it will also help reduce the negative attitudes toward mental health care if all are required to participate. This at least removes one of the barriers to seeking help after critical incident involvement.

To help support the need for such a program, an evaluation of the perceived and personal attitudes of police officers toward critical incident or life-threatening event exposure, evaluation and treatment after the traumatic event, and barriers to treatment will be tested. The hypothesis held is that officers, both those exposed and those not exposed to traumatic events, are less likely to seek treatment because of perceived barriers and stigmatization related to mental health care within the law enforcement community. A more comprehensive mental health policy, one mandating screening and treatment after traumatic event/critical incident exposure, would be an effective way to manage perceived and personal attitudes and get help for those who need it.

Research Design and Methods

The evaluation being undertaken is formative in nature and will attempt to assess the current attitudes and perceived barriers within the law enforcement community toward mental health care after exposure to a traumatic event. The prevailing attitude of the general law enforcement community is of utmost importance in determining if psychiatric treatment should be mandated after involvement in a critical incident. Therefore, the research will identify how many officers have been involved in traumatic incidents that meet the criteria of the DSM-IV and if their departments already have a policy that mandates psychiatric treatment after exposure. It will also evaluate if there is a perceived stigma in a profession that is closely coupled with power, authority, masculinity, and strength, or a belief that one of its members is weaker or less capable to perform because he or she asked for help after a critical incident. Also important will be any significant differences
by demographic characteristics in this philosophy, including differences by age, law enforcement experience, ethnicity, rank, and education level.

In order to collect the data needed to evaluate the impact of the recommended policy change, 516 confidential surveys were distributed to various South and Southwest municipal and county law enforcement agencies. Participation was voluntary and required a signed waiver for inclusion in the evaluation. Of the 516 surveys, 154 were returned and 16 of those did not have the required consent form signed, resulting in 138 usable surveys (n = 138). The participants answered questions related to the previously stated research questions: exposure to a traumatic event as defined by DSM-IV, perception of attitude toward mental health care by law enforcement community, personal perception of barriers to mental health care, and general demographics.

The first set of variables includes the DSM-IV criteria to determine if the officer has been exposed to traumatic events that could be linked to the development of PTSD. This set of variables will be nominal measures of “yes” or “no” to help gauge exposure to traumatic events among the sample group. These measures are not intended to make a diagnosis of PTSD nor should they be construed as such. They are used in this evaluation to establish exposure to events that are likely to be related to PTSD and distinguish those exposed and reporting other criteria from those not reporting other criteria or not exposed. The second set of variables will be an ordinal measurement on a Likert Scale from “strongly agree” through “strongly disagree” and will attempt to define the participants’ perceptions of the law enforcement community’s feelings regarding mental health care. This set of variables will help establish perceived attitudes in the law enforcement community that influence decisions regarding seeking help after involvement in critical incidents. The third set of variables will also be evaluated as an ordinal measure but focuses on what the participants feel are likely barriers to seeking treatment to mental health care. Again, a scale of “strongly agree” through “strongly disagree” will be utilized to help determine what participants personally think are the reasons to not seek help after exposure to critical events. The final variables of the survey will be used to identify demographic information of each participant and differences in responses by groups if observed.

The major threats to validity in this study include the limited sample size and the possible underreporting of symptoms. The same barriers being studied are those that might keep officers from completing the survey and honestly reporting symptoms or feelings regarding the mental health topic—specifically, signs of weakness, fear of retribution, less confidence, stigmatizing, embarrassment, and different treatment from leadership if they participate.

To some degree, this evaluation could also be viewed as a posttest-only control group design by comparing those that have been exposed to a traumatic event and reporting other criteria (Group E) to those not exposed and those exposed but not reporting other criteria (Group C). Table 1 is a graphic representation of this research design that could provide additional insight to recorded findings.
### Findings

The study population was primarily made up of male White officers with a bachelor’s degree, between 40 and 49 years old, with 16 to 20 years of law enforcement experience, who worked in a department with less than 30 sworn officers. (See Table 2 for a more representative depiction of the demographic make-up of the sample group.) The evaluation of the critical incident/traumatic event exposure section of the survey shows that 94.9% of the sample population reported having experienced a traumatic event as defined in the *DSM-IV*. Additionally, 54.3% of participants reported re-experiencing the traumatic event through disturbing thoughts, flashbacks, and reminders that are similar to the event. Only 30.4% of those surveyed said they avoided thoughts, feelings, or activities related to the event, while 34.1% related they had difficulty falling or staying asleep, irritable outbursts, difficulty concentrating, increased alertness, or an exaggerated startle response after the event. This result is much lower then the findings of Neylan et al. (2002) and Mohr et al. (2003) who reported that 64.0% of the officers in their studies suffered from poor sleep quality. It is important to reiterate that no specific survey on sleep quality was included in this survey, which could explain the discrepancy between the two findings.

Finally, of the 138 participants, 15.9% reported the duration of any one of these experiences lasted for more than one month. Eight (5.8%) of the participants reported experiencing all five criteria, and 17 (12.3%) reported experiencing all but the duration criteria, which is much lower than the more extensive studies that show a lifetime prevalence of PTSD in the United States of 8 to 9%, and that approximately 25 to 30% of victims of significant trauma develop PTSD (Grinage, 2003). Of the respondents, 42.8% described experiencing at least three of the criteria lending further credence to the belief that impact from the critical incidents was evident. It is clear that this sample group appears to be reporting fewer signs of PTSD; this could be related to the presence or absence of a policy mandating intervention and the likelihood that police officers underreport symptoms as Honig and Sultan (2004) found.

The final question in the critical incident/traumatic event exposure section asks if a policy mandating intervention after a critical incident exists within the department. There were 127 valid responses for this variable, resulting in 41.7% of respondents indicating their department had such a policy. Of the 11 surveys missing data, most indicated they did not know or were unsure if a policy existed. Keeping in mind that Honig and Sultan (2004) reported “Mandatory interventions after a shooting or other life-threatening event, combined with realistic training to build an officer’s decision-making skills under stress and positively exploit the adaptive stress reaction, remain the most effective and efficient approach to reducing the negative impact of the event on the officer and agency,” in this study, slightly more than 40% of the respondents identified a policy mandating an intervention. This possibly refers to some type of training or proactive response from the department or village that has decreased the effects of exposure and/or utilized the adaptive stress reaction to reduce the impact as described by Honig and Sultan (2004) and Schiraldi (2000). The presence of a policy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pretest</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Posttest</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Group E</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>O</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group C</td>
<td>O</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
mandating an intervention also influences the attitudes regarding perceptions of the stigmatization and barriers to treatment as upheld by the findings of this study.

**Table 2. Demographics**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Valid</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 thru 29</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>14.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 thru 39</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>28.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40 thru 49</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>35.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50 and older</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>15.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>93.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>System</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Officer</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>62.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sergeant</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>21.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lieutenant</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Captain/Commander</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputy Chief</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chief</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>97.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>System</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<table>
<thead>
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<th>Educational Level</th>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>High School</td>
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<td>Associate’s</td>
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<tr>
<td>Some College</td>
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<td>23.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bachelor’s</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>43.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Master’s</td>
<td>12</td>
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<td>Total</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LE Experience</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 thru 5</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>18.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 thru 10</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>12.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>11 thru 15</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>17.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 thru 20</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>20.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 thru 25</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>15.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 or more</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>14.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnicity</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>94.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>99.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>System</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>100.0</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Department Size</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 thru 29</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>42.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 thru 59</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>22.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60 thru 89</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>90 and larger</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>15.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>87.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>System</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>12.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>10.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>88.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Above data includes missing cases*

The data show that officers perceive stigmatization from the law enforcement community but not as significantly as they report slow interventions for assistance and negative attitudes toward officers seeking mental health treatment. In the second section of the survey, participants were asked about how they felt the law enforcement community as a whole reacts toward mental health. If the profession has negative attitudes toward officers seeking mental health treatment, they were asked if stigmas were placed on officers who need mental health treatment after a traumatic event and
if minimal mental health assistance was offered to officers after a traumatic event. They were also asked if the law enforcement community was slow to intervene when officers exhibited signs of distress or dysfunctional behavior, and if interventions were used as a means of punishment. More than 58% of the participants felt that the law enforcement community was slow to intervene despite there being signs of distress, dysfunction, or destructive behavior. This variable was strongly agreed or agreed with most frequently, followed by holding negative attitudes toward officers seeking mental health treatment at 54.3%, and offering minimal mental health assistance after traumatic events at 47.9%. The association of a stigma being placed on officers who need mental health treatment after critical incident exposure was strongly agreed or agreed with by 44.2%, disagreed or strongly disagreed with by 33.3%, and seen as neutral by 22.5% of the respondents. Very few of those surveyed felt that interventions are used as a means to punish, slander, or terminate officers, with only 15.2% strongly agreeing or agreeing, 26.0% being neutral, and 58.0% disagreeing or strongly disagreeing.

Finally, the third section of the survey asked participants to consider and identify which of the listed barriers would keep them from seeking mental health treatment. The barriers of different treatment from department leadership (57.2%), it would be embarrassing (55.1%), and less confidence from department members (54.3%) were the most frequently reported reasons that would keep officers from getting mental health treatment. This varied slightly from the Hoge et al. (2004) study of Iraq and Afghanistan veterans who ranked being seen as weak, being treated differently by leadership, members of unit having less confidence in them, difficulty in getting time off work for treatment, leaders would blame them for the problem, and harmful to career as the most significant barriers to treatment. The barriers least likely to prevent officers from getting help were not knowing where to get help (78.3%), a belief that mental health care does not work (67.4%), thinking the department would blame them for the problem (60.1%), difficulty in getting time off (55.1%), and lack of trust in mental health professionals (54.3%). Table 3 shows the entire distribution of the responses for these variables, using both the raw numbers and the percentage on the Likert scale used in the surveys. These distributions will be important in identifying the impact of having or not having a policy that mandates an intervention and how officers perceive mental health treatment.

In comparing variables to determine if any significant relationship between them exists, several important relationships were uncovered. By using crosstabulations, some of these relationships can be described as statistically significant. Unlike the prediction at the onset of this study, there appears to be only minimal relationships between the demographic information and the presence of a policy and the variables in the barriers section of the survey. The relationships between policy requiring intervention and being embarrassed, policy requiring intervention and being seen as weak, and policy requiring intervention and negative attitudes toward officers seeking treatment show some significance but do not reach the 0.050 threshold of Pearson Chi-Square statistic. Various other variables that show some relationship but not significantly so were uncovered between the independent variables of gender, age, ethnicity, educational level, and law enforcement experience and the dependent variables of sections one and two of the survey.
Table 3. Opinions Regarding Barriers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
<th>Missing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Do not trust mental health professionals.</td>
<td>9 (6.5%)</td>
<td>18 (13.0%)</td>
<td>36 (26.1%)</td>
<td>57 (41.3%)</td>
<td>18 (13.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do not know where to get help.</td>
<td>1 (0.7%)</td>
<td>13 (9.4%)</td>
<td>16 (11.6%)</td>
<td>82 (59.4%)</td>
<td>26 (18.8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It would be difficult to get time off work for treatment.</td>
<td>10 (7.2%)</td>
<td>26 (18.8%)</td>
<td>26 (18.8%)</td>
<td>60 (43.5%)</td>
<td>16 (11.6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It would be too embarrassing.</td>
<td>18 (13.0%)</td>
<td>58 (42.0%)</td>
<td>25 (18.1%)</td>
<td>27 (19.6%)</td>
<td>10 (7.2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It would harm career.</td>
<td>22 (15.9%)</td>
<td>41 (29.7%)</td>
<td>34 (24.6%)</td>
<td>32 (23.2%)</td>
<td>9 (6.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Members of the department would have less confidence in me.</td>
<td>16 (11.6%)</td>
<td>58 (42.0%)</td>
<td>34 (24.6%)</td>
<td>23 (16.7%)</td>
<td>7 (5.1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department leadership might treat me differently.</td>
<td>15 (10.9%)</td>
<td>63 (45.7%)</td>
<td>26 (18.8%)</td>
<td>24 (17.4%)</td>
<td>9 (6.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The department leadership would blame me for the problem.</td>
<td>2 (1.4%)</td>
<td>19 (13.8%)</td>
<td>34 (24.6%)</td>
<td>66 (47.8%)</td>
<td>17 (12.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I would be seen as weak.</td>
<td>14 (10.1%)</td>
<td>53 (38.4%)</td>
<td>29 (21.0%)</td>
<td>33 (23.9%)</td>
<td>9 (6.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mental health care does not work.</td>
<td>4 (2.9%)</td>
<td>11 (8.0%)</td>
<td>30 (21.7%)</td>
<td>57 (41.3%)</td>
<td>36 (26.1%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The relationships between the independent variable policy requiring intervention and various dependent variables proved to be more important and statistically significant. The first significant relationship is found between the variables policy requiring intervention and the stigma placed on officers seeking treatment. The distribution of responses shown in Table 4 clearly shows that those with policies requiring intervention are less likely to report that the law enforcement community places a stigma on officers seeking treatment after exposure. A finding of a 0.016 Pearson Chi-Square score supports its significance. Likewise, when the variables of minimal mental health assistance, delayed intervention, interventions as a means of punishment or termination, department’s loss of confidence in ability, and department would blame me for problem are analyzed with policy requiring intervention, a statistical significance using the Pearson Chi-Square calculation is observed.

The variables of minimal mental health assistance, delayed intervention, and department’s loss of confidence in ability show similar distributions to those shown in Table 4, with those responding “yes” to the policy variable requiring intervention also disagreeing or strongly disagreeing with the dependent variables more frequently. The statistical significance of the distribution between the department policy requiring intervention and minimal mental health assistance variables are shown in Table 5, with the distribution’s resulting Pearson Chi-Square reaching a 0.010 significance level. The distribution between the variables department policy requiring intervention and delayed intervention is slightly more significant as shown in Table 6, while the relationship between department policy requiring intervention and department’s loss of confidence in ability is less significant at a 0.053 level on the Pearson Chi-Square (Table 7). This shows that knowing if a policy mandating an intervention exists helps predict if an officer is less likely to feel that the law enforcement community offers minimal mental health assistance, is slow to intervene when signs of dysfunctional behavior exists, and to not seek help because they feel the department will lose confidence in their ability.
Table 4. Stigma Placed on Officers Seeking Treatment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Strongly Agree</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Department Policy</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% of Total</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
<td>10.2%</td>
<td>8.7%</td>
<td>15.7%</td>
<td>4.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Requiring Intervention</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% of Total</td>
<td>5.5%</td>
<td>26.8%</td>
<td>13.4%</td>
<td>11.0%</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% of Total</td>
<td>7.9%</td>
<td>37.0%</td>
<td>22.0%</td>
<td>26.8%</td>
<td>6.3%</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Chi-Square Tests

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pearson Chi-Square</td>
<td>12.188</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Likelihood Ratio</td>
<td>12.333</td>
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<td>0.015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linear-by-Linear Association</td>
<td>10.930</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N of Valid Cases</td>
<td>127</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*3 cells (30.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 3.34.

Table 5. Significance Between Required Intervention and Minimal Mental Health

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pearson Chi-Square</td>
<td>13.375</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Likelihood Ratio</td>
<td>13.668</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linear-by-Linear Association</td>
<td>11.695</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N of Valid Cases</td>
<td>127</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*3 cells (30.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2.92.

Table 6. Significance Between Required Intervention and Delayed Intervention

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pearson Chi-Square</td>
<td>14.857</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Likelihood Ratio</td>
<td>15.017</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linear-by-Linear Association</td>
<td>13.143</td>
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<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N of Valid Cases</td>
<td>127</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*1 cell (10.0%) has expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 3.76.

Table 7. Significance Between Required Intervention and Department’s Loss of Confidence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Value</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pearson Chi-Square</td>
<td>9.329</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.053</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Likelihood Ratio</td>
<td>11.456</td>
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<td>0.022</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linear-by-Linear Association</td>
<td>1.540</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.215</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N of Valid Cases</td>
<td>127</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*2 cells (20.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2.50.

This is not true for the distributions of policy requiring intervention: interventions as punishment, slander, and termination and department would blame me for the problem. Although both are statistically significant (as shown in Table 8), that is true for very different reasons. The significance in these distributions is a result
of the majority of respondents answering disagree or strongly disagree regardless of the presence or absence of a policy requiring intervention. This effect produces significance because expected counts are less for given responses; it explains little about the relationship between the two variables other than that most disagree with them, however. As an interesting note, such a strong belief that the department would not use the intervention as punishment nor blame the problem on officers suggests openness toward mandating the intervention by those surveyed. This and the findings above support the claim that a mandated intervention after exposure to a critical incident can reduce the negative attitudes and feelings of those involved.

Table 8. Department Policy Requiring Intervention

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chi-Square Tests</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pearson Chi-Square</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Likelihood Ratio</td>
<td>32.683</td>
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<td>0.000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Linear-by-Linear Association</td>
<td>20.078</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N of Valid Cases</td>
<td>127</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*2 cells (20.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.67.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chi-Square Tests</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)</th>
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*2 cells (20.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 0.83.

Conclusions

The findings show that the existence of a policy mandating intervention reduces reported negative attitudes in the law enforcement community and impacts barriers to mental health treatment, although not significantly in all cases. The sample group also rates the barriers of different treatment from department leadership, it would be embarrassing, and less confidence from department members as some of the reasons why they would not seek out mental health treatment after exposure. In applying similar barriers used in Hoge et al.’s (2004) research on combat veterans to police officers, the hope is to identify areas of concern that can help dispel held beliefs within the law enforcement community. Evaluation of why officers are less likely to seek assistance when persistent symptoms are present can be critical during the implementation phase of the proposed mental health policy.

The first conclusion of this evaluation is that as employers, administrators, supervisors, and peers, we are doing little to provide mental healthcare support to police officers before and after traumatic incident exposure as revealed in the 58% of respondents who felt interventions are delayed even if an officer is displaying signs of distress, dysfunction, or destructive behavior. This is despite current research that shows police officers are among a work group that is frequently exposed to traumatic events; likely to develop PTSD or other mental health disorders; suffer from poor sleep related to stress and stressors; and at increased risk of health problems, substance or alcohol abuse, and suicide. The evidence overwhelmingly reflects a need for intervention to extend the careers of well-trained, productive, and valuable members of the department.
The most significant conclusion shows that a policy mandating intervention does influence the perceptions of how the law enforcement community is perceived. The fear of alienation or stigmatization from administrators and peers holds greater power over the behaviors of the officers than the debilitating symptoms that invade their lives. The conclusion, therefore, is to develop and implement an effective policy requiring screening and treatment for police officers after they are involved in a traumatic event, critical incident, or significant stressor. It is rarely a good management practice to hold everyone accountable for the actions or behaviors of a single member of the group. However, there is a difference in this instance. The research shows that not all of those who experience a traumatic event will be adversely affected; by providing the intervention to all who are exposed, the feelings of alienation will be lessened among the entire group. The emphasis should be on the retention and well-being of quality peers and staff who are difficult and costly to replace.

The research presented here is meant to promote the well-being of those in a high-risk work group and to prevent them from developing and exhibiting the often debilitating symptoms of PTSD or other mental disorders. This should not be construed as an attempt to obtain determining factors regarding fitness for duty or faulty actions after involvement in a critical incident, nor should it be seen as an attempt to limit or constrain the “warrior mentality” needed to operate in or control deadly force encounters, critical incidents, and life-threatening situations. As managers and employers, the least we can do for those who respond and get involved in these types of events as part of their oath to serve and protect is to give them a fighting chance at normalcy after the incident. There are many issues, people who make up the pertinent questions, and stakeholders in this research, but none are more important than the police officers involved. There is not only a significant amount of value in a well-trained, highly capable officer but also a willingness to serve that not all men or women possess. The loss of that service should not be due to an employer’s failure to act on the behalf of the employee or the employee’s belief that he or she will be ostracized for asking for help. It is the purpose of this research to address the impact of a policy mandating intervention and hopefully build support for effective and needed change.

References


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Introduction

At times, there are disconnects between what products and services companies offer and the true needs and requirements of their prospective clients. This predicament is likewise demonstrated with regard to homeland security products and services. The State of Illinois has hundreds of companies that offer homeland security products and services along a variety of industry sectors and subsectors, including access controls; authentication; biotechnology; combating biological, chemical, radiological, and nuclear terrorism; commercial technology; computers; data intelligence; emergency; geo-locating; modeling and simulation; sensors and detection; service providers; training and education; vehicles; and video and surveillance.

The Homeland Security Market Development Bureau of the Illinois Department of Commerce and Economic Development tasked the Homeland Security Research Program of the School of Law Enforcement and Justice Administration at Western Illinois University with assisting it in elucidating the needs and requirements of prospective homeland security consumers. Given Western Illinois University’s reputation in the Illinois law enforcement community, it was a natural fit that these consumers of homeland security products and services were approached. In doing so, we sought to gain market insight so that Illinois firms will better appreciate how to approach Illinois law enforcement in the future. As a result of our work, two important goals will be achieved: (1) law enforcement and society’s safety will be enhanced; and (2) companies will increase sales, thereby contributing to job growth and economic development in Illinois.

Methodology

In June 2008, a ten-question survey was sent to 202 State of Illinois law enforcement agencies: the police departments of the 100 largest Illinois cities (by population) and the county sheriffs of all 102 Illinois counties. A stamped, self-addressed envelope was provided with the survey allowing for rapid and anonymous responses, although the survey also enabled agencies to identify themselves.

Within two weeks, 93 surveys were completed and returned, demonstrating a strong response rate of 46%. Given the size of the sample survey, and assuming a 95% level of confidence, the results are accurate within a plus/minus 10% margin of error. While anonymous responses were possible, 33 of the 93 responses (35.5%) listed their affiliations and agreed to be cited by name in the survey. Such self-identification affords these police departments the opportunity for tailored, direct follow-up from
Illinois homeland security product and service providers regarding their wares, particularly in relation to possible adoption of emerging technologies.

The ten questions posed in the survey gauged the current perceptions of Illinois law enforcement regarding homeland security threats. Also, it revealed the factors they weigh in choosing homeland security products and services. The diverse themes that were addressed in the survey included the following ten queries:

1. Greatest threat that homeland security products and services should address
2. Homeland security product or service sought most frequently
3. Principal reason why a homeland security product or service is chosen
4. Whether knowing that other law enforcement agencies are using that product or service would influence purchasing decisions
5. Main rationale as to why a homeland security product or service is not chosen
6. Effect of company-led financing or grants in purchase decisions of homeland security products or services
7. Appeal of products and services having both homeland security and traditional law enforcement applicability
8. Avoiding homeland security product or service with potential liability
9. Interest in participating in a pilot program for an emerging technology
10. Size of the company from which most homeland security purchases are made

The survey allowed for uniformity and consistency with reference to the questions posed to these Illinois law enforcement professionals. The survey was formulated following extensive research involving nationwide and international materials and sources as well as background discussions with homeland security, business, and law enforcement entities. At times, these discussions were conducted on an off-the-record basis. This approach proved fruitful as it allowed for degrees of candor one often fails to secure with on-the-record responses.

Results

Overview

The results of the survey are assessed along two demarcations. The first looks at the whole sample of results: the 93 Illinois law enforcement agencies that returned the survey (Group One). The second grouping includes the results of the 33 Illinois law enforcement agencies that agreed to be cited by name and would consider participating in a pilot program involving an emerging technology (Group Two). At the front end, it was thought necessary to delineate the needs of the two groups—the 93 versus the 33 (subsumed in the former)—such that Illinois homeland security companies could better comprehend the requirements of the prospective technology pilot program participants. As well, it was assumed that there might be some variance in the way each group approached the questions posed in the survey.

Survey Responses of the 93 Illinois Law Enforcement Agencies (Group One)

The survey found that 36.6% of the participants perceived that biological, chemical, radiological, and nuclear terrorism are the greatest threats that homeland security products and services should address. These threats were followed by bombings
(30.1%), shootings (22.6%), and cyberterrorism (10.8%). The alternative of arson was not chosen by any of the participants.

Communications technologies (53.8%), followed by video and voice surveillance (21.5%), other (10.8%), access control (9.7%), and sensors and detection (4.3%) were found to be the homeland security products or services that the responders sought most frequently. As to the main reason for choosing a specific homeland security product or service over another, the survey relayed the following results: applicability to the challenges it is supposed to address (59.1%), cost (29.0%), and technological features (11.8%). The company’s brand was not viewed as a reason to choose a product or service by any of the participants.

In determining what is the effect of purchasing a product or service if other agencies are using the item, the survey found that 62.4% stated that would be an element in their decision, 25.8% noted it would be a very important factor in their decision, 8.6% stated it would not be a determinant in their decision, and 3.2% expressed it would be the most important factor in their decision.

The lack of funding, including no grant money, was perceived as the main justification for not acquiring a homeland security product or service by 68.8% of the survey respondents. Other reasons for not making the purchase included the cost of the product or service (17.2%), too narrow applicability of the product/service or its lack of multi-use (10.8%), and technology issues (e.g., too new, too complex, not cutting edge enough) (3.2%).

In relation to the roles that company-led financing or grants would have on acquiring a homeland security product or service, the survey found that 47.3% said it would be a very important factor, 27.9% noted it would be a determinant, 22.6% stated it would be the most important factor, and 2.3% expressed it would not be weighed in the decision.

Products and services having both homeland security and traditional law enforcement applicability were perceived by the survey responders as follows: 87.1% thought such characteristics definitely would be more appealing and 12.9% believed they would be somewhat more appealing.

The survey found that 52.7% of the participants viewed potential liability arising from the use of a particular homeland security product or service as a factor in making a purchase. Of the remaining participants, 29.0% stated it would be a very important factor, 12.9% noted it would not be a factor, while 5.4% believed it would be the most important factor in making a purchase of a homeland security product or service.

Depending on the program, 39.8% and 45.2% of the survey participants, respectively, believed that participating in a pilot program involving an emerging technology would be of great interest or some interest to their agency. The survey also found that 12.9% of the respondents would probably not find a pilot program appealing, while 2.2% were unsure of their position.

Lastly, 52.7% of the survey participants could not generalize as to the size of the company that provided most of their homeland security products and services.
Still, 31.2% of the survey respondents viewed most of such items as arising from medium-sized companies, 10.8% found most came from large companies, and 5.4% believed most originated from small-sized companies.

Survey Responses of the 33 Illinois Law Enforcement Agencies that Agreed to be Cited On-the-Record and Were Attracted by a Pilot Program Involving an Emerging Technology (Group Two)

In this subgroup of the survey, 36.4% of the participants perceived that bombings were the greatest threat that homeland security products and services should address. These threats were followed by biological, chemical, radiological, and nuclear terrorism (27.2%), shootings (24.2%), and cyberterrorism (12.1%). The alternative of arson was not chosen by any of the participants.

Communications technologies (63.6%), followed by video and voice surveillance (21.2%), other (9.1%), and access control (6.1%) were found to be the homeland security product or service that the survey subgroup sought most frequently. Sensors and detection products and services were not chosen by anyone in the subgroup.

As to the main reason for acquiring a specific homeland security product or service over another, the results of the survey subgroup were applicability to the challenges it is supposed to address (60.6%), cost (30.3%), and technological features (9.1%). The company’s brand was not viewed as a justification for choosing a product or service by any of the participants.

In deciding what is the impact of purchasing a product or service if other agencies are using the item, the results of the survey subgroup were that 66.7% noted that this would be a factor in their decision, 27.2% believed it would be a very important factor in their decision, 6.1% expressed it would not be a factor in their decision, and nobody believed it would be the most important factor in their decision.

The lack of funding, including no grant money, was viewed as the main rationale for not acquiring a homeland security product or service by 66.7% of the survey subgroup. Other reasons for not making the purchase include too narrow applicability of the product/service or its lack of multi-use (15.2%), cost (12.1%), and technology issues (e.g., too new, too complex, not cutting edge enough) (6.1%).

With reference to the impact that company-led financing or grants would have on buying a homeland security product or service, the results of the survey subgroup were 57.6% noted it would be a very important factor, 24.2% expressed it would be the most important factor, and 18.2% stated it would be a factor in the decision. Nobody believed that it would not be a factor in the decision.

Products and services having both homeland security and traditional law enforcement applicability were viewed by the survey subgroup accordingly: 84.8% thought such characteristics definitely would be more appealing, and 15.2% thought they would be somewhat more appealing.

The potential liability arising from the use of a particular homeland security product or service was judged as a factor in buying it by 51.5% of the survey subgroup; 27.3% expressed it would be a very important reason; 18.2% noted it would not
be a factor; while 3.0% believed it would be the most important justification in making a purchase of a homeland security product or service.

Depending on the nature of the program, 54.5% and 45.5% of the survey subgroup responded that participating in a pilot program involving an emerging technology would be of great interest or some interest, respectively, to their agency. More specifically, these 18 police departments noted that, depending on the particulars, involvement in a pilot program for an emerging technology would be of great interest to them:

1. Alton Police Department (Alton, IL)
2. Berwyn Police Department (Berwyn, IL)
3. Edgar County Sheriff’s Office (Paris, IL)
4. Elmwood Police Department (Elmwood, IL)
5. Glendale Hills Police Department (Glendale Hills, IL)
6. Highland Park Police Department (Highland Park, IL)
7. Kane County Sheriff’s Office (Geneva, IL)
8. Kankakee Police Department (Kankakee, IL)
9. Maywood Police Department (Maywood, IL)
10. McHenry County Sheriff’s Office (Woodstock, IL)
11. Montgomery County Sheriff’s Office (Willsboro, IL)
12. Naperville Police Department (Naperville, IL)
13. Ogle County Sheriff’s Office (Oregon, IL)
14. Plainfield Police Department (Plainfield, IL)
15. Shelby County Sheriff’s Office (Shelbyville, IL)
16. Skokie Police Department (Skokie, IL)
17. Wabash County Sheriff’s Office (Mt. Carmel, IL)
18. Westmont Police Department (Westmont, IL)

The remaining 15 police departments stated that, depending on the program, participating in a pilot program for an emerging technology would be of some interest to them:

1. Bond County Sheriff’s Office (Greenville, IL)
2. Buffalo Grove Police Department (Buffalo Grove, IL)
3. Crawford County Sheriff’s Office (Robinson, IL)
4. Galesburg Police Department (Galesburg, IL)
5. Granite City Police Department (Granite City, IL)
6. Jefferson County Sheriff’s Office (Mt. Vernon, IL)
7. Jo Daviess County Sheriff’s Office (Galena, IL)
8. Knox County Sheriff’s Department (Galesburg, IL)
9. Lawrence County Sheriff’s Department (Lawrenceville, IL)
10. McHenry Police Department (McHenry, IL)
11. Randolph County Sheriff’s Office (Chester, IL)
12. Sangamon County Sheriff’s Office (Springfield, IL)
13. St. Charles Police Department (St. Charles, IL)
14. Warren County Sheriff’s Office (Monmouth, IL)
15. Will County Sheriff’s Office (Joliet, IL)

Finally, 69.7% of the survey subgroup could not generalize as to the size of the company that offered most of their homeland security products and services. Still,
21.2% of the survey subgroup noted that most of such items came from medium-sized companies, 6.1% found most came from large companies, and 6.1% felt they were sourced from small-sized companies.

Analysis

The results in Group One and Group Two were identical in terms of the most popular response to each question except one. The sole instance when this was not the case was in relation to the following query: “What is perceived as the greatest threat that homeland security products and services should address?” Group One’s responses were as follows: biological, chemical, radiological, and nuclear terrorism (36.6%); bombings (30.1%); and shootings (22.6%). In contrast, Group Two ranked the perceived threats as follows: bombings (36.4%); biological, chemical, radiological, and nuclear terrorism (27.2%); and shootings (24.2%).

The remaining results between the two groups are easier to articulate as they are nearly mirror images of each other. For example, for the question involving which homeland security product or service is sought most frequently, Group One and Group Two both chose communications technologies, followed by video and voice surveillance, and other. While the two groups did have disparities in the relative percentages per response, the order of the responses chosen were the same. Similar responses were observed in relation to the main reason a homeland security product or service is chosen over another: the applicability to the challenge it is supposed to address was followed by its cost in order of importance.

Both groups viewed the fact that another agency was using a homeland security product or service as being a factor or a very important factor in their decision to buy an item. Likewise, both groups concluded that the lack of funding, the cost of an item, and the narrow applicability of a product (or lack of multi-use) were the key reasons why they would not acquire a homeland security product or service. Still, there was disagreement as to which of the last two reasons were more important.

With reference to the impact of generous company-led financing or grants on buying decisions, both groups responded that this matter is a very critical determinant in the buying decision. Yet, Group A’s second most popular answer was that that issue would be a factor, while Group B’s second most popular response was that it would be the most important factor.

Both groups perceived that a product or service applicable to both homeland security and traditional law enforcement challenges definitely would be more appealing than other offerings. Similarly, the two groups answered that potential liability occurring due to use of a specific homeland security product or service would be a factor in making a purchase decision.

Both groups viewed participating in a pilot program for an emerging technology as appealing, although Group One’s enthusiasm as demonstrated in the response, “It would be of great interest to my agency,” occurred with less frequency than in Group Two. Finally, the two groups could not generalize as to the size of company that offered most of their homeland security products and services, although they both responded that medium-sized firms played an important role in their sourcing.
Recommendations

Survey-Related Insights

In essence, Illinois homeland security companies can reach various conclusions from the survey outcomes as encapsulated in Group One and Group Two’s responses. First, collectively, the greatest threats that homeland security products and services should address are biological, chemical, radiological, and nuclear terrorism and bombings. Firms offering such items should be particularly active vis-à-vis Illinois law enforcement as they offer solutions to perceived immediate risks. This is not to suggest that companies with different offerings would not be considered favorably by Illinois law enforcement.

Second, the homeland security products or services sought most often are communications technologies followed by video and voice surveillance. As such, companies in those market segments should realize that Illinois law enforcement agencies have a history of purchasing their offerings and should take steps to initiate (or expand upon) sales in that realm. The track record of particular purchases, plus recognition of customer perceptions of current threats, must be contemplated when approaching law enforcement customers.

Third, the main reason that a specific homeland security product or service is chosen over another is the applicability of the item to the challenge it is supposed to address. This was followed by its cost factor in order of importance. Consequently, crafting appropriately tailored solutions—although not too narrow in scope—in relation to risks that exist are critical for meeting customer objectives. Similarly, such options must be reasonably priced as buyers, here too, are sensitive to prices.

Fourth, the fact that another agency is already utilizing a homeland security product or service was viewed as an important to very important factor in determining whether Illinois law enforcement agencies acquire items. Therefore, firms that already have law enforcement customers should aggressively tout that reality to prospective customers. Companies trying to make their initial sale to law enforcement may find some resistance in this market segment until they close their first deal.

Fifth, there are three main reasons why Illinois law enforcement agencies choose not to purchase a specific product or service: (1) the lack of funding, (2) the cost of an item, and (3) the narrow applicability of a product (or lack of multi-use). Thus, the issues of company-led financing or grants, reasonably priced offerings, and well-crafted solutions (that are not too narrow in scope) are vital variables that companies should be cognizant of in relation to these prospective buyers.

Outside the scope of this report, it is worth noting that there are numerous other issues that impact purchase decisions such as the following:

- Features of the product or service
- Training required to use the product
- Cost of ownership and maintenance of the product
- Accuracy, efficiency, mobility, and safety of the product
Sixth, company-led financing or grants are crucial determinants as to whether an Illinois law enforcement agency acquires homeland security products or services. Given this reality, companies should attempt to provide generous financing or payment terms to such agencies. Additionally, firms should research and collaborate with these agencies so that they can benefit from law enforcement/homeland security grants that do exist. Awareness of the critical role of financing in making sales, in conjunction with law enforcement budgets and keeping abreast of grant funding cycles, can be the difference between success and failure in this market segment.

Seventh, Illinois law enforcement agencies view products and services that are applicable to both homeland security and traditional law enforcement challenges as definitely more appealing than other offerings. As homeland security challenges—particularly terrorism—shift, agencies want to know that they still have traditional law enforcement uses for the product or service they already own. Therefore, it is imperative to underscore the features of one’s product or service in terms of its applicability to both homeland security and law enforcement risks. After all, there are still some segments of the market that do not perceive homeland security risks as immediate, likely to occur in their locale, nor of significant impact should they happen.

Eighth, Illinois law enforcement agencies do factor in their buying decision the potential liability occurring due to use of homeland security products or services. While all products and services entail some risk, particular items due to their nature or complexity involve heightened levels of risk. For instance, specifically designed nonlethal products may prove lethal when applied on certain citizenry, resulting in potential legal liability. Still, while potential legal risk is an attribute weighed by agencies, the importance of a product or service can readily override such concerns if adequately described by suppliers.

Ninth, over 85% of Group One acknowledged an interest in participating in a pilot program for an emerging technology. Clearly, Illinois law enforcement is open to collaborating with Illinois homeland security firms so that homeland security technologies can be made more effectively. As Group Two is made up of 33 Illinois law enforcement agencies that are open to participate in a pilot program, it would be wise for Illinois companies to approach them with their cutting-edge technology solutions. Even within Group Two, there are delineations between the levels of interest in pilot programs. Therefore, firms may seek to approach one set or the other at first, given the technology’s level of development and other business calculations.

Tenth, as Illinois law enforcement agencies cannot generalize as to the size of firm that most often offers them homeland security products or services, all Illinois companies should feel comfortable approaching this market segment. Still, medium-sized firms appear to have had some success in sourcing this market segment.
Additional Insights

In the homeland security arena, firms would be wise to review the activities and requirements of the following Illinois institutions:

- Illinois Terrorism Task Force
  www.ready.illinois.gov/ittf

- Illinois Law Enforcement Alarm System
  www.ileas.org

- Illinois Emergency Management Agency
  www.state.il.us/iema

- Illinois State Police
  www.isp.state.il.us/contacts/contacts.cfm

Also, there are numerous Illinois-based resources that are available to businesses and entrepreneurs working in the homeland security and technology realms. The following is a partial list:

  www.hsmld.illinois.gov/hs

- Homeland Security Market Development Bureau’s Innovative Product Grant Program
  www.hsmld.illinois.gov/hs/Programs.htm

- Illinois Homeland Security Procurement Technical Assistance Center
  www.cod.edu/BPI/hsptac.htm

- Homeland Security Innovation & Entrepreneurship Center
  www.hsiec.org/dojo/22/v.jsp?p=/home

- Illinois Entrepreneurship Network
  www.ildceo.net/dceo/Bureaus/Entrepreneurship+and+Small+Business/IEN+Partners

  www.ilhomelandsecuritynetwork.org/component/option,com_mosforms/Itemid,19

- Illinois Homeland Security Industry Sectors
  www.illinoishomelandsecurityindustry.com/hls_illinois/Template1/Pages/StartSearchPage.aspx

On a national level, an appreciation of existing homeland security/law enforcement/defense/intelligence technologies, prospective needs in these arenas,
possible partnerships, and funding opportunities can be ascertained through viewing the activities of the following organizations and programs:

- National Law Enforcement and Corrections Technology Center
  www.justnet.org/Pages/home.aspx

- Federal Law Enforcement Training Center
  www.fletc.gov

- Combating Terrorism Technology Support Office
  www.cttso.gov

- Law Enforcement Terrorism Prevention Program

  www.dhs.gov/xres/grants

- Department of Homeland Security Laboratories
  www.dhs.gov/xres/labs

- Department of Homeland Security – Business Opportunities
  www.dhs.gov/xopnbiz

- Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency of the Department of Defense
  www.darpa.mil

- Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence
  www.iarpa.gov/index.html

- In-Q-Tel of the Central Intelligence Agency
  www.iqt.org

In the future, the Homeland Security Research Program of the School of Law Enforcement and Justice Administration at Western Illinois University will undertake additional research activities dealing with the law enforcement and homeland security companies as well as with other themes.

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Increased Controls for Radioactive Materials: A Practice that Impacts Local Law Enforcement

Thomas E. Engells, Assistant Chief of Police, The University of Texas at Houston Police Department
William H. Adcox, Chief of Police, The University of Texas at Houston Police Department

If we are to secure our homeland . . . our hometowns must be secure. . . . We must protect our borders, our people, our physical and electronic infrastructure, our schools and businesses and, yes, our hospitals.

Governor Thomas Ridge (2002)

Radioactive materials are used every day in a wide variety of industrial and medical applications to the great benefit of society. Since each atom of a radioactive substance spontaneously emits a specific type of radiation energy, the materials can be used for very precise tracer and treatment procedures in medicine, affording the detection and treatment of a wide variety of diseases and afflictions. Radioactive material emissions can also be in irradiation processes to sterilize instruments or to enhance the efficacy of blood transfusions or organ transplants. However, like the fabled double-edged sword, there has been a real risk incurred from the use of radioactive materials. Today, we face the heightened threat of theft or diversion of these sources by those who would seek to convert such radioactive material into weapons of terror.

In the age of the Global War on Terror, there has been renewed concern about the risks of weapons of mass destruction, and in the specific case of radioactive material, there is a risk that such substances might be used to intentionally contaminate large populations and areas, resulting in major public health concerns and potentially rendering large swaths of land unusable for years. Instead of contemplating a world war with a peer superpower involving thermonuclear weapons, we must now contemplate, preempt, and prevent the use of weapons containing radioactivity by individuals and associated groups who span a dangerous continuum of nongovernment organizations (terrorist and criminal syndicates). There is a swift undercurrent in both open source media reports and informed private discussions within the homeland security community that the manufacture and use of such weapons, especially Radiation Dispersal Devices (RDD), is a credible ongoing threat to the security of the United States. Many informed officials believe the use of an RDD is not an “if” event but, rather a where, when, and how situation.

Within that context, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has increased the security requirements for those who possess specific amounts of radioactive material. These increased controls (IC) directly affect these organizations, often hospitals and universities, who are termed as a licensee, and will also affect the local law enforcement agency. The operational practices in laboratories, clinics, hospitals, and research centers that use radioactive materials have already changed. This article will explore aspects of the IC program and identify some resources available to local law enforcement to fulfill this new and generally unexpected challenge.
Fundamentally, change is afoot, and this may just be the beginning of a host of increased regulatory controls of designated quantities of radioactive materials.

**Background**

**Radioactive Materials**

Ionizing radiation is a class radiation emission with enough energy that during an interaction with an atom, it can remove tightly bound electrons from the orbit of an atom, causing the atom to become charged or ionized. This radiation may be in either a wave or particle form. The ionization event is crucial because electrons form the basis for chemical bonds, and if the radiation is energetic enough to knock electrons out of their orbits, chemical bonds can be broken, possibly resulting in biological damage in the form of cell death or mutation.

![What Is Ionization?](source: World Health Organization (2008))

Since radioactive materials are constantly undergoing decay, the amount of radioactivity present is normally communicated as a rate rather than a mass. This concept sometimes causes confusion, but in fact it is no different than the approach we use for quantifying other dynamic processes. For example, when talking about the amount of water that flows over a waterfall, we typically speak in terms of gallons per hour or day. In the same way, when discussing amounts of radioactivity, we communicate in terms of a rate of decay, called a Becquerel or (Bq), which represents one radioactive atom disintegrating per second. The Bq replaces the previous common unit of measure called the “Curie” or “Ci,” which represented $2.22 \times 1,012$ disintegrations per minute. The potential harm of ionizing radiation is established by that amount of radiation that is absorbed by or imparted to the body. A series of measures are used to calculate the amount of ionizing radiation, including the gray (Gy) and radiation absorbed dose (rad). Additionally, the biological effect is dependent upon the intensity of the ionization of living cells caused by the radiation; that equivalent dose is measured by the sievert (Sv) or the rem.

Increased controls (ICs) apply to those public and private institutions as well as commercial firms, known as licensees, that possess radiation materials beyond specific threshold amounts, known technically as *quantities of concern*. This extensive list which was abridged for this article (see Table 1) includes the three most commonly used isotopes in industry and medicine: (1) Cobalt-60, (2) Cesium-137, and (3) Iridium-192.
Table 1. Increased Controls for Radionuclides of Concern

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<th>Name</th>
<th>Symbol</th>
<th>Quantity of Concern (Ci)</th>
<th>Quantity of Concern (GBq)</th>
<th>Principal Rad Type and Energy</th>
<th>Half-Life</th>
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<td>Co-60</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>299.700</td>
<td>Gamma 1.17 + 1.33 MeV</td>
<td>5.26 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cesium-137</td>
<td>Cs-137</td>
<td>27.0</td>
<td>999.000</td>
<td>Gamma 0.662 MeV</td>
<td>30 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iridium-192</td>
<td>Ir-192</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>29.600</td>
<td>Gamma 0.317 MeV plus others</td>
<td>74 days</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The Regulatory Environment

The regulatory environment associated with the control of radioactive materials is complex and evolving. Law tasks the U.S. NRC with regulatory responsibilities under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. However, civilian licensees who possess radioactive material in specific amounts are subject to the review and regulation by no less than ten different federal agencies, including the U.S. NRC, the Department of Energy, the Department of Homeland Security, the Environmental Protection Agency, as well as others.

Regulation of radioactive material was viewed as an early opportunity for partnership among several states. Under the provisions of the Atomic Energy Act (see Figure 2), the NRC yields regulatory authority to agreement states in the areas of byproduct materials, source materials, and certain amounts of special nuclear material. Today, more than 34 states have entered into these agreements wherein the state assumes regulatory responsibilities.

Figure 2. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Agreement States

It is important in this background discussion to scope the size of this issue. Licenses are granted based upon the type and quantity of radioactive materials held and used. In Figure 3, the total number of sealed source licensees and their geographical distribution is displayed. Lee (2007) noted,
There are two types of licenses which govern the more than two million radioactive sources in the United States: General and Specific. General licenses apply to the less hazardous sources. Approximately 135,000 companies are general licensees and these account for approximately 1.8 million low level radioactive sources. These sources do not pose a high security concern. Specific licenses are issued to provide stricter controls over the more hazardous radioactive sources that are used in medicine, research, and industry. There are a little over 20,000 specific licenses. (p. 37)

The IC program focus is on that subset of the 20,000 specific licensees who possess radioactive materials that qualify as quantities of concern.

Figure 3. Number of Medical, Industrial, and Research Users of Sealed Sources (About 20,000 Total Nationwide) as of December 31, 2002

The Threat – RDD

A dirty bomb, which is a type of radiation dispersal device (RDD), is at its most basic an explosive device that includes radioactive material (Washington State Department of Health, 2002). While the results would not mimic a nuclear detonation, the damage done by an RDD may be as damaging to society. In the NRC’s (2005a) report, Backgrounder – Dirty Bombs, that distinction was highlighted:

A dirty bomb is in no way similar to a nuclear weapon or nuclear bomb. A nuclear bomb creates an explosion that is millions of times more powerful than that of a dirty bomb. The cloud of radiation from a nuclear bomb could spread tens to hundreds of square miles, whereas a dirty bomb’s radiation could be dispersed within a few blocks or miles of the explosion. A dirty bomb is not a “Weapon of Mass Destruction” but a “Weapon of Mass Disruption,” where contamination and anxiety are the terrorists’ major objectives.

The extent of local contamination would depend on a number of factors, including the specific explosive device, the radioactive material used and the form of that material (e.g., solid, liquid, gas, or powder), weather, geography, and the density and type of buildings. The radioactive contamination and recovery may have chilling effects on local communities that far exceed the visible personal and physical damages at the scene.
Consider one of the most common of these radioactive materials, Cesium-137. The Committee on Radiation Source Use and Replacement of the National Research Council (2008) recently noted that this radioactive substance is found in 1,300 irradiators across the nation, often in the form of radioactive Cesium chloride that is soluble, dispersible, and, if ingested or inhaled, delivers a dose to the whole body. Of additional concern is that with the lack of permanent disposal, this same material remains in storage across the nation and is often vulnerable to theft.

One of the disturbing aftermaths of the use of an RDD is the cost of cleanup. Understand, such a cleanup may well result in prohibited access to buildings and facilities for literally years, which may disrupt if not eliminate routine commerce and activities in sections of your city. Dependent upon the radioactive material used in the RDD, injuries sustained may include radiation sickness and burns as well as a long-term risk or a variety of cancers and potential birth defects.

Yet, the most compelling aspect of the use of an RDD and its resulting contamination will be the panic and anxiety. The term “worried well” is attached to the phenomenon in which healthy persons demand screening or medical treatment, although these same people were not exposed to the danger. With the rapidity of modern communications, these worried well may quickly overwhelm local and area healthcare and mental health systems as well as public facilities in the aftermath of an attack using an RDD. This panic will be the manifestation of the anticipated societal disruption caused by this weapon and may well fuel subsequent civil disturbances or worse in the region in which the weapon was used.

The Issues of Concern

Local law enforcement agencies across the nation may have several supporting roles to perform in this program to increase control of radioactive materials. Foremost, we should always remember that these regulations, either from the NRC or from state-level agencies in the agreement states, apply to the licensee. Yet, as leaders of the local law enforcement agency, it is vitally important that we understand the relevant regulations that may prompt unique requests for response and service. Three important roles for local law enforcement may include (1) personnel processing, (2) security plan assessments, and (3) emergency response to the facilities housing the material.

Personnel Processing

The key concept in personnel processing is the licensee’s obligation to establish the trustworthiness and reliability of those persons who have unescorted access to the radioactive material. Those people who have unescorted access to these radioactive materials in quantities of concern must be established as trustworthy and reliable and their unescorted access approved in writing by the licensee.

The licensee can establish the necessary levels of trustworthiness and reliability by verification of employment, education, and personal references. Under the provisions of the Fingerprinting Order (EA-07-305), those licensees who now possess radioactive materials in quantities of concern are ordered to collect fingerprints as an element of establishing trustworthiness and reliability. As of June 2, 2008, no one will be allowed unescorted access without a determination that includes FBI criminal history results. This is a major change in practice, and the licensees were provided
guidance from the NRC that the fingerprints can be taken by local law enforcement. In addition, the licensees were informed that the fingerprints could also be collected by private entities or by establishing an on-site fingerprinting program.

This fingerprinting requirement is causing true concern among several licensees. With an abbreviated implementation period, thousands of employees, students, and faculty at institutions across the nation must participate and complete the fingerprint and criminal history check in a matter of months (Einberg, 2008).

Security Plan Assessments

In contrast to the physical security plans that are in place at nuclear power plants and nuclear fuel processing facilities, many of these licensees have limited security measures in place. An example of such lax security practices was cited in a 2003 report from the U.S. General Accounting Office:

In the course of visits to a medical licensee, we observed poor security practices with sealed sources. For example, during a visit to a hospital in an agreement state, we were told that sealed sources, including strontium-90, cesium-137, and iridium-192, were securely stored in a room equipped with an electronic lock with limited access. Later, during a tour of the hospital, we found the room unlocked, unattended, and the door propped open. The hospital official explained that this practice was very unusual; he locked the room door after inspection and continued the tour. Shortly thereafter, we passed the room for a second time. Again, the room was unlocked, unattended, and the door propped open. The storage room was in close proximity to the hospital’s laundry and maintenance facility, which is accessible to any hospital employee. In addition, an entry to the hospital from the outside was also nearby, and this entrance was not guarded nor equipped with radiation detection equipment to notify security if any sealed sources were being removed or stolen.

In response to heightened legitimate concerns about the security of these radioactive materials, the NRC promulgated binding regulations in 2005 that require the following:

a. The licensee shall respond immediately to any actual or attempted theft, sabotage, or diversion of such radioactive material or of the devices. The response shall include requesting assistance from a Local Law Enforcement Agency (LLEA).

b. The licensee shall have a pre-arranged plan with LLEA for assistance in response to an actual or attempted theft, sabotage, or diversion of such radioactive material or of the devices which is consistent in scope and timing with a realistic potential vulnerability of the sources containing such radioactive material. The pre-arranged plan shall be updated when changes to the facility design or operation affect the potential vulnerability of the sources. Pre-arranged LLEA coordination is not required for temporary job sites.

c. The licensee shall have a dependable means to transmit information between, and among, the various components used to detect and identify
an unauthorized intrusion, to inform the assessor, and to summon the appropriate responder.

d. After initiating appropriate response to any actual or attempted theft, sabotage, or diversion of radioactive material or of the devices, the licensee shall, as promptly as possible, notify NRC Operations Center at (301) 816-5100.

e. The licensee shall maintain documentation describing each instance of unauthorized access and any necessary corrective actions to prevent future instances of unauthorized access. (U.S. NRC, 2005b)

There are active joint public/private efforts underway to increase security of radioactive sources. The Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) recently released a Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) proposal for enhanced monitoring of radiological sources at hospitals and research centers with low-cost unobtrusive sensors that can be integrated into existing infrastructure. The first phase of that contract has been awarded, and a major corporation has plans to adapt these same sensors to a hospital application.

If the individual licensee has not made an effective liaison with the local law enforcement agency, then necessary coordination will just not exist. A forecasted consequence of no coordination will be law enforcement officers unprepared for an emergency response. This is just shortsighted planning and needs to be more fully addressed. A range of services could be made available to the licensee that can enhance their site security, but the licensee must partner with the local law enforcement agency.

**Emergency Response**

While a variety of security protocols are in place at the various institutions that hold radioactive materials of quantities of concern, there is an apparent gap in the timeliness and sufficiency of the emergency response. By federal regulation (10 C.F.R. §§ 20.1801, 20.1802) (U.S. NRC, 2005b), the licensee is required to “secure licensed materials that are stored in controlled or unrestricted areas from unauthorized removal or access and to control and maintain constant surveillance of licensed material that is not in storage and is in a controlled or unrestricted area.” When radioactive material is being taken or found to have been removed without authorization, the licensee is most likely to contact local law enforcement. At that point, the responsibility for effective resolution, including the plethora of operational issues arising from a response to an event involving radiological materials, becomes a local law enforcement issue.

The equipment, training, and operational proficiency required for an effective response to incidents involving radioactive materials are missing from most local law enforcement agencies’ skill sets. Knowledge is the key to both the successful response and the effective criminal investigation. This is a unique opportunity to partner with other stakeholders to improve the overall emergency response. Dependent on the local situation, some of these partners may include private security staff, institutional radiation safety specialists, hospital administration, and state and federal regulatory agencies.
Next Steps

Many, if not most, campus and local law enforcement agencies were just unaware of these specific regulations during their development and did not actively track the “increased control” efforts. As a result, they did not provide comments to the rule-making authorities. Local law enforcement now must play catch-up to some extent while understanding that the primary and basic responsibility resides with the licensee.

The regulatory approach being taken by the federal agencies and mirrored by the several states is one that is focused on “what” not “how.” That approach permits law enforcement executives some flexibility in response. Partnerships between local law enforcement with private and nonprofit institutions who are licensees may produce the most effective and cost-efficient response to these new regulations.

Our focus within law enforcement must include the emergency first response. Inevitably, we may face the situation where we encounter person(s) moving radioactive materials. Several basic questions must be answered in rapid order on scene, including “What is being moved?,” “Is it safe to handle or contact the materials?,” “If radioactive materials are found in a vehicle, has that vehicle been contaminated?,” “Has the roadway been compromised?,” and, finally, “What information, if any, should be shared with the community at large?” and “Who should provide that information and when?”

The answers to such questions are not easy to establish with confidence without at least some basic understanding of radioactive materials. Through practical training and education, which needs to include the identification and use of shielding, the appropriate use of distance, and the value of limited exposure, the correct answers can be crafted. Effective training must also include orientation to the commonly used tools for the identification of radioactive materials, however, as well as procedures to access such tools in a timely manner.

At the most basic level, law enforcement agencies should take advantage of the requirements for a pre-arranged plan between the licensee and local law enforcement agencies. Those plans should include a realistic Threat/Risk/Vulnerability Assessment of the licensee’s storage facility, an evaluation of the licensee’s security plan, and the development of an appropriate emergency response plan that addresses the specific risk. Robust and in-depth security practices will significantly reduce the licensee’s vulnerability, yet physical security practices at hospitals and universities remain areas of significant weakness across the nation. In the end, law enforcement agencies can be willing partners only with the individual licensee that is seeking to enhance the security of radioactive materials and reduce the opportunity for theft and diversion of those radioactive materials necessary for an RDD.

Local law enforcement agencies do not face this task alone; capable assistance is available. The agencies listed as responsible for RDDs (see Figure 4) have experts who possess a wealth of specialized knowledge and experience. Educational materials are available with which the local law enforcement agency in partnership with the licensee can provide training that will establish a basic understanding of radioactive materials among their first responders, primarily patrol and criminal investigations personnel. The time to prepare is now, for such preparation is consistent with our fundamental mission within the communities that we serve.
Figure 4. Agencies with Responsibility for Radiation Dispersal Devices

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<th>Agency</th>
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</thead>
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<td><a href="http://www.energy.gov">www.energy.gov</a></td>
<td>(202) 586-4940</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental Protection Agency</td>
<td><a href="http://www.epa.gov">www.epa.gov</a></td>
<td>(202) 564-9828</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuclear Regulatory Commission</td>
<td><a href="http://www.nrc.gov">www.nrc.gov</a></td>
<td>(301) 415-8200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department of Justice</td>
<td><a href="http://www.usdoj.gov">www.usdoj.gov</a></td>
<td>(202) 514-2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federal Bureau of Investigation</td>
<td><a href="http://www.fbi.gov">www.fbi.gov</a></td>
<td>(202) 324-3691</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department of Health and Human Services</td>
<td><a href="http://www.hhs.gov">www.hhs.gov</a></td>
<td>(202) 690-6343</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation Security Administration</td>
<td><a href="http://www.tsa.gov/public">www.tsa.gov/public</a></td>
<td>(571) 227-2829</td>
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<tr>
<td>National Nuclear Security Administration</td>
<td><a href="http://www.nnsa.gov">www.nnsa.gov</a></td>
<td>(202) 586-7371</td>
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Acknowledgments

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Cultivating Human Performance: Correctional Officer Preservice Training in Oklahoma

Emran Wasim Khan, EdD, Associate Professor, School of Law Enforcement and Justice Administration, Western Illinois University

Genius will live and thrive without training, but it does not less reward the watering pot and pruning knife.

–Margaret Fuller
(cited in Ceriello & Freeman, 1991, p. 527)

Prelude

Certain occupations continue to exist to accomplish specific and defined results (outputs), and individuals are engaged, usually through employment, so that organizations can accomplish those results. These results are achieved by carrying out tasks. As such, performance is “focused behavior or purposeful work” (Rudman, 1998, p. 205). Gilbert (1998, cited in Gilbert, 2007) additionally notes that performance has two aspects—“behavior being the means and its consequence being the end” (p. 13).

Human performance evolves as “a result of the experience, reflection, and conceptualization of professional practitioners striving to improve human performance in the workplace” (Stolovitch & Keeps, 1992). Workplaces come in various shapes and sizes. How, then, can a workplace contribute to one’s effectiveness on the job or as a human being?

Every Department of Corrections (DOC), from the smallest to the largest, needs a continuing education program for its officers (Slahor, 1991). However, that’s after ensuring that the “right people” are on board. Low salaries, public apathy, shift work, the changing nature of the job, increased danger of escalating drug and gang wars, etc., may not always be enticing enough for people to knock on the doors of such a quasi-military occupation to pursue a career. Hiring the right people that educational or training institutions can train to become good officers is getting more difficult (Cameron, 1990). Even if the DOC overcomes that hurdle, how can it retain the employees who tread its way? Is it the job of the vocational technical school or an academic institution such as a college or a university to prepare people for an occupation as a correctional officer?

This article cannot possibly do justice to all of these questions. No matter whose role it is to train or educate, I am convinced that the issues of liability, certification standards, and personal interest in learning all play roles in the need for education (Slahor, 1991) and training. Training and development, according to Mondy and Noe (2005), “is the heart of a continuous effort designed to improve employee competency and organizational performance” (p. 202). The big picture or an organization’s vision should include endeavors that pursue modifications to this system so that they enhance the system in terms of the accomplishments it values (Stolovitch & Keeps, 1992). Enhanced performance is a strategic goal for
organizations (Mondy & Noe, 2005, p. 203). Improving human performance—in this case, correctional officer performance in the context of quality correctional supervision—is improving a significant part of the system.

The necessity for Correctional Officer (CO) training is evident. In this article, the following will be presented:

• Introduce a CO (also known as Corrections Officer or Correctional Security Officer) and study the necessary skills that position requires.
• Briefly explore the evolution of CO training to its current status in Oklahoma.
• Discuss CO basic (preservice) training curriculum.
• Evaluate the overall dynamics of training.

**Portrait of a Correctional Officer**

Throughout history, the need for Correctional Officer (CO) training has been apparent to anyone who has recognized how complex the CO’s job can be. Under immediate to general supervision, a CO in Oklahoma performs routine duties in the maintenance of discipline and security in a state correctional facility or a privately owned institution among adult inmates who were convicted of one or multiple felonies by a court of law.

A CO must have knowledge of the methods and objectives of discipline required for persons under restraint, of the use and care of firearms, and he must possess knowledge of grammar and arithmetic. Skill in quickly evaluating a situation and adopting an effective course of action, and in following oral and written instructions, are also required (Oklahoma OPM, 1986).

Usually the minimum age for a person interested in the position of a CO is 21, and the maximum age for service is 70. Such a correctional staff member generally possesses a minimum of 30 semester hours from an accredited college or university or a high school diploma acquired from an accredited high school or GED (based upon standards established by the Department of Education) equivalent testing program and graduation from the Council of Law Enforcement Education and Training (CLEET) or be enrolled to complete such a course during the first six months of employment (Oklahoma Statutes, 1983).

Other requirements can include passing work reference checks, attending a selection interview, undergoing psychological profile testing, and satisfactory completion of a physical in keeping with the conditions of the CO job description annually and along guidelines established by ODOC. COs must also satisfactorily complete an adequate training program for their positions as prescribed and approved by the Board of Corrections before going on duty alone (Oklahoma OPM, 1986). A period of probation may also be required.

**General Requisites, Functions, and Accountabilities of a Correctional Officer**

In understanding the duties of a CO, it is essential that the general requisites, functions, and accountabilities are understood before dealing with specifics. If the general principles are understood, then specific instructions can be applied (American Correctional Association [ACA], 1972).
While attempting to describe a CO’s job, a DACUM (National Academy of Corrections [NAC], 1989) was conducted by the ODOC with consultants and researchers from Oklahoma State University (OSU). “One of the best, most cost effective job analysis process,” writes Ida Halasz (1997) “is called Developing a Curriculum (DACUM)” (p. 130). She further writes that the word DACUM actually has two meanings: DACUM conducted by ODOC and OSU, as mentioned above, is one—the job analysis process itself. The second is the chart that results from conducting the process as in a “DACUM of the correctional officer position” (p. 130).

A DACUM chart, such as the one that follows, displays the duties and tasks performed and lists necessary employee traits, attitudes, skills, and knowledge needed to do the work successfully (Halasz, 1997, p. 130). The result of the study (cited in Khan, 2001, pp. 284-287), conducted by ODOC with the assistance of OSU consultants and researchers, lists the following job duties in order of criticality and importance:

I.

A. Maintain Security (41% of total work time):
   1. monitor inmate behavior (essential);
   2. patrol perimeter, walk or drive depending on facility structure (essential);
   3. conduct cell/room inspections (essential);
   4. conduct security checks as required by facility (essential);
   5. conduct outside building checks (essential);
   6. count inmates and reconcile facility count (essential);
   7. conduct shake downs (essential);
   8. conduct searches of persons (essential);
   9. conduct searches of vehicles (essential);
  10. review logged information (essential);
  11. conduct/attend shift briefing (essential);
  12. control the use of tools, equipments, chemicals, and supplies (essential);
  13. operate control center operation (essential);
  14. communicate security related information (essential);
  15. place inmates in restraints (essential);
  16. conduct emergency drills (essential);
  17. control inmate personal property (essential);
  18. confiscate contraband (essential);
  19. carry firearms as assigned (marginal or essential depending on facility security level, post/assignment, and resources available);
  20. maintain firearm’s security (marginal or essential depending on post/assignment and facility security level);
  21. conduct inmate chemical tests (marginal).

B. Supervise Daily Inmate Activities (26% of total work time):
   1. supervise recreation activities (essential);
   2. supervise and evaluate performance of job duties assigned to inmates (essential);
   3. transport inmates (essential);
   4. monitor mail (essential);
   5. issue medications (essential);
   6. oversee inmate housing assignments (essential);
   7. enforce grooming code (essential);
   8. counsel and refer inmates (essential);
   9. monitor inmate phone calls (marginal).
C. Maintain Written Documentation (16%):
   1. make log entries (essential);
   2. conduct inventories (essential);
   3. complete required reports (essential).

D. Follow Emergency Procedures (6%):
   1. conduct in-service training (marginal);
   2. conduct CPR/first aid (essential);
   3. assist with manhunts (marginal).

E. Complete Other Duties as Assigned (11%):
   1. complete in-service training (marginal);
   2. serve temporarily in any post or position as assigned (marginal);
   3. conduct inmate orientation (marginal);
   4. conduct public relations activities (marginal);
   5. serve as transitional development specialist (marginal);
   6. dispense inmate payrolls (marginal); and
   7. investigate inmate offenses (marginal).

The result of the above referred study also lists the following work requirements and skills:

II. 

A. Work Requirements:
   1. meet minimum qualifications specified by the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) for the position of Correctional Officer I;
   2. successful completion of the training requirements for Correctional Officer Cadet;
   3. willingness and ability to work rotating shifts, weekends, holidays, overtime hours as needed, reachable and available for emergencies, and report for work assignment punctually;
   4. physically able to meet the demands of the position and respond to emergencies.

B. Skills:
   1. oral communication skills, ability to give clear instructions and relay accurate information;
   2. written communication skills, ability to prepare reports;
   3. reading and comprehension skills, ability to read and comprehend policy, procedure, post orders, instructions;
   4. counting and math skills, ability to take and reconcile inventories, ability to count inmates and balance count;
   5. willingness to follow written and oral instructions, orders;
   6. organizational and time management skills;
   7. interpersonal skills, ability to work well with others, ability to deal fairly, effectively, and with sensitivity to persons of diverse racial, ethnic, cultural, and ethnic backgrounds and the persons of both sexes;
   8. observational skills, ability to gather visual and auditory data, monitor behaviors and discern changes or unauthorized activity;
   9. good judgment, ability to make quick good decisions and respond calmly under stressful or hostile conditions;
   10. ability to conduct searches, move/lift objects, restrain and maintain custody of inmates, ability to defend oneself; and
   11. ability to operate a vehicle safely.
The preceding portion explains in specific detail what tasks actually are required and are usually performed by a CO under each of the above categories. A CO’s work requirements and skills have also been outlined above. In addition, according to the Oklahoma Office of Personnel Management (OPM) (2008a), “The Correctional Security Officer job family consists of four levels, which are distinguished based on complexity of work performed, the training required to perform assigned functions.” The responsibilities assigned for the supervision of others depends on the individual “level” he or she may have achieved. Such a detailed description of a CO’s job and duties can help retain new employees, evaluate job performance, design training, or justify physical requirements for certain positions (Halasz, 1997).

Evolution of Correctional Training in Oklahoma

CO training has come a long way since a new officer learned his functions and duties, in many institutions (correctional facilities), informally by working for a short time with “an experienced officer” thus sticking to traditional practices too often not attuned to present day thinking (Cass, 1959, cited in Cass, 1972). E. R. Cass, the General Secretary of the American Correctional Association (ACA) further wrote that

Unlike many other vocations there has been little opportunity for a person interested in working as a correction officer to receive formal pre-entrance training. The responsibility has fallen largely upon the administrators of institutions or correctional departments to organize their own training programs with little or no funds allotted for this purpose. (p. vi)

According to Folley (1976), even with the help from the federal government and increased emphasis on training during the 1970s, there were still many law enforcement agencies not providing training. It seems that the need for correctional training was only emphasized whenever traumatic, life-threatening, and costly events like riots and the subsequent involvement of the federal court took place.

In 1967, the President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice recommended that all officers have a minimum of 400 classroom hours of training. The determination of the magic number 400 is yet to be unearthed. I theorize that settling on a 10 work-week curriculum (@ 40 hours per week) was just convenient. Whatever process was followed to “assess needs” and/or to develop a curriculum (DACUM), there must have been a felt need to cover all the choice topics of the day—that is, what the Commission felt was necessary for a student to receive as basic (preservice) training before they would be allowed to become a law enforcement officer.

In the case of the ODOC, Sandhu (1991) chronicled that

toward the middle of the 1970’s, there was an increasing emphasis on the training of staff, particularly the correctional staff. The necessary incentive came from [the] Law Enforcement Educational Program (LEEP) and this federal program provided the funds. A private agency known as [the] Professional Agency for Correctional Training (PACT) on funding from LEEP assumed responsibility for training correctional officials at lower and mid-management levels. PACT hired both full-time and part-time instructors to instruct in their areas of specialization. (p. 43)
Riots reflect dissatisfaction to say the least. Unfortunately, it had to take a chaos situation, such as the riot at McAlester’s OSP (Oklahoma State Penitentiary), in 1973, to shake up the status quo. Days of informal training were over and, beginning in 1974, PACT in Oklahoma helped in training for a year. Sun Tide Inn in Oklahoma City was the location earmarked as the first staff “training academy” to address the training requirements of 1,379 employees in 1976 (Sandhu, 1991).

Four years later, in 1980, a former juvenile treatment center of the Department of Human Services, the Jess Dunn Correctional Center, became the venue for a centralized training academy called George Nigh Staff Development Center (GNSDC). In July 1986, when the adjacent Oklahoma Children Center became available, GNSDC took over that location. This was an era of professionalization of training in Oklahoma—hiring of full-time trainers who were subsequently trained by professional trainers and the National Academy of Corrections (NAC). A needs assessment, instead of personal whim or a policy or procedure, was the guiding light for generating and completing lesson plans and developing curriculums.

The number of ODOC employees had grown to 4,004 in 1988 when they decentralized GNSDC (Sandhu, 1991). The Staff Development Centers, later named the Employee Training & Development Center (ET&DC) in Stillwater and the Center for Correctional Officer Studies (CCOS) in Wilburton, were established. There were 4,416 employees (2,933 males and 1,483 females) on January 1, 1996, who were served by the ET&DC and/or the CCOS. On January 1, 1996, the total number of COs, including CO cadets through Chiefs of Security III, was 1,957. This number was made up of 1,662 males and 295 females. Of these, 1,544 individuals were categorized as White, six as Asian/Pacific Islander, 42 Hispanic, 159 Blacks/African American, and 206 Native American/Native Alaskan (ODOC Personnel Data Count). As of December 31, 1997, the training academies served 5,057 ODOC employees.

More recently, as of September 27, 2008, ODOC had a total of 4,766 employees: 1,968 COs, 344 Probation and Parole Officers, and 2,454 employees in the “Other” category. Both of the staff/employee training sites have recently been renamed and one has been relocated. The one which was relocated from Stillwater, Oklahoma, is now called the Oklahoma Training Academy (OTA)-Norman. The other, OTA-Wilburton, continues to be located on the campus of Eastern Oklahoma State College.

**Correctional Officer Preservice Training**

According to Mondy and Noe (2005), “Training provides learners with the knowledge and skills needed for their present job” (p. 202). Training, especially preservice training, implies learning the essentials of a job or tasks to perform competently (Rothwell, 1996, p. 26). To be effective in what training promises to deliver—that is, to help the employee fare to the demands of the organization and to retain the flexibility to change as a continuing part of the enterprise “it must be a systematic orderly procedure” (Lessly, 1981). Preservice training can provide such experiences that are oriented toward specific learning objectives.

ODOC’s (1992b) Operations Procedure (OP) 100109 defines preservice training as a “formal introductory training provided at an academy site for new employees”
where they are “provided an overview of policies and procedures, the criminal justice system, corrections and the agency.” Such training is “designed to familiarize the new employee with the history, philosophy, structure, and values of the agency” (p. 1).

Data available from ODOC’s Facts at a Glance (1997, 2008) documents that there were about 1,957 COs in the ODOC by the end of 1996. As of December 31, 1997, CO numbers totaled 2,128 out of 5,057 employees (ODOC Personnel Office). The number of inmates per inmate contact staff by security level for June 1997 was 4.8 for Maximum Security, 6.6 for Medium, 7.7 for Minimum, and 6.8 for Community Security; the total average was 6.4. The number of inmates per CO by security level and by month in June 1997 was Maximum, 3.7; Medium, 8.6; Minimum, 8.7; and Community, 13.3 for an average of 7.6 (ODOC daily count and personnel data system). Quite like 1996, as of September 28, 2008, CO numbers in Oklahoma totaled 1,968 out of 4,766 employees (ODOC Personnel Office) who supervised a “facility total” of 17,903 inmates.

On occasions, but very rarely, the ET&DC in Stillwater provided preservice training to COs. However, the then CCOS (currently known as the Oklahoma Training Academy [OTA]-Wilburton) has the primary task of CO training. In 1995, CCOS trained 382 cadets; in 1996, there were 276 cadets who attended CO training; and the figure for 1997 was 520. The number of training academy employees remained about the same for the approximate period. These numbers may shed some light on the varying activity levels of the training staff. In this article, the focus is on CCOS and OTA-Wilburton’s instructional endeavors.

According to CCOS Field Memorandum 000501-01, the Center issues a mission statement each fiscal year which is consistent with the mission of the department. During FY 1997, the identified responsibilities to the public were to use state resources efficiently and effectively in the training of ODOC’s personnel. The basic responsibilities remain about the same today. The responsibilities to the employees are to provide the highest quality of training to CO cadets and other ODOC staff which allows for personal growth and development, promotes a safe and secure working environment, and recognizes each employee as a valuable individual. OTA-Wilburton’s responsibilities to the offenders are to instill in CO cadets and other ODOC staff a commitment to the safe care, custody, treatment, and security of all individuals within their jurisdiction.

Preservice Training Curriculum

As outlined in Operations Procedures (OP) 100202, Section 10, Standards for Basic Peace Officer Training, dated October 25, 2007, “the basic peace officer training curriculum is designed to address specific learning objectives that are determined by the Council on Law Enforcement Education and Training (CLEET). The basic peace officer curriculum is standardized for use by CLEET and authorized for use by its academy sites. [The] Department of Corrections basic peace officer training academy site will follow CLEET’s standardized curriculum” (p. 2). With the goals discussed in the preceding paragraphs, the curriculum from OTA-Wilburton is shared to represent the desired learning experiences.

The following lists a total of 240 hours of academy training (taken from ODOC’s Oklahoma Training Academy website, September 2008; also see Appendix A). The
Orientation to CCOS (8 hours): The primary focus of this program is registration and to familiarize the CO cadet with the Center for Correctional Officer Studies (CCOS), the general policies and procedures of the Center, and the expectations of the ODOC. CCOS staff members are introduced to the cadets. Additionally, time is allowed for the instructors to gain insight and information concerning each class member during individual cadet introductions.

Wellness (2 hours): Emphasizes the importance of personal awareness. Discussion topics include stress management, physical fitness, diet, relaxation techniques, and wellness in the workplace. A tour of facility exercise centers can be included.

Preventing Workplace Violence (2 hours): Increases awareness of possible acts or threats of aggression that can occur at, or directly affects, the workplace. It teaches about the causes and perpetrators of violence and promotes intervention strategies. It familiarizes the CO cadets with ODOC policy.

An Overview of the Department of Corrections (2 hours): The history, mission, organization structure, and operations of the Department are reviewed and explained. Information concerning policies regarding personal responsibilities toward the public, other employees, and offenders are provided.

An Overview of the Criminal Justice System (CJS) (2 hours): Familiarizes cadets with the various components of the criminal justice system and how those various independent systems interact. Basic terminology of the CJS is defined and discussed.

Legal Aspects (2 hours): Introduces the process for establishing laws/statutes and the liability issues most often encountered by correctional officers. The best methods COs can use to protect themselves from unnecessary legal encounters are discussed. Offenders’ constitutional rights and responsibilities are also addressed.

Defensive Driving (4 hours): Designed to ensure employees are aware of potential driving hazards. It offers recommendations for preventing traffic accidents and for making the roads and highways a safer environment. The National Safety Council’s DDC-4 course lesson plan is followed.

First Aid and Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation (8 hours): Follows the American Red Cross CPR modules and the Illinois DOC First Aid lesson plans. Instruction is given to prepare employees to respond properly to an emergency.

Report Writing (12 hours): Basic rules of writing an effective report are introduced. The most common errors are discussed and guidelines for better written communication by using proper grammar, punctuation, spelling, and clear
sentence structure are provided. Practicum sessions are used to allow for hands-on experience in developing the various types of reports used by the ODOC.

**Defensive Tactics/Self-Defense** (40 hours): A combination of the Federal Bureau of Prison’s (BOP) self-defense and the National Law Enforcement Training Center’s (NLETC) defensive tactics models are taught. This course is designed to provide the knowledge and skills needed to prepare for potentially dangerous situations and possible physical assault better. This course includes a practicum.

**Practical Reasoning** (4 hours): Lawrence Kohlberg’s ten universal issues about the “right and wrong” of situations are discussed. This course explores the individual’s values versus societal values, and the general notion of dependence, independence, and interdependence.

**Hostage Survival Techniques/First Responder** (10 hours): Exposes cadets to the potential threat of being taken hostage and the dynamics of a hostage situation, along with general rules to follow if taken hostage. The basics of hostage negotiation and the Stockholm Syndrome are discussed.

**Riot Prevention and Control** (6 hours): Addresses the major causes of prison riots and disturbances. Pre-riot patterns and ways to prevent a riot from being incited are discussed. Also, ways to control rioting offenders once a major disturbance has occurred are addressed.

**Positive Climate** (4 hours): Designed to promote a healthier work environment by working toward the best possible outcomes, working together toward common goals, providing care and concern for coworkers, and strengthening the department through personal commitment to excellence. Instruction focuses on adapting to change and practicing teamwork.

**Correctional Environmental Security Procedures – I, II, III, IV & V** (40 hours): Covers specific security issues, such as radio communications, facility emergencies, post orders, offender counts, key and tool control, search of area and person, identification of contraband and physical evidence, crime scene preservation, restrictive housing, property issues, and offender transportation. Demonstration of acquired skills is required; central control room and inmate cells, etc., are simulated for practicums.

**Conflict Resolution** (4 hours): Provides better understanding of the causes and effects of personal conflicts. The objectives are to teach basic skills of evaluating potential problem areas, controlling the situation, and selecting appropriate response and negotiation resolutions between parties. Procedures on enforcing departmental policies and methods of documenting serious conflicts are also discussed.

**Behavioral Recognition** (6 hours): Identifies and discusses offenders who present special needs. The focus is placed on substance abuse, suicide prevention, and recognizing psychological and emotional disorders, along with other disabilities. Identification, documentation, and resources for referral are stressed.
Offender Classification (2 hours): Covers a basic overview of the current system of offender classification. Explanation of objective (points) and subjective (recommendations) criterions are provided. Criteria used to assess offenders are shown.

Offender Programs (3 hours): Familiarizes cadets with available programs for development of offenders. Topics of discussion include programs required by court rulings and the American Correctional Association (ACA); the purpose and benefits of prison and community programs; the notions of punishment and idleness versus rehabilitation and productivity; and a correctional employee’s role in program referral.

Offender Disciplinary Procedures (12 hours): Provides an understanding of the ODOC’s offender disciplinary process, from initiating an offense report through the appeal process. A practicum provides the opportunity to actually write misconducts and conduct hearings using offense scenarios.

Public Image (6 hours): Addresses several areas of professionalism, including courtroom demeanor. Emphasis is placed on public relations; it points out how public image can mold or promote positive (or negative) public opinion through an employee’s actions (or inaction) and conduct.

Blood Borne/Airborne Pathogens (6 hours): Designed to create an awareness of the types of pathogenic diseases (e.g., HIV, HBV, tuberculosis, etc.) that public employees, and particularly correctional personnel, could come in to contact with in the workplace. The methods for prevention, reporting, and documentation are covered, along with the requirements of federal statutes and OSHA.

Preventing Sexual Harassment (8 hours): Defines sexual harassment and discusses its effect on persons involved, the administration, and others in the workplace. State and federal laws are identified, along with the potential for liability to both the person who harasses and the ODOC. Ways to reduce interference with the ability of employees to work as a team by eliminating sexual harassment are highlighted.

Effective Interpersonal Communication Skills (IPCS) (24 hours): Interpersonal communication is designed to provide the basic knowledge and skills necessary to communicate effectively with others. That an employee’s first and usually best defense is “talking” and how those communication skills can be applied are discussed. The importance of understanding other people, learning the techniques of tolerance, the ways to adapt to a demanding work environment, and mastering the critical skills needed to deal with their real concerns are explored.

Identifying and Handling Criminal Gangs (6 hours): The explosion of street and prison gangs is discussed. Information is provided to help in the identification of possible gang activity. The basic characteristics of gang mentality, including the individual’s need for security and the need to belong, are discussed. Slang and hand sign information are also analyzed.

Clean Facility (4 hours): Benefits of a clean facility and methods of supervision of offenders in maintaining cleanliness of a facility are introduced. Essential elements for successful management of offenders are outlined, and forms and inventory sheets currently in use by the ODOC are introduced.
Physical Conditioning (10 hours): Throughout the six-week curriculum, cadets are required to spend a minimum of ten structured hours in activity that requires physical exertion (e.g., walking/running, aerobics, stretching exercises, etc.). Physical and emotional wellness are emphasized, and additional time for individual and group activities is provided. The facility has a swimming pool, sauna, track, and basketball/volleyball courts. This course is a prerequisite to the Defensive Tactics and Self-Defense course.

Use of Force (2 hours): Identifies and defines the eight (8) levels of use of force. A copy of the current Operations Memorandum covering this information is provided, and each level is examined in depth. Judicious but swift and cautious (as appropriate) use of force is emphasized, while exercising safe, secure, reasonable, and humane control.

Use of Restraints (5 hours): This first level use of force is emphasized. Practical hands-on experience is used to reinforce classroom training in the proper use of handcuffs, leg irons, belly chains, and other methods of physical restraint.

Firearms Training/Simulator (FATS III) (40 hours): Judgmental shooting under stressful situations is simulated through computerized graphics. This training allows a shooter to see and hear life-size action scenarios and provides the opportunity to make split-second decisions concerning shoot/don’t shoot situations. This lesson plan is CLEET certified and provides CLEET credits.

Training

Civilization has not yet found the way to create and sustain an organization without human beings. Nor has it created a mystic concoction which infuses technology and skill into people (Laird, 1985). The preceding sections paint the picture of a correctional officer, his or her skills, and lists the CO’s job duties. The evolution of preservice training reflects back on where correction was, and the detailed curriculum reveals current efforts in the making of a professional CO. The questions still remains: Why train?

Forty years before Laird (1985), Halsey (1947) defined training as “causing people to become interested in their work and aiding them to acquire the knowledge and skill necessary to do that work well” (p. 126). Nadler (1970) distinguished training as “those activities which are designed to improve human performance on the job the employee is presently doing or is being hired to do” (p. 40).

“Training,” Laird (1985) writes, “is the acquisition of the technology which permits employees to perform to standard” (p. 11). He further expounds that people necessarily do not come in as masters of the unique requirements of an organization. Training, as a subsystem, helps them to master the technology of their tasks. Training, he further contends, “changes uninformed employees to informed employees; training changes unskilled or semiskilled workers into employees who can do their assigned tasks in the way the organization wants them done . . . into workers who do things the right way” (p. 7).

Training is usually involved every time someone gets someone else to do work the way it is expected to be done (Lessly, 1981). Nadler and Nadler (1992) believe that training “is the activity where the learning is focused on the present job of the learner” (p. 6). As defined by James (1990), training is “an educational situation
or process by which the skill and ability of employees to perform a specific job is increased. It also offers an opportunity for further development of the individual.” Training is one of the most significant ingredients that can immensely prevail upon the effectuality of an organization’s employees. According to some, training is a systematic process of altering the behavior of employees; and others view training as a specific process of increasing one’s skill and knowledge about a specific job (Khan, 1997, p. 14). The domain of training, adds Rothwell and Kazanas (as cited in Rothwell, 1996), consists of endeavors that “focus on identifying, assuring, and helping develop, through planned learning, the key competencies that enable individuals to perform current or future jobs” (p. 26). Training, therefore, is a critical undertaking which can ease rectification of prior errors but can also be a device for future accomplishment.

Correctional training, it is hoped, empowers the trainees with knowledge and skills to uphold the mission of the organization. Media’s (occasional) portrayal of a prison guard does disservice to the personal and professional competencies COs possess. Besides maintaining a secure environment safely and responding to emergencies, COs as a group participate in designing and delivering programs, and assess inmate needs and problems. They evaluate and monitor the environment and interact with offenders in a meaningful way. COs exert influence in redirecting offender behavior positively. They are able to achieve all of this by working as a team, with the assistance of other professionals in the correctional field, of course.

The human, legal, and social responsibilities facing these professionals require that they be adequately trained to meet the challenges that face them each day as they work with the nation’s criminal offenders (Wolford & Kowalski, 1993, pp. 8, 10). Examining what is being done in Oklahoma can show the world where it stands. It can also provide an opportunity for the world to share with Oklahoma (in response to such writing, as feedback) what we don’t know. Such a meeting of the minds can broaden our perspectives if only we are willing to learn from each other. Learning never ends because no lifelong learning process does!

**Conclusion**

Change in life is as fluid as change itself. Changing technology changes the dynamics of challenges and expectations and consequently leads to societal changes (Villaquirán, 1997). Smith (1997) concurs, adding “Training needs in the workplace go through an eternal evolution process as technology changes, each time a law is written or amended, or different psychological approaches are used.”

Robbins (1994) shared the following from Oliver Wendell Holmes: “Man’s mind stretched to a new idea never goes back to its original dimension” (p. 243). Training stretches the mind of the trainees. The changes and the enrichment that such training inspires can take the trainees where they want to go.

Though it was while elaborating the advantages of education, I believe the consequences of the learning experience that Mahan (1991) enumerated are applicable to the graduates of a professional correctional training academy. What an organization can hope that the trainees would take back to their own place of employment, posts, or facilities, or in other words, the implications of training for a correctional officer, are the following:
• Broad-based decisionmaking skills and knowledge
• Responsibly carrying out responsibilities
• Professional performance
• Mature behavior
• Acknowledges and appreciates rights of individuals
• Values law, policies, and procedures
• Flexibly handles difficult or ambiguous situations
• Applies the understanding of the “big picture”
• Appreciates the prosecutorial, courts, and correctional roles
• Practices empathy and tolerance when applicable
• Efficiently communicates, networks, and builds relationships
• Uses discretion wisely
• Responds to crime and service needs of the public, the employees, and the offenders in a competent manner with civility and humanity
• Serves as a role model

Human performance, or in the context of this article, Correctional Officer performance, can be improved by staying in touch with the changes that are taking place in the world of work. So, in the words of Villaquirán (1997), an organization can actively reposition itself for continued growth resulting in a cycle of renovation. I believe that correctional organizations are poised for such renovation. Such organizations will go through cycles of changes and come out thriving only if we let the above plan of attack come to fruition by not allowing old paradigms or barriers to stand in our way for a new reality to emerge.

In order that people may be happy in their work, three things are needed:
They must be fit for it. They must not do too much of it. And they must have a sense of success in it.

–John Ruskin
(cited in Ceriello & Freeman, 1991, p. 503)

Bibliography


Appendix A

The following is the most recent listing (September 2008) of courses alphabetically in the Oklahoma DOC’s Oklahoma Training Academy’s website:

Behavioral Recognition
This training identifies and discusses offenders who present special needs. Focus is placed on substance abuse, suicide, and psychological and emotional disorders, along with other disabilities. Identification, documentation, and resources for referral are stressed.

Blood Borne and Airborne Pathogens
This course is designed to create an awareness of the types of pathogenic diseases that public employees, and particularly correctional personnel, could come in to contact with in the workplace (e.g., HIV, HBV, tuberculosis, etc.). The methods for prevention, reporting, and documentation are covered, along with the requirements of federal statutes and OSHA.

Conflict Resolution
The goal of this course is to provide better understanding of the causes and effects of personal conflicts. The objectives are to teach basic skills of evaluating potential problem areas, controlling the situation, and selecting appropriate response and negotiation resolutions between parties. Enforcing departmental policies and documenting serious conflicts are also discussed.

Defensive Driving
This course is designed to ensure employees are aware of potential driving hazards. It offers recommendations for preventing traffic accidents and for making the highways a safer environment.

Defensive Tactics and Self-Defense
A combination of the Federal Bureau of Prisons self-defense and the Counsel on Law Enforcement Education and Training’s defensive tactics models are taught. This course is designed to provide the cadet with knowledge and skills needed to better prepare for potentially dangerous situations and possible physical assault.

Effective Interpersonal Communication Skills
Interpersonal communication is designed to provide cadets with the basic knowledge and skills necessary to communicate effectively with others. Since the correctional employee’s first and usually best defense is “talking,” the importance of understanding other people and identifying their real concerns are critical skills.

Environmental Security Procedures
This block of training covers specific security issues: radio communications, facility emergencies, post orders, offender counts, key and tool control, searches, contraband and physical evidence, crime scene preservation, restrictive housing, property issues, and transport. In addition to classroom instruction, cadets are required to demonstrate hands-on skills. A central control room and inmate cells are simulated for practicums.
Firearms Training Simulator (Fats III)
Judgmental shooting under stressful situations are simulated through computerized graphics. This training allows a shooter to see and hear life-size action scenarios and provides the opportunity to make split-second decisions concerning shoot/don’t shoot situations.

First Aid and Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation
The course standard for this block of instruction is the American Red Cross lesson plan. Instruction is given to prepare employees to respond properly to an emergency situation.

Hostage Survival Techniques and First Responder
During this instruction, the cadet is exposed to the potential threat of being taken hostage and the dynamics of a hostage situation, along with general rules to follow if taken hostage. The basics of hostage negotiation and the Stockholm Syndrome are discussed.

Legal Aspects
The purpose of this class is to inform the cadet of the process for establishing laws/statutes, the liability issues most often encountered by Correctional Officers, and the best methods for protecting yourself as a Department of Corrections employee. Offenders’ constitutional rights and responsibilities are also addressed.

Offender Disciplinary Procedures
The focus of this course is to provide the cadet with an understanding of the Department’s disciplinary process, from initiating an offense report through the appeal process. A practicum provides the opportunity to actually write misconducts and conduct hearings utilizing offense scenarios.

Orientation to the Academy
The primary focus of this program is to familiarize the Correctional Officer cadet with the ODOC’s Oklahoma Training Academy, the general policies and procedures of the Academy, and the expectations of the Department. During this time, the staff members are introduced to the cadets. Additionally, the instructors are afforded an opportunity to gain insight and information concerning each class member during individual introductions.

Overview of the Criminal Justice System
Cadets are familiarized with the various components of the criminal justice system and how those various independent systems interact. Basic terminology is discussed in addition to legal definitions.

Overview of the Department of Corrections
The history, mission, organization structure, and operations of the Department are reviewed and explained. Cadets are provided information concerning policies regarding personal responsibilities toward the public, other employees, and offenders.

Physical Conditioning and Wellness
Throughout the six-week curriculum, cadets are required to spend a minimum of ten structured hours in activity that requires physical exertion (e.g., walking/
running, aerobics, stretching exercises, etc.). Physical and emotional wellness are emphasized, and additional time is provided for individual and group activities. The academy utilizes a swimming pool, sauna, track, and basketball/volleyball courts. This course is a prerequisite to the Defensive Tactics and Self-Defense course.

**Positive Climate**
This course is designed to give cadets the training necessary to make the work environment healthier by working toward the best possible outcomes, working together toward common goals, providing care and concern for coworkers, and strengthening the Department through personal commitment to excellence. Instruction focuses on adapting to change and teamwork.

**Practical Reasoning**
Ten universal issues are discussed relative to the “right and wrong” of situations. This course explores the individual’s values versus societal values, and the general concept of dependence, independence, and interdependence.

**Public Image**
This training addresses several areas of professionalism, including courtroom demeanor. Emphasis is placed on the fact that the public’s opinion of corrections is based on its opinion of ODOC employees, their actions, and conduct.

**Report Writing**
Cadets are given instruction in the basic rules of writing an effective report. The most commonly found errors are discussed. Guidelines are provided for better written communication through the use of proper grammar, punctuation, spelling, and clear sentence structure. A practicum is utilized to allow the cadets to have hands-on experience in developing various types of reports used by the Department of Corrections.

**Riot Prevention and Control**
This course addresses the major causes of prison riots and disturbances. Pre-riot patterns and ways to prevent a riot from being incited are discussed in addition to the control of rioting offenders once a major disturbance has occurred.

**Sexual Harassment**
This training defines sexual harassment and discusses its effect on persons involved, the administration, and others in the workplace. The state and federal laws are identified, along with the potential for liability to both the person who harasses and the Department. Emphasis is placed on the fact that sexual harassment interferes with the ability of employees to work as a team.

**Use of Force**
This block of training identifies and defines the eight levels of use of force. A copy of the current Operations Memorandum covering this information is provided, and each level is examined.
Use of Restraints
This first level use of force is emphasized. Practical hands-on experience is used to reinforce classroom training in the proper use of handcuffs, leg irons, belly chains, and other methods of physical restraint.

Workplace Violence
This course describes the established procedures to provide employees a safe work environment which is free from violence and the threat of violence through the established guidelines for preventing and responding to incidents of workplace violence.

Dr. Emran Khan earned his Bachelor in Social Sciences (BSS) with Honors and an MSS in International Relations from the Dhaka University, Dhaka, Bangladesh, in 1979 and 1980, respectively. He obtained an MBA (Marketing and Management) from Central State University, Edmond, Oklahoma, in 1985. His third master’s, an MA in Criminal Justice Management and Administration (1986), is also from the CSU. He earned his Doctoral degree (EdD) in Occupational and Adult Education (OAED) in 2001 from Oklahoma State University in Stillwater, with an emphasis in Human Resource Development (HRD). His research focused on correctional officer training in the USA.

Prior to teaching in the School of Law Enforcement and Justice Administration at Western Illinois University, Dr. Khan was a professor at Fort Valley State University in Georgia for two years and an instructor at the Employee Training and Development Center in Stillwater, Oklahoma, for more than six years. In his 16-year correctional career, mostly with the Oklahoma Department of Corrections, he has been a Correctional Officer and a Case Manager in a maximum security prison; a Probation and Parole Officer; a Senior Probation and Parole Officer; a Grievance Review Officer, reviewing all levels of statewide offender appeals; a Detention Officer at a juvenile facility; a Senior Correctional Training Officer; a Contract Monitor; and a Local Administrator of Community Sentencing.

He has published several articles in refereed and non-refereed journals, is a co-author and the editor of the Moral Dilemmas and Decisions in Law Enforcement & the Administration of Justice textbook, and has served as a consultant to various agencies in Oklahoma. He has also presented his research at numerous local, regional, national, and international conferences.
Answering the Call for More Minority Police Officers: What Barriers Ring Out?

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David J. Thomas, PhD, Assistant Professor, Division of Justice Studies, Florida Gulf Coast University

General Observations: Significant Milestones

• There have been many issues involving the hiring of minority police officers in law enforcement agencies nationwide. First, there was the discrimination of African Americans and other minorities, which brought on many changes by the Civil Rights Act.

• Then, there was reverse discrimination: White officers began to file lawsuits, claiming they were being eliminated from police positions simply because of their race.

• Issues of racially motivated police brutality have led many to believe that there should be a racial balance in law enforcement agencies.

• Racial issues do not only exist in reference to the number of officers on police forces but also in the areas of promotion, shift assignment, and specialized units.

These observations beg the following question(s):

Is a racially balanced police force in the future of this country or are concerns over race diminishing among our police departments?

We hope to find the answer for these questions through our investigation on this matter as we examine the plight of ethnic/racial minority candidates.

Scope of the Problem

According to the Bureau of Justice Statistics (2004), there are 836,787 full-time, sworn, law enforcement officers serving in the United States. Of the 836,787 listed, 731,903 worked at the local and state level(s) and the remaining 104,884 worked in federal agencies. The Bureau also disclosed that of the federal officers, 33.2% were members of racial or ethnic minority groups. In regards to the local and state agencies, 42.4% were members of ethnic or racial minority groups. The above numbers look encouraging until there is greater scrutiny on factors such as community populous and future projections. The America.gov website (2008) projects that by 2042, minorities, collectively, will make up more than 50.0% of the U.S. population. That is compared to the current 32.0% that currently makes
up the minority population. Another problem with taking the above numbers as true representation is that many communities are still “segregated,” thus we have a high concentration of minorities in some neighborhoods. With that high concentration, it could be expected that a high number of minority officers would be needed in order to maintain fair representation in that community. Also, the high concentration of minorities should influence/increase the number of applicants from minority groups. Saltzstein (1989) suggested that a high African-American population in a city means more minority candidates are going to apply for and be selected to receive a police officer’s job notwithstanding any other factors that may come into play. Saltzstein went on to offer that the African-American population in a city was the strongest predictor of the increase in the hiring of African-American officers. Although Saltzstien provides some very valuable insight(s), his offerings implicitly discount the importance of other factors argued to be significant in minority inclusion in American policing. The authors will examine select law enforcement agencies in the State of Florida in order to glean what factors play a significant role in minority applicants securing or not securing jobs in law enforcement.

Snapshot of Minority Representation in Florida’s Law Enforcement Agencies

Table 1. Comparative Five-Year Report of Criminal Justice Officer Population by Minority and Gender (ATMS)

<table>
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<th>Minority and Gender Breakdown</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>% of Total</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>% of Total</th>
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<td>21.31</td>
<td>14,298</td>
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</table>

Table 2. Percent of Full-Time Law Enforcement Officers Employed by Sheriffs’ Offices and Police Departments Reported by Agency Size (ATMS)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Range</th>
<th># of Sheriff’s Agencies</th>
<th>Sheriff’s FT Officers</th>
<th># of PD Agencies</th>
<th>PD’s FT Officers</th>
<th>Total Number of Agencies</th>
<th>Total 2007 FT Officers</th>
<th>% of Total Officer Population</th>
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Information for tables provided by the Florida Department of Law Enforcement (2007)
The above tables should be viewed with these facts in mind: 39.0% of Florida’s population is comprised of members from ethnic and racial minority groups and 51.0% of Florida’s population is comprised of women. This information helps give a more accurate picture of minority group representation in law enforcement in the State of Florida (U.S. Census Bureau, 2007).

Based on the numbers provided by the U.S. Census Bureau (2007) and those provided by the Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE), it can be seen that the State of Florida is seriously underrepresented with minority law enforcement officers. Again, the purpose of this study is to investigate why different campaign efforts have faltered in regards to the hiring of more minorities for law enforcement positions.

**Important Legislation**

There has been a great deal of legislative action taken that has been geared toward making employment opportunities fair and equitable to all citizens. Law enforcement agencies are not exempt from the mandates which resulted from such actions. The following examples will highlight a few legislative actions that should have an impact on hiring practices at the various agencies:

- The Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution says, “No state shall deny to any person the equal protection under the law.”
- Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act prohibits employment discrimination based on race, color, national origin, religion, or sex.

**Significance:** The Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII) and The Equal Rights Amendment of 1972 made all local and state governments enact the same guidelines as the federal government in order to reduce employment discrimination. No longer could they use race, color, creed, or sex as a condition of employment in any government office. The 1971 *Griggs v. Duke Power Company* case set forth the principle that a plaintiff does not need to prove discriminatory intent. This ruling placed more of the burden on employing agencies to show fair practices.

- Affirmative Action

In 1999, Jeb Bush introduced “The One Florida Initiative.” This bill eliminated racial quotas as related to college admissions, state contracts, and the hiring of state employees. The bill ended Affirmative Action in Florida. In the United States, Affirmative Action mostly applies at transition points—times when individuals are changing their employment, housing, or enrollment.

**Methodology**

A qualitative research method was used to analyze the nature and contextual experiences of background investigators who were responsible for investigating the backgrounds of applicants who were applying for positions at law enforcement
agencies. These officers were also responsible for making recommendations to the hiring committee/individual. A qualitative method was used in order to provide a rich description of background investigators’ experiences. Bogdan and Biklen (1992) defined qualitative research as being “rich in description of people, places and conversation,” which are “not easily handled by statistical procedures,” stating that “qualitative researchers are concerned with understanding behavior/experiences from the subject’s own frame of reference” (p. 2). Consequently, analyzing the experiences of the background investigators is more easily understood utilizing qualitative research because this approach permits the in-depth exploration of the experiences of a group of people in their own voices.

Participant Selection

The population studied consisted of eight background investigators who represented eight different law enforcement agencies in the State of Florida. Interviews were conducted with these individuals as they responded to a series of questions which probed to gain insight on their experiences as background officers. The questions also solicited insight as to their experience(s) with minority applicants. Once the interviews were completed, the authors coded the responses based on notes taken during the interviews.

An attempt was made to include a range of experiences and orientations in order to examine the full spectrum of the nature and contextual factors which condition the background investigators’ experience(s) and to examine the interface of background investigators and hiring officials in working through the hiring process. This group included background investigators/hiring officers representing various ranks within the law enforcement agencies. The officers participated on a voluntary basis and were not coerced/forced to participate in the study.

Research Design

Prior to the beginning of the study, the background investigator in each law enforcement agency was contacted, given a brief description of the study, and asked to participate. The background investigators were asked to provide a brief description of their positions and to set up a time when an interview could be conducted in regards to their experience(s) as background investigators. The participants were encouraged by the researchers to be as candid as possible and told that the information gathered from the interviews would be used to analyze and critique the existing hiring practices at the respective agencies. The primary method of gathering data for this study was through open-ended questions asked by way of interviews.

The participants were asked to respond to ten open-ended questions. They were generally asked to describe their work experiences and to share their experiences of working with the applicants as well as the hiring official(s). The participants were asked to share their views on the level of quality in the hiring process performed by their respective agencies. As interviews progressed with the background investigators, probes were used to encourage the officers to illustrate their reflections with specific examples and experiences. However, tangential topics and questions evolved, and the researchers pursued what Spindler and
Spindler (1992) refer to as a flexible format, encouraging the participants to speak freely about concerns and, in the process, to answer questions that had not been asked. The interviews usually lasted about 30 minutes, although some of them were longer. Notes were taken during the interviews, which later served as a means for data analysis.

Data Analysis

There is a unique relationship between the data and their analyses in a qualitative study. As the data are collected, “units” emerge that suggest further data that needed to be collected and suggest categories of information. Typically, the data are coded according to these categories and analyzed to explore meaning and interrelationships (Bogdan & Biklen, 1992).

Coding

Coding is the process by which data are ordered. Three forms of coding—(1) open, (2) axial, and (3) selective—occurred simultaneously with the data collection to permit the researchers to identify relationships among the variables.

The line-by-line examination of each transcript to identify emerging concepts expressed by the study’s participants initially was performed with open coding. Axial coding was used to review experience areas and hypothesize relationships. Selective coding for core arenas was conducted systematically to identify codes with a significant relationship that could be used for additional data collection (Strauss, 1987).

As the researchers analyzed and reviewed the notes from the interviews, they noted similar terms, phrases, and experiences that emerged. These were carefully examined, resulting in the development of common barriers that were noted by the background investigators.

Results

What Are the Voices Saying?

Now that we have laid out a basic accounting for the scope of the problem as well as examined legislation aimed at addressing underrepresentation, we need to discuss the possible barriers as seen by the individuals who are responsible for screening and recommending minority applicants.

Common Themes/Observations

The common themes fell into the following areas:

• Education
  
  • Most agencies are now requiring at least an associate’s degree.
  
  • Many minorities are eliminated from the applicant pools due to being school dropouts. Stinchcomb and Terry (1995) indicated that White applicants, rather
than ethnic minority applicants, were more likely to score higher on written tests, which might simply reflect the applicants’ educational experience.

- **Sociological Aversion**

  Many minorities are taught that the police are the enemy and should be avoided at all times. This ideology automatically dwindles the potential minority pool.

- **Background**

  - **Criminal Record**: Minorities carry a larger burden of the criminal records held in society. Whether just or not, these records are disqualifying applicants at an alarming rate—even for minor, nonviolent offenses.

  - **Drug Use**: Many departments have a stipulated time period in which the applicant must have been drug free. The time period varies from agency to agency.

  - **Felonious Family Members**: Due to the level of crime in most minority communities, it is very likely that applicants will have family members who have been convicted of a felony.

  - **Psychological Testing**: Ho (2001) found that racial minority applicants are less likely to be recommended by psychologists on the basis of psychological testing and assessment. He went on to suggest that a psychologist’s recommendation does not have any significant impact on police recruitment decisions among the non-White group.

- **Unequal Application of the Rules**

  The minority participants in the study expressed a concern over the lack of consistency when it comes to screening and processing applicants. The concerned participants suggested that oftentimes nonminorities are allowed to continue in the application process although their records had been flagged by the background investigator(s). The participants announced that this practice was pretty much nonexistent with minority applicants.

  One participant revealed that although administration may not consciously block the hiring of Blacks, females, Hispanics, Native Americans, or Asians, it appears that executives tend to hire, retain, and promote individuals who have qualities similar to themselves:

  - Similar economic background
  - Similar culture
  - Similar ideology
  - Same gender

  *Key Point*: Even though the chief administrator of an agency may espouse his desire to hire, retain, and promote minorities, the people in positions to have an impact on hiring, retaining, and promoting may not share that commitment.
General Discussion

It appears that many of the barriers to the hiring of minority police officers are systemic, but several are the responsibility of the general citizenry. The participants in the study shared some of their observations, including that as the minority population grows in society, it will be very difficult to reach and/or maintain an adequate representation of minority officers. The barriers that were highlighted in this study can be addressed in numerous ways, but it will take commitment by all involved to rectify what could become a crisis within the next 20 to 30 years. Now is the time to put effective measures in place that would counteract the barriers that have been discussed in this paper. Although a more thorough investigation needs to be conducted in order to present a more comprehensive strategy, the researchers feel that this study has yielded enough observations/results that allow for a few recommendations in terms of addressing the issue. So, the question becomes, how do we approach the issue?

Possible Solutions

• Minority groups should assume partial responsibility for the dilemma.

• Minority youth need to be exposed early on to positive experiences with the police.

• Youth need to be helped to understand how decisions in their youth can have lasting consequences.

• Agencies should be required to have hiring committees that are racially and ethnically balanced, even if civilians are needed to create the balance.

• Minority youth should be encouraged to see the importance of education as the standards for entrance are being raised in all job markets.

• Agencies should attend career fairs at educational institutions that have high numbers of minorities in an effort to show that the agencies are serious in their efforts to hire minority officers.

• Hiring practices should continue to be monitored and scrutinized until significant gains are made in the hiring of minority officers.

References


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**Dr. David J. Thomas** has a PhD in Forensic Psychology and a Master of Education in Curriculum Design and Instruction. He retired from Gainesville Police Department after 20 years of service. His assignments as a police officer were in patrol, detectives, community oriented policing, SWAT, hostage negotiations, and training. He is a certified law enforcement trainer in the State of Florida with 25 years of experience. His training expertise is in firearms, defensive tactics, driving, human diversity, and general law enforcement topics. He currently serves as an assistant professor of Criminal Justice at Florida Gulf Coast University.
Use-of-force training is a requirement for law enforcement to prepare officers to deal with the multitude of dangerous circumstances that they may face on a daily basis. Typically, recruits in the Academy and active duty police officers are trained in the use of a variety of weaponless control techniques, disarming techniques, and searching techniques. They are also trained in the use of chemical agents, batons, electrical devices, and deadly weapons. In Academy and advanced officer training sessions, officers spend time refining skills in searching and handcuffing suspects, practicing how to retain their firearm when a suspect grabs it, and many other skill-building, life-saving exercises. Officers are trained via scenarios or simulations on whether to shoot or not shoot. Hours and hours are spent on the shooting ranges or in shooting houses to be able to master firing their duty weapon so that they will be prepared for the time when its on-duty use is required. Officers are trained to punch, kick, and restrain suspects and to do so only using that force considered objectively reasonable$^1$ to the circumstances. What then is missing from law enforcement’s use-of-force training?

When an officer uses force in the line of duty, he or she needs to be able to document the circumstances surrounding its lawful use. The general public, the media, the litigators, and the police administrators expect officers to be able to recount each and every force application with clarity. There seems to be a general assumption in law enforcement that officers required to use force will know how to write a factual, clear, concise, complete, and timely$^2$ use-of-force report. Agencies assume that their officers have been trained in the Academy how to write reports, and they consider a use-of-force report as just another police report. In many police organizations, once the recruit has left the Academy, very little is done to equip the officer on how to write an accurate report describing what occurred before, during, and after the use of force. How can the police administrators and trainers maximize the preparation of their officers to be able to recall a peak stress event that is typically tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving?

One remarkable and tragic event that significantly changed law enforcement training was the April 6, 1970, murder of four California Highway Patrol Officers in a firefight known as the Newhall Incident. This extraordinarily violent incident was the genesis for changes in law enforcement training, tactics, equipment, and policy throughout the professional law enforcement community. One of the key lessons learned in the Newhall Incident was that police training failed to prepare the officer for the eventualities of such a violent confrontation. It is now well-known that officers react to their training in these peak stress events. Effective trainers rely on actual incidents to create training which replicates real-world events that have occurred so officers can learn from the apparent successes or mistakes of their fellow officers. This type of training is outstanding in that it allows officers to safely develop skills, under controlled circumstances, that might prove to be life saving during their very next car stop.

We in law enforcement need only watch the evening news to view some new law enforcement event, whether it is a pursuit, use of force, or shooting to see
circumstances that could be used as training tools because they are real events that officers are facing. In these events, the officers are required to use critical thinking skills, tactical planning, cover and concealment, and the multitude of other law enforcement tools and skills to manage the event. In one recent incident, two police officers in the City of Long Beach, California, were making a traffic stop on a vehicle. When the suspect stopped his car, he immediately exited it and took the officers under fire, wounding both of them. That event resulted in a very extensive manhunt in southern California. Within a few days, the suspect was tracked to a strip mall in the City of Santa Ana, California, where officers attempted to take the suspect into custody. Again, those events led to another officer-involved shooting, only this time it was the suspect who was shot and killed. Not all of the tactics used have been made public at this point in time, but imagine, when they are accessible, building a training exercise replicating those events and allowing officers to experience the tactics used by those officers under controlled circumstances. I believe that any responsible administrator or trainer in law enforcement would agree that this type of training would provide officers much needed skills because law enforcement officers will be faced with similar situations again and again.

So how can we make this realistic training even better? One method that should be very effective is to take the training to the next step. Let’s examine a typical scenario-based firearms qualification course. An officer is given a scenario by the range master in which the officer is to visualize that he or she will be entering into a room where a domestic violence situation has been reported. The range master provides the officer with the information that the reporting party had heard screams coming from within a room and heard the victim yelling at the suspect to put the gun down. Current teaching would then have the officer or officers enter into the simulated room and react to whatever they saw confronting them, whether that be a hostage or an armed suspect facing them, etc. The expected outcome of that type of training situation is for the officer to exit the room in one piece after hopefully disarming or shooting the bad guy and saving the victim. This training is generally accepted as outstanding if the officer hits the target without getting shot and saving the victim. While this training is better than some, it is missing a major component of realism that faces any officer who would be involved in a real-world incident. Therefore, consider taking this training a step further. Why not train the officer to complete the entire event, which includes report writing or verbally recounting the events? In real-world events, the officers have to do this. They make a statement to some investigating entity or write a report that documents what the officer knew going into the confrontation, what the officer faced upon entering the location, what the officer took in the way of action, and, most importantly, the justification for doing what was done. This is what we expect an officer to be able to do in a real on- or off-duty situation, but we do not do a good job of training them to perform this essential task. Of course, the immediate question is, “Won’t this take too much time?” In a training course situation, writing the report may consume too much time, so if that is a valid concern, then rather than require the officer to write the report, have the officer give a verbal accounting. Giving a verbal accounting will require the person who is running the scenario to either listen to the account or have another assistant act as a supervisor to whom the officer must report. Another method might be for the officer to tape record or videotape their recollections and turn them in for review. Scripting of the event before putting it into practice would be important so that all of the persons participating would gain the same training experience. It would be
a good idea to have a checklist of typical questions asked by investigators during these types of incidents and responses that an officer might make to the situation prepared so the acting supervisor could check off correct responses. If the correct responses were not checked off, investigators would note that the officer may need additional remediation on the deadly force training scenario.

This same concept can be used when an officer is going through arrest and control training. Again, let us look at a typical arrest and control training scenario that an officer might face. An officer is told that he is to enter into a room and be prepared to take action on whatever he is faced with. He might be given additional information to simulate a call for service or details about what the officer might observe from a radio car. Regardless, the officer enters a room and is immediately confronted by a hostile, aggressive suspect who starts yelling at the officer. Perhaps the suspect is wearing a Red Man Suit and starts to attack the officer, forcing the officer to resort to the use of a baton or chemical agent. The expected outcome for this type of training event is for the officer to react with the appropriate law enforcement tactics and weapon systems, to overcome the resistance of the suspect, to prevent the escape, and to take the suspect into custody, using objectively reasonable force. Again, taking the next step to enhance the realism and training, the officer should be required to exit the training session and write a report documenting what had occurred and the lawful actions taken to overcome resistance, to prevent escape, and to effect the arrest during the training event. If time is an issue during the training session, the officer could be required to verbally identify the circumstances encountered when entering into the room and the steps taken to overcome the resistance, and then describe the justification for making the arrest. If a reporting is required, there would be a need for an assistant instructor to play the role of a supervisor, so the person being trained could have a live person to whom to report. Scripting the training event ensures all participants receive the same training benefit.

The type of strategy the agency selects for training will determine what the officer should be able to write when writing the report or state when giving a verbal accounting of the event. If the agency is training officers in a scenario that requires the officer to use deadly force, part of the expected accounting should include factors that are outlined in the U.S. Supreme Court case decision Tennessee v. Garner. In the Garner decision, the court held a Tennessee statue unconstitutional insofar as it authorized the use of deadly force against an apparently unarmed, nondangerous fleeing suspect: “such force may not be used unless necessary to prevent the escape and the officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a significant threat of death or serious physical injury to the officer or others.” The Federal Court established the following standards of care for an officer using deadly force to capture a fleeing suspect:

- **Life-Threatening Escape:** “Where the officer has probable cause to believe that the subject poses a threat of serious physical harm, either to the officer or others.”

- **Life-Threatening Felony:** “[I]f the subject threatens the officer with a weapon or there is probable cause to believe that he has committed a crime involving the infliction of serious bodily harm.”
• **Give Warning When Feasible**: “[T]he court imposes a constitutional requirement that some warning be given prior to the use of deadly force where feasible” such as “Halt, police! Stop or I’ll shoot!”

• **If Necessary to Prevent Escape**: “[I]n order for deadly force to be constitutionally permissible, there must be probable cause to believe that the use of deadly force is reasonably necessary.”

Officers should also be able to recall and explain any state law or department policy that applies to the situation. None of these needs to be verbatim, but the officer needs to be able to supply his or her reasoning and reliance on those laws or policies which affected his or her decisions during the training encounter.

If the training pertains to something other than the use of deadly force then the expectation would be to include some of the rationale mandated by *Graham v Connor*. In the *Graham* decision, the Court told law enforcement that “all claims that law enforcement officials have used excessive force—deadly or not—in the course of an arrest, investigatory stop, or other seizure of a free citizen are properly analyzed under the Fourth Amendment’s *objectively reasonable* standard, rather than under a substantive due process standard.”

The Court found in part that the reasonableness inquiry is whether the officers’ actions are *objectively reasonable* in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them, without regard to their underlying intent or motivation. The Court indicated use-of-force situations should be looked at and that the “totality of circumstances” to justify that particular sort of seizure must be considered.

The Court also stated that the “reasonableness” of a particular use of force must be judged from the perspective of a “reasonable officer” on the scene rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight. The Court went on to state, “the calculus of reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments—in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving—about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation.”

By adopting this new idea of training, requiring an officer to give a verbal accounting or writing a proper report, agencies emulate what they expect officers to do in their regular everyday duties. Replicating reality should enhance officers’ learning of proper procedures as well as their recollection and retention of the peak stress facts that they experienced while in the controlled environment, thereby strengthening their ability to apply those lessons should they ever be presented with these types of real-life situations.

**Endnotes**


See Graham v. Connor.


See California Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training, Basic Academy Workbook Series, Learning Domain 20, Chapter 3.

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A Pilot Study of Kinetic Energy Transfer Based Upon Police Baton Designs

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Introduction

For the past several decades, law enforcement technology has seen major advances. Technology such as the advent of the radio has shaped the very nature of how police respond to calls for service. The introduction of high-powered ammunition, rifle rounds, and large capacity magazines that are available to the public has resulted in law enforcement reacting with more advanced bullet-resistant vests, which are lighter and created from technologically superior materials. Chemical agents, once available only to the military, are now standard issue to almost all law enforcement officers in the United States. Although the chemical composition, strength, and propellants have changed, the basic principle of a chemical weapon remains the same.

Another very recent technological advancement has been the almost universal adoption of conducted energy weapons (CEWs) which are also referred to as electro-muscular disruption devices (EMDs). These less-than-lethal tools include the popular TASER®, which functions by discharging two probes that are connected to the weapon by thin wire tethers which allow a current to pass from the TASER® to the subject. This current disrupts the body’s ability to pass electrical impulses and is therefore incapacitating.

However, despite these advances in technology and in many other areas, law enforcement officers still have much more rudimentary tools on their duty belt. The most simple, and likely the most archaic, is the police baton. Modern styles of police batons are significantly different when examined closely, including major differences in composition, size, weight, feel, and grip. These differences, when taken into consideration with all the potential physical and biological differences that can occur between law enforcement officers, can result in a significantly different level of police use of force despite the attempt at standardization. Little research into these differences has been conducted, and any research into this phenomenon is certainly dated. The following is a review of the literature on police batons, and the mathematics of force and force transfer.
Literature Review

Impact weapons, such as clubs, sticks, and stones, are perhaps the earliest and most simplistic form of weaponry. Man has used clubs as defensive as well as offensive weapons to kill not only game and prey but other humans as well. Archeologists have discovered clubs dating back as far as 35,000 BC that were predominantly used as hunting tools (Dupuy, 1990). Traditionally, clubs were crafted from a single piece of wood and were designed to be maneuvered and controlled with a single hand. Throughout history, they have been some of the most employed weapons.

Not only has prehistoric man used clubs effectively, but, historically, they have also been employed by law enforcement. Billy clubs, truncheons, and straight wood batons have been utilized for hundreds of years by police officers around the world. Military and law enforcement applications of these simplistic weapons have remained virtually unchanged. The most modern advancement in the field of baton design came in the early 1990s with the introduction of new composite materials as well as telescopic and side-handled batons. Expandable batons are designed to be collapsible for storage and extended as the user needs. The PR24 side-handled baton is simply a composite straight baton with a perpendicular grip on one side creating a 90-degree angle to the straight baton.

The science of law enforcement has shaped the tools and procedures used to serve and protect populations all around the world. As technology has evolved, we have seen the introduction of weapons that were considered fiction a decade ago. However, some literature suggests that these advances have come at a price. According to the Potomac Institute for Policy Study (2005), there exists statistical evidence demonstrating that as a result of the introduction of CEWs, such as a TASER®, law enforcement officers are becoming complacent and lack the skills to effectively conduct close quarters defensive and offensive tactical moves.

While there are an immeasurable number of potential use-of-force scenarios, it is clear that there are instances in which an impact weapon may serve an officer better than the latest electronic weapons technology. This is especially true when a risk of hitting innocent bystanders exists or the subject is wearing clothing that would resist the penetrating barbs of a CEW. In addition, an increasing phenomenon encountered by police and law enforcement is subjects wearing body armor. In these situations, a CEW would not be effective; however, blunt force to an exposed area of these individuals may be.

Mathematically, there are several factors which influence a baton’s level of force transfer and, therefore, its resulting effectiveness. The kinetic energy potential of a baton depends on its weight and speed of swing. However, heavy objects tend to move slower than light ones and are more cumbersome to deploy. To calculate the force of a baton strike, the velocity of the impacting end of the baton is multiplied in proportion to the increase in its distance from the pivoting body parts such as the pelvis, shoulder, elbow, and wrist (Crosby, 2002).

Highly visible nightsticks and side-handled batons carried on the police officer’s belt seem to have gone out of style and have been replaced with smaller, expandable batons which have a more positive public perception and are easier to carry (Johnson, 1996). The new structure of these common impact weapons may
also have increased the baton’s effectiveness. Gervais, Baudin, Cruikshank, and Dahlstedt (1997) found that a 26-inch ASP® expandable baton created more impact pressure than a traditional full-size baton. The study further indicated that the ASP® expandable baton is much lighter and easier to carry than the traditional baton. Research conducted by Mesloh, Henych, Hougland, and Thompson (2005) found that the newest generation of batons has now added an enlarged plastic tip, which creates a larger amount of kinetic energy in the strike, consequently making the weapon more effective.

Due to advances in medical knowledge concerning the human body, law enforcement officers now have increased access to information on pressure points, nerve clusters, and fluid shock from strikes. Therefore, when properly trained, law enforcement officers are more cognizant of how these factors influence the body’s weaknesses and thus have a better understanding of how to control a person. Consequently, batons are now designed to be extremely effective and a more precise tool for law enforcement officers. One recent change to the modern baton is its basic construction as they are no longer fashioned from a single piece of hard wood. New materials such as aluminum, nickel, and hard plastics comprise a majority of these less-than-lethal weapons. Varying the materials of the baton directly impacts the key issue of weight.

In addition to weight reduction, the ability to reduce size has also become a key feature of the newer batons. This reduction is accomplished by collapsing two or three inner shafts that lock into place when expanded. Traditional batons and truncheons are between 21 and 26 inches in length, while modern collapsible batons expand to that length from 7 to 10 inches in their collapsed state. An examination of the existing and anecdotal literature suggests that while it may appear docile and underpowered in the collapsed state, it commands respect and often gains psychological compliance when expanded, even before it is ever utilized.

Law enforcement personnel commonly cite weight and size as negative factors that influence their decision to carry a baton on their duty belt. While 10% of officers reported carrying the heavy wooden baton or truncheon at all times, 95% of officers surveyed reported that they carried a lighter and collapsible ASP® baton at all times (Johnston, 1990). Manufacturers such as ASP® and Monadnock® market their batons to the general policing population; however, the more modern collapsible batons have become an effective alternative less-lethal weapon to undercover officers or those who do not wear traditional police uniforms (Gervais et al., 1997).

While impact weapons have become lighter and easier to carry, they still have the ability to deliver an effective amount of force. In a study conducted to determine the impact characteristics of modern batons, it was concluded that the amount of energy exerted by the ASP® and ESHB (expandable side-handled baton) were relative to the amount of energy produced by the traditional wooden truncheon (Gervais et al., 1997). However, Roberts, Nokes, Leadbeatter, and Pike (1994) found that the peak pressure of modern batons, obtained by calculating the impact size area, were considerably higher than traditional batons. This study compared the standard wooden truncheon that was being used in the United Kingdom with the baton that was being used in the United States and other European countries. The study found that the traditional truncheon’s impact area was nearly double (196%)
that of the expandable ASP® baton. The data set showed a greater tendency toward extended areas of bruising with the traditional truncheon or baton upon impact, while the impact area of the ASP® was smaller and thus produced less bruising.

This research conducted by Roberts et al. (1994) also claimed that the average traditional police baton produced 3,513 newtons (N) of energy while the new ASP® batons only produced 3,230 N of energy. While the traditional baton produced over 1.096 times the energy, it did not sustain that maximum amount of force for the same length of time. The newer ASP® models were found to exert their pressure on a continuous level for longer periods of time, thus allowing for a higher amount of kinetic energy transfer.

Currently, many agencies choose to take a “one size fits all” approach in issuing impact weapons to their officers. However, the researchers of this current study originally hypothesized that it is an individual science to determine which baton best fits each officer. This is accomplished by determining which baton generates the greatest amount of energy and assigning that particular baton to the officer. Most law enforcement agencies dictate that the primary approved target areas are large muscle masses. The ability of an officer to hit these targets is directly related to their success in an encounter (Gervais et al., 1997). This has forced agencies to discontinue their use of some impact weapons, including saps and blackjacks, due to their size and potential reach as well as the propensity of the officer to strike the head of the suspect. Consequently, serious injuries are a likely result if the head is targeted for an impact weapon strike (Cox, Buchholz, & Wolf, 1987), which still limits the officer’s deployment of a baton.

To study the effect of baton type, weight, and size, the researchers designed an experimental pilot study. In this study of baton force potential, the researchers sought to conduct tests with the various types of batons and compare their resultant kinetic levels of force by utilizing a standardized group of research volunteers. A force sensor was used to capture the G-Force (G) of transferred energy to a training target, and the results were reported. The following section addresses the methodology employed in this study.

**Methodology**

The current study examined the effect of length and weight on the kinetic energy output of impact weapons. A number of batons were utilized in an attempt to create a model for matching an individual with the impact weapon that generates the greatest amount of force. The batons tested consisted of three straight batons and six expandable batons of varying lengths and weights. A baseball bat was also included for comparison purposes.

The field study utilized nine participants who were, prior to the data collection, trained in an impact weapon training course. Participants were taught the proper form and accepted law enforcement approved methods for delivering the strongest strikes possible, while instructors corrected deficiencies. At the conclusion of training, participants were invited to participate in data collection for this pilot study.
Each participant was given a score sheet, which they maintained throughout the study. After being randomly assigned to a testing order, each participant would strike a testing target three times using a forward swing from their dominant side. To reduce the effect of fatigue, participants would move to the end of the rotation after each set of baton strikes. This created a rest period of five to six minutes between batons. Practice swings with each new baton were permitted to allow the user to become accustomed to the baton. The testing target was a training dummy with two accelerometers (force sensors) attached that measured the amount of G from the baton strikes. The force sensor provided measurements of maximum power through an LED readout, which allowed the researchers to create a rank order of impact weapon force. The data was collected into SPSS 15 (Statistical Package for the Social Sciences), and basic analysis was conducted. The following tables reflect the mean scores of the strikes by the test volunteers.

Findings

As shown below in Table 1, baton force loads from the test subjects are presented with length, weight, and features of the batons under examination. Initially, the authors hypothesized that impact weapon performance would be based upon a range of factors, which would require precise matching of the baton with the user. Surprisingly, this was not the case. In both male and female test groups, an identical rank order of baton force was observed.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 1. Baton Force Loads and Baton Features</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Composite thick</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Composite thin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wood</td>
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<tr>
<td>Expandable 1</td>
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<td>Expandable 2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Expandable 3</td>
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<td>Expandable 4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Expandable 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expandable 6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Expandable 7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** A = enlarged striking tip; B = enlarged end cap

In a review of Table 1, it is clear that expandable batons 1 through 4 were very similar in performance across the test subjects. This is of interest as these batons vary significantly in length, although with less variation in weight. It appears from this finding that expandable batons 1 through 4 generate a very similar force and, as such, would allow an agency some discretion in the particular model to be assigned to individual officers. This would also allow individual officers some choice if agency policy permitted.

In almost every case, it was clear that the force generated was directly related to the length and weight of the baton, regardless of the size of the user. Clearly, larger test subjects were capable of generating larger force loads, but the individual
performance from even the smallest users indicated that they proportionately had better results with longer, heavier batons.

### Table 2. Force Loads by Gender

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mean N SD</td>
<td>Mean N SD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baseball bat</td>
<td>18.3 5 2.28</td>
<td>9.00 4 1.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Composite thick</td>
<td>13.3 5 1.65</td>
<td>8.75 4 0.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Composite thin</td>
<td>10.7 5 1.44</td>
<td>7.88 4 0.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wood</td>
<td>10.2 5 2.51</td>
<td>8.00 4 0.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expandable 1</td>
<td>10.2 5 1.89</td>
<td>7.25 4 0.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expandable 2</td>
<td>9.7 5 1.44</td>
<td>6.88 4 0.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expandable 3</td>
<td>9.9 5 1.64</td>
<td>6.50 4 1.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expandable 4</td>
<td>9.4 5 1.02</td>
<td>6.88 4 1.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expandable 5</td>
<td>8.8 5 1.40</td>
<td>6.13 4 0.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expandable 6</td>
<td>7.3 5 1.57</td>
<td>5.00 4 0.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expandable 7</td>
<td>7.1 5 0.90</td>
<td>4.88 4 0.25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In comparing the sampled respondents by gender, male test subjects’ mean scores were higher than those of the female participants. However, the “composite thick” baton when examined in the female score group produced a mean score of 8.75, which is very comparable to the amount of force generated by the male testers with expandable batons 5 and 6. From this initial study, it may be hypothesized that the heavier straight baton allows for some equalization of force between genders and may offer officers with less strength the competitive advantage needed to be effective in a use-of-force confrontation with a baton. Additionally, straight batons, regardless of their composition and weight, outperformed all of the expandable batons.

Although the majority of the baton performance can be explained by the length and weight, additional baton characteristics and features certainly impacted the results. First, several of the batons were equipped with an enlarged end-cap on the grip, which prevents the baton from slipping from the user’s hand. With these batons, participants tended to grip the baton much further down the grip. Hand placement on batons without this feature tended to be much higher as participants “choked-up” on the grip. Second, several batons were equipped with an enlarged striking tip, which appeared to improve performance. It is unclear if this is a result of a mathematical factor of force transfer (increased mass on the end thereby generating higher speed and force transfer coefficients) or the users simply were more efficient striking the center of the target with the tip rather than the side of the baton.

Third, the comfort and ease of use for each baton appeared to be a factor as well. A number of test subjects commented that the smaller batons were harder to grip and were uncomfortable to use. It was not unexpected that the scores for these batons were substantially lower. Conversely, when a test subject determined that a baton had a comfortable grip, scores tended to be higher.
Conclusions

Law enforcement’s decision to transition away from the straight baton and adopt expandable batons was viewed as a significant evolution in law enforcement technology. However, critics complained that many of the control techniques, once possible with straight and side-handled batons, were difficult to perform with the new, smaller expandable batons. Further, there was a perceived loss in force transfer, which unfortunately was only anecdotally documented. This pilot study tends to support those claims as all of the straight batons outperformed expandable batons in generating force.

However, the value of the expandable baton is still compelling. Officers have access to an impact weapon on their duty belt when they need it most, whereas many straight and side-handled batons remained on the front seat of the police car and are not available for immediate deployment. This research also shows that collapsible batons can be used to strike with an effective amount of force if they have sufficient mass and length. On the other hand, if a smaller, lighter baton is chosen, it may lack the potential energy potential to be effective against active suspect resistance.

Issues of ergonomics greatly affect the force that could be produced by those batons. Many of the testers mentioned that it was difficult to grip the smallest batons tested and, as a result, these batons generated considerably less force. Frequently, the user was able to predict the performance of the baton by simply gripping it. Although this was not a scientific measure, it was worthy of mention and of potential examination in future research.

Finally, the rank order of performance is almost identical between genders. This has direct application to law enforcement as some agencies have a practice of issuing smaller batons to smaller officers. Although the smaller batons may be easier to handle, these lighter batons simply cannot generate the force of larger, heavier batons. Consequently, this practice actually works against the smaller officers by reducing the force that they are capable of delivering. A baton that is too light or too small may cause an officer to strike a subject repeatedly to effectively control a suspect, which is perceived badly by both the media and the public. While a heavier baton is more likely to cause injury, this risk is reduced when strikes are properly delivered to an approved target area on the body and is more likely to be effective in a single strike. The most practical, less-than-lethal force option is one that incapacitates with the least number of applications.

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A Transformation Model to Address the Social Developmental Needs for Black Adolescent Male Offenders

Barry Shelby McCrary, EdD, Assistant Professor, School of Law Enforcement and Justice Administration, Western Illinois University

Preface

The Maleness to Manhood Transformation Model was born out of the idea of using Dr. Na’im Akbar’s (1991) book, *Visions for Black Men*, which talks about moving from the level of maleness to boyhood to manhood as the core objective from an Afrocentric point of view. The idea was to use this concept as a foundation for a model program for young males living in the inner cities who are at risk of being exposed to the traps of unconscious, self-destructive behavior. This Maleness to Manhood Transformation Model also focuses on addressing the issues of Black adolescent masculinity and antisocial behavior.

Introduction

The purpose of the Maleness to Manhood concept is to facilitate that transformation process, moving from the level of maleness to boyhood to manhood. When I first read Dr. Na’im Akbar’s (1991) book, *Vision for Black Men*, I knew this was the answer. I was working as a Juvenile Justice Community Monitor for juvenile court. My job was to monitor youth offenders in the community who were on probation. The task to monitor youth through a juvenile community intensive supervision program was and is juvenile court’s answer to reducing crime and decreasing Black male incarceration rates. However crime rates have increased, and Black male incarceration rates have increased. When I was offered the chance to work with the young men in the community, I was excited about the opportunity to make a difference. Prior to working in the community, I worked for a state youth development center, which was a locked secured juvenile facility.

This was an opportunity to work in the community; however, how could I work for the courts and help our young brother? I could read and study our Afrocentric scholars, who address the issues facing the Black community, and that’s what I did. I also facilitated group counseling sessions on various topics, and I always tried to help the young men examine their thinking. When I read Dr. Akbar’s (1991) book, I knew this could be the blueprint for a new innovated curriculum. The first chapter of this book, “Maleness to Manhood,” gave me the focus I needed to teach Human Development and Psychology 101 to the young men who were adjudicated delinquent in the program. With the Maleness to Manhood concept, I was able to assess the stages of development and counsel them on appropriate behaviors. This way of understanding, assessing, explaining, and teaching became extremely effective. I was able to facilitate parent support meetings, group counseling, and individual counseling sessions, all within the context of the Maleness to Manhood Transformation Model. This method of providing treatment, parent training, and assessing stages of development is the core objective for creating change by utilizing an Afrocentric point of view.
Introduction

Issues Impacting the Black Community Today

In my opinion, the most critical public health issue facing the African-American community today is the serious increase in Black adolescent male incarceration. This issue starts with society’s negative expectations of Black males, to the inadequate educational system, to little or no employment opportunities, and then to a mentality of hopelessness. Hopelessness, then, translates to violence, which, according to the Uniform Crime Reports published by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, translates to homicide, which is the leading cause of death for Black males from ages 15 to 24. The homicide rate for Black males in this age range continues to rise. Firearms are involved in nearly 80% of all the homicides for young Black males. In the inner cities, Blacks accounted for 49.5% of all arrests for violent crimes (e.g., murder, forcible rape, robbery, and aggravated assaults). The odds of becoming a murder victim are less than one in twenty for young Black males living in the cities between the ages of 20 and 29. Over 40% of all jail inmates throughout the nation are Black, and the percentage is rapidly rising.

–Langston Hughes (1996)
Although the statistics are alarming, the implications of the statistics can be misleading and misdirected. To fully understand the cause of Black adolescent criminality in many inner cities today, we must look at what Amos Wilson (1991) offers as a multicausal explanation, the implications of which, if appropriately translated into education, rehabilitative, social and institutional reorganization, will move us beyond blaming to resolving.

To move prevention work forward, systems must legitimize and validate different cultural groups and provide a balance of funding and resources that normally is allocated toward correctional institutions for prevention programming. An example of correctional dollars spent is an inner-city juvenile community-based program in Pittsburgh. The county and state provides $3.5 million a year for a juvenile offender community-based program to operate; this type of money needs to be available for prevention and community intervention programs as well. It is imperative that the system in control meet the needs of youth from a variety of cultural backgrounds, offering prevention programs to help children cope with, discrimination, prejudice, and oppression, which translates to hopelessness. Wilson (1993) states that unemployment, underemployment, poverty, drugs, poor education, inadequate housing, overcrowding, and the like are tangibly related to Black on Black criminality and violence. While Wilson questions their causal roles, they do reflect the fact that Americans currently possess an inordinate amount of power to defend and extend their economic, psychological, and sociocultural advantages at the expense of African Americans. Black on Black criminality and violence, according to Wilson (1991), represents a quest for power and is an outraged protest against a sense of powerlessness and insignificance. They are protective fetishes used to defend against feelings of helplessness and vulnerability. In my opinion, to deliver effective services, the policymakers must respond to the multicausal explanations and establish policies and procedures that affirm and validate diverse populations through employment practices, access to resources within the community, and through the ideology of diverse populations for solutions.

To begin the process of understanding Black adolescent male violence, the following critical questions must be asked:

- Are Black males frustrated by restrictions placed on their masculine possibilities?
- Is our training for positive manhood inadequate or nonexistent?
- Are Black males confused about what it means to be a man in today’s society?
- Have Black males under oppression accepted an incomplete, distorted, self-defying, self-destructive definition and expression of masculinity?
- Do Black males feel they are successfully defying authority by expressing their independence and masculine prerogatives?
- By expressing their independence and masculine prerogatives, are Black males being misled or misdirected into violently attacking and corrosively undermining the peace, stability, and the very viability of the African-American community?
- Are Black males provoked by their oppressive circumstances into what Wilson (1991) calls a “reactionary masculinity”?
- Do the current system’s policies embrace, validate, and affirm African-American life, its cultural integrity, and its authenticity?
The following are the results of a survey given to youth from various races but predominantly African-American living in the inner city of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, to ask them about police interaction. The coding below Figure 3 through Figure 8 represents the following populations: AA – African American, W – White, O – Other, and U – Unknown.

Figure 3. In general, people fear small groups of Black youth who are simply hanging around, laughing and playing rap music.
Figure 4. The police will not usually stop me unless I am doing something wrong.

Figure 5. The police have always focused their attention on minorities and youth.
Figure 6. It is OK to carry a firearm for safety when I am out in the community.

Figure 7. I feel I can get respect from the police if I give the police respect.
A qualitative research study entitled “Violence and the Masculine Idea” makes the argument that males who do not have power derived from family background, educational achievement, income, social and political connections, or material goods would be more likely to exert a “compulsive” masculinity which could easily result in violent behavior (Toby, 1966, p. 19). This continues to make the argument for the Masculinity to Manhood Transformation Model, which would address specific components to decrease the likelihood of Black adolescent males falling prey to an oppressive system.

Formulation of the Concept

Years ago, when I first became employed as a Juvenile Justice Community Monitor for Juvenile Court, one of my duties was to monitor youth offenders in the community who were on probation. This meant that I had to make sure the young men went to school, completed their homework after school, and I had to monitor their behaviors. If any youth violated the program rules, they were given a consequence such as 72 hours in the detention center, community service, extra work at the community center, or they were placed in a residential institution. I was always uncomfortable with the job title, Community Monitor, because it was simply a position to monitor youth offenders in the community who were on probation. But as Community Monitors, my colleagues and I did far more than monitor. We looked for ways to help the young men such as by developing trusting relationships with them, role modeling, and counseling the young men through our personal experiences.

So, the questions we continue to ask are the following:

- What should be the underlying task to facilitate change in adolescent Black males?
- How can we facilitate change, growth, and individual development?
- How can we address the needs of the individual, the community, and the family?
• How can we prepare the young men for long-term success?
• How can we work to change unresolved issues surrounding masculinity?
• How can we provide adequate manhood training?

Figure 9

Beneath the hat brims haunting me
More faithful than a mirror
The figuration of my grief
The image of my error

Figure 10. Sharing Personal Experience at Maleness to Manhood Meeting
These are questions that need to be answered because we know that the answer to reducing crime long-term or decreasing Black male incarceration rates consists of much more than court intervention. So, the challenge and question was and still is how could we develop an approach and theoretical framework to enhance the lives of Black adolescent males living within inner cities? First, I began to read and studied what our leading African-American scholars were saying, such as Dr. Na'im Akbar, Wade Nobles, Haki Madhubuti, Molefi Kete Asante, Amos Wilson, Jawanza Kunjufu, Dr. Carter G. Woodson, Dr. Asa G. Hilliard III, Kobe Kazembe Kalongi Kambon, Eugene Perkins, Paul Hill Jr., La Francis Rodgers-Rose, Drs. Nathan and Julia Hare, Reverend Harold Davis, and many others, to address the issues facing the Black community. We also began to develop a curriculum to facilitate group counseling sessions on various topics which could help the young men examine their thinking. We have been successful with getting the young men involved in community rites of passage programs and other various community activities, but all of these remain limited by the resources available and the inability to address multicausal issues. There needed to be a theoretical framework to address the various concerns that would enable the model to be duplicated with clarity and understanding, and that would also enable parents to implement the model within the home. We believe that this Maleness to Manhood Transformation Model and framework can be used as a solution for the communities to work toward the “It Takes a Village” concept. Akbar’s (1991) work seems to be most fitting to address what Amos Wilson (1991) called “reactionary masculinity” (p. 34) for adolescent Black males living in the inner city. With this concept, we were also able to effectively teach human development and introduce a course in psychology to the young men in the community who were struggling with unresolved issues of masculinity. The Maleness to Manhood Transformation Model enables community members to identify stages of development. It is also a way of understanding, assessing, explaining, and teaching human development as organizations facilitate parent meetings, and group and individual counseling sessions, all within the context of this model. This method of providing community intervention, parent training, and stages of development assessment can become the core objective in creating change.

Figure 11. Maleness to Manhood Meeting
Stages of Development

If a man at the age of 40 thinks the same as he did at the age of 20, he lost 20 years of his life.

–Muhammad Ali
(Evanzz, 2002)

Figure 12 and Table 1 show stages of development and mentality from birth when one comes into existence as a male, to becoming a boy, and, then, to becoming a man.

Figure 12. Development Stages

Table 1. Movement Determined by Discipline – Mentality

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Maleness</th>
<th>Boyhood</th>
<th>Manhood</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Instincts</td>
<td>Development of discipline</td>
<td>Knowledge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urges</td>
<td>Control demanding urges</td>
<td>Accurately evaluate situation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Desires</td>
<td>Become rational</td>
<td>Concern for others</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feelings</td>
<td>Understand order</td>
<td>Moral and spiritual consciousness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relief of tension</td>
<td>Understand delay is possible</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appetite</td>
<td>Understand the world is orderly and predictable</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Passion for pleasure</td>
<td>Please others; play the game</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dependency</td>
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</table>

Historical Framework

According to Akbar (1994), ancient African minds had reached a significant plateau in human development in the phenomenal Nile Valley civilization. It is important, at least, to understand some of what they achieved so that we can continue beyond the level of their accomplishments. He also states that the classical African civilization offers the best glimpse of a meaningful prototype of effective African life. He goes on to say that the assumptions about the fundamental ontology which we must adopt—that is, to see all beings as fundamentally spiritual—and the ethical standards which must be applied are found in the ruins of what is left of the myths of these civilizations.

Akbar (1994) explains the nature of human development or transformation as the process of becoming better. To become better, individuals must exercise and develop a strong desire, which one is born with, and that they must discipline and control that desire.
The following diagram shows stages of development from maleness to manhood. According to Dr. Wade Nobles at a conference in 1995, first you Be, then you Become, then you Become better.

**Figure 13. Maleness to Manhood**

The Maleness to Manhood Transformation Model clearly defines manhood by identifying the stages of development, moving from the level of maleness to boyhood to manhood as a theoretical framework. The idea is to use an Afrocentric concept of human development, believing that it is possible to be in a continual stage of development, opposed to being limited by one’s early childhood experiences. The idea was to use this concept as a model for young males living in inner cities who are at risk of being exposed to the traps of unconscious, self-destructive behavior. According to Akbar (1991), “[W]e suggest the possibility that there is a weapon, yet undeveloped among ourselves which, if developed, could perhaps eliminate both the symptoms and the problems” (p. 1) facing our young males. Thus, this model has focused on addressing the issues of Black adolescent masculinity and anti-social behavior. According to Wilson (1991), a goodly portion of Black male violence against other Black males is the consequence of unresolved conflicts around masculinity; the resolution of what it means to be a man is a major crisis of adolescence and young adulthood under normal circumstances.

How much more is this the case for the Black adolescent and young adult male under conditions of oppression? The reality of this oppression is evident in terms of African Americans being almost totally economically dependent on European Americans or what we may call economic incarceration. This is the inability to have greater opportunities for employment and economic opportunity because of total dependency on a people who can limit African-Americans choices of societal inclusion. The laws that attempted to address part of this area of concern
were Affirmative Action laws, but European Americans dismissed this societal inclusion calling it reverse racism. This total dependency on European Americans is what African Americans are born into and have been taught to be unconcerned about—to be unconscious and unaware of the ramifications of these conditions and long-term effects.

**You Must Be Twice as Good**

In the African-American family, it has been a common theme to teach Black children that they have to be twice as good to make it in this world. Nathan and Julia Hare (1985) explain it like this: Black parents customarily, intuitively, and routinely sought to prepare the Black child’s perspective on the locus of control—“A black person has to be twice as good to get a chance. So you have to work, try, twice as hard” (p. 14). This is a good thing if the reason parents are telling children to set high standards of achievement is to be the best. In the Black family, however, the motive behind this is two-fold: (1) academic excellence and (2) because of racism. Parents are preparing children, especially Black males, to be the best because they will face economic hardship due to the three strikes against them: (1) being Black, (2) being male, and (3) being totally dependent on European-American economic opportunity. This dilemma is so dangerous, and underestimated by most, that it is not realized until ten years after they are out of high school and find out that their choices are limited. At this stage, it can be so devastating that the mental and physical effects on the body can be irreversible. Black men find themselves either in prison, in mental institutions, on drugs, alcoholic, overweight, with high blood pressure, on medication, or suicidal. For those who seem to be doing well, it is not uncommon that they reveal, despite their gifted academic background, that they aren’t presently doing very well, justifying that they need a drink to put up with them white folks, forgetting that they are killing themselves with alcohol (Hare & Hare, 1985).

The effects of these conditions can and usually are interpreted by European Americans as mental disorders and mental illnesses among African Americans, especially among the Black adolescent male and young adult population. According to Kambon (1992), the Afrocentric paradigm for African personality has enabled African psychology to begin to realize the importance of broadening the context of African-American mental health to encompass those sociopolitical behavior patterns that have direct implications for the survival and affirmation of the African-American community. According to Kambon, the Male to Manhood Transformation Model allows for a new conceptualization and understanding of the psychological distortions and pathologies that are so prevalent in African-American behavior today. When we begin to address the issues of manhood training, it is imperative that we understand the multicausal explanations and manifestations of African-American mental disorders, which are demonstrated in inner-city street life; through drugs, crime, and all forms of physical violence; and through the self-destruction prevalent in African-American communities. Manhood training is imperative for Black males; we must help them to work through their present situation and prepare them for what is ahead of them. They must be aware and not fall into the trap of self-destructive behaviors that is detrimental to their survival and the survival of the community. They must be prepared to withstand all of the hardships and pain, and develop ways to cope and change the underlying problem.
Facts:

1. Look up the Slavery Law of 1665 (which stayed in effect until 1968) and the Maryland Doctrine of Exclusion (1638): both laws state that Blacks must be excluded from the benefits afforded Whites and that Blacks must remain noncompetitive with Whites, except in sports and entertainment.

2. Two White men, Bill Gates and Larry Ellison, combined have more wealth than the combined wealth of all 36 million Blacks in America. Civil Rights did not change the economic landscape or the balance of power in America.

3. Asians received 80% of all government minority set-aside contracts.

4. There are no Black-owned national cable or major network television stations. The Black woman, who owns our only Black-owned radio stations, plans to sell to White owners after hearing the deal Bob Johnson received for selling BET.

5. There are no Black-owned companies on the Wall Street Stock Exchange where Blacks own the majority or controlling interest of the stock.

6. Ninety-six percent of all Black inmates are men.

7. Over the next two years, 440,000 Black inmates will be released from prison. There is no place to put them as they re-enter society.

8. In 1860, 98% of all Blacks in America worked for White people. In 2001, 98% of all Blacks in America still work for White people [meaning only 2% of Blacks are entrepreneurs].

9. In 1860, Blacks in America had a combined net worth of one half a percentage point. Guess what, in 2001, after Civil Rights, Jesse Jackson, Oprah, Shaq, the NAACP, and the Urban League, our combined net worth is half a percentage point.

10. The last week of April 2003, in Washington, DC, Black teenagers were arrested and booked for eating McDonald’s on the metro subway. Cops cited the recent 5-4 Court decision as the permission they required to arrest lawbreakers even for minor offenses.

11. Sixty-seven percent of all hate crimes in America are against Blacks.

Hare and Hare (1985) state that most statistics today confirm the popular awareness of an acute Black male decimation from homicide, crime, mental illness, addiction, and just about every source imaginable, consequent and leading to socioeconomic insufficiency. They go on to say that the Black male is hampered in his performance of his role and, accordingly, loses and misses a certain sense of purpose, function, personal importance, and family and group commitment. We must address this systemic issue and utilize the Male to Manhood Transformation Model to become
aware and to understand the Black male survival thrust and the multicausal approach to addressing this devastation, which, if not addressed, will result in inhuman and catastrophic results.

Figure 14

The night was made for rest and sleep
For winds that softly sigh;
It was not made for grief and tears;
So then why do I cry?

Figure 15. If the first sign of spring is the swallow, then the first sign of maturity is pride. We gulp when we realize there are few choices in life that are clear.
A Biblical Framework

From a biblical context, according to the book of Joshua, Chapter 5, Verses 1-9, as published in the *Life Recovery Bible* (Arterburn & Stoop, 1992),

When the nations west of the Jordan River, the Amorites and Canaanites who lived along the Mediterranean coast, heard that the Lord had dried up the Jordan River so the people of Israel could cross, their courage melted away completely and they were paralyzed with fear. The Lord then told Joshua to set aside a day to circumcise the entire male population of Israel (this was the second time in Israel’s history that this was done). The Lord instructed them to manufacture flint knives for this purpose. The place where the circumcision rite took place was named, “The Hill of the Foreskins.” The reason for this second circumcision ceremony was that although when Israel left Egypt all of the men who had been old enough to bear arms had been circumcised, that entire generation had died during the year in the wilderness, and none of the boys born since that time had been circumcised. For the nation of Israel had traveled back and forth across the wilderness for forty years until all of the men who had been old enough to bear arms when they left Egypt were dead; they had not obeyed the Lord, and he vowed that he wouldn’t let them enter the land he had promised to Israel—a land that “flowed with milk and honey.” So now Joshua circumcised their children—the men who had grown up to take their fathers’ places. And the Lord said to Joshua, “Today I have...
ended your shame of not being circumcised.” So the place where this was done was called Gilgal (meaning, “To end”), and is still called that today. After the ceremony, the entire nation rested in camp until the raw flesh of their wounds had been healed.

**Figure 17. Prayer and Unity Circle**

The purpose of this biblical analogy is to look at Joshua’s act of obedience to circumcise all the males among them. God took away their shame when they submitted to the painful act of circumcision. Fortunately, we do not have to go through a physical cutting to be rid of our shame. But we do have to go through the painful process of acknowledging our failures and allowing God to remove the shame from us. The process can be so painful that we are tempted to deny our shame rather than to allow God to remove it.

The Male to Manhood Transformation Model is a process which helps to develop young boys into responsible young men. Although painful, the community must implement an approach and work continuously toward making our situation better. The purpose of this model is to advocate and provide community resources, often family support, and facilitate individual development.

**American Culture’s Stages of Development: Milestones**

The Male to Manhood Transformation Model attempts to identify the stages of development which are used to enhance the participant’s life and purpose. In the absence of supportive fathers and manhood training, the male is left to discover meaning in life through a culture of meaningless milestone events. As stated earlier, the resolution of what it means to be a man is a major crisis of adolescence and young adulthood under normal circumstances, and it is much more so under conditions of oppression. The goal of this model is to develop the mind along with survival skills for Africans in America. America identifies milestones within the culture, but if these are not enhanced with meaning and purpose, adolescents can be left with a distorted view of milestones and achievement. For example, there are
events in American culture that are milestones which are celebrated that represent growth and development such as baby showers, first birthday party, kindergarten, first day in school, entering first grade, report card, graduating to middle school (party), becoming a teenager (party), entering high school, 16th birthday party, more birthday parties, driver’s license, graduating from high school (cookout), 18th birthday party, entering college, 21st birthday, (you’re a man, son), first drink of alcohol, graduating from college, 50 years old, over the hill party, retirement party, and the home-going service (funeral). As you can see, these are celebrations in American culture without much meaning or purpose. However, if one belongs to a church, religious, or spiritual group, certain events take on more meaning such as being baptized, being ordained, or being given an assigned position in the church. These are events that count as milestones, and the person is recognized for achieving his or her goal.

**African-Centered Transformation Rites and Development**

According to Kambon (1992), the following are African-Centered Lifecycle Rituals:

- **Recognition of Conception Ceremonial Rites**: Three months pregnant, focus on recognition of special gift, life, anticipation of new life
- **Naming Ceremony**: Recognition of new life, shortly after birth, giving of a name
- **Childhood Ceremony, 3 to 8**: Role expectation, personal qualities, and skills
- **Adolescence Passage, 9 to 17**: Focus on more substantive participation
- **Adulthood Rite, 18 to 39**: Focus on parenting, responsibility for mentoring, apprenticing younger members
- **Middle-Age Rite, 40 to 59**: Focus on taking on critical responsibilities of leadership and mentoring younger members of community
- **Elevation to Eldership Rite, 60 to 70**: Special authority privileges, obligations, and responsibilities; wise counsel for the community
- **Physical Death**: Funeral, home-going services, legacy

These are examples of the stages of development and expectations of the community member. The purpose of the Maleness to Manhood Transformation Model is to facilitate these stages of growth for young men.

**Figure 18. Young Men Using Computer Lab at the Local Church**
Transformation Model Core Domains

Perkins (1989) states that during adolescence, all young men are undergoing an important stage in their social development. It is a stage that begins to prepare young men for adulthood. During this period, the Male to Manhood Transformation Model activities will help young men become responsible, caring adults. Perkins outlines the following core components for individual development and transformation:

- **Manhood Training:** A person does not become a man simply because of his age and physical development. Becoming a man is an educational process that can best be learned by emulating men who have become positive role models for youth. As the young men grow older, they must follow their parents’ example and the example of other positive men in the community. The Maleness to Manhood Transformation Model (see Appendix) provides manhood training with mentors, offers learning topics, advocates for resources, and encourages and supports youth effort.

- **Spiritual Enrichment:** People of African descent are very spiritual. African Americans generally have deep feelings about religion and having a relationship with God. This means encouraging the desire to do God’s will.

- **Cultural Enrichment:** Young men should have a knowledge and appreciation of their own culture to help them know who they are and in order to appreciate the greatness of Africans and the African-American people. This component also focuses on African-centered thinking to help the youth to understand the multicausal issues surrounding African Americans’ unique problems and solutions.

- **Educational Reinforcement:** Young men should receive help from a counsel of elders, adults, and supportive family members so that they can perform to the best of their ability. The Maleness to Manhood Transformation Model promotes the importance of an education.

- **Financial Management:** If the young men are counseled on how to use money properly, it can help them spend money appropriately. This component also focuses on the dilemma of most African Americans who are economically incarcerated and are totally dependent on European Americans for economic opportunity.

- **Sex Education:** When young men understand its true function and use it properly, it can help them become responsible, caring people.

- **Physical Fitness:** Young men can become productive people if they stay physically fit.

- **Health Maintenance:** Young men must know that eating the correct food is important to helping them become strong, healthy, energetic individuals.

According to Perkins (1989), to develop Black adolescent males, they should know that they are special people who represent the future for all people of African descent. Therefore, it is important that each young man prepares himself today, so he can best meet the challenges he will face tomorrow.
35 Tenets to Manhood

The Maleness to Manhood Transformation Model teaches youth to do the following:

1. Always be true to yourself.
2. Love, appreciate, and believe in yourself and your brothers.
3. Love, appreciate, and respect women.
4. Love, appreciate, and respect others.
5. Serve as a positive role model for youth.
6. Discipline yourself spiritually, mentally, and physically.
7. Minimize material needs, wants, and possessions.
8. Develop character and morality.
10. Labor for family.
11. Master communication.
12. Be proactive.
13. Study your history.
15. Be a problem solver.
16. Develop analytical skills.
17. Treat your mind and body properly.
19. Strive to be a good husband.
20. Strive to be a good father.
22. Generate positive energy.
23. Defend and protect yourself and others.
24. Be conscious of your enemy.
25. Be proud of your heritage and ancestry.
26. Give constructive criticism.
27. Be accountable for your actions.
28. Be loyal to your family.
29. Live by truth.
30. Maintain responsibility in your life.
31. Respect elders.
32. Develop substantial relationships.
33. Be courteous to others.
34. Treat your body like a temple.
35. Work to control your destiny. (Madhubuti, 1990, p. 194)

This transformation process moves from carnal minded to spiritual awakening. The renewal of the mind is a spiritual awakening that gives power over prior situations. When men begin to understand the process of transformation, then they will be able to transform the minds of our youth. This process is about speaking life into our youth—giving a sense of hope to the hopeless, moving from chaos to order, making houses homes, and changing a concept into a model and ideas into reality.

Dr. Akbar’s (1991) Maleness to Manhood Transformation Model addresses specific issues surrounding Black adolescent male development, but it is universal in that its overall purpose is to encourage and guide people to become productive members of their family, community, and society as a whole.

Figure 22. Productive Work
References


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What is the purpose of the weekly Maleness to Manhood Leadership Initiative Sessions?
What is the Point?
The biggest **problems** facing the black community are:

- Black males have the highest school drop-out rates in Pennsylvania...
- ...highest rate of incarceration...
- ...lowest rate of college attendance.
- ...highest rate of unemployment.
- ...highest rate of father absenteeism in the household.
- ...highest rate of negative images and stereotypes.
- ...lowest rate of church attendance.
- ...lowest rate of business ownership.
- ...highest rate of violence.
- ...highest rate of black on Black crime.
The solutions to the problems facing the black community are:

✓ Understanding your situation.
✓ Understand the overall problem.
✓ Ask yourself the question, "Who Am I? Am I Really Who I Think I Am?, and Am I All That I Ought To Be?"
✓ Learn how to surround yourself with good people.
✓ Surround yourself with people who can help you, act as your support system, and who can provide opportunities.
Maleness to Manhood Leadership Initiative

- Understand and assess S.W.O.T.
  - Strengths
  - Weaknesses
  - Opportunities
  - Threats

- Understand the importance of having a plan.
- Understand that this is a sense of urgency.
- Understand that no one is excluded from this dilemma.
Maleness to Manhood believes that with our intervention, we can make a difference.

- We believe that the church can make a difference.
- We believe that the young men can be redirected and positively guided.
- We believe that the black male jail population can be decreased.
- We believe that we can help our young men improve their educational needs.
- We believe that our young men need support, exposure to career opportunities and a vision for the future.
Maleness to Manhood Leadership Initiative

That is the Point!
Dr. McCrary is currently an assistant professor at Western Illinois University teaching in the School of Law Enforcement and Justice Administration. Prior to Western Illinois University, he worked for the Allegheny County Juvenile Court, Community Intensive Supervision Program for 18 years as a program supervisor, where he was responsible for counseling, designing, implementing, and monitoring a progressive treatment program. Other responsibilities included supervision of the probation officers, probation counselors, and drug and alcohol counselors. His responsibilities also included parent training, life skill training, and research in the area of criminal behavior. As a program supervisor, Dr. McCrary collaborated with schools, churches, and community organizations to enable the juvenile court to provide a holistic approach to improving the social developmental needs of delinquent youth.

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Dr. McCrary is also the founder of Maleness to Manhood Inc., a nonprofit, faith-based organization. The purpose of this organization is to improve the educational and social developmental needs of inner-city youth by promoting the importance of an education and designing, implementing, and developing progressive programming for urban youth, particularly African-American males.

Dr. McCrary was also an adjunct professor for Carlow University in Pittsburgh where he taught Introduction to Criminology. He continues to be active in many professional and community organizations.

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Attempted Crimes: A Police Perspective – Poland and the United States

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Introduction

Attempted crimes (as opposed to completed ones) are a very interesting and at the same time very underrated area of criminal law. People usually do not consider the consequences of attempting but not completing a criminal act. We think even fewer people are aware that criminal responsibility for some attempted crimes can be very serious, or that there is any responsibility in the first place. Let us take the classic case of trying to kill someone, not realizing that the victim is already dead. Wouldn’t most people think that there should not be any liability because, after all, “You can’t kill a dead body?” Criminal law’s firm stance on such issues seems to defy logic, although upon further reflection, it certainly fulfills the demand that justice be done by punishing the perpetrator of attempted murder. Of course it is true that you can’t kill a dead body, but the point is that the perpetrator did not know the body was dead, so in his or her mind he or she thought that he or she was killing a human being. Consequently, according to principles of criminal law, the perpetrator must suffer the consequences of his or her attempted crimes because of the person’s mens rea, even though the actus reus of the crime was not completed, which could raise serious questions in the minds of many about whether there is any criminal harm coming from the attempted murder. It is also important to realize that the list of actual reasons crimes cannot be completed is quite long and includes a wide variety of different situations, covering both reasons having to do with human behavior (e.g., the living, intended victim of a murder ducks at the last moment; the intended victim is already dead when the perpetrator tries to murder him or her; the perpetrator shoots at an empty bed; the perpetrator is apprehended by police before the crime can be completed; or somebody warns the intended victim about the intended crime) and reasons that can be described as mechanical malfunction (e.g., no bullet in the intended murder gun, the intended murder gun has a bullet but the gun jams or the trigger does not work, tools being used for the commission of a burglary malfunction, a vehicle being used for the commission of a murder or another crime runs out of gasoline, or the door of a bank is locked making it impossible for the perpetrator to enter the bank and commit bank robbery).

That is the essence of the law of criminal attempt. In this article, we would like to identify and analyze issues surrounding criminal attempts from a police perspective in both Poland and the United States. What issues do criminal attempts raise for police? Let us begin with selected issues from the law of criminal attempt as well as from criminological, criminal law, or criminal justice literature in both countries.
Criminal attempt to commit a crime in Law and Scholarly Literature – Poland (Brief Outline of Some Selected Issues)

Criminal attempt to commit a crime can be understood in two basic ways: (1) according to classical formulas, criminal attempt is “the beginning of crime commission” (poczatek dokonania), and (2) according to broader concepts of attempt, which will be discussed later. The first type started with the French Penal Code of 1810 and was used in a great number of other countries’ penal codes—for example, Belgium (1867), Japan (1880), Russia (1903), Greece (1950), Hungary (1950), and Bulgaria (1951). The essence of the classical formula was that a criminal attempt occurs when the perpetrator has started an action directly constituting one of the essential elements of the intended crime, with his or her will being directed at the whole crime (i.e., at its completion, not just attempting to complete it). Later concepts of criminal attempt included a focus on the subjective part of attempt—the perpetrator’s intent. According to that concept of criminal attempt, what defines attempts is not the behavior of the perpetrator but his or her intent, especially the perpetrator’s conviction in his or her mind that he or she is acting in a way which directly (as opposed to indirectly) leads to the commission of the crime in question—for example, the penal codes of Norway (1902) and Denmark (1930).

According to current Polish substantive criminal law, there are three stages of crime commission: (1) preparation, (2) attempt, and (3) the completion/perpetration of the crime.

1. **Criminal preparation** is the earliest stage of crime commission. It occurs when the perpetrator, with the goal of committing an illegal behavior, undertakes behavior aimed at creating conditions for perpetrating an act which would be aimed directly at committing that illegal behavior (Articles 16 and 1 of the Polish Penal Code of 1997). In order to count as criminal preparation, behaviors described in the code must be undertaken with the goal of committing an illegal act. So, the mental side of the crime is about direct intention aimed at accomplishing that goal.

Preparation to commit a crime can occur in two forms: (1) object-based preparation (forma rzeczowa) and (2) person-based preparation (forma osobowa). Object-based preparation can take the form of obtaining or adapting means, collecting information, or creating a plan of action. The legal provision thus provides a list of examples of the most typical forms of preparation, but it is not an exhaustive list. Other acts can also count as preparation as long as they create conditions for committing an illegal act.

Person-based preparation, on the other hand, is about making an agreement with another person with the goal of perpetrating an illegal act. This can be an agreement between two persons or among more than two persons, and it is about agreeing on the intention to commit a specific crime.

Preparation to commit a crime is a crime only if a law (ustawa) specifically states so (Article 16, Section 2, Polish Penal Code of 1997). This means that the general rule is that preparation is not a crime. Among other cases, preparation is a crime if it is done for the purpose of the following acts: committing an act against the sovereignty of the Republic of Poland (Article 127, Section 2), an
act against a unit of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland (Article 140, Section 3), forgery of documents (Article 270, Section 3), and counterfeiting of currency (Article 310, Section 4).

A perpetrator of a punishable preparation can avoid punishment if he or she voluntarily abandons the preparation, especially by destroying the means/resources that he or she has already collected, or if the person makes it impossible for anybody to use those in the future. In the case of person-based preparation (see above), the person must also undertake significant measures aimed at preventing crime commission (Article 17, Polish Penal Code of 1997).

2. **Criminal attempt** is about the perpetrator, with the intent of committing an illegal act, moving directly toward crime commission with his or her behavior; however, the crime commission does not take place. According to the definition in Article 13, Section 1, of the Polish Penal Code of 1997, criminal attempt has three elements: (1) intent to commit an illegal act, (2) behavior aimed directly at crime commission, and (3) absence of crime commission (completion). In order to determine criminal attempt, the perpetrator’s intent to commit (complete) the crime is necessary. The perpetrator must be implementing his or her intent to commit a specific illegal act which is contained in criminal laws, not simply any illegal act at all. That means that attempt is possible only with regard to intentional crimes (*przestępstwa umyslnie*). Further, the perpetrator’s behavior must be aimed directly at crime commission, which means that the perpetrator must be undertaking such activities which are directly aimed at fulfilling the definition of the particular crime—for example, an attempt to commit burglary must be about the perpetrator at least attempting to overcome a physical obstacle which the perpetrator must overcome in order to have access to the item which he or she intends to steal.

Further, criminal attempt may be either in the form of a maximum attempt (*usilowanie zupełne*) or a less-than-maximum attempt (*usilowanie niezupełne*). The first type is about the perpetrator performing all the steps toward crime commission, but the crime commission does not take place for some reason. For example, the perpetrator shoots at the victim with the intent to kill, but he misses the target. The second type is about situations in which for some reason the perpetrator does not carry out everything that he or she intended to carry out for crime commission. For example, when a third person pushes the gun out of the perpetrator’s hand, thus making it impossible for him or her to shoot at all.

So far, we have been talking about “ordinary criminal attempts” (*usilowanie zwykle*). There is, however, another type, the “doomed attempt” (*usilowanie nieudolne*), in which it is a special type of criminal attempt. In this situation, it is impossible for the attempt to lead to crime commission. As with ordinary attempts, the elements of intent to complete a crime, behavior aimed directly at crime completion, and lack of crime completion must all be present. Unlike with ordinary attempts, a doomed attempt is about behaviors that cannot lead to crime commission/completion, which the attempter does not realize. This impossibility can be caused, for example, by lack of a suitable target—that is, a person intending to commit murder does not realize that the victim is already dead—or because the instruments that the perpetrator is using are somehow
defective or the wrong kind—that is, a person attempting to commit murder shoots but does not realize that the gun has only blank bullets. In order to determine a doomed attempt, a significant mistake in the perpetrator’s mind regarding factual circumstances that are supposed to lead to crime commission must be established.

According to Article 14 of the Polish Penal Code of 1997, punishment for attempted crimes is within the legal boundaries of the punishment that the law states for the completed crime in question. In cases of doomed attempts, the perpetrator is responsible just as he or she would be for the completed crime. The court may apply “extraordinary reduction of punishment” (nadzwyczajne zlagodzenie kary), however, or it can even not impose any punishment at all (odstąpienie od wymierzenia kary). Non-imposition of any criminal punishment results in a lack of criminal record, but it does not remove the criminality of the behavior. According to Cieslak (1994), although it is a sanction, “it is not a punishment because it is precisely about not imposing a punishment” (pp. 466, 471).

Voluntary abandonment of attempt, coupled with prevention of the criminal harm, entitles the perpetrator to be free from punishment (niepodleganie karze). In cases of trying to prevent the criminal harm unsuccessfully, the court may apply extraordinary reduction of punishment.

It is also worth stressing that according to Polish criminal law and relevant criminal law literature, it is possible to attempt not only crimes of action but also crimes of omission. In the case of crimes of omission, it is crucial that the perpetrator be legally obliged to prevent the occurrence of the given harm in question. Such a legal obligation can be based on provisions of legislation, a court verdict, an employment contract or some other types of contract, and even on the so-called “prior behavior of the perpetrator” (Kubicki, 1975, p. 182).

3. **Completion (perpetration)** of a crime is about carrying out all legal elements. In cases of crimes in which criminal harm is one of these elements, it must include such harm as well. Completion of a crime “absorbs” all the earlier stages and, therefore, the perpetrator is responsible only for the completed crime.

**Criminal Attempt to Commit a Crime in Law and Scholarly Literature – United States (Brief Outline of Some Selected Issues)**

In United States law, criminal attempt must of course be viewed, as is the case with so many other concepts of criminal law, from the perspective of state-to-state differences. Literature quite frequently cites provisions from penal codes and other laws from different states, although some state laws are sometimes described as “typical.” Alabama is one such state:

A person is guilty of an attempt to commit a crime if, with the intent to commit a specific offense, he does any overt act towards the commission of such offense. (*Alabama Criminal Code of 1975*, as cited in Samaha, 2008, p. 237)

Samaha (2008) also stresses, among other things, that attempt is a crime of purpose because to attempt means to try and you can’t try to do something without specifically intending it. Therefore, with attempt laws, one does not need to
concern oneself with determining whether the mens rea was purpose, knowledge, recklessness, etc., because “All attempt crimes require purpose to engage in criminal conduct or cause a criminal result” (Samaha, 2008, p. 237). The author also emphasizes the element of failure, which is so crucial to criminal attempts. He calls criminal attempt “probably the best-known failure in criminal law” (p. 235). This is very important because even though other forms of crime commission share some elements with attempts (e.g., both completed and attempted crimes must have both actus reus and mens rea), failure to achieve the desired goal is what very clearly distinguishes attempts from all other forms of crime commission.

Many authors stress some very difficult dilemmas inherent in attempt laws. For example, Brody, Acker, and Logan (2001) put it this way:

Attempt law poses unique line-drawing problems, which can significantly affect whether liability arises. Most important among these is the distinction between “mere preparation” and actual attempt. . . . Because the criminal law is wary of imposing liability for mere bad thoughts, it requires an act of some kind as an external manifestation of the defendant’s mental determination to commit the object crime. However, what kinds of acts, and how close the defendant must come to completing the crime before attempt liability arises, continue to vex the courts. (p. 555)

Indeed, it can safely be said that attempt law is excellent proof that criminal law is “an art, not a science.” There is no “scientific formula” for resolving such dilemmas. Each case must be evaluated on its own, and a decision must be made whether a behavior was “only” preparation or whether it was “already” an attempt. Some cases may be relatively easy to classify—for example, driving to a gun store to buy a weapon for murdering someone (or even actually buying the said weapon) would normally be preparation, not attempt. However, some other scenarios may not be so easy. While most courts agree that looking for a robbery victim (as in “looking for someone to rob” not “looking for a specific Mr. X that the robbers can’t find”) is preparation, not attempt (People v. Rizzo, 1927), what about looking for a specific victim, a specific individual (as opposed to a victim, any victim) with a gun pointed at a crowd of people, ready to shoot the instant the perpetrator sees that particular victim? On one hand, if the victim has not been found yet, one would think it has to be a case of preparation. On the other hand, since the perpetrator has committed “all but the last act” (which in this case is finding the victim), there is nothing else that the perpetrator must do except to pull the trigger. Doesn’t that make it an attempt? We are not aware of any such case actually reaching the court system, but if it does, the court’s verdict and reasoning are going to be very interesting.

According to Wallace and Roberson (2008), every U.S. jurisdiction punishes the crime of attempt. The authors also discuss attempt provisions of the Model Penal Code:

The drafters of the Model Penal Code divide the crime of attempt into two categories: (1) The crime of attempt occurs when the defendant has completed all planned acts but has failed to accomplish the substantive crime, and (2) the crime of attempt occurs when the defendant has not completed all planned acts and for that reason has failed to accomplish the substantive crime. (p. 67)
This seems to be very similar to the Polish law provisions regarding “maximum attempts” versus “less-than-maximum attempts” described earlier.

Gardner and Anderson (2003) describe two very interesting attempt cases. One was a case of attempted murder by omission (not acting). In this case, a mother abandoned her 15-month-old infant. When found, the baby was near death and infested with maggots. Conviction of attempted murder was upheld on appeal (State v. Klafta, 1992, cited in Gardner & Anderson, 2003, p. 64). This is very interesting because it shows that it is possible to attempt crimes of omission, which we believe is not common knowledge.

The other case was very interesting for another reason. The defendant thought the crime had been completed, whereas in fact it was only attempted. The case involved an undercover police officer who was hired as a hitman and participated with the defendant in planning the intended murder. The defendant was then falsely told by the undercover police officer that the murder had taken place. Fortunately for the intended victim, it was a lie. The defendant was convicted of attempted premeditated murder (United States v. Church, 1989, cited in Gardner & Anderson, 2003, p. 64).

**Attempted Crimes from a Police Perspective – Poland**

One of the crucial issues from the perspective of law enforcement is to correctly make the distinction between behaviors which aim at crime commission only indirectly (an overwhelming majority of which are not punishable as crimes because of the fact that preparation to commit a crime is a crime only if a law (ustawa) specifically states so, as was mentioned earlier) and behaviors which aim at crime commission directly. A scholar commenting on the 1969 Penal Code stressed that

Behaviors aimed directly at crime commission take place when, taking into account the perpetrator’s plan and looking at it from the point of observable behavior, one can state that the behavior is the last stage of the action aimed at crime commission. This last stage includes not only action which fulfills exactly the verb description of the crime in the law (for example, “takes property away,” “acquires,” “hurts”) but also those behaviors which directly precede such action. For example, using a skeleton key/passkey trying to open an apartment door is an attempt to commit burglary/larceny, even though the literal “taking away” of someone else’s property has not started yet. (Swida, 1975, p. 230)

Swida (1975) concludes by saying, “To recap: the code [of 1969 – added by EP] in its Article 11, constructs attempts both on offender-related grounds ‘Whoever, with the intent to commit an illegal act . . . ’ and on offense-related grounds by requiring that the intent be demonstrated in the physical world, but not through any behavior but only through such behavior which directly aims at the commission of the illegal act” (p. 230). The view that the directness of behavior is assessed both from an objective point and from the subjective point of the perpetrator’s state of mind is commonly accepted also with regard to current laws (see Marek, 1997, p. 188).
The Supreme Court of Poland has spoken on the issue of attempts versus preparations a number of times, basing its decisions largely on factual determination by police of direct behavior by perpetrators, thus establishing that their behavior was past the stage of preparation and entered the stage of attempt. In its verdict of January 22, 1985 (sygn. IV KR 336/84 published in OSNKW 1985, nr 9-10, poz. 71), the Supreme Court expressed the following principle:

Arriving at a house with the intention of committing a robbery against a specific person living in the house—according to a plan that was made before—and with tools for the commission of the crime, followed by abandonment of the implementation of the plan for reasons out of the perpetrator’s control, exceeds the boundaries of preparatory action and constitutes behavior which is directly aimed at implementing the intent.

This verdict has met different assessments in scholarly literature, both positive and critical.

In late 2006, Poland’s Supreme Court handed down a verdict in an interesting case. The defendant had acquired some controlled substances and then had made steps to get ready to give the substances to another person. The Supreme Court declared that these actions were still within preparation for the crime described in Article 59 of the Law of July 29, 2005, concerning counteracting drug addiction (Dz.U. Nr. 179, poz. 1485); in other words, the Supreme Court stated that the behaviors did not meet the requirements of directness (bezposredniosc), which is a necessary condition for a behavior to constitute a criminal attempt (verdict of December 5, 2006, III KK 273/06, Orzecznictwo Sadu Najwyzszego w Sprawach Karnych 2006, poz. 2358). With this verdict, the Court thus stated that the behaviors still remain within the area of preparation for giving the substances to another person and that such preparation is not a crime. Thorough police work in this case regarding what had actually happened very likely contributed to the Supreme Court being able to formulate its unambiguous decision, thus refusing to follow the prosecutor’s charges of an attempt to commit the crime. This view by the Supreme Court has also found wide acceptance in scholarly literature (see Bojarski, Michalska-Warias, Piorkowska-Flieger, & Szewczyk, 2008, p. 54).

Bojarski et al. (2008) share another example of the importance of police work:

A perpetrator’s behavior should be considered as being direct not only when the pickpocket thief actually takes somebody else’s wallet in his/her hand, but also when he/she only puts his/her hand into somebody else’s pocket or travel bag. The touching of the object of the theft should always be regarded as behavior aimed at crime commission directly, despite the fact that the act of “taking the property away” has not begun yet. (p. 54)

In addition, from conversations conducted by one of us (EP) with Polish police officers, one of the biggest conclusions is that good knowledge of the environments of pickpocket thieves, coupled with appropriate tactical-technical measures, can lead to the apprehension of pickpocket thieves “red-handed,” which can consequently lead to charges of at least attempted theft. This is significant insofar as pickpocket thieves, after emptying their victims’ wallets, usually get rid of them very quickly, which can often make it impossible to apprehend them and charge
them with theft. One of us (EP) had actually experienced something similar in Budapest (while taking part in a Criminology Congress in 1993) when, after having done some grocery shopping, he came back to the hotel and discovered somebody else’s wallet, containing only a few coins, in his plastic grocery-store bag. Tracing the facts back in time, EP concluded that the pickpocket thief or thieves must have stolen the wallet from one of the passengers on a crowded street car in which EP had been traveling, after which the thief must have dropped the wallet into EP’s plastic bag (EP had not been paying much attention to the bag because the items inside were not valuable).

In Polish scholarly criminal law literature, there are different possible theories of when a theft is regarded as just having taken place. Theories vary depending on how far the perpetrator has gone in the process of committing the theft. The current Polish Penal Code of 1997 (as was the previous one of 1969) is based on the “theory of taking permanent control of the property” (teoria zawładniecia), according to which the perpetrator’s act of stealing property for the purpose of keeping it as his or her own (przywłaszczenie) takes place at the precise moment the perpetrator takes full and real control over the property (faktyczne władztwo) (see Marek & Peczeniuk, 1985, pp. 54-55). Currently, however, scholarly literature indicates that the “theory of taking permanent control of the property” may generate doubts as to the essence of taking control of somebody else’s property. According to Tyszkiewicz (2006), taking permanent control over property manifests itself in placing the property in a place over which the perpetrator has full control. This includes placing the item in a pocket of the clothing the perpetrator is wearing; in his or her briefcase, desk, or closet at his or her workplace; and the like. However, there was no taking permanent control over the property (which also means there is no commission of the theft) in a situation where perpetrators of a burglary of a warehouse carried the merchandise from the warehouse into its courtyard but then abandoned the whole plan upon seeing somebody else before they had a chance to load the merchandise onto their truck. According to Tyszkiewicz, if they had succeeded in loading the items onto the truck, they would have taken permanent control of the property, and thus they would have committed the crime. But because the perpetrators did not succeed in loading it onto the truck, they are responsible only for attempted theft (pp. 49-50).

Attempted Crimes from a Police Perspective – United States

Policing literature reveals no concern for attempted crimes. That is indeed one of the reasons for writing this article—to address an area which we think is not recognized, although it certainly deserves recognition. The reason we say so is that it is obvious from our review of these issues so far that attempted crimes are a very serious problem, moreover one that is plagued by misconceptions, the biggest of which is the classic “What’s the harm if he hasn’t actually killed her?” question. Despite the lack of professional literature on the topic, we would like to try to identify several ways in which attempted crimes are relevant to police work. Two ways in which we’ll do this are (1) by looking at some court cases involving attempted crimes from a police perspective, and (2) by sharing our thoughts on the topic based on an interview with an experienced police officer in the United States:
In State v. Harrell (811 So.2d 1015 [La. App., 2002], as cited in Samaha, 2008, p. 239), defendant Thaddeus Harrell was arrested by Deputy Joseph Ortego when the officer responded to a disturbance call and after Harrell told the officer that he had just “beat up his old lady.” After handcuffing the defendant, Deputy Ortego went into the apartment and discovered the victim lying in a large pool of blood, unconscious but breathing. The legal question was, “Was Harrell guilty of attempted murder?” The court answered that question in the positive, primarily because the severity of the victim’s injuries demonstrated the defendant’s specific intent to kill. Importantly, from a police perspective, although Harrell “testified that he never intended to kill his wife, his specific intent to kill can be inferred from his actions and the extent and severity of the victim’s injuries” (Samaha, 2008, p. 239). We think that from a police standpoint, it is clear that at least two rules may be formulated:

1. **Upon initial contact with law enforcement, either during or immediately after the commission of a crime, suspects may come up with their own versions of what happened (e.g., “I beat up my old lady”), which frequently grossly underestimate what really happened from a legal standpoint. In this case, the defendant apparently thought he had committed only an assault whereas in fact it was attempted murder (unless he really did know it was attempted murder but was “acting stupid” in front of the officer). However, not every case is like that because some suspects demonstrate their knowledge of law and admit it openly in front of police, which is not very “smart” of them from the perspective of their interest in staying out of prison because it definitely sheds a light on their mens rea. In Young v. State (493 A.2d 352 [Md. 1985], as cited in Samaha, 2008, p. 244), defendant Young, upon apprehension for attempted armed robbery, asked the police officer, “How much time could you get for attempted bank robbery?” In this case, the defendant realized that attempted bank robberies are illegal, but we think that there is a good portion of offenders who do not necessarily realize the full scope of criminalization of attempts. In fact, we believe there is a good chance that criminalization of acts like attempted murder does not have to be common knowledge among the general population, not to mention criminal suspects or defendants. Having said that, the lack of that knowledge cannot be used as a defense because “ignorance of law is no excuse” of course.

2. **Going back to the Harrell case, it has an element that we believe makes it very relevant to police officers. Although the defendant testified that he had never intended to kill his wife, his specific intent to kill can be inferred from his actions and the extent and severity of the victim’s injuries. Here is the way we believe this is not just relevant but also important to police: Even though determination of guilt or innocence is in the hands of courts of law, not police officers (especially in countries like the United States and Poland that embrace the presumption of innocence), we think it is vital that police be properly educated on laws of attempted crimes in order to be able to infer a defendant’s intent from his or her actions as well as factors such as the extent and severity of the victim’s injuries. We think this is especially important in police work for at least two reasons: (1) police are the “front line of the criminal justice system,” coming in contact with crime the soonest of all agents of the system, thus having an obvious advantage of
being at the scene of a crime “fresh” after it happened or was supposed to have happened; and (2) unfortunately, as we will see soon, there may be a number of serious problems with the legal system’s accurate and proper perception of attempted crimes.

Further, from a police perspective, attempted crimes create their own very special problems and dilemmas. In People v. Terrell (459 N.E.2d 1337 [Ill. 1984], as cited in Brody et al., 2001, p. 563), the defendant, armed with a gun, was hiding behind a service station about to commit an armed robbery. Upon seeing a police officer, he started running away. About 15 minutes after he was initially observed, the defendant was discovered by police hiding in weeds. He had removed his shirt and was lying on it. A black nylon stocking with a knot in the end of it was found in his pocket. Although he claimed that he was going to the gas station to buy cigarettes, there was no money on him. The defendant claimed that the State’s evidence is insufficient to establish the two essential elements of the offense of attempt. Unfortunately for him, however, the court found that “the facts and circumstances of this case are sufficient to prove that the defendant possessed the requisite intent to commit a specific armed robbery and that he took a substantial step toward the commission of that armed robbery.” The defendant did not deny the presence of “some” criminal intent, but he maintained that the evidence failed to “imply a design to commit an armed robbery at the station.” He also suggested a list of alternative targets and offenses, including the crime of burglary. The court found the argument “unpersuasive” because it is “unreasonable” to expect a trier of fact to infer intent to commit burglary rather than armed robbery given the suspect was seen carrying a loaded revolver and in possession of a nylon stocking but no burglary tools. We believe the case is also of crucial importance to police because it raises a dilemma for police officers that was made very clear in the court’s opinion:

When defining “attempt” it becomes problematic deciding when to allow the police to intervene in an unfolding course of criminal conduct. While caution must be exercised to avoid punishment for inconclusive acts, prevention of an intended crime is necessary. . . . It should not be necessary to subject victims to face to face confrontation with a lethal weapon in order to make a positive finding of the essential element of a substantial step.” (People v. Terrell [459 N.E.2d 1337 (Ill. 1984)], as cited in Brody et al., 2001, p. 564, emphasis added)

This dilemma facing police officers in situations of possible attempted crimes is something that, we believe, is seriously underestimated. In fact, as we already stated, we couldn’t find anything published on the topic of police dealing with attempted crimes. Certainly, punishment for “inconclusive acts” is not something that society would think is proper or desired. But how do we determine when an act is “inconclusive”? It is not an easy question given the literally millions of possible life situations, coupled with a whole range of police officer profiles that covers vastly different amounts of variables like job experience, powers of observation, the skill of making right conclusions, the ability to predict human behavior, and judgment skills. So, if we place punishment for inconclusive acts at one end of the spectrum, at the other end, we have the danger of unnecessarily exposing victims to “face to face
confrontation with a lethal weapon.” That would be even worse than punishment for inconclusive acts because it could easily be deadly for totally innocent victims. What right does a police officer have to expose an innocent victim to that? But let’s please remember that officers are not lawyers or psychologists but human beings with, frequently, a high school diploma and some police training, having to make split-second decisions which society not just expects but demands be perfect judgment in every case. No exceptions will be tolerated!

2. In summer 2008, one of us (WC) interviewed a very experienced officer from a municipal police department somewhere in the United States. We want to completely protect the anonymity of the officer; therefore, we are going to say nothing more about him or her. We are perfectly aware that one should not draw conclusions based on data from just one respondent; however, we want to share this with our readers because what we were told by him or her was based on his or her real police experience rather than on anecdotes, and also because we believe there is no reason to think that our interviewee somehow deviates from an overwhelming majority of his or her counterparts among U.S. police. A third reason we want to share this is that the officer him- or herself made some remarks that would indicate that he or she was generalizing to other municipal police officers.

Here, then, are the main points of what the officer said:

• This officer has had some experience with dealing with attempted crimes, although they are not very frequent. The officer once apprehended a person attempting to steal an item of somebody’s property while being in the process of getting close to a vehicle with which the offender was planning to take the item away. On another occasion, the officer was involved in a case of attempted bank robbery for which the defendant received a sentence of multiple years in a state penitentiary.

• Prosecutors frequently are quite hesitant or reluctant to pursue cases of attempted crimes for two reasons: (1) It is frequently not easy to prove intent to commit a crime without the actual completion of the crime, which is a discouraging factor for prosecutors; and (2) Prosecutors may regard attempted crimes as not serious enough to warrant prosecution, even though the law may regard them as serious.

• In addition to prosecutors, police themselves may be reluctant to act in cases of attempted crimes because they do not want to harm their reputations when a case is dismissed. The interviewee also stated that such situations are bad for police morale. The officer added that another reason for reluctance to act is that in attempt cases, defense attorneys deny any attempt and also because decisions to arrest or not to arrest must be based not just on what law says about attempted crimes but also on departmental policy and the realities of the court system.

Conclusions
Initially, this was supposed to be a comparative study between Poland and the U.S., but it quickly became apparent that we do not have enough information on attempted crimes from a police perspective to enable us to do such a comparison.
The reason for that is the general lack of concern for attempted crimes in professional policing literature in either country. There is no doubt that there is an urgent need to examine these issues in an empirical way—for example, by replicating, both in Poland and the U.S., the idea of the interview that was conducted with the U.S. police officer for purposes of this article. We think that results of such a study, especially their comparative aspect, would be most enlightening. We hope this article will turn out to be a first step toward this. Let it therefore constitute a call to criminologists and law enforcement in both countries, and perhaps even beyond them, to focus attention on this very interesting and challenging aspect of criminal law as it impacts law enforcement. There is no doubt in our minds that attempted crimes are not just useful and interesting to study, but they also pose a number of difficult challenges that come from their peculiar nature—for example, the very essence of attempted crimes seems to defy logic. After all, what's the harm if the crime was not done? In the minds of many, there may be no difference between criminal attempts and mere thinking about committing a crime. The criminality of the first and the noncriminality of the latter may not be as obvious to the general population as it is to criminologists or lawyers. We therefore believe that when it comes to society at large, this area of criminal law is not just underestimated, but it is also full of misconceptions which are to a great extent based on people’s ignorance of what the laws of attempt are. All these factors mean that that much more attention must be directed toward attempted crimes. They are not only very different from “regular” crimes, but they are also very real, they may be very serious, and they are popularly misunderstood. On the seriousness issue, while it is true that attempted crimes are not as serious as completed crimes within the same crime (e.g., a completed murder is definitely a more serious crime than an attempted murder), this does not hold when comparisons are made across different crimes. An attempted murder will always be much more serious than a completed theft of $1,000 or even $10,000. To the average person without much knowledge of criminal law, the harm in the latter case seems real and tangible, whereas in the former case, it seems “fuzzy” because, after all, the intended victim survived and “is OK.” We must continuously explain to the general population that the attempted murderer (and the intended victim, of course) was extremely lucky in the failure to complete the crime; however, because the attempted murderer did everything in his or her power for the murder to take place, and because in his or her mind there was FULL INTENT to murder the victim, the person MUST be brought to justice even though, luckily, the crime was not completed. We believe the problem here is for society to realize that “harm” may be very serious even though it is invisible. Until this issue is properly understood by the population at large, attempted crimes will continue to be dismissed as trivial and definitely not serious enough to warrant anybody’s attention. Such an outcome would be an extremely serious injustice to those persons who were, and will be in the future, lucky enough to escape somebody’s criminal scheme because of a “stroke of luck.” It is also an issue of morality. “Luck” should NOT determine whether somebody will be brought to justice or not. To let an attempted murderer go scott-free would therefore be an extremely immoral outcome, one that should cause outrage in any society.

References


Bioterrorism Preparedness: 
Preparedness in the Local Government – 
Case Study of Springfield, Illinois 

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Introduction 
This study is devoted to an analysis of interviews and findings on the City of Springfield’s level of preparedness in case of bioterrorism attack. Most of the interviewees had the same, or similar, answers because bioterrorism training is coordinated by the state and federal governments uniformly at the local government level. Interestingly, with follow-up questions, more confidential information came out of the interviews along with a plea for anonymity. First, the analysis provides the overall findings of the interviews of the ten departments. Second, since the City of Springfield is the focus, the findings’ focus is on the three city departments which are known as the first responders. Third, the City of Springfield will be evaluated using the standard and ideal model of preparedness known as the Domino Effect Model.

The Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this study is to examine a local government’s preparedness after 9/11 to counter bioterrorism through effective response plans and new changes implemented to gain public confidence. The local government specifically chosen for this study is Springfield, Illinois. The research question becomes “Is the City of Springfield prepared to meet a bioterrorist attack in a timely, effective, and efficient manner in an emergency situation?” Ancillary questions are “What constitutes preparedness at the local level?” and “How does the City of Springfield respond and utilize the resources of the state and federal governments?” 

In order to be effectively prepared and to minimize damage, bioterrorism preparedness includes and demands cooperation from the general public, private sector (for-profit and not-for-profit organizations), and public agencies. This synchronized process of effective preparedness among the three levels of government and cooperation with private organizations is known as the Domino Effect Model. This study will evaluate the three levels of cooperation in preparedness against terrorism.

Evaluating the City of Springfield’s preparedness for bioterrorist attacks in light of September 11, 2001, is an essential part of this study. The conceptual framework for this research centers on Springfield’s preparedness to counter biological terrorism. This study will be focusing on the cooperation of local government with the state and federal levels of government to access resources in order to respond to any unexpected massive emergency. Effective cooperation of the three levels can trigger the Domino Effect Model through the Incident Command System (ICS).
Significance of the Study

This study will contribute and add value to the existing knowledge because, to the best of my knowledge, limited research has been conducted in smaller cities. Evaluating the first responders’ dependency on the state and federal governments due to lack of enough resources or no funding is considered to be an issue of preparedness. From another perspective, the interdependency of local, state, and federal governments is also a signal of unity, strength, and availability of resource contribution from all sides. The “We must work together approach” explained by the Domino Effect Model demands all three parties to act and respond simultaneously with efficiency and effectiveness in an emergency situation. To prepare for any emergency crisis (biological or otherwise) is a duty given to everybody in the nation, including the general public.

Preparing against bioterrorism has been one of the top issues among politicians, elected officials at all levels of government, and the general public. However, not too many people know the logistics and how the local government could be prepared in case of disaster. The recent interest in bioterrorism preparedness among the three levels of government has stimulated different drills among organizations without the involvement of the public at large. This being the case, this study could be beneficial to the local government because it will accomplish the following:

- Raise awareness of the threat
- Respond to an incident of mass destruction efficiently
- Emphasize the importance of the ICS and the network
- Raise the awareness for developing police, firefighter, and volunteer training
- Develop public health readiness to provide services
- Remind and urge local government as to the need to educate the public
- Provide the local government with the incentive to be prepared
- Examine the local government’s strengths and weaknesses
- Provide recommendations as to what needs to be done in order to be prepared

This study makes the local government cognizant of what it needs to know. It can serve as an independent needs analysis guide for first responders to see what is missing and needed to prepare the united forces to combat bioterrorism. Further, the study will address the dependency, interdependency, and the cooperation of the three levels of government to address preparedness to prevent any attack.

The Methodology of the Study

This study applies a qualitative method to reach a qualified conclusion. Informational data was gathered through personal interviews with city and state officials, each scheduled to last at least two hours initially. The participants represented ten different organizations (N = 10). Data were collected and analyzed from participants who have major roles in preparedness and who are active participants in the event of bioterrorism attacks.

The interviews with the local and state officials addressed the threat of the bioterrorism challenge, communication with the public, prevention, and response to epidemics. Local preparedness and the effectiveness to protect the public were measured based on availability of resources and effective crisis and consequence
management. The city partners and major role players in emergency preparedness who were interviewed represented the following departments: Illinois Emergency Management Agency, Illinois State Police, Springfield City Firefighters, Springfield City Police, Springfield City Public Health, Illinois Department of Public Health (Environmental) with the cooperation of the Illinois Environmental Protection Agency, Illinois Department of Public Health (Bioterrorism), Illinois Department of Transportation, local hospitals, and Sangamon County Public Health.

The departments/agencies above were selected based on their contribution and responsibility for bioterrorism response preparedness. The interviewees in this study were the most qualified or the highest ranking agency official charged with bioterrorism preparedness. The interviews were voluntary, and all individual and departmental names are kept confidential. A number was assigned to each individual and department as an identifier to maintain confidentiality.

Primarily, interviews were conducted with ten administrators from these ten departments/agencies from the City of Springfield and the State of Illinois. Consequently, the degree of preparedness for the local jurisdiction could not be equated to that of the State of Illinois or the United States of America. The research design was limited to show only the level of preparedness of the local jurisdiction.

Interview results were analyzed based on the expert opinion as to how well the local jurisdiction was prepared for such attacks. Overall, the local preparedness was measured by the ability to respond in a timely and effective manner to save and protect a jurisdiction made up of 115,000 residents.

Interview questions were sent to each participant to prepare them for the face-to-face interview. Their responses and comments remain confidential unless permission was given to cite their names and comments. All questions were asked with attention being paid to follow-up questions and clarifications.

The departments/agencies have different responsibilities such as medication distribution, traffic control, transportation of hazardous materials, and other related duties. The main responsibility of these partners in times of crisis is to have an organized and effective plan in place to save lives and minimize damage.

**Questionnaire**

This study utilized a questionnaire adopted from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). The questionnaire addressed the threats of bioterrorism, communication with the public, prevention, and preparedness for epidemics. Some questions were modified from the CDC’s (2002) *Local Public Health Preparedness and Preparedness Capacity Inventory*. These questions were modified to specifically fit the City of Springfield’s needs in addressing its preparedness. This was useful to the researcher in examining the preparedness of the public health administrators in their jurisdictions. Questions were addressed to the public officials, and their answers were compiled to see if preparedness translates to readiness against bioterrorism. There were criteria built in for all of the questions. Each criterion of preparedness related to the evaluation of one, two, or more questions. Interview questions were assigned to the criteria, with numbers assigned to the questions.
This relationship of the questions to the criteria assisted the researcher in assessing the City of Springfield’s preparedness against any bioterrorism attack.

Pilot interviews were conducted and feedback was collected from public health employees and academicians. The objective of the pilot study was to validate the interview questionnaire, using people who are knowledgeable in the subject of preparedness. Feedback will be used to revise the interview questionnaire and data collection methods.

The researcher chose the City of Springfield as a local jurisdiction because it is the capital of Illinois. Second, the city is widely visible and professionally diversified. Being the capital city, there are many different public offices and private organizations located there.

Limitations of the Study

The data sources are professionals—experts and people who work in the area of bioterrorism in the private, local, and state levels. Due to security reasons, the information gathered from the interviewees is limited and is not privileged to any citizen. This may cause some difficulties in obtaining complete and correct information for certain questions.

The subject is very sensitive, and some areas may not be disclosed to the public. Officials who are in positions of responsibility may not talk freely or reveal information as needed to the inquiry. This may have the effect of limiting knowledge-sharing for security reasons. However, the end result will address, as thoroughly as possible, whether the city is ready to prevent an attack and protect its citizens if bioterrorism is threatened or occurs in the city.

Analysis of the Interviews

The interview questions were made up of seven parts: (1) Demographics, (2) Preparedness Planning and Readiness Assessment, (3) Terrorism Preparedness and Response Planning, (4) Strategic National Stockpile (SNS) Preparedness, (5) Surveillance and Epidemiology Capacity, (6) Health Alert Network/Communication and Information Technology, and (7) Education and Training.

Below are the summarized findings of the bioterrorism interview questions of the ten selected local and state departments/agencies.

Part I. Demographics

Below are the summarized findings of the bioterrorism interview questions of ten selected local and state departments/agencies.

The ten departments/agencies interviewed are made of one county department, one private organization, three city departments, and five state departments. The population of the jurisdictions reported in this assessment ranges from 115,000 to 12.5 million people. Employees in these departments range from 61 to 6,200. The total department budget ranges from $3.7 million to $5 billion. The private organization reports to the Chief Executive Officer (CEO); and the county and city departments report to the local health board or City Council officials and the
Mayor. All the state departments report to the highest official of the department/agency appointed by the Governor, Director, or Secretary.

The departments/agencies’ participation and networking with other state-based assessments such as the Illinois Project for Local Assessment of Need (IPLAN) has been good (two out of three). The networking is excellent; all of the departments/agencies network with each other.

Part II. Preparedness Planning and Readiness Assessment

Strategic Direction, Assessment, and Coordination

Only two out of ten interviewed departments/agencies have an emergency plan for vaccination, mass distribution of medicine, and identifying first response. Four out of ten of the departments/agencies are required to have one or more of the following staff: nurse, health practitioner, a veterinarian, Emergency Medical Technician (EMT), and a person trained in infectious diseases. All ten departments/agencies have gone through HAZMAT training. The hazardous condition training is classified as hot (dangerous) and cold (normal). This needs to be a high priority in learning how to operate safely and is provided to all of the departments/agencies through training and practice.

During the last 12-month period (during the time of the interviews), the departments/agencies used and tested their emergency response plan. This emergency response plan addresses bioterrorism. The ten departments/agencies provided updates to high-level policymakers and elected officials on their progress toward goals in the community plan to improve public health. The departments/agencies sponsor and participate in jurisdiction-wide conferences. Workshops for emergency preparedness are conducted to bring together partners and stakeholders.

All ten of the departments/agencies were involved in sponsoring risk communication in time of emergency crises. Managers (top and middle) were involved in leadership management, and emergency management in the regional, state, and national arenas most of the time.

All ten departments/agencies identified legal counsel who would be available during emergencies to advise the department/agency on legal matters pertaining to public health.

The departments/agencies were questioned on ten different activities of strategic emergency preparedness. Four of them had perfect scores of activities, ten out of ten; another four had nine out of ten; one had eight out of ten; and another one had seven out of ten activities of emergency preparedness. The average of strategic emergency preparedness and the follow-up planning process was nine out of ten among all departments/agencies.

The departments/agencies formalized working relationships with each organization for the purpose of emergency response in the area of a Formal Written Agreement, Informal Written Agreement, and Health Alert Network Partner
Agreement. Out of the ten departments, all ten had at least two out of the three agreements. The three agreements are defined as follows:

- **Formal Written Agreement**: The department and the organization both sign a written jurisdiction-wide/multidepartment emergency response plan that shows their roles and responsibilities.
- **Informal Written Agreement**: The department and the organization agree to collaborate for emergency response, but the agreement is informal with roles and responsibilities not clearly defined in writing.
- **Health Alert Network Partner**: The department considers the organization a partner in its health alert network and ensures that the organization receives future “alerts.”

### Part III. Terrorism Preparedness and Response Planning

All ten of the departments/agencies have staff members assigned to each role and responsibility of the Emergency Response Coordinator (ERC). The departmental jurisdictions have formal arrangements with other jurisdictions to respond as a region (multicity, multicounty, city-county) in emergencies. The departments/agencies (city, county, and other state departments) submitted a joint plan to the leading department, the Illinois Department of Public Health (IDPH).

IDPH’s Emergency Response Plan is integrated in three ways: (1) jurisdiction emergency response plan, (2) regional emergency response plan, and (3) state public health department emergency response plan. Four out of the ten departments/agencies have integrated only two of the emergency response plans. The remaining have integrated all three.

IDPH only assesses hospital readiness for emergency response through hospitals and their representatives in emergency response exercises and through the state public health department emergency response plan. These are done through other departments/agencies working closely with hospitals in areas of infectious disease, emergency, decontamination, and other factors which need immediate attention.

The issues addressed in the city’s public health department emergency response plan, in other sections/annexes of the jurisdiction/regional emergency response plan, and referenced in the state public health department emergency response plan are as follows:

- Plan activation and link to Emergency Operations Center (EOC)
- Public health and medical coordination
- Surge capacity
- Protection of environment
- Personnel and provisions
- Recovery

The IDPH’s plan activation, its link to the EOC, and public health and medical coordination are stronger and better prepared than the surge capacity protection of the environment, personnel and provisions, and recovery.
The present status of the IDPH’s directory of emergency contact information is in paper form only; electronic directories consistent with information technology function and specifications are available.

The ten departments/agencies have performed the following exercises over the past 12 months:

• Conducted tabletop exercises with individuals and organizations that have response roles
• Conducted functional exercises with individuals and organizations that have response roles
• Corrected deficiencies in the emergency response plan based on knowledge gained from these evaluations
• Convened jointly at least once with community response partners to update the emergency response plan, even if no emergency occurred to warrant review

Most of the departments/agencies prepare their own strategic emergency processes. However, sometimes the duties are specialized and done by different groups rather than by a specific agency. The following three items are the responsibilities of other departments:

1. Formulate a community plan that describes action steps to reach goals.
2. Disseminate the plan among public health partners.
3. Establish how often the community plan will be reviewed and updated.

Part IV. Strategic National Stockpile (SNS) Preparedness

The IDPH is only responsible for prophylaxis. Two out of ten (the city and the county public health departments) could assist and participate in the process with the cooperation of hospitals and clinics in the area that have management strategies for implementation of mass vaccinations, prophylaxis, and treatment distribution or administration directly and indirectly. Only three, excluding the local and state government, have the ability to vaccinate or distribute antibiotics around the clock to the entire population within their jurisdiction in three to five days. The departments/agencies have exercised these management strategies for implementation of mass vaccinations, prophylaxis, and treatment distribution or administration during the flu season. In addition, the departments/agencies have the ability to vaccinate or distribute antibiotics around the clock to the needy population within almost one day. Cooperation with the surrounding cities is identified by shift and is open 24 hours a day. The plan divides cities and counties into quadrants using the two major highways (55 and 72). The two highways are used as “X” and “Y” axes. Help is sent based on the location of the quadrants from the nearest center of distribution.

Part V. Surveillance and Epidemiology Capacity

The hospitals in the jurisdiction most consistently comply with IDPH rules and regulations. The urgent care facilities in the jurisdiction consistently comply with IDPH Rules and Regulations for Control of Communicable Disease with regard to communicable disease reporting. The survey indicated that one out of ten strongly agree with urgent care compliance, seven out of ten agree, one disagrees, and one doesn’t know. In regards to whether the physicians in the jurisdiction
consistently and mostly comply with IDPH Rules and Regulations for Control of Communicable Disease with regard to communicable disease reporting, out of the ten departments/agencies interviewed, three strongly agree, six agree, and one disagrees that the hospitals are compliant.

Part VI. Health Alert Network/Communication and Information Technology

During working and nonworking hours, the best/preferred method for the departments/agencies to receive important information from IDPH about significant or potential communicable disease situations is mostly via telephone. In addition, all ten departments/agencies have a mechanism for public notification in case of a catastrophic public health event as well as the capacity to disseminate information quickly (within two hours) to local healthcare providers.

There are different ways of alerting and informing the public—for example, the use of media (two radios), 911 system, use of mobile RV communication, and a county emergency management office and dispatch number ([217] 753-6666).

Part VII. Education and Training

All of the departments/agencies made an effort to train the people who are involved in bioterrorism preparedness. Training has been rated one of the top strengths of the departments/agencies.

One out of the ten is solely responsible for identification of a threat through surveillance, confinement of illness, adherence to response protocol, providing service to the community, and evaluating the whole process. These and other functions that protect the public are not new to one or two of the departments/agencies; they are the infrastructure of the public health system, and this is what they have been doing for a long time. The three public health departments, overall, feel prepared for a bioterrorism attack. The administrators of these departments feel well-prepared based on their HAZMAT training, public health bioterrorism preparedness, entire department awareness preparedness, and training in explosives.

The City of Springfield

The City of Springfield has a population of 115,000. The city’s bioterrorism preparedness depends primarily on the readiness of the city public health, fire, and police departments. The three department officials are appointed by and report to the mayor and the elected aldermen. The mayor is strong and has power; however, his power is shared and diluted by the eight aldermen who are officially elected by the city residents. In most decisionmaking, the mayor has to have the approval of the aldermen. This balance of power between the mayor and the aldermen ensures that there is equal representation for the city’s different socioeconomic classes and demographics.

The City of Springfield has fewer resources compared to the county and the state. However, bioterrorism preparedness asks for tremendous cooperation, networking, and sharing of resources at all levels and at all times. The city takes tremendous advantage of this relationship to utilize the resources available in the county and the state to prevent bioterrorism. In any event, asking for assistance and getting
it from the county and state, and maybe even from the federal government in the name of preparedness, seems most assuring.

The city’s public health, fire, and police departments play lead roles in safety and preparedness. The ongoing communication and exercises are the only confidence-boosting signs of how well prepared the city may be against a bioterrorism attack.

The city public health department uses vaccinating the public for influenza as an exercise and emergency procedure, handling the event as it would if it were a terrorist incident. The fire department’s use of dummies for role playing in a simulated exercise replicating an emergency procedure in responding to a terrorist incident is one way to prepare. The city police, even with their limited numbers, are expected to assist in traffic control by directing traffic and securing areas where law and order is needed. Volunteers will also be trained to help law enforcement officers in the city, county, and state in case of any bioterrorism attack.

The City of Springfield’s preparedness is solely based on its surrounding partners, and they receive aid from the county and the state. The model applied here is the Domino Effect Model. This model explains that the reaction of the city, county, and state, including the federal government, needs to be instantaneous when an emergency occurs. In this scenario, if an attack occurred in the City of Springfield, then the county, state, and the federal departments/agencies must respond immediately. First responders need to perform their duties systematically in the same way that state and federal responders would in order to protect and save lives.

The city departments participated in programs that supplemented their internal training exercise: Mobilizing for Action through Planning and Partnerships (MAPP), National Public Health Performance Standards Program (NPHPSP), and other state-based assessments. Locally, the city has a networking relationship with other city entities such as local healthcare providers, with county agencies, with state agencies, with their federal government counterparts, with the private sector, with not-for-profit organizations, and directly and indirectly with public volunteers.

The city departments had exercise drills and an emergency response plan to test the city preparedness in the areas of planning, readiness, assessment, strategic direction, and coordination. The city departments have tested their emergency response plan sometime during the last 12-month period.

The City of Springfield has an emergency response plan in place which addresses bioterrorism. The city’s activities are geared toward strategic emergency preparedness planning and include identifying and engaging stakeholders, using data to identify health problems and gaps therein, setting improvement goals, formulating a community plan that describes action steps to reach goals, disseminating the plan among public health partners, evaluating effectiveness, recommending changes to action steps if they have proven ineffective, and establishing how often the community plan will be reviewed and updated. In addition, the city updates high-level policymakers and elected officials on progress toward goals in the community’s plan to improve public health.

The most critical aspect of emergency response preparedness is establishing relationships among public health system partners. The city formalizes working
relationships with each organization for the purpose of emergency response through its departments. These can be Formal Written Agreements. The city’s public health emergency response plan is integrated with the jurisdiction emergency plan, regional emergency response plan, and the state public health department emergency response plan. Not only that, the city, through its departments, assesses hospital readiness for emergency response through collaboration with state and federal partners (e.g., Health Resources Services Administration) charged with assessing readiness. These activities address the public health emergency response plan addressed in other sections/annexes of the jurisdiction/regional emergency response plan and referenced in the public health plan such as plan activation and link to the EOC, public health and medical coordination, surge capacity, protection of environment, personnel and provisions, and recovery.

In the past 12 months, the city, through its public health, fire, and police departments, conducted tabletop exercises, participated in drills, coordinated a flu vaccination with individuals and organizations that have response roles, conducted a functional exercise(s) with individuals and organizations that have response roles, participated in regional exercise(s) conducted by federal departments, responded to a public health emergency (e.g., chemical spill, bio-release, suspicious letter), corrected deficiencies in the emergency response plan based on knowledge gained from these evaluations, and convened jointly at least once with community response partners to update the emergency response plan, even though no emergency occurred to warrant more frequent review.

City Public Health

The city public health department has 61 full-time, 1 part-time, and 5 contractual employees. The city public health budget is $3.7 million. This department reports to the local board of health and the City Council. The department participates in an ongoing preparedness effort with the local, state, and federal areas. The city networking relationships with others such as the local healthcare providers; county, state, and federal government; private sector, not-for-profit organizations, hospitals, and laboratories; and volunteers is well-established. This strategy is backed up by the city plan, the larger jurisdiction/regional plan (with other collaborators), and the ICS.

The city public health department, through the community readiness initiative, which is sponsored by the CDC and the Department of Justice (DOJ), has participated in and practiced the Strategic National Stockpile (SNS) plan, forensic epidemiology, tabletop exercises (all involved parties discuss how to respond), and drills (real exercises) such as mobilizing flu vaccinations in the city. It is a fact that the city public health department located in four to five locations could vaccinate 1,000 people per hour. In case of an emergency, the city public health department will vaccinate 120,000 people, five thousand more in 12 hours. The city public health department is organized using new technology called the Geographic Information System (GIS), which displays the city photo to do mapping, cases, and patterns. Food security summits are conducted, security measures are discussed, and training for involved parties is performed in case of any food poisoning. In the city public health department, top and middle managers are involved in leadership and emergency management roles at the regional, state, or national levels. The city has the full cooperation of the U.S. Attorney General, Illinois Terrorism Task Force,
the National Guard, State Police, and Law Enforcement Intelligence, and it meets monthly to discuss issues pertaining to bioterrorism preparedness.

The city public health department has multiple systems in place to communicate effectively with stakeholders and the public at large. They have a system called the Illinois Public Health Mutual Aid System (IPHMAS). This system is made up of different public health organizations. The city public health department outlined the drop areas, distribution locations, and plan for prophylaxis and vaccination. In case of an emergency, the city public health department uses media, 911 services, TV-channel 18 (which belongs to the city), and HAM radio (home amateur) to disseminate its message.

The city public health department has trained volunteers as Emergency Medical Technicians (EMTs) in case of an emergency to help in assisting with medical procedures. These volunteers are on call 24/7 as first-line responders. The city public health department has electronic directories consistent with information technology functionality and specifications such as fax, telephone, e-mail, and pager.

City Fire Department

The city fire department has equal or better training than the public health and police departments. It also has a larger jurisdiction. The population of its jurisdiction is more than the population of the city. The city is made up of small, unincorporated areas which increase the population served by the fire department by 20,000 to 130,000. The fire department has 230 full-time employees and one part-time employee. Its budget is $19 million.

The city fire department’s networking relationship with other entities is much larger than the other two departments. The fire department is networked to all state borders. It has its own local emergency planning committee and has the capacity of MAPP and other state-based assessments such as a HAZMAT team, technical rescue team, action guide flip chart, and standard operating guidelines.

The city fire department created a Community Emergency Response Team (CERT) that is made up of volunteers who aid and assist in case of emergency side-by-side with firefighters. The department is also involved in the Mutual Aid Box Alarm System (MABAS), which is a formal agreement with another 90 members to come to each other’s rescue.

City Police Department

The city police department reports to the mayor and city council. The city police have limited duties in rescue and medical practice and more in securing areas, protecting the public, crowd control, directing traffic, and other law enforcement duties. The population of the police jurisdiction is equal to that of the public health department, which is about 111,454. The department has 318 full-time employees and has a budget of $24 million.

The police department also has volunteers known as the Civilian Emergency Response Team (CERT). The CERT volunteers have training classes twice a year. In case of emergency, these volunteers perform routine jobs such as traffic control,
paperwork, runners, and other jobs which free the police to do more serious jobs that cannot be handled by volunteers. The police have a well-established system called the Illinois Law Enforcement Alarm System (ILEAS), which can be used to inform the population of any dangerous or emergency situation.

The city police sponsor and participate in jurisdiction-wide conferences and workshops for emergency preparedness that bring together partners and stakeholders for training. Following the Russian school incident in September 2004, the police sponsored training to schools for emergency situations and training about bioterrorism.

Summary

This study can be summarized as follows: Using the Domino Effect Model as a theoretical standard, it will be demonstrated that the City of Springfield has its Incident Command System (ICS) in place. The hospitals in the area also have Hospital Emergency Incident Command Systems (HEICS) for guidance and direction. The city has done all the necessary training and participated in drills, including traditional educational methods for instilling skills through teleconferencing, working with patients or mock victims, performing tabletop exercises, working through computer simulations, and practicing disaster drills. Dr. Green and his colleagues at Johns Hopkins are developing a set of data collection tools on how to evaluate and assess a disaster drill. So far, there is no methodology or standard to evaluate the effectiveness of a drill. No matter how much the city practices drills, however, it does not guarantee a successful response for any emergency.

It is debatable whether the city is fully prepared for disaster; however, areas of strength and weakness have been uncovered.

Strengths

- **Dissemination of Information:** The City of Springfield has regional linkages to disseminate information to all partners through different systems—radio, telephone, fax, and television, among others. The dissemination of information does not guarantee resources in a timely fashion.

- **Bioterrorism Planning and Structure:** The city fully developed and has in place a program against bioterrorism attack. However, this planning and its ensuing structure do not mean that in a time of emergency the plan will be executed efficiently.

- **Training and Exercise:** The city has trained its managers and others involved in preparedness and has been involved in many preparations of different forms.

- **Information Systems:** The city has a well-developed information technology system that is a vital part of preparedness. Fortunately, in the last four years, the federal government has helped cities by way of generous funds to upgrade and buy more computers for their information systems with the focus on bioterrorism preparedness.

- **Laboratories:** The city has access to state-of-the-art laboratories. It can send any suspicious materials for testing to the state laboratories at any given time.
Weaknesses

- **Triage, Diagnosis, and Treatment**: The City of Springfield has no strong plan in place and, to say the least, has no control or say over the hospitals that deal with and prepare for these concerns and any future planning for them. The Illinois emergency doctors reported that the state is not prepared against any bioterrorism attack because doctors are leaving the state due to outrageous malpractice insurance citations. The city has no authority nor does it have the financial resources to assist in hospitals addressing triage, diagnosis, and treatment in the case of a large-scale emergency. IDPH regulates the healthcare industry, but how hospitals should practice and how much they spend are not up to IDPH. Only hospitals have full responsibility for how much to prepare and how much they can spend.

- **Infection Control**: Infection control has been a great concern, and special facilities are not yet available from the hospital’s or city’s perspective. There is a lack of trained doctors in the area of anthrax-bioterrorism and related biological weapons of mass destruction (WMD). A make-up day shift has been the most talked about alternative in case of high casualties. Still, there is little preparation in this area to make this possible in case of attacks. There is no clear direction on how to deal with decontamination and isolation because the city has no authority or responsibility for dealing with these issues. The responsibilities for cooperation and coordination of hospital and healthcare employees are given to other state agencies and not to the city. These issues explain the limitation of the city in regard to resources that include human, financial, and expert decisionmaking. The city is also limited in the important areas of public health surveillance due to budget constraints and staff shortages.

- **Prophylaxis and Mass Immunization**: Lack of immunization capabilities and prophylaxis has been the main concern of most of the ten departments/agencies that were interviewed. The City of Springfield is highly dependent on other state departments for filling this need in case of emergency. The least the city can do is to address these and many other issues through its public relations office to inform the city’s residents of what they realistically can expect. The dialogue may assist in preventing false hope and avoiding broken communications.

Meeting the Criteria

The City of Springfield has strong management and leadership in place to provide most of the assistance needed by the public in order to minimize the pain and suffering of victims. However, the Homeland Security office is understaffed and needs more resources. The existence of the ICS is highly effective in prevention, preparation, response, or recovery in emergency attacks. Each of the first-response departments have strong incidence commands.

The most successful way to fight a terrorism attack is to prevent it from occurring. The city has most of the needed plans in place, but it does not have the ownership or authority to execute those plans in case of emergency. The city’s dependency on other state departments for prophylaxis, security, transportation, laboratories, and available emergency rooms for victims make it less effective. The success of a local government’s strategy is built on all the different departments having working
plans in place and relationships that are synchronized internally to respond quickly and effectively in case of emergency. The abundance of funds from the federal government created united forces for preparation. Participating in drills and planning may not lead to success in the outcome of preparedness, however. Some problems already are creeping in which defy thorough preparedness. The first responders not being vaccinated is a big blow to response preparedness in case of chemical or biological attacks.

Local or city governments need assistance from external sources (e.g., private, public, state, and federal) to fight terrorism effectively. There is adequate support from the external sources but not to the fullest extent. As indicated above, the lack of prophylaxis is a great concern. From the city perspective, there is little in the way of an outreach program to inform the public so that they may be involved in an educated way in case of attack. Even so, training of special task forces in the public health, fire, and police departments in the city has been done to the best level possible, and this makes prevention, investigation, and response much easier in the fight against bioterrorism.

There are cooperation, coordination, and communication systems in place between the private, public, and not-for-profit organizations that make things easier to facilitate in times of crisis. This does not mean the public is aware of the different communications or that the private and not-for-profit organizations are involved and brought into the prevention activities in a way they are expected to perform. Assistance from state and federal governments in the form of funds, personnel, equipment, and medicine is declining, and some of the funds provided were appropriated to other support duties and equipment such as computers, which are necessary in order to survive a bioterrorist attack in a local government.

It takes strong networking to facilitate making difficult tasks easier to accomplish through availability of enough resources and human power. Trained personnel and volunteers make assistance readily available and cause fewer shortfalls in service to the public. In the event of a real disaster, this may not be true due to human nature and the tendency for people to want to stay in their own jurisdictions rather than going to assist others. Fear, emotion, chaos, and other psychological factors play a big role in determining how people function in times of emergency. Not only that, but more trained doctors and other medical allies, the right equipment that could serve against WMDs, and good decisions by trained medical healthcare officials need to be readied for response. Educating the public in case of emergency in regards to what they need to know, when to do what, and how to act and react is essential to make them more prepared, calmer, and ready for action.

The city needs a stockpile of medication stored and readily available in case of emergency to avoid shortages and to save lives. The ICS can lead and facilitate operations to effectively enable prevention, preparedness, and response and recovery.

As mentioned, based on the criteria set, the City of Springfield failed to meet the basic requirement of prevention and readiness. Frankly speaking, there is no such thing as 100% preparedness. In the meantime, there is no proven method that can stop terrorism from occurring either. One thing we know, though, is that there is a great probability of minimizing and reducing terrorist acts from happening in any city by
using surveillance, public education, trained volunteers, and through the deployment of special forces that deal with terrorist activities and their collaborators.

It is a very misleading statement to say that any city in the United States is ready or prepared to respond to any terrorist attack or any large natural disaster such as we observed in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina in Louisiana. Bioterrorism preparedness is collective, not individual. In case of attack, the unified forces of the local, state, and federal governments, including for-profit and not-for-profit organizations, should come together to respond as one. In theory, this may sound doable, but practically speaking, due to financial concerns, resource availability, or lack of commitment of the for-profit or not-for-profit organizations, the probability for acting as one is complicated at best.

The city may not have all the resources, but a well-organized plan and shared resources with the state and federal governments are the only hope to be more prepared in case of disaster. At a certain point, the preparedness of the city can be enhanced if city government educates the residents in exactly what they need to do based on what, when, where, and how in case of catastrophic disaster. Educating the public and securing major infrastructure such as the City Water Light and Power plant are good plans. Other facilities where masses of people can gather need to be protected at all times. Training enough volunteers and working and sharing resources with nearby cities and counties would be sufficient to prepare for an unpredicted attack, which may never happen in our lifetime. Spending millions of dollars for something that may never happen is not a prudent investment. According to the FBI, there are 120 terrorist-targeted cities in the United States out of thousands. In Illinois, Chicago is the only targeted city. The argument here is for not preparing or spending money in prevention; still, we need to make smart investments and strategic economical decisions rather than investing in something that may never occur. The hospitals are not investing in preparedness because they think that this type of emergency may not occur and is not a wise investment. However, they are smart enough to still plan for such a contingency.

By now, we know how well-prepared we are if we have to respond to a disaster. The whole issue of preparedness was compromised by the natural disaster in New Orleans, however. There was enough warning to the public and all levels of government. The failure of all responsible parties to respond in time doomed the effort even within 86 hours of the warning. The question here is “Even though we knew about it and all parties were duly informed, what happened to the emergency response plan?” Another challenging question is “If we failed to respond to an event we knew was coming, how can we be prepared for something we do not know is coming?” That is the mystery of bioterrorism and terrorism.

**Conclusion**

According to the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) (2005) study, 80% of small cities with a population under 300,000 are not prepared against a major disaster. The lack of preparedness is attributed to fewer resources and lack of cooperation, surveillance, treatment capacity, and funding.

So far, preparedness is complicated and needs more organization and coordination because there are so many parties involved. In regards to the local jurisdiction,
the problem is likely the same as it is at the state and federal levels. The local jurisdiction requires coordination internally and externally. Internally, coordination is needed between the local department of public health, the fire marshal, and the local police. Externally, coordination is required between the state and federal governments, and the private sector (for-profit and not-for-profit) organizations such as hospitals and clinics. The involvement of so many departments may complicate the ability to operate smoothly and effectively. In the long run, the massive involvement of different departments from the local, state, and federal government levels may be beneficial to coordinate any response from anywhere. But at present, emergency management presents a big challenge because, based on the subdivisions in organizations of preparedness, some jurisdictions lack the capability to assist and accommodate victims in disasters they may face.

The main research question in the interview was if the City of Springfield is ready to protect its population or prepared to respond in case of any terrorist attack. One public health administrator responded saying that “Public health has been prepared for many years; most public health departments will respond adequately and effectively because we have been trained and prepared for years to respond effectively.” As a public health agency, he added, “We have participated in disaster emergencies many times, responding to emergencies and dealing with large disasters. It is true that the experience gained in the past from more conventional disasters—earthquakes, floods, and wind storms, for example—is the foundation of bioterrorism readiness.” Even so, although most public health departments do have the experience and expertise to respond to large disasters, they still require additional knowledge, skills, and resources to be prepared for bioterrorist attacks.

Based on the parameters set to evaluate the city’s preparedness and the outcome of the interviews from the city officials, the result is unanimously in favor of readiness— theoretically rather than practically. The 34 interview questions, divided into six parts for preparedness analyses demonstrate how well the city has prepared. According to Ralph Caldwell, who plays a double role as the Director of Homeland Security and Assistant Police Chief for the City of Springfield, “We are ready.” In his interview with the State Journal-Register (2005), Mr. Caldwell points to a combination of recent large-scale terrorism drills—preparation for the opening of the Abraham Lincoln Presidential Museum and homeland matters of the city in general—to verify his statement that Springfield is prepared. The drills occurred in July 2005, consisting of 40 departments. Drills included live scenarios, from holding hostages, having bomb threats, and responding to explosives. These mock-up situations provided the police, fire, emergency, hospital, school, public health, public works, and other departments/agencies a chance to practice their response to any large-scale emergency. Further, all relevant departments/agencies of the city came together in April 2005 for the opening of the Abraham Lincoln Presidential Museum and President Bush’s visit to Springfield. This opportunity demonstrated the readiness and strengthened confidence in the first responders in Springfield and their ability to respond collectively and effectively in case of a terrorist attack. Communication problems uncovered through the drills were reformulated and resolved during the five-day drill.

The emergency response plan has thus been tested in the areas of strategic direction, assessment, and coordination. Preparedness planning and readiness
assessment showed that departments have an emergency response plan for the main three first responders: public health, fire, and police. These emergency plans address bioterrorism and have established relationships with 40 departments/agencies among public health system partners and have secured the commitment of high-level policymakers.

The city sponsored or participated in jurisdiction-wide conferences and workshops for emergency preparedness that brought partners together. These forums included leadership management training for middle and top managers. The city also identified legal counsel who will be available during emergencies to advise each department on legal matters pertaining to public health.

Administrators utilizing staff, budget, and the emergency response plan claim they are fully ready to respond to terrorism. The city has an ERC on staff, with all that position’s requisite responsibilities. The response team has jurisdiction and formal arrangements with other entities to respond as a region (multicity, multicounty, and city-county) during emergencies. The city’s public health emergency response plan is integrated with the city and state departments. The city assesses hospital readiness for emergency response by coordinating with the state public health department and the two large hospitals in the city. Constant communication is available through multiple media outlets such as a radio, electronic technology, and emergency communications using the 911 emergency numbers for immediate responses.

In the past 12 months, the city has conducted a tabletop exercise(s), conducted a functional exercise(s) with individuals and organizations, and participated in a regional exercise(s) conducted by state and federal departments. These emergency exercises provided an opportunity to correct deficiencies in the emergency response plan based on knowledge gained from the evaluation of these exercises. Further, the city convened jointly at least once with community response partners to update the emergency response plan through the tornado that hit Springfield in March 2005.

The city arranged strategies and implemented mass vaccinations, prophylaxes, and treatment distribution for flu in 2004. The city successfully administrated the SNS Preparedness plan. It has the ability to vaccinate or distribute antibiotics around the clock to the entire population in one day less than the recommended time line of three to five days. The city formulated out the surveillance and epidemiology capacity with the hospitals in the jurisdiction. Hospitals have a mobilization plan to accommodate patients through the hospital’s network for locating space in any hospital. If this is inadequate, there is a back-up plan to implement a make-up shift to assist a large number of patients. This healthcare service consistently complies with IDPH Rules and Regulations for Control of Communicable Disease with regard to communicable disease reporting. Communication and information during working hours is available in the best/preferred method for receiving messages via pager, fax, telephone, and e-mail. The city, overall, has the capacity to disseminate information quickly (within less than two hours) to local healthcare providers. The city’s education and training are well-respected among managers and staff.

The city is continuously planning for and revisiting the issue of bioterrorism preparedness. The key components in preparedness are an Incident Command System (ICS), system integration, logistics, security, clinical care, human resources,
and public relations. The interviewed officials rated the city’s preparedness in case of bioterrorism attack as slightly less than five on a scale of one to five, with one being the lowest and five the highest.

The city has a well-organized ICS in the three first responder departments—(1) public health, (2) fire, and (3) police. The three departments have specialized duties in conjunction with other departments to fulfill most of the procedures needed to provide guidance during an emergency disaster. There is a well-organized communication system in place to allow all the partners to react expeditiously to mobilize resources in case of emergency. Logistics are in place with departments for planning, supplying resources, transporting patients, and providing medical care. The city and state police mainly provide security and allow the plan to operate smoothly. The hospital provides the necessary emergency medical care and activates the network system for additional assistance such as space and high-level care. The city has trained medical technicians and police assistants in case of shortages in human resources. Information will be disseminated, and the public will be made aware through radio and public access television in case of any high-level emergency disaster.

This study found that Springfield, Illinois, has done more to prepare than most cities in the State of Illinois. However, excessive preparedness may not constitute readiness. Springfield is a special city. Being a historic city and the state capital makes Springfield one of the favored cities. The preparedness became easy as resources became available, coupled with a commitment to prevent terrorist attack in the capital city. First, there is extensive support from legislative bodies. Second, all the state departments are housed in Springfield. Thus, it is easy to provide all the resources, logistics, and funds to make the city potentially prepared.

The results of this research may benefit the city, state, and federal governments in maximizing security against bioterrorism. All departments in the healthcare sector will benefit from this research; they can glean from this study information about preparedness efforts, comparing their own efforts to those of their counterparts. The greatest beneficiary of this study is the public who needs protection, demands security, and seeks safety against any harm, including danger from bioterrorism.

The results of this research address the general interests of the public, which are safety and protection of lives from unnecessary pain, suffering, and death. The main topics in the research speak to those concerns in a way that public administrators can understand and implement in the event of an emergency.

The departments interviewed are assigned to and classified as local, city, and state government entities responding to any emergency, especially terrorist attack. The departments are carefully selected based on their responsibilities and active participation in assisting in the prevention of any future terrorist attack or an expected natural or unnatural disaster. Most of the departments interviewed consisted of city, state, federal, and private groups that are designated by the mayor, legislators, or governor of the state to be involved. To be a designated department requires having one or more functions to perform in any given disaster with a heightened awareness of the need for synchronization with other departments.
Findings

Terrorism preparedness requires all stakeholders to be involved actively and equally in times of emergency. If there is a terrorist attack, local, state, and federal agencies must react simultaneously as one. In December 2005, the Commission, made up of five democrats and five republicans, gave terrible news to the public. On its final report card, it said that we are “safer” now after 9/11 but we are not as “safe” as we need to be. The report card showed failing grades in safety and preparedness. The 9/11 Commission made 41 recommendations for preventing and fighting terrorism.

Based on the study conducted and the results of the research cited here, Springfield is NOT prepared to respond effectively and efficiently if there were a bioterrorism attack. First, it is not practical that a city could be prepared by itself; rather, city preparedness needs to be built on the Domino Effect Model. This model involves the preparedness of the local, state, and federal entities collectively, including private sectors. There is no such thing as one department or level of government being prepared and the other departments being less prepared. Preparedness must be 100% equal for all parties that are involved in saving lives through the expertise of their specialties and their readiness to respond.

In the United States, 120 cities are cited as being susceptible to terrorist attack. In Illinois, Chicago is the only targeted city, yet Springfield has spent hard-to-come-by money in preparation for a bioterrorist attack. The question here is, “Is it necessary to spend so much money when the city is not on the targeted list?” Second, “Is the City of Springfield ready to fight against any attack?” The answer to the first question is “Yes. Saving lives is priceless!” In regards to the second question, based on the Domino Effect Model, assessing preparedness is collective, not individual. The city is not ready, and the lack of preparedness is assessed based on the following facts:

- The city cannot be ready without the full preparedness of its other allies in case of emergency. The localities, along with the state and federal entities, have to deliver needed resources immediately during any large emergencies. The city does not have the ability nor enough resources to respond to a bioterrorism attack by itself.

- The study also identified the cooperation of local, state, and federal entities as key to all preparedness. However, the poor report card of the 9/11 Commission and the poor response to the Hurricane Katrina disaster in New Orleans, Mississippi, Alabama, and Texas made our readiness doubtful. Any city alone cannot do all the necessary work without assistance from nearby localities, and the state and federal governments.

- The Domino Effect Model is about the process of work in action by local, state, and federal governments in responding as one, simultaneously and immediately. Springfield’s preparedness is dependent on the county, state, and federal departments/agencies to react and respond effectively. The city is also dependent on various state departments and private and not-for-profit healthcare organizations to carry out a successful response.
• The city hospitals do not have practical space (e.g., enough emergency rooms), equipment, or medical personnel to deal with a high-level disaster such as that of the 9/11 incident. There is low incentive for any hospital in any city not targeted by terrorists to prepare for something that may not definitely occur in the future. There is a shortage of doctors trained to deal with bioterrorism emergencies, and the inventory of specialty medical equipment (e.g., ventilators) leaves much to be desired.

• Preparedness is based on the cooperation and coordination of all local resources—city to city or county to county. In certain bioterrorism incidents, it may not be wise for other cities to send resources to assist. A good example is in the case of the anthrax threat where if it spread in one city, the nearby cities may fear that they will be next and will need to protect themselves. Sharing and cooperation are hindered in such situations.

• The hospitals in the jurisdiction consistently and strongly comply with IDPH Rules and Regulations for Control of Communicable Disease with regard to communicable disease reporting. “In compliance” does not necessarily mean preparedness. There is little incentive for hospitals to invest in preparedness against bioterrorism because nobody knows the predictability of such an event. The timing, duration, and magnitude of an occurrence are big parts of a puzzle that are altogether unknown. Without that knowledge, it is questionable how preparation can be totally adequate. For those targeted cities that are more vulnerable, preparedness will make the difference between life and death, and it makes a lot of sense to get ready.

• The lack of information sharing has been a problem locally and nationally. Individuals involved in bioterrorism preparedness are reluctant to share information with their colleagues at the same level. The 9/11 Commission stressed that there is a lack of communication between firefighters and the police. Sadly, the Commission reported that there is no improvement in information sharing between the CIA and FBI, not to mention the lack of security and scrutiny in airports. At the city level, there was tension and lack of cooperation between the city public health department and the county public health department, which was an unhealthy situation when it comes to approaching a response that requires cooperation in working together.

• First responders are a critical part of preparedness. Springfield’s first responders are not vaccinated. Additionally, the lack of prophylaxis in the state is an issue which jeopardizes the whole process of preparedness. The first rule of saving lives is to protect your own to save others. In this scenario, it is very difficult for first responders from different departments to react to save others’ lives without first being protected themselves. This failure to prepare the first responders puts the city in the category of “unprepared” to respond to any kind of high-level emergency, including bioterrorism.

• Funds for bioterrorism have started scaling down for small cities. More funds are directed to large cities that are more vulnerable. Neither the City of Springfield nor the State of Illinois has enough money to spend on bioterrorism preparedness.
• The city’s Homeland Security Director splits his time between the Homeland Security office and his duties as Assistant Police Chief for the City of Springfield. This demonstrates limited fiscal support and a lack of commitment on the part of the city in not having a full-time director to plan and prepare against any disaster that may occur.

• Successful preparedness is indicated by how well the citizens are trained to prepare, cooperate, and respond in case of any emergency crisis. The city has little or no training for citizens on how to deal with bioterrorism or even where to go to get help in case of an emergency. Lack of education and training resulted in much confusion after 9/11 when people started buying unnecessary items to protect themselves against a biological attack. Preparedness is not complete unless city residents have training and education about what to do, where to go, and what to look for if faced with an emergency situation.

• The Incident Command System is the main command and control authority for each department in its response to an emergency. This defines the role of the city’s responsibility to others to get resources from all participants in times of disaster. The unhealthy political relationship between the city public health department and the county public health department has been an obstacle to the ICS; it is a nightmare even to think about in the event an actual emergency occurs. After completion of the interviews for this study, the city and the county public health departments combined under the county’s jurisdiction.

• Systemwide integration of communication capabilities within the ten departments/agencies interviewed in this study has not been clearly defined. The city’s response functions with healthcare organizations are not clearly identified, and assurance of their availability is questionable. The city lacks the authority to advise the healthcare system what to do, and this makes it more difficult for the city to plan, prepare, and respond to any disaster, especially a bioterrorism attack. The hospitals need to work with the city to develop an integrated community response that includes all the different governmental departments and defines their roles and responsibilities for cooperation in case of disaster. The hospitals have no financial incentive for investing in preparedness, nor do they have the time and resources to invest in preparing for an incident that may never occur. For the City of Springfield, fortunately, a terrorist disaster incident is unlikely, especially since it is not a targeted city.

• In the realm of human resources, the city has not trained enough medical assistants nor made efforts to train more volunteers in case of a large disaster. This shortage of trained human resources may contribute to and create chaos in emergency situations.

• How well prepared we could be, given the natural elements of psychological and emotional preparedness, plays a big role in the readiness factor. Drills and repeated training may help people to do their best in an environment full of casualties, injuries, death, and fear. Public relations efforts may be a way to put people at ease in time of fear and confusion. At present, the public relations element of the city, particularly in regards to a possible bioterrorism attack, has done little to prepare or inform citizens. Not having a strong public relations
office may contribute to the disarray in any public crisis if response is not in place for direct action.

**Recommendations**

- The city must vaccinate all first responders to act and assist in time of emergency, especially with bioterrorism-related incidents.
- The city must have prophylaxis ready and stored at all times.
- The city should train volunteers in different areas (e.g., medical technicians, police assistants, and helpers) ahead of time for a period of crisis.
- The city should exert enough energy and devote time to train the public about catastrophic disasters such as bioterrorism. Involving the public in surveillance through training and education is the most effective and efficient way of preparing, preventing, and detecting terrorist acts.
- The city should participate in decisionmaking and have a good working relationship with the healthcare community, especially with clinics and hospitals in the area, in order to plan and address issues of safety and preparedness.
- The city should have modern equipment for first responders and develop pools of different resources for times of emergency.
- The city should have a good public relations office and well-staffed personnel in the office of Homeland Security to address solely the threat of bioterrorism and terrorist attack.

**References**


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